Analytical Psychology and German Classical Aesthetics: Goethe, Schiller, and Jung, Volume 1

Analytical Psychology and German Classical Aesthetics: Goethe, Schiller, and Jung, volume 1, *The Development of the Personality* investigates the extent to which analytical psychology draws on concepts found in German classical aesthetics. It aims to place analytical psychology in the German-speaking tradition of Goethe and Schiller, with which Jung was well acquainted.

This volume argues that analytical psychology appropriates many of its central notions from German classical aesthetics, and that, when seen in its intellectual historical context, the true originality of analytical psychology lies in its reformulation of key tenets of German classicism. Although the importance for Jung of German thought in general, and of Goethe and Schiller in particular, has frequently been acknowledged, until now it has never been examined in any detailed or systematic way. Through an analysis of Jung’s reception of Goethe and Schiller, *Analytical Psychology and German Classical Aesthetics* demonstrates the intellectual continuity within analytical psychology and the filiation of ideas from German classical aesthetics to Jungian thought. In this way it suggests that a rereading of analytical psychology in the light of German classical aesthetics offers an intellectually coherent understanding of analytical psychology.

By uncovering the philosophical sources of analytical psychology, this first volume returns Jung’s thought to its core intellectual tradition, in the light of which analytical psychology gains new critical impact and fresh relevance for modern thought. Written in a scholarly yet accessible style, this book will interest students and scholars alike in the areas of analytical psychology, comparative literature, and the history of ideas.

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Analytical Psychology and German Classical Aesthetics: Goethe, Schiller, and Jung

Volume 1

The Development of the Personality

Paul Bishop
For Helen
Often it is the best and most profound ideas in a man’s work which most obstinately resist a clear formulation, even though they are hinted at in various places and should therefore really be ripe enough for a lucid synthesis to be possible.

Jung, *Psychological Types*, §196
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While writing this book and its forthcoming companion volume I have sometimes been prompted to wonder how the subjects of my research – Goethe, Schiller, and Jung – were able, given their manifold commitments, to ‘manage their time’ or develop the appropriate ‘coping strategies’. (To judge by his letter to L.F. Huber of 28 August 1787, there is good reason to regard Schiller as nothing less than the father of ‘time-management’.) But clearly all three knew of the difficulties.

For example, writing in a reflective mood to Charlotte von Stein on the evening of 8 March 1781, Goethe noted that ‘the day disappears like life itself, one does nothing and does not know where the time goes’. Then again, having decided to take up work again on Faust in the summer of 1797, Goethe wrote to Schiller on 1 July 1797, expressing the desire for ‘just one quiet month’, in which his work would be able, ‘to much astonishment and dismay, to grow out of the earth, like a giant family of toadstools’. Later on, in a letter of 27 July 1799, Goethe wrote to Schiller, starting up again his ‘old litany’ to excuse his delayed arrival in Jena, complaining that his tasks were ‘like an octopus’ – ‘when you cut it into a hundred pieces, each single one comes alive again’. Schiller, who himself found writing a struggle and so was constantly amazed at Goethe’s productivity despite all his hindrances, would still have sympathized. For on 5 May 1784 he felt moved to write to W.F.H. von Reinwald: ‘I still carry on with my favourite thought of withdrawing from the world and living, in philosophical peace, for myself, my friends, and a happy wisdom’. On 16 December 1791, in a letter to Jens Baggesen, he wondered what he wouldn’t have given for ‘two or three quiet years’ that he could have dedicated ‘just to study, just to the development of my ideas’. And in his letter to C.W. Hufeland of 16 July 1804, he wrote that ‘to produce something poetic, I must live alone for six to eight months of the year’ – but added that Weimar was still the right place for him to live.

For his part, it seems that Jung was no stranger to a sense of occasional frustration with some of his clients. Jolande Jacobi tells the story of
a long-standing patient who arrived one morning ten minutes late to find that Jung had gone off sailing on the lake. Mr X was furious, immediately hired a boat and instructed the navigator to find Jung as quickly as possible. When they sighted him, Mr X used the equivalent of a loud hailer to bawl at Jung, ‘Where the hell are you? I’ve been waiting at your house.’ Without answering, Jung simply sailed away as fast as he could on a zig-zag course.

As Jacobi tells the story, ‘Mr X gave chase. No sooner did Mr X overtake and confront his quarry than Jung made off again until at last coming up once more within hailing distance Jung shouted: “Go away – you bore me!”’. But Jung could be shrewd, too. Initially reluctant when invited to join a Mediterranean cruise out of a concern for abandoning his patients, Jung then changed his mind. ‘I’ve realized’, he said, ‘that somebody who’s tired and needs a rest, and goes on working all the same, is a fool’. There is evidence, however, of a darker aspect to Jung’s attitudes in an anecdote, related by Baldwin Sawyer, concerning Jung’s response to the invention of the atom bomb. When meeting, in 1948, a scientist who had worked on the Manhattan Project, Jung asked whether the whole earth could be destroyed and was told that it could. ‘Jung sat focused’, so the story goes, ‘having listened closely to each word, absorbing. Suddenly he lifted his hands and smote his left palm with his right fist, saying “Good!” with finality’. In Jung’s terms, such negativity represents the ‘shadow’ aspect of the personality, necessary to give one’s character, it is claimed, proper depth.

Jung had the benefit of a number of assistants to help him with his research, and no one works entirely alone. Or as Schiller put it in his letter to Charlotte von Schimmelmann of 23 November 1800, ‘anything good I have has been planted in me through a small number of excellent people’. So it is a pleasure to acknowledge the help and support I have received when writing this book and its companion volume. Over the last few years in particular I have been able to participate in the AHRB-funded (now AHRC-funded) Research Project, ‘Conceptions of Cultural Studies in Ernst Cassirer’s Philosophy of Symbolic Forms’, out of which these two monographs have, in part, grown. And I have also been able to attend a number of conferences and seminars in different locations (Glasgow, Birmingham, Oxford, London, Munich, Moscow, Pittsburgh, Yale, Texas) on various subjects, including Cassirer, Goethe, Jung, Klages, Thomas Mann, Rilke, and Schiller. All these have offered opportunities to reflect on the rich intellectual tradition of which Jung forms a vital part and to which he properly belongs. My thanks to all those concerned for having invited me to participate in these occasions.

I have also benefited immensely from the privilege of reading, in the original German, various texts by Freud and Jung with our students at Glasgow. Their questions have often encouraged me to try to formulate Jung’s ideas, as
I understand them, more precisely. Equally, I am particularly grateful to my colleagues at the University of Glasgow who have helped to provide an intellectual atmosphere conducive to research. So I should like to thank, first of all, my professorial colleague Roger Stephenson, il miglior fabbro, for our many discussions, both formal – in the context of the M.Phil. programme ‘Modern German Thought’ – and informal, on the topics of Weimar classicism, Nietzsche, Cassirer, and Jung. Then, I am grateful for their help and support to my colleagues in the German Department (now German Section), the Centre for Intercultural Studies, and on the Cassirer Project (among whom, in particular, Hedy Harsem, as well as Bernard Ashbrook); the staff of Glasgow University Library, and especially Graham Whitaker; and, for their administrative and technical assistance during earlier stages of this project, to Roslyn Campbell and Meta Jamison. Among those in the Jungian world or associated with it, Andrew Burniston, Alan Cardew, Gottfried Heuer, Lucy Huskinson, Nick Lewin, Martin Liebscher, Roderick Main, Susan Rowland, Sonu Shamdasani, Leo Schlamm, and David Tacey have provided stimulating conversation, comment, or discussion; and for his support I am particularly grateful to Andrew Samuels. Moreover, I continue to recognize the debt I owe to those who first helped me make sense of Jung: Richard Sheppard, Robert Currie, and the late Anthony Storr. For help with archival and bibliographical information concerning Freud and Jung, I am grateful to Giles Clark, Keith Davies, Waltraud Ernst, Ulrich Hoerni, the late Franz Jung, and Peter Jung. And I should like also to thank my friends David Cowling, Martin Dixon, Karl Leydecker, Patrick McGuinness, Barbara Miller, Kerstin Schneider, Peter-Paul Schneider, Peter Smith, Janet Stewart, and Simon Ward for continuing, after all these years, still to speak to me. Finally, I should like to thank Helen Bridge for reading the drafts of these chapters, for driving me round the Devonshire countryside in search of rabbit-bosses . . . and for everything else.

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Finally, I should like to thank Kate Hawes and her colleagues at Routledge and Psychology Press for their help and support, from initial proposal through to final publication. And I am greatly indebted to Andrea Bevan for the care and thought in her preparation of the index.

This book and its companion volume represent an attempt to revisit, revise, and synthesize a variety of approaches taken to the question of Jung’s
relation to Weimar classicism in the form of a series of journal articles over recent years. So I am grateful to the following editors and publishers for permission to draw on some of this material in its earlier form: to the editor, Albrecht Bergold, for material from ‘Über die Rolle des Ästhetischen in der Tiefenpsychologie: Zur Schillerrezeption in der analytischen Psychologie C.G. Jungs’, *Jahrbuch der Deutschen Schillergesellschaft* 42, 1998, 358–400; to the English Goethe Society, for its original invitation to give a paper to the society in 1999, as well as for material from ‘Intellectual Affinities between Goethe and Jung, with Special Reference to *Faust*’, *Publications of the English Goethe Society* 69, 1999 [2000], 1–19; and to the editor, Gernot Müller, for material from ‘Das Naive und das Sentimentalische in der Weimarer Ästhetik und in dem Persönlichkeitsbegriff der analytischen Psychologie’, *Studia Neophilologica* 71, 1999, 61–71.

**A note on translations**

Where possible I have used the translations of Goethe and of Jung given in the list of abbreviations. On occasions, however, I have amended these translations. Where possible I have used gender-inclusive language, although there are cases where context and euphony have made this undesirable. Reference to these standard editions is also intended to facilitate locating the original German of all passages quoted.
Abbreviations

**Jung**


**Freud**


**Goethe**


The following volumes have been cited:


Cited in the text with volume number plus page reference.

**HA**


**WA**


**Schiller**

**NA**


Where appropriate, German spelling and punctuation have been modernized.
This study in two volumes, of which this is volume 1, aims to complete a series of books, which began with a monograph published in 1995. In *The Dionysian Self* I examined the work of C.G. Jung in the light of his reception of Friedrich Nietzsche, offering the figure of Dionysos as a symbol of the transformation of the self that Jung’s psychology seeks to effect.1 Dionysos, the dying-and-rising god, enacts the *sparagmos* of the self on its path to integration at a higher level, akin to what Jung called the ‘process of individuation’. ‘From that height of joy where human beings feel themselves to be altogether a deified form and a self-justification of nature, down to the joy of healthy peasants and healthy half-human animals’, Nietzsche wrote, ‘this whole, long, tremendous light and colour scale of happiness, the Greeks, not without the grateful shudder of someone who is initiated into a mystery, not without much caution and pious silence, called by the divine name: *Dionysos*.2 So it comes as no surprise, perhaps, that the phoenix-like and protean nature of Dionysos has been linked back to Nietzsche and adopted by the French thinker, Michel Onfray, as the emblem of his philosophy of materialist hedonism.3

Then, in 2000, an investigation of Jung’s concept of synchronicity in the light of his claim to be working in the tradition of Immanuel Kant led me to suggest that a Romantic yearning for ‘intellectual intuition’ might be lurking behind the pseudo-scientificity of Jung’s excursions into the time–space relationship.4 After all, in some respects Jung is no friend of the Enlightenment. In a lecture to the Kulturbund in Vienna in 1932, subsequently published in 1934 as ‘The Development of Personality’, Jung declared that ‘the age of Enlightenment, which stripped human nature and human institutions of gods, overlooked the god of terror who dwells in the human soul’ (CW 17 §302). And in ‘After the Catastrophe’ (1945), he complained that ‘the mere act of enlightenment may have destroyed the spirits of nature, but not the psychic factors corresponding to them’, among which he included suggestibility, lack of criticism, fearfulness, propensity to superstition, and prejudice. In Paracelsus’s time, he wrote, the daimons were in the natural world, ‘frolicking happily’; in the modern world of ‘a lifeless
nature bereft of gods’, these forces have been entirely internalized (CW 10 §431).5

So now, in this book and in its companion volume, I wish to examine Jung’s relationship to Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, to Friedrich von Schiller, and to the ideas of the period with which they are associated, Weimar classicism.6 To do so is a logical extension of those two earlier studies. After all, Nietzsche chose to place Goethe under the sign of Dionysos: ‘what Goethe aspired to’, he tells us, ‘was totality; he strove against the separation of reason, sensuality, feeling, will [. . .]; he disciplined himself to a whole, he created himself . . .’: 

A spirit thus emancipated stands in the midst of the universe with a joyful and trusting fatalism, in the faith that only what is separate and individual may be rejected, that in the totality everything is redeemed and affirmed – he no longer denies . . . But such a faith is the highest of all possible faiths: I have baptised it with the name Dionysos.7

Moreover, in a co-authored book, a colleague and I have explored the filiation of ideas in Nietzsche and Weimar classicism, demonstrating the constitutive function of the aesthetics of Weimar classicism in his philosophy.8 It turns out that another study of the relation between Nietzsche and Weimar classicism, published at the same time but independently written, has likewise concluded that the relationship between Nietzsche and Weimar classicism – the term is used to cover both Schiller’s systematic presentation of aesthetics and Goethe’s manifold theoretical essays, conversations, and fragments (an anticipation, the author argues, of Nietzsche’s own aphoristic, metaphoric philosophy) – is an ‘affirmative’ one.9

The epoch of Weimar classicism belongs to the age of the Enlightenment. Schiller saw himself, at least between 1791 and 1794, as a disciple of Kant, before turning away from the philosopher, a move captured in the famous xenion, ‘Two decades you cost me: for ten years it took me / To understand you; and ten more, to free me from you’ (Zwey Jahrzehende kostest du mir, zehn Jahre verlohr ich / Dich zu begreifen und zehn, mich zu befreyn von dir) (NA 2/i, p. 86).10 Early on in his treatise On the Aesthetic Education of Humankind in a Series of Letters (1795) Schiller admitted that he would ‘not attempt to hide’ that it was ‘for the most part Kantian principles on which the following theses’ were based.11 The recent biography by Rüdiger Safranski has highlighted the status of Schiller as a thinker of the Enlightenment and, indeed, as a ‘founder’ of German Idealism.12 Equally, Goethe engaged with the philosophy of Kant, not least in his short essay ‘Judgment through Intuitive Perception’ (1820),13 and he acknowledged Kant as a source of corroboration for his belief in polarity – a key notion in the works of Jung, of course.14 In his conversation with Johann Peter Eckermann of 11 April 1827, Goethe described Kant as ‘the highest’ of the new philosophers; Schiller
had studied him ‘with great zeal’, and Goethe studied Kant too, ‘and not without profit’. Kant’s doctrines, Goethe claimed, ‘still continue to work, and have penetrated most deeply into our German civilization’.\textsuperscript{15}

For his part, Jung drew constantly and significantly on the work of Goethe and of Schiller, as we shall see. In \textit{Psychological Types} (1921), Jung followed his chapter on Schiller’s ideas on the type problem (chapter 2), a discussion of Schiller’s \textit{On the Aesthetic Education of Humankind} and \textit{On Naive and Sentimental Poetry} (1796), with a chapter on the Nietzschean categories of the Apollonian and the Dionysian (chapter 3). According to Jung, Goethe is an example of the ‘intuitive, extraverted feeling type’, while Schiller represents the ‘intuitive, introverted thinking type’ (CW 6 §148, fn. 47; cf. CW 6 §104); Nietzsche he considers an ‘introverted intuitive type’ (CW 6 §242), although he later refers to him as an ‘introverted thinking type’ (CW 6 §704). Given that Jung classified himself as an ‘introverted thinking type’,\textsuperscript{16} we can see that we could consider him to be typologically aligned at least with Schiller and Nietzsche, and Jung claimed an even more profound affinity with Goethe, as – again – we shall see.

Although this book is written from an intellectual-historical, rather than a clinical, perspective, it seems appropriate to suggest that Jung’s biography may also have something to teach us, as well as his texts. To do so is to adopt Nietzsche’s methodology when teaching ancient philosophy to his students in Basle. In his letter of 16 September 1882 to Lou von Salomé, Nietzsche welcomed her idea of ‘a reduction of philosophical systems to the personal dossiers of their originators’, calling it ‘a thought from a “sibling brain”’. He used to like to tell his audience, he related to Lou: ‘“This system is refuted and dead – but the person behind it cannot be refuted, the person cannot ever be regarded as dead”’ – for example, Plato.\textsuperscript{17} In \textit{Beyond Good and Evil} (1886), Nietzsche wrote that ‘gradually it has become clear’ to him ‘what every great philosophy so far has been: namely, the personal confession of its author and a kind of involuntary and unconscious memoir’.\textsuperscript{18} And in his Preface (1887) to \textit{The Gay Science} (1882), Nietzsche wondered ‘whether, taking a large view, philosophy has not been merely an interpretation of the body and a misunderstanding of the body’, and suggested that ‘what was at stake in all philosophizing hitherto was not at all “truth” but something else – let us say, health, future, growth, power, life’.\textsuperscript{19} Nietzsche’s method underlies the ‘biocentric’ approach adopted by Werner Deubel (1894–1949) in his study of Schiller, in which he sought to reveal the cultural-historical developments at work in the lives of his subject or, as he put it, to uncover the metaphysical behind the biographical (\textit{hinter dem bloß Biographischen das metaphysische Geschehen sichtbar zu machen}).\textsuperscript{20} And, despite Barthes’s structuralist postulate of ‘the death of the author’, extended by Foucault more generally to the postmodern outlook of ‘the death of man’,\textsuperscript{21} there has been a return to the idea that ‘writing takes root in physiology, not ideology’ – just as Diogenes Laertius offered an account of the \textit{lives}, as well as of the \textit{opinions}, of the
eminent philosophers in ancient Greece – in the *contre-histoire* of philosophy currently being outlined by Michel Onfray.22

Precisely the sort of set of anecdotal *aperçus* that Diogenes Laertius used to offer insight into the lives of the early philosophers about which he wrote can be found in the relation of our Goethe, Schiller, and Jung in relation to – wine. In the case of Goethe, the autobiographical work *Poetry and Truth* contains a famous passage which records Goethe’s response to the vintage bottles produced by his mother, dubbed Dame Aya (*Frau Aja*) (the Spanish word for ‘governess’), from the family cellars to assuage the rabid political rhetoric of her son and his friends. ‘She betook herself to her cellar, where the oldest wines were preserved in large well-maintained barrels’ – ‘no less distinguished vintages were there than 1706, 1719, 1726, and 1748’, we learn, ‘carefully tended by herself and rarely tapped, only for occasions of solemn significance’. Then, ‘setting the high-colored wine down in a cut-glass decanter’, Frau Aja would loudly exclaim: ‘“This is the true blood of tyrants! Enjoy it, but all thoughts of murder are unwelcome in my house!”’. And so she would, in Goethe’s words, steer him and his friends ‘into greater moderation and humaneness’.23 The entire complex of wine in Goethe’s writings, from the invocation of Dionysos under his title and aspect of Bromios, ‘the noisy one’, in the early poem ‘Wanderer’s Storm-Song’ (*Wandrers Sturmlied*) (1774),24 to the praise of the grape in the *West-Eastern Divan* (*West-östlicher Divan*) (1819) or in the ‘Chinese-German Times of the Year and the Day’ (*Chinesisch-Deutsche Jahres- und Tageszeiten*) (1830), was examined by L.A. Willoughby in his 1977 Bithell Memorial Lecture.25

In Schiller’s ‘Ode to Joy’, it is precisely wine, and its adjunct symbolism of intoxication, that the poet chooses as emblematic of the subject of his encomium:

*Freude, schöner Götterfunken,*
*Tochter aus Elysium,*
*Wir betreten feuertrunken,*
*Himmliche, dein Heiligtum.* [. . .]

*Freude sprudelt in Pokalen,*
*In der Traube goldnem Blut*
*Trinken Sanftmut Kannibalen*

*Die Verzweiflung Heldenmut.*
*Brüder, fliegt von euren Sitzen,*
*Wenn der volle Römer kreist,*
*Laßt den Schaum zum Himmel* [spritzen:]

**Brightest spark of Heaven’s**
*[bestowing,*
**Daughter of Elysian race,**
*[joy! with ardent rapture glowing,*
**Tread we now thy holy place;*[ . . .]**

**Joy is in the wine-cup sparkling,**
*[in the grape’s rich amber blood;*
**Softness drinks the Savage,**
*[darkling,*
**And Despair new fortitude.*
**Brothers, let the toast be given!**
**When the foaming goblets pass,**
*[Bid the foam mount up to*
*[Heaven –*}
As far as Jung is concerned, there are frequent references in the accounts recorded by observers and associates to his conviviality and his vinosity. According to his student colleague and lifelong friend, Albert Oeri (1875–1950), Jung was a sociable student, known to his drinking companions as ‘the barrel’ (die Walze); he was ‘rarely drunk’, we are told, ‘but when so, noisy’.27 It is also said that Jung impressed Paul and Mary Mellon on their first meeting at a New Haven restaurant when, after ‘the waiter left a bottle of Chianti on their table and went away without opening it’, Jung ‘produced a hunting knife from his pocket, used the corkscrew to open the bottle and poured the wine’.28 And when, in the 1930s and 1940s, Olga Froebe-Kapteyn organized the Eranos conferences at the Casa Gabriella on Lake Maggiore near Ascona in Switzerland – the name, eranos, meaning a meal to which everyone contributes something or a ‘shared feast’, was suggested by Rudolf Otto –29 then Jung’s contribution, apart from some of his most important papers, was his ‘continuous presence and genial spirit’.30 According to Aniela Jaffé, there was on one evening ‘a nocturnal celebration on the terrace of Casa Eranos, which lives on to this day as the legend of “Nekyia”’, involving ‘a great deal of merriment and noise’, which ‘resounded far over the lake’. On this occasion Jung was ‘slightly tipsy’ and ‘thoroughly enjoying himself, encouraging those who were still too sober to pay due homage to Dionysos’; he was ‘here, there, and everywhere, bubbling over with wit, mockery, and drunken spirit’.31 For one woman guest, the evening was, she is recorded as saying, ‘“the nearest I ever came to wicked abandonment in my life”’.32 ‘Only a poet’, Jaffé reflected, could have described ‘this gay and abandoned “night-sea-journey”’, during which the epithet of ‘maenads’ to describe Jung’s female followers was apparently coined.33

Since the early 1990s, increasing attention has been paid in Jung scholarship to the intellectual-historical contextualization of his works. As far as Jung’s relationship to Nietzsche is concerned, several major studies have appeared: first, the attempt to delineate a structural identity in the thought of the philosopher and the psychologist in Gerhard Schmitt’s Zyklus und Kompensation: Zur Denkfigur bei Nietzsche und Jung (1998);34 second, Patricia Dixon’s long-awaited meditative study, Nietzsche and Jung: Sailing a Deeper Night (1999);35 third, Lucy Huskinson’s reckoning with previous scholarship as well as the two central intellectual figures in Nietzsche and Jung: The Whole Self in the Union of Opposites (2004);36 and fourth, a series of highly significant articles by Martin Liebscher, in which, among other subjects, the ramifications
of Jung’s concept of libido and Nietzsche’s notion of the Will to Power are explored and clarified. 37 (During the same period, Freud’s reception of Nietzsche has also received definitive treatment in the form of two monographs in English by Ronald Lehrer (1995) and by Reinhard Gasser (1997),38 as well as a comprehensive study in French by Eric Vartzbed (2003) to follow Paul-Laurent Assoun’s earlier study (1980; 1998).)39 According to one reviewer of Synchronicity and Intellectual Intuition, ‘the long-awaited Kant-Jung book’ is still waiting to be written,40 although the actual concept of synchronicity and its function in Jung’s critique of religion and society has received admirable clarification at the hands of Roderick Main in his study The Rupture of Time: Synchronicity and Jung’s Critique of Modern Western Culture (2004).41

For much of the 1990s, a good deal of the historical discussion on Jung was framed by the work of Richard Noll, beginning with The Jung Cult: Origins of a Charismatic Movement (1994) and continued in The Aryan Christ: The Secret Life of Carl Jung (1997), in response to which Sonu Shamdasani published Cult Fictions: C.G. Jung and the Founding of Analytical Psychology (1998).42 Noll’s central thesis that analytical psychology was originally founded as a neo-pagan cult provoked dismay in the Jungian world, although his historicizing approach provided a much-needed corrective to the hagiographical ditch into which Jung scholarship had fallen. The forthcoming publication by Shamdasani of Jung’s famous Red Book, together with the complete re-edition of Jung’s works as part of the Philemon Project, should provide a firmer basis for the prosecution, and the defence, of all theses concerning Jung. At any rate, the biographical approach to Jung is still very much alive, as witnessed by Ronald Hayman’s A Life of Jung (1999), Claire Dunne’s Carl Jung: Wounded Healer of the Soul: An Illustrated Biography (2000), and Deirdre Bair’s Jung: A Biography (2003),43 although Shamdasani has taken these and other biographers to task in his Jung Stripped Bare by his Biographers, Even (2005).44

On the side of literary analysis, there has also been an increasing awareness of how, in the words of Kaarino Kailo, ‘the marginalization of Jungian literary and psychotherapeutic approaches in the academic context’ is rooted in ‘the same control of eurocentric epistemological ideologies as the trivialization and criticism that feminist theories face constantly’.45 So it is not surprising that, in addition to Gerhard Schmitt’s introduction to using Jungian ideas as a tool for literary criticism in Text als Psyche: Eine Einführung in die analytische Psychologie C.G. Jungs für Literaturwissenschaftler (1999), and Susan Rowland’s articulation of a new relationship between Jungian discourse and modern literary theory in C.G. Jung and Literary Theory: The Challenge from Fiction (1999), particular attention has been given to the interface between Jung and feminism, notably in Susan Rowland’s Jung: A Feminist Revision (2002).46 And now Rowland has turned her attention to Jung’s own literary techniques in her study, Jung as a Writer (2005).47
Although this brief survey of recent work on C.G. Jung cannot be comprehensive, it is worth noting that the affinities between Jung and other important intellectual contemporaries have also been the subject of scholarly attention; for example, to Ernst Cassirer (1874–1945) by Petteri Pietikäinen in *C.G. Jung and the Psychology of Symbolic Forms* (1999);48 to Thomas Mann (1875–1955) and to Ludwig Klages (1872–1956) in three papers, by Stefan Breuer, Hermann Kurzke, and Manfred Dierks, at a conference on *fin-de-siècle* literature and depth psychology held in Zurich in 2000;49 and to Martin Heidegger in papers by Frank H.W. Edler and by Alan Cardew.50 Elsewhere, a fruitful approach to Jung’s concept of the self has been undertaken by Lucy Huskinson with recourse to the work of Emmanuel Levinas (1905–95),51 and Christian Kerslake has highlighted the little-discussed early interest in Jung on the part of Gilles Deleuze (1925–95).52 Jung has been studied in relation to postmodernism (by Christopher Hauke),53 to the New Age (by David Tacey),54 and to film.55 In an important collection of papers, edited by Joseph Cambray and Linda Carter, the full breadth of current historical-intellectual, as well as clinical, concerns related to Jung can clearly be seen.56

Similarly, attention has been given to the institutional development of analytical psychology and the personalities involved in the international Jung movement by Thomas B. Kirsch in *The Jungians: A Comparative and Historical Development* (2000).57 And in one of the most significant publications for some years on the intellectual-historical background of Jung’s thought, Sonu Shamdasani has argued in *Jung and the Making of Modern Psychology: The Dream of a Science* (2003) for a ‘Jung without Freud’. According to Shamdasani, ‘Jung held that psychology constituted the fundamental scientific discipline, upon which other disciplines should henceforth be based’, since, in Jung’s view, psychology was ‘the only discipline which could grasp the subjective factor that underlay other sciences’. On Shamdasani’s account, ‘the establishment of complex psychology’ – Jung’s original term for ‘analytical psychology’ – ‘was to enable the reformulation of the humanities and revitalize contemporary religions’, and he concludes that ‘the history of Jungian psychology has in part consisted in a radical and unacknowledged diminution of Jung’s goal’.58

Now in all these works there is a curious omission: the absence of any detailed discussion of Jung’s relation to Weimar classicism, and specifically to Goethe. Nearly all the important literature on Jung’s intellectual-historical development acknowledges the significance of Goethe, but it has not followed up this lead. Interestingly, Richard Noll notes that, ‘through Goethe and the German Romantics, and through the widespread adoption of the teaching of Latin and Greek in secondary schools and universities’, nearly everyone, including Jung, ‘had some familiarity with Greco-Roman mythology and culture’.59 Nevertheless, and despite the fact that the address attributed by Noll to Jung and presented as the inaugural moment of analytical psychology concludes with a reading of Goethe’s poem ‘The
Mysteries’ (*Die Geheimnisse*), Noll has little to say about this text or about Jung’s relation to Goethe, aside from the comment that this poem not only conjures up images of the hierarchical ancient mystery cults of Greco-Roman antiquity (which were, partially, Goethe’s models in this poem) but also the Grail-quest imagery of an elite corp of seekers (like the heretical Templars so beloved of [Stefan] George) who could merge their Christian cross with Wotan’s Tree.60

‘Given his specific reference to Goethe’s 1816 poem on “The Mysteries” in his 1916 talk to the newly founded Psychological Club’, Noll argues, ‘it is clear that Jung consciously viewed his cult as one that offered *mysteria* in the ancient Hellenistic sense’.61 Yet this would mean that Goethe, too, sought to inaugurate a charismatic movement (Noll reminds us of Goethe’s positive remarks, as reported by Eckermann, about sun worship),62 and for all Goethe’s positive attitudes about paganism – see, for example, his poem ‘The First Walpurgis-Night’ (*Die erste Walpurgnisnacht*)63 – and for all the subsequent uses and abuses of its ideals for political ends,64 Weimar classicism was not a cult. Moreover, Noll allies Goethe with Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph von Schelling (1775–1854) and such other *Naturphilosophen* as Lorenz Oken (1779–1851) and Carl Gustav Carus (1789–1869), despite the major theoretical differences between them and Goethe.65 By the same token, although Shamdasani absolves Jung of the accusation of founding a cult, his discussion of Goethe’s poem does not go beyond the observation that Jung also referred to ‘The Mysteries’ in a footnote in *Psychological Types*.66 And in *Jung and the Making of Modern Psychology*, Shamdasani is more keen to see Jung in relation to William James (1842–1910) and Wilhelm Wundt (1832–1920), and hardly mentions Goethe at all. Rather, it has been Freud who has been placed in the tradition of Weimar classicism by Graham Frankland, in his groundbreaking monograph on *Freud’s Literary Culture* (2000).67 Likewise, Matthew Bell has recently shown that the classicism of Schiller, Goethe, and Karl Philipp Moritz (1756–93) became ‘the main channel through which eighteenth-century psychology fed into the nineteenth century in Germany’, and argued that ‘a continuous line of descent’ leads from Moritz, via Johann Christian Reil (1759–1813), Johann Christoph Hoffbauer (1766–1827), and Christian Friedrich Nasse (1778–1851), to psychoanalysis and modern clinical psychology. Even though Bell’s focus is on German literature and thought in the period 1700–1840, he also recognizes that ‘Goethe was a stimulus for some of the most influential nineteenth-century German theorists of “depth psychology” ’.68

Yet, aside from the burgeoning literature offering Jungian interpretations of *Faust*, which reads Goethe’s dramatic poem in purely alchemical terms,69 the only major discussion of Goethe and Jung to date has formed part of a larger attempt, developed in a series of three lectures given by Jack Herbert
at the Temenos Academy in 1998, to see ‘the German tradition’ in terms of ‘inner renaissance’ and ‘the holistic approach’. According to Herbert, ‘the concept of Humanität’ – that is, ‘the ideal of Humanität put forward at Weimar by Herder, Wieland, Goethe, and Schiller which became authoritative for the whole of the nineteenth century’ – underpinned ‘the equally new Bildungsideal (cultural ideal)’ of Weimar classicism. This ideal envisaged ‘a harmonious individuality in which intellect and feeling were equally balanced and vehement passions firmly anchored, or in Schiller’s terms reconciling the instincts and senses with reason’s law’. Yet even in Herbert’s account, alchemy – or ‘psychology and alchemy’, as the title of volume 12 of Jung’s Collected Works has it – forms the lynchpin of the argument:

What Faust does is to alchemicize psychology – that is, present psychology in an alchemical guise. Or, in reverse, psychologize alchemy, as Jung himself does in the twentieth century. Thus we can see how Goethe and Jung join hands, as it were, across time.

Herbert’s vital insight resides in his statement that ‘Goethe’s central doctrine of Polariität und Steigerung (polarity and intensification)’ informs Jung’s ‘own theory of psychological polar opposites’ in general and his theory of extraversion and introversion in particular. Herbert quotes a passage stating that ‘man cannot dwell for long in a conscious state, or in consciousness. He must again take refuge in the unconscious, for that is where his life is rooted’. A statement by Jung? It is, in fact, by Goethe. ‘Goethe’s Faust, then,’ Herbert concludes,

and the poetic thinking that accompanies it, encompasses not only an unusually wide range of diverse scenes from the horizontal world of experience, but also a pronounced vertical dimension from the depths to the heights, embodying an alchemical process of action resulting in a modern opus alchymicum.

Although, in this study, I shall pack away the retort, clear the room of salamanders, and avoid the kings, queens, and hermaphrodites, this vision of totality – central to the work of the adept, embraced by Weimar classicism, yet often regarded today as null and void – will remain at the centre of this non-alchemical opus.

The structure of these two volumes is loosely based on the figure of the spiral, elucidated by Goethe in the section ‘On the Spiral Tendency in Vegetation’ in his On Morphology. The spiral combines the notion of circularity with the idea of development: similarly, across the two volumes the central thrust of the argumentation is chronological, examining Jung’s reception of Weimar classicism in the order of his various conceptual shifts and phases of intellectual development. In volume 1, The Development of the Personality,
Goethe turns out to be a figure in whom Jung took an interest very early on in his life, whereas his most intensive reading of Schiller took place in the early 1920s, the fruit of which is in *Psychological Types*. Later in Jung’s life, and in volume 2, *The Constellation of the Self*, the references to Schiller recede, while the figure of Goethe regains prominence and acquires new significance. As a result, certain concepts will recur across both volumes of this account of Jung’s reading of Goethe and Schiller, but each time, it is to be hoped, on a higher level. In this way, repetition of the particular elements of Weimar classicism that apparently fascinated Jung throughout his lifetime gives way to an appreciation of how he developed these concepts in his own work. Although the two volumes are related, each is intended to stand on its own and to be able to be read separately from the other. Taken together, it is hoped, the argument for the importance of German classical aesthetics for analytical psychology will, however, be more convincing, because more complete.

In Chapter 1 of this volume, I examine the biographical and intellectual affinities between Goethe and Jung. These are, I believe, far more important than his alleged biological or genetic debt to Goethe, of which *Memories, Dreams, Reflections* speaks. I use Freud’s notion of the ‘family romance’ to explore the fantasy of a secret exalted descent, the first of many biographical affinities between Goethe and Jung. Not the least of their common ideas is the notion of rebirth, achieved, in Goethe’s case, through his visit to Italy, and, in Jung’s, through his encounter with the unconscious. Chapter 2 pursues in closer detail Jung’s early reception of Goethe in his writings. Jung’s insistence on the methodological need for synthesis and analysis, an idea found also in Goethe, provides the conceptual background to his use of *Faust*, in his letters and early texts, to articulate his new psychological ideas. In particular, *Faust* plays a central role in Jung’s great text of 1911–12, *Transformations and Symbols of the Libido*. Consideration of two further foundational texts, ‘On Psychological Understanding’ (1914) and ‘La Structure de l’inconscient’ (1916), in the light of Jung’s reading of *Faust*, brings the chapter to a close.

Chapters 3 and 4 turn to Jung’s reception of Schiller. After outlining the main features of the correspondence between Schiller and Goethe, I look at how Jung used this correspondence to expound his theory of typology. Some central Jungian concepts – extraversion and introversion, fantasy, and the superior and inferior functions – emerge in the course of examining Jung’s major discussion of Schiller in *Psychological Types*, which focuses on Schiller’s *On the Aesthetic Education of Humankind*. In Chapter 4, the Jungian concept of the symbol is subjected to close scrutiny, in the light of Schiller’s conception of ‘living form’. After an overview of Jung’s discussion of another major Schillerian text, *On Naive and Sentimental Poetry*, Chapter 5 concludes this volume with an examination of Jung’s doctrine of the ‘personality’.
My concern throughout is to present, without undue oversimplification, a series of arguments about some extremely complex texts in a way that is clear and comprehensible to analytical psychologists and to scholars of German literature alike. In my experience, the Jungian analytical fraternity has shown itself a good deal more interested in these arguments than have the *Germanisten*; but these books are addressed, in good faith, to both groups. True, *confusa* is an essential stage in the alchemical process, the darkness out of which the light of the alchemists’ stone arises, and Jung himself reminds us that ‘life wants not only the clear but also the muddy, not only the bright but also the dark; it wants all days to be followed by nights, and wisdom herself to celebrate her carnival’. That said, this book and the one that follows it aim to clarify the intellectual continuity between Weimar classicism and analytical psychology in as enlightened and enlightening a way as possible.
In one of his early papers on psychoanalysis, entitled ‘Family Romances’ (Der Familienroman der Neurotiker) (1909), Freud suggested that some neurotics, during their childhood psychological development, entertained the fantasy that their parents were not their biological progenitors. Instead, they believed themselves to be the offspring of much more (socially) important parents, and this belief centred, in particular, on the figure of the father.

‘The later stage in the development of the neurotic’s estrangement from his parents’, Freud wrote, ‘might be described as “the neurotic’s family romance”’, a belief system which is ‘seldom remembered consciously’, but which ‘can almost always be revealed by psychoanalysis’. Indeed, Freud noted that ‘a quite peculiarly marked imaginative activity’ was ‘one of the essential characteristics of neurotics and also of all comparatively highly gifted people’. During this period of estrangement, then, ‘the child’s imagination becomes engaged in the task of getting free from the parents of whom he now has a low opinion and of replacing them by others, who, as a rule, are of higher social standing’. In order to sustain this fantasy, the neurotic will make use of ‘any opportune coincidences from his actual experience’. Moreover, ‘chance occurrences’ will ‘arouse the child’s envy, which finds expression in a phantasy in which both his parents are replaced by others of better birth’, Freud observed, adding that ‘the technique used in developing phantasies like this (which are, of course, conscious at this period) depends upon the ingenuity and the material which the child has at his disposal’ (SE 9, 238–9).

Shortly afterwards, in his paper ‘A Special Type of Choice of Object made by Men’ (1910), the first of his three Contributions to the Psychology of Love, Freud linked the idea of the ‘family romance’ to the polarization of women into two types (the ‘madonna’ and the ‘whore’), the workings of the Oedipus complex, and fantasies of maternal infidelity in which the lover exhibits features of the boy’s own ego or idealized adult personality. As far back as his sketches of psychoanalytic theory in his letters to Wilhelm Fliess (1858–1928), however, Freud had seen in the ‘family romance’ further evidence of the Oedipus complex. Although Freud does not give any examples, it is tempting, from a Freudian standpoint, to see the fantasy that Goethe, on
hearing rumours that his father was the illegitimate son of an illustrious nobleman, entertained about having an aristocratic grandfather, as constituting just such a case of ‘family romance’. Or, equally, the fantasy that C.G. Jung cultivated about his relationship to Goethe. For, however strong Freud’s own personal sense of intellectual proximity to Goethe (to be discussed at greater length in the second volume), he was undoubtedly surpassed by Jung, his one-time pupil and most famous apostate, who propagated a family legend that claimed he was nothing less than a descendant of Goethe, and that his grandfather had been an illegitimate child of the famous poet (MDR, 52 and 261).

**Great** Grandfather Goethe?

Research has shown that much of Jung’s ‘autobiography’, Memories, Dreams, Reflections (1961), was written by his secretary, Aniela Jaffé (1903–91). In some respects, Jaffé came to be for Jung what Johann Peter Eckermann (1792–1854) had been for Goethe. Indeed, Jung’s publisher, Kurt Wolff, saw her precisely in this role, even if this ‘Eckerfrau’ ended up writing the equivalent of Dichtung und Wahrheit. (The very title of From My Life: Poetry and Truth – in German, Aus meinem Leben: Dichtung und Wahrheit – points, even if the authorship of the work is not in question, to Goethe’s awareness of the complex and problematic status of biographical ‘truth’.) And if George Henry Lewes (1817–78), the first biographer of Goethe in English, wrote that, ‘to the biographer, this Wahrheit und Dichtung is almost as much of a stumbling block as a stepping stone’, then Memories, Dreams, Reflections has equally acted as both and more – as what the German language calls ein Stein des Anstoßes, a rock or, rather, bone of contention, as the debate over its authenticity and its relevance has risked distracting, and even detracting, from the importance of Jung’s ideas. Nevertheless, Memories, Dreams, Reflections retains its significance as the work that has arguably had, more than any other, the greatest influence in creating the public image of Jung – an image that has, only recently, begun to be revised. (That some of the accounts found in it do nevertheless stem from Jung is corroborated by the English psychiatrist, E.A. Bennet (1888–1977), in his diaries detailing his conversations with Jung between 1946 and 1961, a selection from which was published in 1982 by his widow, Eveline Bennet, in a work which, as has been noted, closely resembles one of the prototypes of Memories, Dreams, Reflections, Eckermann’s Conversations with Goethe.) Even the title of Memories, Dreams, Reflections contains a Goethean influence, for, as well as alluding to the title of Bismarck’s memoirs, there is surely also a buried allusion to the Classical Walpurgisnacht of Faust, Part Two: ‘Are these dreams now, or memories?’ (Sind’s Träume? Sind’s Erinnerungen?).

In this ‘autobiography’, Memories, Dreams, Reflections, there are two occasions on which reference is made to the ‘family legend’ (or as Freud
would say, ‘family romance’), according to which Jung was a descendant of Goethe. While Jung apparently (and, so it seems, with good reason) denied the authenticity of the legend, he nonetheless attributed some psychological importance to it. ‘This annoying story’, as it is described, made an impression on him, inasmuch as it both ‘corroborated and seemed to explain’ his own ‘curious reactions’ to *Faust* (MDR, 261). Yet Jaffé also recalls that, while he described the rumour as ‘annoying’, Jung never related the story ‘without a certain gratification’ (MDR, 52). In a footnote, Jaffé summarizes the ‘evidence’ for this kinship. Jung’s great-grandfather, Franz Ignaz Jung (1759–1831), was married to Sophie Ziegler who, together with her sister, had connections to the theatre in Mannheim, and was a friend of Lotte Kestner, a niece of Charlotte Buff, one of Goethe’s first lovers. Allegedly – there is no evidence for this story – Goethe slept with Sophie and gave her a child, Karl Gustav Jung the Elder (1794–1864) (Jung’s grandfather). But, as has been pointed out, many of these details are false. For a start, Charlotte Kestner was the daughter, not the niece, of Charlotte Buff; Kestner never stayed in Mannheim; she did not know Sophie Ziegler; nor is there any record of Sophie Ziegler visiting Weimar.

Nevertheless, there are indications that the legend was of great importance to Jung. According to *Memories, Dreams, Reflections*, Jung fantasized as a child that he was, in fact, two different persons (MDR, 50). This fantasy began when Jung saw an eighteenth-century carriage drive past his house, and he felt a strong sense of identification with the period of the carriage and its past owner. Although Jung does not say so explicitly, Henri F. Ellenberger has suggested that this ‘other’ of Jung’s childhood was none other than Goethe. According to one of his university friends, Gustav Steiner, Jung would boast of being a descendant of Goethe. Furthermore, one of Jung’s earliest experiments in scientific investigation was a case-study of mediumship conducted, perhaps somewhat unethically, on his cousin Helene Preiswerk (the eleventh child of Rudolph Preiswerk, Jung’s maternal uncle). During one séance, Preiswerk summoned the spirit of the woman whom Goethe had, allegedly, seduced. Jung’s great-grandmother had also, it was claimed, been reincarnated as the Seeress of Prevorst. Finally, according to William McGuire, a word-test administered to Jung by LudwigBinswanger in 1907 reveals that Jung had a complex about Goethe. Although *Memories, Dreams, Reflections* makes much of Jung’s feeling of being two separate personalities, the temporal No. 1 and the eternal No. 2 (MDR, 50, 62), it is worth noting Goethe’s comment in *Dichtung und Wahrheit* (Part Three, Book 11) that,

as they progress in their cultural development, all people of good quality sense that they have a double role to play in the world, a real and an ideal one, and this feeling must be viewed as the basis of every noble impulse.

*(GE 4, 344)*
In his correspondence, or that portion of it which has been published, Jung sometimes compared himself to Goethe, telling E. Sabott on 3 February 1933, somewhat aphoristically, that ‘many must repeat the bare word, even though this repetition is not a new birth sprung from the heart’, and pointing out that ‘the picture of Goethe, for instance, would be incomplete without Eckermann – to cite a famous example (no presumption intended)’ (L 1, 117). Sometimes, Jung appears to have set himself a higher standard than Goethe did. Writing in response to a question by Kurt Wolff about the composition of what turned into Memories, Dreams, Reflections, Jung wrote that he had been so completely misunderstood that he had ‘lost all desire to recall “significant” conversations’. And ‘God help me’, he added, ‘when I read Eckermann’s Conversations even Goethe seemed to me like a strutting turkey-cock’. His letter concluded with the sentence, ‘I am what I am – a thankless autobiographer!’ (L 2, 453). Those covert allusions to Luther – Gott helfe mir, ich kann nicht anders – as well as to Goethe – ich bin nun wie ich bin – provide a nice example of Jung’s immodest modesty.

In later years, Jung received visitors in Küsnacht with what appears to be the same mixture of engagement and irritation with which Goethe received his in Weimar. And, on the basis of transcripts of unpublished interviews with Jaffé in the Bollingen Foundation Archives at the Library of Congress in Washington, DC, Richard Noll has been prepared to make the bold claim that ‘Carl Jung believed himself to be, literally, the reincarnation of Johann Wolfgang von Goethe’. That said, one reason why Jung himself never denied the story was once plausibly suggested to me by a Jung researcher at the Eidgenössische Technische Hochschule: ‘I can well imagine that Jung, who was sometimes quite mischievous, could have taken a secret delight in this rumour, and may have thought – if people are stupid enough to believe it, then let them!’

Leonardo and the archetypal parents

In two of his lectures, ‘The Concept of the Collective Unconscious’ (1936) and ‘Concerning the Archetypes, with Special Reference to the Anima Concept’ (1936/1954), Jung not only rejects the Freudian theory of the sexual aetiology of neurosis, but also argues for what amounts to an alternative explanation of the ‘family romance’. In the first lecture, Jung takes as his starting-point Freud’s interpretation of Leonardo da Vinci’s painting Virgin and Child with St Anne. In his letter to Jung of 17 October 1909, Freud had written that psychoanalysis needed to conquer two fields, mythology and biography. ‘I have had an inspiration’, Freud wrote to Jung, ‘the riddle of Leonardo da Vinci’s character has suddenly become clear to me’. He told Jung that, despite the fact that the ‘material’ concerning Leonardo was ‘so sparse’ he despaired of making his conviction intelligible to others, he was prepared to ‘reveal the secret’ to Jung. ‘Do you remember my remarks’, he
In particular, Freud argued, the motif of the dual mothers in the *Virgin and Child with St Anne* reflected the biographical circumstances of Leonardo’s life. For Leonardo had two mothers: his biological mother, Caterina, and his stepmother, his father’s wife, Donna Albiera (SE 11, 113).

When the essay on Leonardo was published, it included, in inverted form, one of the phrases Freud had used in his letter to Jung. After claiming that, because of ‘his insatiable and indefatigable thirst for knowledge’, Leonardo had been called ‘the Italian Faust’, Freud added that ‘a possible transformation of the instinct to investigate back into an enjoyment of life’ (*die mögliche Rückverwandlung des Forschertriebs in Lebenslust*) was ‘fundamental in the tragedy of Faust’ (SE 11, 75). Elsewhere, Freud compared Leonardo’s notebooks from the time of the campaign against the Romagna with Goethe’s *Campaign in France* (1792). (Similarly, in his speech written on the occasion of his acceptance of the Goethe-Preis, delivered on his behalf by Anna Freud in the Goethe-Haus in Frankfurt in 1930, Freud was later to note that ‘Goethe can be compared in versatility to Leonardo da Vinci, the Renaissance master, who like him was both artist and scientific investigator’ (SE 21, 208).)

To judge by his response in their correspondence, Jung initially welcomed Freud’s treatment of Leonardo, exclaiming to Freud in his letter of 17 June 1910 that ‘Leonardo is wonderful’. Jung knew of Oskar Pfister’s ‘discovery’ of a vulture in the painting of the *Virgin and Child with St Anne*, and he told Freud that he, too, had seen one, ‘but in a different place’. (In Jung’s eyes, the beak of this vulture was located ‘precisely in the pubic region’.) Apparently alluding to Kant’s third *Critique* (but without giving a precise reference), Jung added that ‘one would like to say with Kant: play of chance, which equals the subtlest lucubrations of reason’. Claiming that he had read the essay on Leonardo straight through and planned soon to return to it, he noted that ‘the transition to mythology grows out of this essay from inner necessity’. He added, in an early indication of the different paths which the two men were soon to tread, that this essay was the first of Freud’s ‘with whose inner development I felt perfectly in tune from the start’. In his introduction to *Transformations and Symbols of the Libido* (1911–12), which sealed the break with Freud, Jung cited the essay on Leonardo as a methodological
exemplar for his own study, speaking of the need ‘to broaden the analysis of
the individual problems by a comparative study of historical material relating
to them, just as Freud has already done in a masterly manner in his book
on “Leonardo da Vinci’’ (PU §5). The name that Jung would give to this
technique is ‘amplification’.

By the time of ‘The Concept of the Collective Unconscious’, over a quarter
of a century later, Jung felt differently about the painting Virgin and Child
with St Anne. Now he argues that it should be seen, not in the light of the
personal circumstance that Leonardo had, so to speak, ‘two mothers’ (his
real mother and a stepmother), but rather in terms of the archetypal motif of
the ‘dual mother’. To this motif Jung links to another, the motif of ‘dual
descent’ – namely, the descent from both human and divine parents. Hence,
Jung argues, the tradition of godparents, which is connected to the idea of a
‘second birth’ (baptism):

The idea of a second birth is found at all times and in all places. In the
earliest beginnings of medicine it was a magical means of healing; in
many religions it is the central mystical experience; it is the key idea
in medieval, occult philosophy, and last but not least, it is an infantile
fantasy occurring in numberless children, large and small, who believe
that their parents are not their real parents but merely foster-parents to
whom they were handed over.

(CW 9/i §94)

As an example, Jung cites the case of Benvenuto Cellini (1500–71), the great
sixteenth-century Florentine goldsmith and sculptor, whose autobiography
Goethe had translated in 1796. Similarly, in an Eranos lecture given in
1938, ‘Psychological Aspects of the Mother Archetype’, Jung explained the
tradition of godparents in terms of the avoidance of a variant of the ‘family
romance’ – the investing of the parents with divine status. ‘To the personal
parents’, he maintains, humankind has always instinctively added ‘the pre-
existent divine pair, the “god”-father and “god”-mother of the newborn child’,
in order that the child should never, ‘from sheer unconsciousness or short-
sighted rationalism’ (aus Unbewußtheit oder kurzsichtigem Rationalismus)
– those twin enemies in Jung’s thought – forget itself and ‘invest its own
parents with divinity’ (CW 9/i §172).

In the second paper of 1936, Jung made his critique of Freud’s approach
to Leonardo da Vinci as explicit as never before, arguing in a footnote that
the motif of baptism or rebirth (as which the motif of ‘dual birth’ is said to
play an ‘important role’ in ‘mysteries and religion’) had ‘misled’ Freud,
prompting him to a ‘violent interpretation’ that exhibited, in Jung’s view,
precisely the ‘religious inhibition of thought’ (SE 11, 79) that Freud was
quick to detect in others. Jung pointed out that other artists had also painted
the motif of St Anne, Mary, and the Christ-child – so did all these other
painters, as in the case of Leonardo, have stepmothers, too? he wondered (CW 9/i §140, n. 27). Jung also took the opportunity to argue, at some length, that, behind the Oedipal incest-fantasy, there lie repressed archetypal contents – ‘contents which are repressed through a still greater resistance’ (CW 9/i §122). Further, he claims that, ‘apart from the incest-fantasy’, there are ‘religious ideas’ which are ‘associated with the parental imagos’ (CW 9/i §123). In other words, Jung wishes to argue that repression is as much a question of religion as it is one of sexuality. As for Freud’s argument in The Future of an Illusion (1927) and elsewhere that religion is no more than the projection of infantile fantasies that project patriarchy (or matriarchy) into the heavenly realms, Jung argues that this position (along with the ‘depotentiation’ of ‘the polytheistic heaven’ proposed by the fourth-century Sicilian philosopher, Euhemerus) must be rejected. For, in his view, Freud mistakes the nature of projection, because the image of the parents is, in fact, too conscious to be projected:

It is indeed easy to show that the divine pair is simply an idealization of the parents or of some other human couple, which for some reason appeared in heaven. This assumption would be simple enough if projection were not an unconscious process but were a conscious intention. It would generally be supposed that one’s own parents are the best known of all individuals, the ones of which the subject is most conscious. But precisely for this reason they could not be projected, because projection always contains something of which the subject is not conscious and which seems not to belong to him. The image of the parents is the very one that could be projected least, because it is too conscious.

(CW 9/i §121)

So what, then, is projected in religion? After all, as Jung concedes, it is precisely the parental imagos that would seem to be projected most frequently (CW 9/i §122). According to Jung, however, what is projected is not the image of the (real) parents, but rather the imagos of the archetypal parents (die Elternimagines). And motivating these imagos are, Jung claims, powerful archetypal forces, since ‘behind the parental pair, or the pair of lovers, lie contents of extreme tension which are not apperceived in consciousness and can therefore become perceptible only through projection’ (CW 9/i §130). On this dynamic view of the working of the unconscious, ‘an emotionally charged content is lying ready in the unconscious’, which can ‘spring into projection at a certain moment’ (CW 9/i §134).

In the course of his paper Jung observes that, in polite society, it is more embarrassing to talk about God at a dinner-party than it is to tell a risqué joke (CW 9/i §124). In the intervening years since Jung delivered his paper, and despite the rise of ‘political correctness’, it is unlikely that circumstances have changed. At the heart of Jung’s defence of religion, however, there is a
rather uncomfortable thought, namely ‘that the parents are also the least known of all human beings’ (CW 9/i §135). Thus, right at the heart of Jung’s theory of religion, he reinscribes the fantasy of the family romance that rejects the (real) parents and replaces them with fantastic – or here, archetypal – substitutes.

**Biographical affinities**

Although there is no evidence for the ‘annoying tradition’ that Jung’s grandfather had been an illegitimate son of Goethe’s, Jung’s repeated references his legendary blood-relationship to Goethe can be read as a strategic move. On this view, Jung was seeking to claim intellectual kinship with the Father Figure of German culture. Moreover, there do exist, in key biographical respects, a number of important affinities between Jung and Goethe, not least in their account of the problem of religion, and the concomitant experience of sickness and health. For both men were individuals who grappled with sickness, overcame it, and turned it to creative account.

To begin with, Goethe received a conventional Protestant education and, in *Dichtung und Wahrheit*, recalled listening to theological discussions as a child in Frankfurt (GE 4, 44). As the text entitled ‘Poetic Thoughts on the Descent into Hell of Jesus Christ’ (*Poetische Gedanken über die Höllenfahrt Jesu Christi*) (1765), written when Goethe was 16, shows, some of his very early poetry was religious in inspiration. Indeed, in one of the most famous passages of *Dichtung und Wahrheit*, Goethe brings the first book to a close with an account of how, as a 7-year-old child, he built an altar to the God of Nature – ‘the God who is in direct contact with nature, who acknowledges and loves it as His work’ (GE 4, 44).

For his part, Jung, the son of a Protestant pastor, was also brought up in that tradition, and was exposed to the intellectual conversations at the lunch-table in the household of his uncle, the pastor of St Alban’s church in Basel. Although he grew up in a learned and intellectual climate – his works are rich in Patristic and Scholastic references – Jung became dissatisfied with the arid faith, as he saw it, of his father. Like Goethe, he sought to establish a more direct contact with divinity. As a child, Jung had a dream of an underground temple containing a giant ritual phallus, which he called ‘a subterranean god not to be named’, through which he believed himself to have been initiated into ‘the secrets of the earth’ (MDR, 28 and 30).27

Following his break with Freud in 1912, Jung apparently suffered a mental breakdown, which is commonly, if euphemistically, referred to as his ‘confrontation with the unconscious’ (*Auseinandersetzung mit dem Unbewussten*). During this period, his memories of life as a child – kindling a fire in a stone-wall, sitting on a stone and playing with the notion of identity – came back to him in the form of an intensified memory (MDR, 36).28 Amid his psychic turmoil, Jung tried to re-establish contact with that period of his life;
collecting stones from the shore of Lake Zurich by his house, he began con-
structing cottages, a castle, a church – and an altar. As Jung placed this altar
inside the church, he recalled the vision of the subterranean phallus that
he had experienced as a young child (MDR, 197–8). If the dream of the
ithyphallic god had been, in the words of Memories, Dreams, Reflections,
Jung’s ‘first great secret’, then his second ‘great secret’ was a small wooden
mannikin, which he carved as a 7 or 8 year old out of the end of a ruler,
coloured black with ink, and placed, together with a special stone, in a pencil-
case which he kept hidden under one of the roof-beams in the attic (MDR,
42 and 36). In the light of his research for Transformations and Symbols of
the Libido, Jung interpreted the mannikin as ‘a little cloaked god of the
ancient world’, a Telesphorus, such as the one that stands on monuments of
Asclepius and reads to him from a scroll, or as a kabir, the natural deities that
formed part of the cult of Demeter (MDR, 38–9).

Given his intensely religious background, it is hardly surprising that
Goethe was, at an early stage in his life, preoccupied with the link between the
dark side of life and institutional religion. He records that he was concerned,
to the point of obsession, with the possibility of committing a sin against
the Holy Ghost. And he remained hesitant not just about the sacrament of
penance but also about the Eucharist, recording that, even when he was very
young, ‘the saying that anyone who takes the sacrament unworthily eats and
drinks damnation unto himself’ had made ‘a tremendous impression’ on him
(GE 4, 222). He relates that

all the dreadful things I had read in medieval histories about ordeals,
about the strangest trials by glowing iron, flaming fire, and rising
water, even what the Bible tells us about the spring whose water benefits
the innocent person but makes the guilty one swell up and burst – all that
presented itself to my imagination and merged into the most terrible
thing.

(GE 4, 222)

In fact, on Goethe’s account, ‘this gloomy scruple tormented me so much,
and the explanations represented to me as adequate seemed so bleak and
feeble, that the terrible image only acquired an increasingly fearful aspect’. In
Leipzig, Goethe tried to distance himself from the Church; until, he adds,
‘at last I completely abandoned these qualms of conscience along with the
church and the sacrament’ (GE 4, 222).

In July 1768, just before he turned 19, Goethe suffered a heart complaint,
aggravated by excess, from which he took over a year to recover. At the time,
he was a student at Leipzig, and the pulmonary haemorrhage forced him to
convalesce at his home in Frankfurt am Main for over year. During this
period, Goethe began to frequent Pietist circles and, encouraged by a friend
of his mother, Susanna Katharina von Klettenberg (1723–74), he read various
works on mysticism, alchemy, and theosophy. As a result, he immersed himself in writings on Gnosticism, Hermetics, Kabbalah, and neo-Platonism, including Georg von Welling’s *Opus mago-cabbalisticum*, the *Aurea Catena Homeri*, and several works by Philippus Aureolus Theophrastus Bombastus von Hohenheim (1493–1541), better known as Paracelsus. When he was recovered, Goethe identified as the effect of convalescence a complete psychological change in himself: ‘I also seemed to have become a different person now’ (GE 4, 248).

In his home, Goethe set up a small laboratory and when, in March 1770, he went back to university, this time in Strasbourg, he continued his investigations into what he called ‘my mystic-cabalistic chemistry’ (*meine mystisch-cabbalistische Chemie*) (GE 4, 307). Of his time as a student he wrote in *Dichtung und Wahrheit* that he was ‘really more familiar with church history than secular history’ (GE 4, 351), and he completed a dissertation on the history of religion. As a further witness to the persistence of his interest in biblical matters, he wrote about ‘Two Important but Hitherto Undiscussed Biblical Questions’ (*Zwo wichtige bisher unerörterte biblische Fragen*) – did the stones Moses carried down from Sinai contain the ten commandments, or ritual cult-laws? and what was the significance of the speaking in tongues at Pentecost? – in 1772–3 (GE 4, 378–9). But on 26 August 1770 he told Fräulein von Klettenberg in a letter: ‘Chemistry is still my secret love’ (*Und die Chymie ist noch immer meine heimlich Geliebte*).

In the case of Jung, however, the sense of the dark side of life, the sense of ever-present and numinous menace, was even more acute than in the case of Goethe. *Memories, Dreams, Reflections* recounts a sequence of recollections and events relating to Jung’s strong intuition of ‘the night-side of nature’. Indeed, many of Jung’s earliest memories are associated, in one way or another, with violence: for example, there is his memory of the blood and water trickling down an open drain from a wash-house in which the corpse of a man drowned at the Falls had been placed (ETG, 14). And later, from the time after the family had moved to Klein-Hüningen, just outside Basel, in 1879, Jung recalls, along with the green colour of the sky after the eruption of Krakatoa in 1883 and the sight of a comet in the sky, the corpses stuck in the sand when the river Wiese broke its banks and flooded the village; and his fascination with the slaughter of a pig (ETG, 21–2).

According to Alfred Baeumler, ‘in the word *mother* is combined everything that Romanticism sought, desired, strove for’, in the sense that ‘the indissoluble combination of demonic sexuality with love of the night and the belief in spirits, fear of and longing for death, ancestral cult and submission to fate’ was precisely what constituted Romanticism. Seen in this light – or rather, in this dark twilight – Jung’s relationship with his mother stands out as a major source of his Romantic yearnings. ‘At night’, *Memories, Dreams, Reflections* tells us, ‘Mother was strange and mysterious’, an occasion of strange visions and terrifying anxiety dreams: ‘by day she was a loving
mother, but at night she seemed uncanny’ (MDR, 33 and 67). Emilie Jung née Preiswerk, whom Jung compared to a priestess in a bear’s cave, an embodiment of ‘natural mind’, was, as we shall see, responsible for introducing her son to a text which was to fascinate him throughout his life – Goethe’s Faust, and particularly the mysterious episode of the Mothers (MDR, 78). Although Goethe’s relationship with his mother was by no means as fraught, psychoanalysts and biographers have been keen to uncover a special significance that Catharina Elisabeth held for her son.31

Goethe’s account in Dichtung und Wahrheit of his first sight of Strasbourg cathedral is cited by the theologian and philosopher of religion, Rudolf Otto (1869–1937), as an example of what he called ‘the numinous’.32 On first seeing the cathedral, Dichtung und Wahrheit records, Goethe regarded ‘this marvel’ (dieses Wunderwerk) as ‘something monstrous and terrifying’ (ein Ungeheures) – or he would have done, ‘had it not at the same time seemed comprehensible in its disciplined order and even pleasant in its planful execution’ (GE 4, 266). On closer inspection, the cathedral – a true fascinans for Goethe – revealed to him more of its terrible, yet also beautiful, nature:

The more I contemplated its façade, the more my first impression was confirmed and expanded, namely, that here sublimity and amenity [das Erhabene mit dem Gefälligen] had entered into a covenant. If enormousness [das Ungeheuere], encountering us as a mass, is not to frighten and confuse us as we attempt to investigate its details, then it must accept an unnatural, seemingly impossible, combination: it must be joined with the pleasant [das Angenehme].

(GE 4, 284)33

Although work on the cathedral had commenced in 1015 after a fire had destroyed the original Carolingian building dating back to the eighth century, the major reconstruction had begun with work on the choir and transept around 1190; with the completion of the nave in 1275; and the completion of the façade in 1439. Most of the west front was designed by the architect Erwin von Steinbach (c.1240–1318), whom Goethe believed to have been responsible for the design of the cathedral as a whole. According to Dichtung und Wahrheit, Goethe’s admiration for the western façade was virtually boundless, on account of its aesthetic qualities:

If we approach [the façade] at dusk, or in moonlight, or on a starry night, when its parts grow more or less indistinct and finally are indistinguishable, then all we see is a colossal wall, the height of which is in pleasing proportion to the width. If we contemplate it by day and exert our minds to abstract the whole from the details, then we perceive a front which not only closes off the inner spaces of the building but also covers
much that is adjacent to them. [. . .] It cannot be denied that the whole mass has a beautiful proportion of height to breadth, and thanks to these pillars and the slender sections between them the details acquire a uniformly light quality.

(GE 4, 284)

From this observation Goethe derived the principle that

an artwork that is wholly made up of large, simple, harmonious parts can make a noble and dignified impression; but real enjoyment is based on pleasure [der eigentliche Genuß, den das Gefallen erzeugt], and can only result when all the details have been developed and balanced.

(GE 4, 285)\textsuperscript{34}

Elsewhere, in other writings, Goethe extends the principle of totality from architecture to the lived life of the individual human being.

Goethe’s reaction to the cathedral is also deserving of close attention for another reason. In Book 9 of Part Two, which recounts his years as a law student in Strasbourg, Goethe records how he felt ‘locked in combat with myself, with objects, nay, with the elements’, suffering from ‘a certain hypersensitivity’. He detested ‘loud noises’, and ‘morbid objects’ aroused his ‘disgust and horror’ (GE 4, 277). ‘But’, we read, ‘I was especially uneasy about the dizziness that always attacked me when I looked down from a height’ (GE 4, 278). To combat his hypersensitivity Goethe forced himself to listen to the roll of the drums when the evening tattoo was being played; and, to combat his dizziness, he forced himself to climb the tower of the cathedral, precisely the object whose aspect he had found so ungeheuer:

All alone, I climbed up to the highest part of the cathedral tower and sat in its so-called ‘neck’, under the knop or ‘crown’, as it is named, for a good quarter of an hour, until I dared to go back out in the open air and stand on a platform that is hardly a yard square and has hardly any handhold. From there one sees the infinite landscape before one’s eyes, while the ornaments and other things round about hide the church and everything upon and above which one is standing.

(GE 4, 278)

‘I exposed myself’, Goethe writes, ‘to similar fears and torments often enough so that I became quite indifferent to the impression they made’, and so attending medical courses in obstetrics allowed Goethe to ‘liberate’ himself from ‘all apprehensiveness about repulsive things’ (GE 4, 278). As becomes clear, however, Goethe imposed this ‘aversion therapy’ on himself, not simply as a cure for the fear of physical objects or situations, but also a means of enabling him to confront what we might call the dark side of life:
I sought to steel myself not only against these physical impressions [sinnliche Eindrücke] but also against the assaults of fantasy [die Anfechtungen der Einbildungskraft]. I succeeded in becoming indifferent to the eerie and uncanny impressions [die ahndungs- und schauervollen Eindrücke] made by darkness, cemeteries, solitary places, churches and chapels at night, and everything of that nature; and in this, too, my progress was such that day and night and every locality were all the same to me.

(GE 4, 278)

Such was Goethe’s success that he was unable, we are told, to feel ‘those pleasant youthful shudders’ (die angenehmen Schauder der Jugend) again in later life, even when he summoned up ‘the weirdest and most frightful images’ (die seltsamsten und fürchterlichsten Bilder) he could evoke.

There are clear parallels between Goethe and Jung in terms of the psychological strategies they developed for turning fears and weaknesses to creative account. In his review of Memories, Dreams, Reflections, Donald Winnicott suggested that a psychotic illness had probably set in by the time Jung was 4 years old. But he added that he believed that ‘Jung’s life’ had shown ‘how psychotic illness may not only give a person a lot of trouble but may also push that person on to exceptional attainment’. Using Memories, Dreams, Reflections as a source, we can find several examples from Jung’s life. First, as a 12-year-old child, June was prone to fainting-fits, until he willed himself out of them. ‘That was when I learned what a neurosis is’, he tells us (MDR, 48). Then again, Jung’s childhood experiences as they are recounted in Memories, Dreams, Reflections also suggest that the problem of God as something profoundly Other – and, according to Rudolf Otto, the sense of ‘the Wholly Other’ is closely bound up with the sense of the numinous – came to define Jung’s religious development as a school child and then as a student in Basel. At this time, God seemed to Jung to be both divine and, in a terrible way, anything but divine: ‘annihilating fire and an indescribable grace’, or ‘on the one hand a bloody struggle, on the other supreme ecstasy’ (MDR, 74 and 65). The creation of the mannikin, Jung recalled, coincided with a growth in his interest in plants, animals, and stones. And when ‘religious teachings’ were ‘pumped’ into him and he was told about what was lovely and what was good, then Jung thought to himself: ‘Yes, but there is something secret and very Other [es gibt noch etwas sehr geheimes Anderes], and people don’t know about it’ (MDR, 38).

This sense of a secret and, indeed, terrible aspect to God lies behind the vision, recounted in Memories, Dreams, Reflections, that Jung had in 1886 and that also focused on a cathedral – not, as in Goethe’s case, the one in Strasbourg, but the cathedral in Basel. The essential content of this now famous vision was of God as a deity that defecates. The account – which is placed immediately after the first reference to Jung’s alleged kinship with
Goethe – relates how Jung, leaving school one sunny day and passing the
cathedral in Basel with its glittering, multicoloured roof, was ‘overwhelmed
by the beauty of the sight’, and thought: ‘The world is beautiful and God
made all this and sits above it far away in the blue sky on a golden throne
and . . .’ (MDR, 52). Here came, we read, ‘a great hole’ in his thoughts, and
a ‘choking sensation’ (MDR, 53). Reluctant to think his vision through to
its conclusion, Jung struggled, so this account tells us, to repress his thought
for two days until, on the third night, he permitted himself to acknowledge
the conclusion to the vision: ‘God sits on His golden throne, high above
the world – and from under the throne an enormous turd falls upon the
sparkling new roof, shatters it, and breaks the walls of the cathedral asunder’
(MDR, 56). Jung describes his resultant sense of relief as ‘an enormous relief
[\textit{eine ungeheure Erleichterung}] and an indescribable salvation’, as a moment
of ‘grace’ and as ‘an unutterable bliss’, and as though he had experienced
’an illumination [\textit{Erleuchtung}]’ (MDR, 56). For the acknowledgement that
God could befoul his cathedral had brought with it ‘the intuition [\textit{die Ahnung}]
that God could be something terrible’, and Jung believed he had been vouch-
safed nothing less than ‘a terrible secret’, ‘a dark and worrying matter’
(MDR, 57).

(In some respects, Jung’s fantasy offers parallels with the symptoms of
the obsessional neurosis displayed by one of Freud’s most famous patients.
As a child, the ‘Wolf Man’ was plagued during his evening prayers by blas-
phemous thoughts that obliged him to think ‘God – shit’, would think of the
Holy Trinity when he saw three heaps of dung lying in the road, and was
obsessed with the question of whether Christ had had a behind and whether
he had defecated (an issue of concern to the Gnostic school of Valentinus as
well). The ‘Wolf Man’ also felt a strong attraction to women with ‘large and
conspicuous buttocks’.37 Given the Jung family’s devotion to reading scrip-
ture, Jung’s own fantasy may well have been inspired, at least in part, by the
Book of Exodus where Moses, desirous to see the ‘glory’ of Yahweh, is
permitted to see His backside. (According to scripture, the prophet has to be
put in a cleft of a rock, and Yahweh will cover him with his hand, when He
passes. ‘And I will take away mine hand’, Yahweh tells Moses, ‘and thou shalt
see my back parts: but my face shall not be seen’.)38 In a footnote to one
analysis in \textit{The Interpretation of Dreams}, Freud recalls the following satirical
lines by Goethe: ‘And if he hasn’t a behind, / How can his lordship sit?’ (\textit{Und
wenn er keinen Hinten hat, / Wie mag der Edle sitzen?}),39 and it is interesting to
note that, only a page away from the account of the Basel cathedral episode
in \textit{Memories, Dreams, Reflections}, in the footnote on Jung’s legendary kinship
with Goethe, we read that Jung’s grandfather saw Goethe in Weimar only
once – and then from behind (\textit{und nur von hinten}) (MDR, 52). An obsession
with one of the ancient attributes of Venus, the callipygous, thus forms a
subterranean link between Goethe, the ‘Wolf Man’, Jung’s grandfather, and
Jung himself.)
Be this as it may, the contemplation of such secrets as the ambiguity of the divine and the fantasy-vision of Basel cathedral apparently strengthened Jung in his sense of vocation (MDR, 65), but it also made, not surprisingly, his experience of the church services he attended, and over which his father presided, extremely problematic (MDR, 63). In particular, Jung’s own first communion turned out to be a bitterly disappointing event (MDR, 71–3); so much so, in fact, that it constituted, Memories, Dreams, Reflections tells us, ‘the greatest defeat’ of his life, for along with his ‘religious outlook’ had disappeared his ‘sole meaningful relation with the universe’. For Jung, it might be true that ‘God alone was real’, but this God was a terrible God as well as a gracious one, He was ‘annihilating fire and an indescribable grace’ (MDR, 74).

Finally, during the breakdown following his move away from Freud, Jung deliberately subjected himself to those psychic experiences that enabled him to engage with the unconscious. According to one of the most well-known passages of Memories, Dreams, Reflections, ‘I was sitting at my desk once more, thinking over my fears. Then I let myself drop’ (MDR, 203). And so began his ‘confrontation with the unconscious’. Like Odysseus in the underworld, like Orpheus making his descent, like Faust visiting the realm of the Mothers, Jung – so this passage would have us believe – embarks on the terrifying journey to the collective psyche as a result of a conscious decision.

Although, as far as we know, Jung wrote very little poetry, the lyric text, ‘Thoughts during a Spring Night’ (Gedanken in einer Frühlingsnacht), provides evidence of his poetic talent, as well as of his early religiosity. The poem consists of 35 lines, written on two sides of a single sheet of paper, and the manuscript is dated as 1893, when Jung was 18 years old and still living in Klein-Hüningen near Basel. The handwriting is consistent with that in other documents in Jung’s hand from this period, and the manuscript has been archived along with Jung’s other papers, in the Eidgenössische Technische Hochschule in Zurich. In the poem, the lyric subject moves from a description of a storm, via theological reflections on what is ‘Eternally new, eternally old, / Never similar, but always the same!’ (Ewig Neues, ewig Altes, / Nie sich gleich, doch stets dasselbe!), to a conclusion – ‘It is life, / And life, it is God!’ (Es ist Leben, / Und das Leben, das ist Gott!) – that sounds like a conscious variant on the final line of Goethe’s poem ‘The Bridegroom’ (Der Bräutigam) (1824), ‘Life’s good, though worst befall us, life is blessed’ (Wie es auch sei das Leben es ist gut) (GE 1, 267).

Moreover, in the alleged ‘founding speech’ given at the Psychological Club in Zurich in 1916, variously called ‘Analytical Collectivity, or ‘Lecture on Goethe’, and attributed, sometimes to Jung, sometimes to Maria Moltzer (1874–1944), the speaker drew a parallel between the analytic experience and the death of Christ, specifically the descent into hell. According to this text, ‘the struggle with the Dead is terrible’, yet ‘here too the parallel with Christ continues’, for ‘the struggle with the Dead and the descent into Hell are
unavoidable’. As if drawing on Goethe’s early poem ‘Poetic Thoughts on the Descent into Hell of Jesus Christ’, the speaker continues:

In studying Christ’s Descent into Hell I was surprised to find how closely the tradition coincides with human experience. This problem is therefore not new, it is a problem of general mankind, and for this reason probably too, symbolized through Christ.42

Does this text present evidence of Jung’s ‘secret epiphany’, when he became ‘the Aryan Christ’?43 Or does it constitute a proposal by Maria Moltzer to reformulate the statutes of the Psychology Club?44 Or does it demonstrate the extent to which Jung, and the analytical psychological circle in Zurich, were steeped in Goethean vocabulary, and perhaps in Goethean ideas? True, Goethe’s poem ‘Poetic Thoughts on the Descent into Hell of Jesus Christ’ is not exactly a well-known text, and not included in many anthologies of Goethe’s poetry. But the author of the 1916 talk also discusses how ‘the night, the chaos and the despair which appear before the Menschwerdung, have been divined by artists of not long ago’, and refers to how Goethe’s Faust ‘is enveloped in night’, ‘becomes blind, and dies’, and only then does his ‘transfiguration’ take place. In other words, Goethe’s dramatic poem, Faust, is read as showing how ‘the Transcendental Function [. . .] reveals the completed human being of our time’. The text concludes with an allusion to the poem ‘The Secrets’ (Die Geheimnisse).45 And in a paper known to have been delivered by Moltzer in 1917, ‘The Relation between the Zurich School and the Club’, she makes extensive reference to Faust. In the context of a discussion of the conflict between thinking and feeling, a conflict which ‘expresses itself in personal as well as in collective life’, Moltzer cites some well-known lines from the scene in Part One, ‘Outside the City Gate’, referred to elsewhere by Jung;46 and with reference to the ‘deliverance’ of the individual from the ‘Imago symbols’ of the ‘participation mystique’, she cites lines spoken by ‘the more perfected angels’ in the ‘Mountain Gorges’ scene at the end of Faust, Part Two.47 Goethe, then, was a focal point for those associated with analytical psychology in its early years, as well as for Jung himself.

Given Goethe’s fascination with Strasbourg cathedral, is it a coincidence that Jung’s childhood experiences, particularly his vision of God and Basel cathedral, became transmuted into an interest in Gothic architecture? Memories, Dreams, Reflections draws a link between the natural world as the locus of ultimate meaning and the architecture of Gothic cathedrals. For Jung, the woods were ‘the place where one most closely feels the deepest meaning and awe-inspiring workings [tiefsten Sinn und schauervolles Wirken]’ and trees ‘the immediate representation of the incomprehensible meaning of life’, an impression that was ‘reinforced’ when Jung became interested in Gothic cathedrals, where ‘the infinity of cosmos and chaos, of meaning and meaninglessness, of subjectless intentionality and mechanical law, was
hidden in stone’. Gothic architecture ‘contained and at the same time was the groundless secret of being, the quintessence of spirit’ (MDR, 86). Mindful, perhaps, of Goethe’s interest in the Gothic as reflected in his essay ‘On German Architecture’ (1772) in Herder’s Concerning German Art and Manner (1773), Jung associated Gothic architecture with another work by Goethe, the literary edifice of Faust, in his lecture ‘On Psychological Understanding’ (1914), published as a supplement to the second edition of The Content of the Psychoses (1908, 1914). Here Jung articulated the difference between an ‘analytic’ approach (Freud’s) and a ‘synthetic’ approach (his own) with reference to the appreciation of Gothic architecture and to the problem of interpreting Faust:

Anyone who understands Faust ‘objectively’, from the causal standpoint, is – to take a drastic example – like someone who tries to understand a Gothic cathedral under its historical, technical, and finally its mineralogical aspect. But where is the meaning of the marvellous edifice? [Wo aber bleibt der Sinn des Wunderwerkes?] Where is the answer to that all-important question: what goal of redemption did the human being of the Gothic period seek in his work, and how have we to understand his work subjectively, in and through ourselves?

(CW 3 §396)

Throughout his life, Jung derived inspiration from painting pictures or sculpting stone (MDR, 199), much as Goethe had attempted to master the skills of sketching, water-colours, and oil painting – with mixed results. Over a long period, Goethe produced drawings and paintings, albeit to his own dissatisfaction; he complained to Charlotte von Stein on 22 July 1776 that everything in his work went ‘from the eye to the hand, without going through the heart’, but, by practising for so many years, he is, as Joseph-Francois Angelloz notes, the ancestor to ‘that line of writers who tried the pencil and colour first’, including Gottfried Keller (1819–90), Adalbert Stifter (1805–68), and Hermann Hesse (1877–1962). And, aside from their relationship to Gothic architecture, there are further affinities between Goethe and Jung in respect of their relationship to art, particularly architecture and sculpture. Goethe had a garden-house, and Jung had a tower.

In April 1776 Goethe, with some financial help from his friend Carl August, Duke of Sachsen-Weimar-Eisenach, purchased a small house in an overgrown garden at the foot of the Rosenberg (in what is now – thanks, in fact, to Goethe and Carl August – the Park an der Ilm). Goethe redesigned the interior of the house, creating a small English garden to its rear. Between 1776 and 1782 Goethe lived here, seeking respite from the business of the Weimar court and inspiration from nature, but even after he had moved into the house on the Frauenplan, he would continue to use the garden-house regularly. In a letter of 17–24 May 1776, Goethe tells Auguste Gräfin zu
Goethe is keen for the builders to leave the house, so he can enjoy the peace, the quiet, the solitude. At eleven o’clock at night he writes, ‘it is a wonderful feeling to be sitting at home, all alone, in the fields’, ‘everything is so still’, ‘I can hear only the ticking of my clock, and the wind and the weir in the distance’. The emphasis of the theme of the garden in Goethe’s correspondence in May 1776 indicates, in Joseph-François Angelloz’s view, ‘the depth of the transformation’ which had taken place in Goethe in his move from Leipzig to Weimar, and Angelloz implicitly places Goethe in the Epicurean tradition, describing Goethe as ‘the philosopher who meditated in his garden, enjoying the serenity of the countryside’.53

On 6 April 1777 Goethe erected a sculpture in the garden of his garden-house, the ‘altar of good fortune’, as he called it, dedicated to the goddess herself, Agathe Tyche. This sculpture consists of a sphere, standing on a cube: a representation of the division in the human being between individuality (the cube) and the happiness of external circumstances (the sphere), or as an emblem of mobility (the sphere) supported by an emblem of stability (the cube). When his birthday was celebrated in Weimar in 1787 – Goethe himself at this time was away in Rome on his Italian journey – a firework display was held in the evening, illuminating in the garden the altar of good fortune. So it was entirely in keeping with this spirit that in 1787 Martin Gottlieb Klauer erected on the left bank of the Ilm the ‘serpent stone’ (Schlangenstein), depicting a large serpent coiled around a small classical column bearing the inscription Genio huius loci (‘to the genius of this place’).58

For his part, Jung built, as he explained in a letter to Hermann Graf Keyserling of 2 January 1928, ‘a little house way out in the country near the mountains and carved an inscription on the wall’: Philemonis sacrum – Fausti poenitentia, ‘the Shrine of Philemon, the Repentance of Faust’ (L 1, 49). The ‘small house near the mountains’ is Jung’s Tower at Bollingen, the construction of which had begun in 1923, and to which various developments and additions were made in the 1950s. The inscription Philemonis sacrum – Fausti poenitentia was first placed above the gate of the Tower, and when the gate was walled up the inscription was then placed over the entrance to the second tower. The name ‘Philemon’ in this context recalls the figures of Philemon and Baucis, the old couple whom Faust has to murder in order to pursue his project of land reclamation in Act 5 of Part Two, and whom Memories, Dreams, Reflections associates with the actions of Germany in the First World War (MDR, 261–2).

Jung’s tower at Bollingen, currently not accessible for the general public to visit, remains a special place. According to Memories, Dreams, Reflections, whenever Jung experienced a lack of creativity, he painted a picture or hewed
stone. As early as 1920, Jung had carved two wooden figures, reminiscent of the Telesphorus-like mannikin he had made as a child, later having one (a figure he called Atmavictu, ‘the breath of life’) reproduced in stone and placing it in his garden of his house in Küsnacht (MDR, 38–9). In his later years, working with stone proved to be what he called a ‘rite d’entrée’ for the thoughts and works that followed this activity. In fact, it has been claimed that everything Jung wrote in 1957 – that is, ‘The Undiscovered Self (Present and Future)’, ‘Flying Saucers: A Modern Myth’, and ‘A Psychological View of Conscience’ – ‘grew out of’ the stone sculptures that Jung made after the death of his wife, Emma Jung, on 27 November 1955 (MDR, 198–9). These sculptures and carvings included various reliefs, among them a bear rolling a ball and a woman milking a mare, a bull, and a laughing trickster. At the end of the path near the boat-house there is a small pillar, carved in stone, dedicated to Attis, the beautiful shepherd of Phrygia who, unfaithful to the goddess Cybele, was driven by her into a state of madness and transformed into a fir-tree. And there is the Bollingen Stone, which features various inscriptions: on one side, a Latin verse by Arnaldus de Villanova, a medieval alchemist; facing the front, a little hooded figure carrying a lantern, a Telesphorus of Asclepius, and three Greek inscriptions from Heraclitus, the Mithras liturgy, and Homer; on the third side, facing the lake, a selection of Latin inscriptions from various alchemical texts (MDR, 253–4). ‘The stone’, we read in Memories, Dreams, Reflections, ‘stands outside the Tower’, of which it constitutes ‘the explanation’. It is, we are told, ‘a manifestation of its occupant, which nevertheless remains incomprehensible for others’ (MDR, 255).

Examining their attitude towards religion further deepens the sense of affinity between Goethe and Jung. Both men, it could be argued, went through a crisis of faith in their lives. In the case of Goethe, this involved an intense interest in Pietism and his cultivation of the friendship with Lavater until, after his experiences in Italy, he finally rejected orthodox Christianity. In the case of Jung, it involved the realization that, to his father, a Protestant pastor, religion was but a meaningless exercise, and Jung was deeply affected by this experience. Yet for both men, the crisis of faith discussed in their works not only was a personal one but also took on more general characteristics. In Dichtung und Wahrheit, for example, Goethe inserted an excursus on organized religion which was controversially received by such contemporaries as Böttiger and Niebuhr because of its apparent defence of the Catholic notion of the sacrament (GE 4, 218–21). Yet, despite his analysis of the attraction of religion, Goethe was fully aware of the true state of Christianity in the eighteenth century, characterized as it was by the debate between reason (Vernunft) and feeling (Empfindung) (GE 4, 250). Even if, as Goethe wrote of his youth in Book 14, ‘the conflict between knowledge and faith’ (der Streit zwischen Wissen und Glauben) was not yet on the agenda of the time (GE 4, 451), it was not long before it was, and Goethe was fully aware...
of – and, indeed, personally involved in – the so-called ‘pantheism dispute’ (GE 4, 469).

Much eighteenth-century theological debate involved the distinction, going back to the Middle Ages, between ‘natural theology’, whose truths were accessible to discursive thought, and ‘revealed theology’, whose truths were not. In Dichtung und Wahrheit, Goethe introduced another distinction of his own between ‘natural, universal religion’ (natürliche, allgemeine Religion) and ‘particular, revealed religion’ (besondere, geöffnbarte Religion) (GE 4, 109 and 208). Drawing on a commonplace of the age, Goethe adopted the notion of private religion, stating that ‘in the last analysis every person has his or her own religion’ (jeder Mensch habe am Ende doch seine eigene Religion) (GE 4, 261). Remaining sympathetic to Pietism, Goethe accepted the idea of a private and pragmatic religion. ‘Since I could not be robbed of my affection for the Holy Scriptures or for Christianity’s founder and its early believers’, he wrote,

I made up a version of it for my own private use [ein Christenthum zu meinem Privatgebrauch] and tried to give this a foundation and structure by means of diligent historical studies and careful examination of those people who had been inclined to the same views as I.

(GE 4, 466)

Throughout his life, Goethe maintained a deep interest in religion, although not in all its conventional or institutional aspects, for which he maintained a deep suspicion or even expressed contempt. At the same time, Goethe’s religion, if it may be called that, is based less on the Gospels than on what he learnt from Adam Friedrich Oeser (1717–99) to call das Evangelium des Schönen – ‘the gospel of beauty’ (GE 4, 237).

But what of Jung’s long-standing interest in religion, which finds expression in the numerous lectures and essays collected in volume 11 of his Collected Works? Goethe may have described himself as ‘definitely a non-Christian’ (ein dezidierter Nichtchrist), but surely the same cannot be said of Jung, who had the phrase Vocatus atque non vocatus deus aderit (‘Called or not called, the god will be present’) above the front door of his house in Küsnacht, Seestrasse 227. Indeed, some analysts claim that Jung is a ‘believer’, and they point to Jung’s response in the BBC Face to Face interview with John Freeman in 1959. On that occasion Jung was asked if he believed in God, to which Jung replied: ‘I know. I don’t need to believe. I know’ – although exactly what Jung claimed he knew, was never explored in the interview. Nevertheless, a certain sensibility for religious matters is detectable in many places in Jung’s writings. Well over half a century after his vision of Basel cathedral, Jung’s controversial work of 1952, Answer to Job, in effect put the deity onto the psychiatrist’s couch. Yet this work, too, is not without its Goethean echoes: in key respects, it constitutes a reckoning with
the theme of the Devil’s wager with Yahweh regarding the fidelity of his loyal ‘servant’, Job – the basic motivating factor of the plot of Faust.

Some of Jung’s critics have charged him with inaugurating a ‘private religion’ (Philip Rieff) and, more recently, with having presided over a religious ‘cult’ (Richard Noll). According to Noll, Jung’s purpose was to found an organized religion or, as Ferdinand Tönnies would have called it, a ‘cult’. On this account, Jung’s writings are infested with covert – and, sometimes, not so covert – references to paganism, mysticism, and völkisch politics. Then again, in a letter to Baur-Celio of 30 January 1934, Jung posed as – and is presented by Noll as having actually been – the initiate of a mystery-cult. Claiming that he had undergone experiences ‘which are, so to speak, “ineffable”, “secret” because they can never be told properly and because nobody can understand them (I don’t know whether I have even approximately understood them myself)’, Jung quoted the opening lines of the ‘Mountain Gorges’ scene from the end of Faust, Part Two –

The sheltering caves are deep.
Lions prowl round us, dumb,
Gentle and shy to come
Into this holy place,
Sacred to love and grace

Höhle, die tiefste schützt,
Löwen, sie schleichen stumm-
Freundlich um uns herum,
Ehren geweihten Ort,
Heiligen Liebeshort

– adding: ‘And already too much has been said’ (L 1, 140). In this letter, where he also quotes from St Matthew’s gospel, Jung explains his suggestion that he already said too much with a throwaway remark, ‘my public might be fatally infected by the suspicion of Poeterie – that most painful aberration!’ (L 1, 141). The question of the status of Jung’s work as an artistic or scientific project is a theme that emerges strongly in Memories, Dreams, Reflections (as we shall see in volume 2).

But what counted for Jung was not the dogmatic content of religion, nor its use as a cultic model for the dissemination of his views, but rather the attitude it inculcated and the therapeutic benefit this allegedly brought. In his lecture ‘Psychotherapy Today’ (1941/1945), Jung insisted on the link between attitude and Anschauung, claiming ‘that the philosophy of life [Anschiuung] is of overwhelming significance for someone’s mental attitude [seelisches Befinden]; so much so, indeed, that one might almost say that ‘things are less what they are than how we see them’ (die Dinge seien viel weniger so, wie sie sind, als vielmehr, wie wir sie sehen) (CW 16 §218). In his introduction to the two papers reproduced in Psychology and Alchemy (1943), he noted that ‘psychology is concerned with the act of seeing, and not with the construction of new religious truths’ (CW 12 §15). Or as Goethe once put it, ‘there is nothing insignificant in the world – it all depends on how you look at things’ (Es gibt nichts Unbedeutendes in der Welt. Es kommt nur auf die Anschauungsweise an).
As far as Jung was concerned, religions are not just ‘therapies for the sorrows and disorders of the soul’, but, as he pointed out in 1929 in his commentary on Richard Wilhelm’s translation of *The Secret of the Golden Flower*, they also offer a way to attain ‘a higher level of consciousness and culture’ (CW 13 §71). Similarly, in his lecture on ‘The Aims of Psychotherapy’ (1929/1931), Jung emphasized both the therapeutic value of the religious attitude and, mutatis mutandis, historical continuity:

In handling a dream or fantasy I make it a rule never to go beyond the meaning which is effective for the patient; I merely try to make him as fully conscious of this meaning as possible, so that he shall also become aware of its supra-personal connections. For, when something happens to a man and he supposes it to be personal only to himself, whereas in reality it is a quite universal experience, then his attitude is obviously wrong, that is, too personal, and it tends to exclude him from human society. By the same token we need to have not only a personal, contemporary consciousness, but also a supra-personal consciousness with a sense of historical continuity.

(CW 16 §99)

For, Jung argued, ‘it is precisely for the religious function that the sense of historical continuity is indispensable’; in other words, Jung’s concern with religion is primarily concerned with its historical and, above all, its cultural function.

To put it another way, Richard Noll and other critics have focused on Jung as an ‘esoteric’ writer. Yet it is important equally to take into account the wide variety of audiences that Jung addressed. For example, he addressed the Society for Psychical Research in London on 4 July 1919, while a few days later on 11 July he was delivering a lecture to the Royal Society of Medicine in London, where he gave another talk, twenty years later, in 1939.74 In 1927 he spoke at Hermann Graf Keyserling’s Schule der Weisheit in Darmstadt (otherwise known as the Stiftung für freie Philosophie); in 1929, the Literary Club of Zurich; and in 1934, the Kulturbund in Vienna.75 He gave a series of lectures to the Institute of Medical Psychology (The Tavistock Lectures) in 1935, to Yale University in 1938, and many of his most famous papers were first delivered as lectures at the *Eranos-Tagung*. He gave radio interviews, wrote newspaper articles, and addressed medical colleagues and fellow analysts, as well as a wider public. In each case, Jung largely adapted his message to his readers or listeners on a particular occasion. In an essay on Freud in 1932, Jung accused Freudian psychoanalysis of having ‘no intention of passing as a strict scientific truth; it aims rather at influencing a wider public’ (CW 15 §56), but of no movement is this truer than of analytical psychology.

As Jung put it in his letter of 1933 to Sabott, ‘many must repeat the bare word, even though this repetition is not a new birth sprung from the heart’ (L1, 117).
For all that, one might still regard Jung as an esoteric writer in the more precise sense that he has a place in an intellectual tradition that is rooted in Weimar classicism. Goethe, Schiller, and Nietzsche are writers whom Jung frequently cited and yet who, because so few Jung scholars have read them, are rarely mentioned in the context of analytical psychology. All three writers, and Jung, too, were thus participants in what, playing on the idea of the ‘perennial philosophy’, the British scholars, Elizabeth M. Wilkinson and L.A. Willoughby, termed a ‘perennial aesthetic’. In particular, Jung’s work is shot through with concepts and vocabulary derived probably, and sometimes problematically, from Goethe. One might say that analytical psychology represents a renaissance of Classical precepts. In other words, it was from the spirit of Weimar classicism that analytical psychology was born.

Rejuvenation, rebirth . . . or Rome?

In his lecture on ‘The Concept of the Collective Unconscious’, Jung places great emphasis on the motif of rebirth. In 1939, Jung gave an Eranos lecture entitled ‘Die verschiedenen Aspekte der Wiedergeburt’ (later published as Über Wiedergeburt (1950) and translated as ‘Concerning Rebirth’) (CW 9/i §199–§258), in which he counts rebirth among ‘the primordial affirmations of humankind’ (CW 9/i §207). Yet the theme of rebirth had been present in Jungian psychology right from its earliest stages. Borrowing extensively (in a way often overlooked) from Otto Rank’s The Myth of the Birth of the Hero (Der Mythus von der Geburt des Helden) (1909), as well as an earlier work, Leo Frobenius’s The Age of the Sun-God (Das Zeitalter des Sonnengottes) (1904), Jung examined in detail various hero myths and found in them, behind the ostensible theatre of incest, the desire for rebirth. In his major post-Freudian work, Transformations and Symbols of the Libido, Jung extracts from the account of ‘the night-sea journey’ given by the ethnologist and cultural philosopher Leo Frobenius (1873–1938) the basic structure of descent and return in the myth of the sun (PU §342). This structure provides Jung with evidence for his argument that ‘the fundamental basis of the “incestuous desire” does not aim at cohabitation’ – as Freud would argue – but, rather, at an experience of rebirth whose nature is psychological, not biological, at ‘the special thought of becoming a child again, of turning back to the parent’s protection, of coming into the mother once more in order to be born again’ (PU §342). Jung’s claim is unambiguous – ‘it is not incestuous cohabitation which is desired’, he asserts, ‘but the rebirth’ (PU §342).

Just such an experience of rebirth is undergone by Faust in Part One of Goethe’s dramatic play, in the scene set in the Witch’s Kitchen. In ‘Analysis Terminable and Interminable’ (1937), Freud speaks of analytic therapy in terms of ‘a “taming” of the instinct’ and, in the course of his explanation, alludes to Mephistopheles’ words in the ‘Witch’s Kitchen’ scene from Faust:
That is to say, the instinct is brought completely into the harmony of the ego, becomes accessible to all the influences of the other trends in the ego and no longer seeks to go its independent way to satisfaction. If we are asked by what methods and means this result is achieved, it is not easy to find an answer. We can only say: ‘So muss denn doch die Hexe dran!’ – the Witch Metapsychology. Without metaphysical speculation and theorizing – I had almost said ‘phantasying’ – we shall not get another step forward.

(SE 23, 225)

Freud’s use of the term Phantasieren in this passage suggests that the imagination may have a key role to play in psychoanalysis, as well as in analytical psychology. According to Prokhoris, that fundamental transformation of which Freud speaks ‘is brought about, in Goethe’s play, through the Witch’s offices’.78

Now Freud defined psychoanalytic treatment in ‘Delusions and Dreams in Jensen’s Gradiva’ (1907) as ‘an attempt at liberating repressed love which has found a meagre outlet in the compromise of a symptom’ (SE 9, 90). In Prokhoris’s view he also turns, ‘like Faust, to the Witch, the Witch metapsychology’.79 Hence what Freud, in a letter to Jung, called ‘the love with which we operate’, whose flames can ‘scorch’ even the analyst,80 ‘leads us to the Witch’.81 No wonder, then, that Freud wrote elsewhere that ‘no one who, like me, conjures up the most evil of those half-tamed demons that inhabit the human breast, and seeks to wrestle with them, can expect to come through the struggle unscathed’.82 And perhaps it is no surprise, either, that Prokhoris reads Freud largely in terms of Faust, Part One, in general and the ‘Witch’s Kitchen’ scene in particular, whereas Jung, for his part, structures much of Transformations and Symbols of the Libido around Faust, Part Two and around the Mothers scene, the counterpart of the ‘Witch’s Kitchen’ in the second part of the drama.83

At the end of the ‘Witch’s Kitchen’ scene, Mephistopheles mutters aside to the audience: ‘With that elixir coursing through him, / Soon any woman will be Helen to him’.84 And to precisely these lines Jung alludes when he writes in Transformations and Symbols of the Libido that ‘the libido, after having seen a “Helen in every woman” for so long a time, sets out on a search for the difficult to obtain, the worshipped, but perhaps unattainable, goal, and which in the unconscious is the mother’ (PU §347). For Jung, however, there is also a historico-cultural component to this argument.

For the historical role of Christianity, Jung suggests, lay in the discovery of the existence of ‘personal values’ (PU §347), thus initiating a corrective to ‘the far-reaching depreciation of women’, but posing a problem. If ‘the depreciation of the sexual object hinders the outflow of that libido which cannot be satisfied by sexual activity, because it belongs to an already desexualized higher order’, then ‘how might those higher valuations be given
to a worthless, despised object?’ he asks. As a consequence of this shift in values, and in an attempt to answer the problem posed by the sexual libido, human history, so Jung argues, has made a turn away from the classical clarity of ancient Greece and Rome to the obscure and incomprehensible (as it were, proto-Romantic) world of the mystery cult. As ‘symbolic needs, based on the incest resistance, arise again in an increased degree’, so ‘the beautiful, sinful world of the Olympian Gods’ becomes transformed into ‘incomprehensible, dreamlike, dark mysteries, which, with their accessions of symbols and obscure meaningful texts, remove us very far from the religious feelings of that Roman-Graeco world’ (PU §347).

If it is important, as Jung suggests, for the human individual to recover that portion of libido bound up with incest phantasies – we need our ‘whole libido’, to ‘fill out the boundaries’ of our personality, and only then can we ‘do our best’ (PU §345) – then what can we do? In the past, incestually invested libido could be activated by means of religious or mythological symbols (PU §345); but as Jung knew, such symbols are no longer valid (PU §356). So instead, analytical psychology proposes new symbols and a ‘new mythology’, for a new form of ‘rebirth’.

The essence of ‘rebirth’ lies, as Jung emphasized in his 1925 seminar on analytical psychology, in its transformative effect. And as far as Jung was concerned, it was just such a transformation experience that he himself had undergone in the years around 1913. According to Richard Noll, Jung’s accounts of these experiences, euphemistically referred to in his autobiography as his ‘confrontation with the unconscious’, constitute ‘an initiation into the ancient mysteries of Mithras’. Noll has shown, in great detail, how Jung immersed himself in such works as the German translation of Textes et monuments figurés relatifs aux mystères de Mithra (1896–9) by Franz Cumont (1868–1947) and Eine Mithrasliturgie (1903) by Albrecht Dieterich (1866–1908), to say nothing of Symbolik und Mythologie der alten Völker, besonders bei der Griechen (1810–12) by Georg Friedrich Creuzer (1771–1858). Indeed, Jung himself said in his seminar of the set of experiences on which Noll concentrates – his alleged transformation into the leontocephalus – that ‘all this is Mithraic symbolism from beginning to end’. Yet perhaps we should not look to the ancient mystery cult of Mithras but closer to Jung’s own cultural home for a model of what, in general terms, he meant by rebirth.

For nothing less than a model of ‘rebirth’ can be found in Goethe’s journey to Italy in 1786 to 1788, as recounted in, among other places, his Italian Journey (Italienische Reise) (1816–17). To be sure, Goethe’s attitude towards Rome was conditioned both by his upbringing and by the cultural expectations of the age. (Rome, of course, formed a key point in the ‘Grand Tour’ of the eighteenth century.) Yet in another respect, this journey might well be called the product of a ‘mid-life crisis’. For Goethe was nearly 40 when he took his decision to go to Italy, apparently as sudden as it was secret. At the same time, Goethe’s decision reached back to his experiences of the previous
decade and even further back to his childhood.² Looking back in conversation with Eckermann on 3 May 1827 on his sudden departure for Italy, he described it as a decision born of ‘despair’.³ Before leaving for Italy, Goethe had begun plans to publish his collected works. In December 1786, already on his way to Rome, he told Carl August: ‘When I resolved to have fragments printed, I considered myself dead; how happy I will be, when I can once again claim to be living through the completion of what I have started’. Thus his trip to Italy was undertaken in the hope of rebirth, and this is how Goethe came to think of his achievement. Moreover, it became part of Goethe’s search for completeness. On 24 July 1786, Goethe had written to Carl August: ‘I am going to improve all kinds of defects and to complete all kinds of omissions – may the healthy spirit of the world stand by me’.

This quest for totality is reflected in Goethe’s attitudes to what he saw en route. Of Tuscany, for example, he wrote: ‘Tuscany seems to me well run, everything looks as if it’s been completed’.⁴ And of Santa Maria sopra Minerva, a former Roman temple turned into a Christian church in Assisi, he recorded the following reaction:

Finally we came to the old town proper, and behold! there stood the lovely sacred work. Such a modest temple as befitted such a small town, and yet so complete and conceived in a style that would look well anywhere.⁵

Finally, once in Rome itself, on 1 November 1786, Goethe wrote:

Yes, I have finally arrived in this city, the capital of the world! I wish I had been in the fortunate position of seeing it fifteen years ago with good companions and some really intelligent man as guide. But since I was destined to visit alone and see it through my own eyes, it is well that this joy was granted to me so late. […] My desire to reach Rome was so great and increased so much with every passing moment that I could stay no longer anywhere, and stopped in Florence for only three hours. Now I am here and calm – calmed, it would seem, for the rest of my life. For it may well be said that a new life begins when something previously known inside and out, but still only in parts [teilweise in- und auswendig kennt], is beheld in its entirety [wenn man das Ganze sieht].

(GE 6, 103–4)

Over a week later, on 10 November 1786, Goethe wrote to the Herders that he was living in Rome with ‘a feeling of clarity and calm’ such as he had not experienced for a long time. ‘My practice of seeing and taking all things just as they are, my constancy in keeping a clear eye, and my complete rejection of all pretensions’, he told them, ‘are proving very useful again, and make me quietly happy’. Every day would bring him ‘a new remarkable object’, every
day ‘some new great, extraordinary pictures’, he wrote, and – ‘a totality that is past imagining, however long one might think and dream’ (GE 6, 110).

Having visited that day the memorial pyramid of Caius Cestius, an imposing memorial covered in white marble set in the Aurelian Wall near Porta San Paolo, known since medieval times as the tomb of Remus; and, in the evening, the Palatine, the very cradle of Rome, rich in historical buildings and sites of archaeological interest, Goethe expressed to Charlotte von Stein the new sense of completeness he was feeling by using the image of solidity:

Returning now to myself, as one so gladly does at every opportunity, I discover a feeling that infinitely delights me, and that I shall even venture to put into words. No one can take a serious look around this city, if he has eyes to see, without becoming solid, without forming a more vivid concept of solidity than he has ever had before. His mind becomes certified as capable, it achieves seriousness without growing prosaic, and a steadiness combined with joy. I, at any rate, feel as if I had never appreciated the things of this world as properly as here. I look forward to the beneficial effect this will have on my whole life.

(GE 6, 111)96

In this account and in his letters, we find a statement of the programme of totality that was to inform Weimar classicism, and which Jung, too, was to make his own. If Goethe’s decision to go to Italy was an expression of his ‘mid-life crisis’, then what he discovered in Rome – and in himself – was the solution to that crisis. As Joseph-François Angelloz has noted, the fragment ‘On Nature’ praises nature for creating ‘imbalance’, an imbalance ‘which is always the prelude and the occasion of a new equilibrium’; but the human being, of course, ‘cannot be satisfied with this imbalance’, and so Goethe, ‘the man of metamorphoses’, was someone who ‘never ceased to strive for equilibrium’ – ‘that inner equilibrium of which Italy was a model’.97

On 18 September 1786, Goethe had written to the Herders from Verona, expressing the hope that, when he returned, he would be ‘reborn’ (wiedergeboren).98 That this hope became reality is reflected in the way in which, during his first stay in Rome, Goethe began to speak of himself as having undergone just such a rebirth. On 4 November 1786, for example, Goethe wrote in a letter to his mother that he would return from Rome ‘as a new man’ (Ich werde als ein neuer Mensch zurückkommen). Of this experience of rebirth, Goethe wrote in the Italian Journey that ‘nothing can compare with the new life a reflective individual receives from contemplating a new country’. ‘Although I am still the same person’, he recorded, ‘I think I am changed to the very marrow of my bones’ (GE 6, 120). To the Herders he wrote on 3 December 1786 that what he experienced in natural history was linked with Rome, and that he counted the day when he entered the city as his ‘second birthday, a true rebirth’ (einen zweiten Geburtstag, eine wahre
Wiedergeburt) (GE 6, 121). And on 13 December 1786 he wrote, again to the Herders, emphasizing the transformative result of his journey when he told them:

One must be, so to speak, reborn, and one will look back on one’s former ideas if though they were children’s shoes. The most ordinary person becomes something here, at least he gets an idea of the extraordinary, even if it cannot become a part of his nature.

(GE 6, 122)

And, looking back over recent weeks, Goethe summarized his visit to Rome in the judgement that ‘the past year has been the most important one in my life’ – ‘it does not matter whether I die now or last a while longer, in either case I am content’ (GE 6, 122). Finally, in a long letter to Charlotte von Stein written on 20 December 1786, Goethe described to her what he called ‘this strange major period of my life’:

The rebirth, which is remoulding me from within, is still in progress [Die Wiedergeburt, die mich von innen heraus umarbeitet, wirkt immer fort]. I certainly expected to learn something worthwhile here; but I did not imagine that I would have to go so far back in school and unlearn, indeed relearn, so much in a thoroughly different way. Now, however, I am truly convinced and have submitted totally; and the more of myself I must renounce, the happier it makes me. [. . .] May God grant that when I return, the moral consequences of having lived in a wider world will also be manifest in me. Yes, along with my artistic sense my moral one is undergoing a great renovation.

(GE 6, 123)

Even over forty years later, on 9 October 1828, Goethe was able to tell Eckermann:

Indeed, I may say that only in Rome have I felt what it really is to be a human being [was eigentlich ein Mensch sein]. To this elevation, to this happiness of feeling, I have never since arisen; indeed, compared with my situation at Rome, I have never since felt real gladness.99

One of the components of that experience in Italy was, if we are to believe W.H. Auden, undoubtedly sexuality. According to Auden,

the difference between the over-refined, delicate, almost neurasthenic face of the pre-Italian portraits and the masculine, self-assured face in the portraits executed after his return is very striking; the latter is that of a man who has known sexual satisfaction.100
And whether or not we choose to believe Auden, the balance between mind and body, between intellect and feeling, between eye and hand that underpins Weimar classicism, finds expression as one of the central themes of his Roman Elegies (Römische Elegien) (written 1788–90, published 1795). Goethe’s most recent biographer, Nicholas Boyle, has adjudged the visit to Rome to be a failure. Despite this harsh conclusion, even Boyle argues that one of the immediate consequences of the Italian journey was a profound change in Goethe’s understanding of himself and of his art. As a result, one is entitled to argue that the visit to Rome constitutes a central moment, in Goethe’s ‘individuation process’, providing an example of the ‘transcendent function’ in practice and of the constellation of the archetype of ‘rebirth’.

Goethe’s discovery of sensuality and/or sexuality in Rome and his concomitant sensation of rebirth provide us with a template for the kind of rebirth in which Jung was interested. As is clear from the case of Goethe, such a rebirth is far from being a mystical one. And, as Nietzsche underlined in his second Untimely Meditation, ‘Schopenhauer as Educator’ (1874), the yearning for totality that is bound up with the desire for ‘rebirth’ can be regarded as a universal one, indeed it is ‘the root of all true culture’. By the same token, Jung would have found in Nietzsche’s writings an affirmation of the possibility of ‘rebirth’ in the sense of a psychological renewal and its association with the sign of Dionysos. In his Eranos lecture discussing rebirth as an archetypal process, Jung cites the ‘midday vision’ (Mittagsvision) of Zarathustra as a ‘classic example’ of a particular type of rebirth experience representing what he called the ‘transcendence of life’ (GW 9/i §210). Jung interpreted ‘At Midday’ as an attempt on Nietzsche’s part to substitute the mystery of Christianity by the myth of Dionysos, thereby imputing to Nietzsche a strategy that closely resembles his own formulation, in his letter to Freud of 11 February 1910, of the psychoanalytic agenda to transform Christ into Dionysos. Nietzsche, Jung reminded his audience, ‘substitutes for the Christian mystery the myth of Dionysos-Zagreus, who was dismembered and came to life again’ (GW 9/i §210). As a result, Jung regards the final part of Zarathustra as the outcome of Nietzsche’s philosophical project which began in 1872 with The Birth of Tragedy, a work on the religious and metaphysical significance of tragedy and on the role of Dionysos.

And did Jung ever make his own italienische Reise? It is interesting to note that both Freud and Jung were, albeit in different ways, obsessive in their attitude towards Rome. For his part, Freud had a long-standing obsession with Rome (part of his identification with the figure of Hannibal) as well as an inhibition actually to travel there, not overcome until the late summer of 1901. Freud called his first visit ‘the fulfilment of a long-cherished wish’ and described it as ‘a high-point of my life’ (as he wrote to Fliess). Although Freud was ‘totally and undisturbedly absorbed in antiquity’ and found modern Rome ‘full of promise and likeable’, the atmosphere of Christian
Rome ‘troubled’ him – ‘I found it difficult to tolerate the lie concerning redemption’.108 Freud visited Rome on six further occasions, and indeed became a frequent visitor to Italy, including the Dolomites, the inspired setting for his essay on transience. Jung, however, never visited Rome, although he did make it to Ravenna, Pompeii, Genoa, and Naples. During Freud’s visit to Sicily in 1910, Jung wrote to him, saying that he had ‘secret obligations to my unconscious (“inconscient supérieur”) as regards Rome and the south, which make a quick run through the country altogether impossible’. ‘Rome in particular’, he added, ‘is not yet permitted to me, but it draws nearer and I even look forward to it at odd moments’.109 From the rail of a ship sailing to Naples, he looked out, when the vessel reached the latitude of Rome, towards ‘the still smoking and fiery hearth from which ancient cultures had spread, enclosed in the tangled rootwork of the Christian and Western Middle Ages’ (MDR, 318).

But it appears Jung had an ‘unconscious taboo’ about Rome. Indeed, Memories, Dreams, Reflections speaks of Jung having a ‘Rome Complex’ (MDR, 318).110 It also recounts what supposedly happened when, later in his life, Jung tried to go. ‘In my old age – in 1949 – I wished to repair this omission, but was stricken with a faint, while I was buying tickets. After that, the plans for a trip to Rome were once and for all laid aside’ (MDR, 319).

Was Jung’s reluctance due to his attitude towards Roman Catholicism? Was he afraid of what he might find in the Mithraeums in such churches as Santa Prisca and San Clemente or at the ancient site in Ostia? Was it an unconscious mirroring of Freud’s inhibition? Or was it that he hesitated to visit the site of the ‘rebirth’ of the figure with whom he so closely identified, Goethe? Whatever the reason might have been, Jung was able to formulate his own thoughts on several occasions because of his reading of Goethe, not least his continuous meditation on the meaning of Faust. It is to Jung’s engagement with this masterwork of German literature that we shall turn in the next chapter.
Chapter 2

Jung’s early reception of Goethe and Faust, 1880–1916

Jung first read Goethe’s *Faust* when he was 15 years old. At least, this is what he told the Swiss author Max Rychner (1897–1965) on 28 February 1932, in response to a questionnaire about attitudes to the famous writer that Rychner had circulated on the centenary of Goethe’s death (L 1, 88). This basic, factual information undergoes considerable expansion in the chapter on Jung’s school years in *Memories, Dreams, Reflections*.

On this account, it was his mother, Emilie Jung, who encouraged her son to read Goethe’s dramatic poem (MDR, 78). If we are to believe *Memories, Dreams, Reflections*, Emilie Jung possessed the same cheerful disposition or *Frohnatur* that Goethe claimed to have inherited from his own mother, and she may well have been the source for Jung’s love of wonderful stories, his *Lust zu fabulieren*. As Maggy Anthony has noted, ‘too much has been written about the importance of the mother in infant psychology for anyone to doubt it seriously’, and, in the case of Jung in particular, one is tempted to wonder about the significance of his mother, ‘given the folklore and mythologies of the Great Mother that permeate Jungian psychology’. Emilie Jung is said by *Memories, Dreams, Reflections* to have been ‘a very good mother’, ‘most companionable and pleasant’, who ‘liked to talk’, whose ‘chatter was like the gay plashing of a fountain’. Beneath her appearance as (in the words of the rather blunt description) ‘a kindly, fat old woman, extremely hospitable, and possessor of a great sense of humour’, there was another quality, ‘a decided literary gift, as well as taste and depth’, which remained hidden (MDR, 66). But it seems there was another side altogether to her.

As the young daughter of Samuel Preiswerk (1799–1871), antistes or head of the Protestant clergy in Basel, professor of Old Testament Exegesis and Oriental Languages at the Evangelical Theological Institution in Geneva, and a notable scholar of Hebrew, she had been required to sit behind him when he was working, to protect him from evil spirits. As a full-grown woman, this aspect developed into something altogether stranger, when she would ‘speak as if talking to herself’, but what she said was aimed at Jung, striking him ‘to the core of his being’ and ‘stunning him into silence’ (MDR, 66). (Thus Emilie Jung might be said to have exhibited in full the aspect of
Goethe’s mother that led the Stolberg brothers to call her ‘Frau Aja’ (GE 5, 559), an old Byzantine term for a governess, but also a reference to an ancient Babylonian fertility goddess.) Of his mother Jung wrote that, at night, she was ‘strange and mysterious’; ‘frightening influences’ came from her room, for she slept apart from Jung’s father (MDR, 33).

In the terms suggested by Memories, Dreams, Reflections, Emilie Jung had a split personality – or, rather, two personalities, between which there was ‘an enormous difference’. By day, she was the ‘loving mother’; by night, she became ‘uncanny and full of secrets’ (unheimlich und geheimnisvoll), she became like ‘one of those seers, who is at the same time a strange animal’, like ‘a priestess in a bear’s cave’. She was, we are told, ‘archaic and ruthless’, ‘ruthless like truth and nature’, nothing less than an embodiment of what Jung later called ‘natural mind’ (MDR, 67–8).

In turn, Jung himself, on the account given in Memories, Dreams, Reflections, experienced himself in terms of two personalities, one historically situated as the son of his (biological) parents, the other closer to nature and ‘all living things’ (die lebende Kreatur), identified with the period of the Middle Ages personified by Faust – and hence in touch with ‘the legacy’ that had stirred Goethe, too (MDR, 61–2 and 107). Henri F. Ellenberger has suggested that this ‘other’ of Jung’s childhood was none other than Goethe, although Jung does not explicitly say this; however, this sense of a split personality is associated with Faust, when Memories, Dreams, Reflections attributes to Jung the sense that Faust’s cry in Part One – ‘Two souls, alas, are living in my breast’ (Zwei Seelen wohnen, ach! in meiner Brust) – was ‘directed straight at’ him (MDR, 261).

So, thanks to his mother, Jung first read Faust when he was 15. The effect of this reading, according to Memories, Dreams, Reflections, was tremendous. Picking up his family’s fine edition of the forty-volume Goetheausgabe letzter Hand, Jung turned to Faust. The text, we read, poured onto Jung’s soul ‘like a miraculous balm’ (wie eine Wunderbalsam) (MDR, 78). What attracted Jung in particular was the aspect of the drama that deals with the problem of evil. In the figure of Faust, we are told, Jung had at last found someone who took the devil seriously, and who even concluded a blood pact with ‘the adversary who has the power to frustrate God’s plan to make a perfect world’ (MDR, 78). In the fate of Goethe’s figure (an imaginary one, but based on historical fact), Jung realized that there had been people who saw ‘evil and its universal power’, as well as ‘the mysterious role it played in delivering humankind from darkness and suffering’. For Jung, Goethe became nothing less than ‘a prophet’ (MDR, 79).

As for the character of Faust himself, however, Jung’s attitude was allegedly more negative, at least as far as the plot of Part One was concerned. He would have been content to see the soul of Faust go to hell – he ‘deserved it’, Jung thought. Faust’s behaviour had been ‘regrettable’: he had been too one-sided (einseitig), too easily tricked, and not sufficiently clever or moral.
How ‘childish’ Faust had been to gamble his soul away ‘so frivolously’! And even worse (presumably with the great soliloquies of Part One in mind), Faust was, Jung surmised, ‘obviously a bit of a windbag’ (MDR, 78).

By contrast, and in a way characteristically, Jung responded far more favourably to the figure of Mephistopheles. He had the impression that ‘the weight of the drama and its significance’ lay largely on the side of Mephistopheles, and this is why, according to Memories, Dreams, Reflections, Jung was so highly critical of the end of Faust, Part Two. The motif of the ‘cheated devil’ displeased Jung: Mephistopheles had been anything except a stupid devil, so when he was distracted by the ‘silly little angels’ at the end, he had indeed been ‘cheated’. For he had not received what was, in fact, his by rights, and Faust, ‘this somewhat dubious and characterless fellow’, had taken his swindle into the Beyond. In that other realm, his boyish nature had been revealed, but did he deserve his initiation into the Great Mysteries (MDR, 78)? Jung thought not.

So how would Jung have liked to see Part Two end? He would have given Faust, we are told, ‘a taste of the purgatorial fire’. And though he accorded Goethe, because of his recognition of evil, the status of a prophet Jung also accused Goethe of having remained too – well, ‘too theological’. Jung thought that Mephistopheles had been dealt with by ‘a mere trick’, by ‘some jiggery-pokery’. And that, for the Jung whom we find in the pages of Memories, Dreams, Reflections, was ‘too theological, too frivolous and irresponsible’, and he regretted ‘most deeply’ the fact that Goethe, too, had apparently fallen victim to ‘the, oh so deceptive! playing down [Verharmlosung] of evil’ (MDR, 79). ‘That the devil loses the wager, and that a man continually struggling towards something better, should be redeemed, is an effective thought, a good thought, that enlightens much’, said Goethe to Eckermann;¹⁰ Jung would not have agreed.

The complaints in Memories, Dreams, Reflections about Faust display one of the chief shortcomings in Jung’s reception of Goethe, his tendency to neglect the literary or the aesthetic dimensions of the text. (At the same time, we should remember that, in the context of Memories, Dreams, Reflections, Jung is meant to be recalling how he reacted to Faust when he was 15 years old.) Throughout his writings, whenever he discusses Faust, Jung persistently opposes the aesthetic to the ‘psychological’ or ‘human’ value of the text. For example, in his lecture, ‘Paracelsus as a Spiritual Phenomenon’ (1942), Jung asserted that Faust, Part Two, ‘presents only incidentally and in doubtful degree an aesthetic problem, but primarily and in far greater degree a human one [ein zweifelhaft ästhetisches, in ganz anderem Maße hingegen ein menschliches Problem]’, claiming this problem had been ‘a preoccupation that accompanied the poet right into old age, an alchemical encounter with the unconscious [die alchemistische Auseinandersetzung mit dem Unbewußten], comparable to the labor Sophiae of Paracelsus’ (CW 13 §210).¹¹ In fact, as we shall see, Jung tended to see Goethe largely in his own, analytical
psychological terms, although, as I shall argue, there are several respects in which Jung may have been far closer to Goethe than he apparently realized.

From Jung’s first reading of Faust on, however, one aspect would remain central to his various interpretations of it throughout his life. Just as the text had been recommended to him by his daimonic mother, so the most important aspect of the drama was Mephisto – and the Mothers:

The real problem, it seemed to me, lay with Mephistopheles, whose whole figure made the deepest impression on me, and who, I vaguely sensed, had a relationship to the mystery of the Mothers. At any rate Mephistopheles and the great initiation at the end remained for me a wonderful and mysterious experience [ein wunderbares und geheimnisvolles Erlebnis] on the fringes of my conscious world.

(MDR, 78)

Throughout the rest of Memories, Dreams, Reflections, the text keeps returning to Faust in general and to the Mothers scene in particular. First, in the context of one of his childhood fantasies – the vision of a mysterious laboratory apparatus that created gold – we learn that there was ‘an inner prohibition’ (ein inneres Verbot), ‘a silent embarrassment’, associated with it, of the kind evoked by Goethe when Mephisto says of the Mothers, ‘the very mention of them is embarrassment’ (Von ihnen sprechen ist Verlegenheit) (MDR, 101). Second, and more generally, the fantasies experienced during his period of intense introversion or mental breakdown from 1912 to 1916, are referred to as Jung’s time in ‘the magic mountain’ (Zauberberg) (MDR, 233). Third, discussing a sequence of intense and ecstatic visions that followed his heart attack in 1944, Jung is recorded as having commented that these experiences had been ‘glorious’. ‘Night for night’, we read in Memories, Dreams, Reflections, he floated ‘in a state of purest bliss’ – ‘thronged round with images of all creation’ (umschwebt von Bildern aller Kreatur), an allusion to the Mothers scene (MDR, 325–6). Finally, in his reminiscences concerning the German Sinologist Richard Wilhelm (1873–1930), Jung wrote of his friend’s reluctance to discuss his psychological problems, which Jung understood in terms of the conflict between consciousness and the unconscious, between the west and the east. Whenever he touched on the problems of Wilhelm’s ‘inner conflict’, he sensed a hesitancy in Wilhelm, as if his friend were closing in on himself. Jung described this phenomenon, which he said he had observed in many important men, in terms of the realm of the Faustian Mothers, as ‘a path untrodden, / Which none may tread’ (ein “Unbetretenes, / Nicht zu Betretendes”) – ‘something which cannot and should not be entered by force, a destiny that brooks no human intervention’ (MDR, 409).

Thus it is no exaggeration to say that the text of Memories, Dreams, Reflections, whoever is responsible for its authorship, is steeped in references
and allusion to Faust, the echo of which resounds throughout Jung’s writings as a whole. We might say that, for Jung, Goethe constitutes a kind of \textit{offenbares Geheimnis}, an ‘open secret’,\textsuperscript{17} and that \textit{Faust} became the text in terms of which he interpreted, not just his own psychological development, but that of humankind in general, too. In short, both Jung’s sense of being personally addressed by the work on his first reading in 1893, as well as its wider significance for him, are well summarized in the following remark from \textit{Memories, Dreams, Reflections}. The text presented Jung with the ‘spirit of the age’ (\textit{Zeitgeist}) and all its problems, it ‘struck a chord’ in him and ‘pierced through’ him, in a way he could not but regard as ‘personal’. Above all, it awakened in him ‘the problem of opposites, of good and evil, of mind and matter, of light and darkness’. In Goethe’s masterpiece,

\begin{quote}
Faust, the inept, purblind philosopher, encounters the dark side of his being, his sinister shadow, Mephistopheles, who, in spite of his negating disposition, represents, against the arid scholar who hovers on the brink of suicide, the true spirit of life [\textit{den eigentlichen Lebensgeist}].
\end{quote}

And, in Faust’s problem, Jung sensed one that became his own:

\begin{quote}
My own inner contradictions appeared here in dramatised form; Goethe had written virtually a basic outline and pattern of my own conflicts and solutions. The dichotomy of Faust-Mephistopheles came together within myself as a single person, and I was that person.
\end{quote}

(MDR, 262)

As a glance at the references to Goethe as they are listed in the index volume to the \textit{Collected Works} (CW 20) shows, it is clear that Jung’s main interest is in \textit{Faust}, rather than in Goethe’s historical life. And on close examination, Jung’s immersion in Goethe’s works in general and \textit{Faust} in particular proves to be extremely deep, so that Goethean thought can be seen to inform his psychology in many respects that have been hitherto unappreciated. Indeed, his references to Goethe are so ubiquitous that it is extremely difficult to treat them systematically.

For example, Jung’s paper ‘The Psychology of the Child Archetype’ (1940) provides two instances of this complex use of Goethean language. There is, surely, an allusion to the words of the ‘Proktophantasmist’ in the first \textit{Walpurgisnacht}, when Jung writes that ‘the scientific intellect is always inclined to put on airs of enlightenment in the hope of banishing the spectre once and for all’ (\textit{der wissenschaftliche Intellekt verfällt [...] immer wieder einmal in aufklärerische Allüren und hofft mit dem Spuk endgültig aufzuräumen}) (CW 9/i §267).\textsuperscript{18} And later in the same essay, Jung’s words carry a distinct echo of the Goethean (and Schillerian) distinction between \textit{Stoff} (‘material’) and \textit{Gehalt} (‘content’) when he writes:\textsuperscript{19}
In medicine, fantasies are real things with which the psychotherapist has to reckon very seriously indeed. He cannot therefore deprive of all justification those primitive fantasies whose content [Gehalt] is so real that it is projected upon the external world. In the last analysis the human body, too, is built of the stuff [Stoffe] of the world, the very stuff [Stoffe] wherein fantasies become visible; indeed, without it they could not be experienced at all.

(CW 9/i §290)

In the same essay, Jung urges us not to get caught up in terminological confusion about the archetype – ‘language itself’, he tells us, ‘is only an image’ (Sprache ist ja nichts anderes als Bild). The correct response, we learn, is ‘to dream the myth on’ (man träumt bestenfalls den Mythus weiter) – and to give a new ‘shape’ to it (moderne Gestalt geben) (CW 9/i §271).

Because, in this study, I am trying to identify the main areas where the affinities between Weimar classicism and analytical psychology, between Goethean and Jungian thought, are particularly striking, in the rest of this chapter I shall concentrate on the methodological concerns Jung shares with Goethe. For, as Nietzsche rightly claimed, ‘the most valuable insights are methods’.

**Methodological matters**

One of the things that bears out the claim of *Memories, Dreams, Reflections* for an early and profound influence on Jung of Goethe’s *Faust* is the extensive use he made of it in his early clinical writings. In some of these works, it is true, the use of Goethe is, to a certain extent, peripheral. For example, we find fragments of Goethe’s poetry (Erlkönig, Prometheus) turning up in Jung’s experiments on word-association. But far more important, and bearing witness to the truth of Nietzsche’s statement about the importance of method, is the distinction, first made in ‘The Associations of Normal Subjects’ (1904/1906) (CW 2 §1–§498), between ‘synthetic’ and ‘analytic’ word-association.

Here Jung regarded the association between, for instance, the words ‘father’ (Vater) and Sorge – a so-called ‘synthetic’ association – as being, in psychological terms, much more significant than the association between, say, the words Bleistift (‘pencil’) and Länge (‘length’), which he termed an ‘analytic’ association. According to Jung, this distinction was based on Kant’s distinction between analytic and synthetic judgements in the first *Critique*. Historically speaking, the roots of the distinction between analysis and synthesis are to be found in traditional logic. For example, in his lectures on logic (the ‘Blomberg Logic’), Kant wrote that cognition can be made ‘distinct’ (deutlich) (as opposed to merely ‘clear’ [klar]) in two ways: by analysis, which makes distinct a concept that was previously ‘confused’ (verworren), or by synthesis, which makes a new and distinct concept altogether. Thus in the
case of analytical distinctness, we do not know more about something than we did previously, but we know it more distinctly, more clearly, and with greater consciousness; in the case of synthesis, something new has been created (Kant associates synthesis with empirical distinctness and a posteriori knowledge).23 In his 1914 supplement to The Content of the Psychoses (1908), Jung himself quoted Kant’s definition of comprehension, referring to ‘that cogent definition of Kant’s according to which “comprehension” [Begreifen] means “to cognize a thing to the extent which is sufficient for our purpose” ’ (in dem Grade erkennen, als zu unserer Absicht hinreichend ist) (CW 3 §393).24

Nor was the distinction restricted to Kantian or scholastic philosophy, for it was a commonplace of eighteenth-century discourse, and Jung would have been familiar with the distinction from Goethe’s writings. For example, in his essay ‘Analysis and Synthesis’ (1829), Goethe argued that ‘the analytical thinker ought to begin by examining (or rather, by noting) whether he is really working with a hidden synthesis or only an aggregation, a juxtaposition, a composite, or something of the sort’ (GE 12, 50). We might compare this statement with Goethe’s remark in his autobiography, Dichtung und Wahrheit (Part Four, Book 19), that ‘whoever feels a synthesis very pregnantly in himself really has the right to analyze because he is testing and legitimizing his inner wholeness on the external detail’ (GE 5, 581). (Goethe cited the case of his friend, the Swiss writer and preacher, Johann Caspar Lavater (1741–1801), as an example of the truth of this claim.) Or as Goethe put it in his poem ‘Atmosphere’ (Atmosphäre), part of his trilogy dedicated to the English meteorologist Luke Howard (1772–1864) (Trilogie zu Howards Wolkenlehre) (1822):

To locate yourself in the infinite,
You must distinguish and then combine.

Dich im Unendlichen zu finden,
Muß unterscheiden und dann verbinden.25

Whereas, in his essay ‘Analysis and Synthesis’, the term ‘synthesis’ implies a methodological procedure or conceptual precondition of scientific inquiry, it is used in his conversation with Eckermann of 13 February 1829 to describe an object of scientific inquiry.

Here, Goethe distinguished between sciences whose subjects are ‘dead’, and hence are apprehended by the understanding (Verstand) (for example, mineralogy), and those whose subjects are ‘living’ and are the object of reason (Vernunft) (for example, meteorology). Those subjects that belonged to this second category presupposed, Goethe claimed, the notion of ‘synthesis’.26 As H.B. Nisbet has noted, Goethe’s attempt was by no means the only one in the eighteenth century to attempt to reconcile analytic and synthetic faculties.27 Drawing on the French natural historian Buffon (1707–88),28 Goethe taught that ‘separation’ (Sondern) and ‘combination’ (Verknüpfen) should be
regarded as ‘two inseparable vital acts’ (zwei unzertrennliche Lebensacte). 29

Or, as he also put it, this time more trenchantly, in a text on the history of chromatic theory:

All effects, of whatever kind they may be, that we notice in experience, are related to each other in the most continuous way, merge into each other; they undulate from the first to the last. That we distinguish them, set them apart from each other, mix them together, is unavoidable; but, as a result, an endless conflict must arise in the realm of science. Obdurate pedantry of distinction and blurring mysticism both equally bring disaster [Starre scheidende Pedanterie und verflößender Mysticismus bringen beide gleiches Unheil]. But those activities, from the basest to the highest, from the tile that falls off the roof to the moment of intellectual illumination that happens to you and you communicate, they line up next to each other.30

The distinction between ‘analysis’ and ‘synthesis’ is related to the methodological distinction, central to intellectual discussion in Jung’s time, between ‘understanding’ (Verstehen) and ‘explanation’ (Erklären).

It has been argued that the shift from synthesis to analysis constitutes a chief characteristic in the development of modernity and in the rise of sceptical rationalism and scientific materialism, leading to a concomitant ‘fragmentation of reality’.31 And there exists a specific philosophical background to the late nineteenth century and the early twentieth century, and particularly its neo-Kantian context, which has been set out in helpful introductory accounts offered by, among others, Herbert Schnädelbach, Rüdiger Bubner, and Paul Gorner.32 The methodological distinction between ‘understanding’ and ‘explanation’ was first worked out by the German historian, Johann Gustav Droysen (1808–84),33 and brought to systematic fullness by the German philosopher Wilhelm Dilthey (1833–1911).34 According to R.G. Collingwood,35 ‘the lonely and neglected genius Dilthey’ took the distinction between two kinds of science, ‘pompously baptized’ by the German philosopher Wilhelm Windelband (1848–1915) as nomothetic science and ideographic science, that is, as science in the sense of Naturwissenschaft, or ‘hard’ science, and Kultur- or Geisteswissenschaft, or ‘the humanities’.36 In the hands of Dilthey, this became the distinction between Naturwissenschaft and Geisteswissenschaft, associated with a methodological distinction between ‘explanation’ (appropriate to the former) and ‘understanding’ (appropriate to the latter).37 Thus Dilthey both anticipated and abandoned the simplistic dichotomy of Droysen and Windelband. And in an article of 1894, Dilthey drew a contrast between ‘explanatory’ and ‘descriptive’ or ‘analytic’ psychology.38 If, in the view of Schnädelbach, ‘there is no question that Dilthey at first sought to base psychological understanding [psychologisches Verste-hen]’ – in the sense of the German theologian, Friedrich Schleiermacher
(1768–1834) – ‘on an interpretative psychology [verstehende Psychologie]’, it is for him less clear whether, in this context, ‘psychology’ means – as it did for the German philosopher and psychologist, Wilhelm Wundt (1832–1920) – ‘merely the comprehensive discipline which marks out the domain of the human sciences’, or whether it simply refers to ‘the medium of the critique of historical reason itself’. Later, Windelband’s distinction between nomothetic and ideographic sciences was taken up and developed by the German philosopher, Heinrich Rickert (1863–1936), whose view was, as Collingwood says, ‘closely connected with Windelband’s thought, but much more systematic’. Later still, the German philosopher, Karl Jaspers (1883–1969), in what became his best-selling textbook, *General Psychopathology (Allgemeine Psychopathologie)* (1913; 1959), discussed the validity of the distinction between (in volume 1) ‘meaningful psychic connections’ (verstehende Psychologie) and (in volume 2) ‘the causal connections of psychic life’ (erklärende Psychologie).

The difference between *Erklären* and *Verstehen* is explained by Dilthey in *The Formation of the Historical World in the Human Sciences* (1910) with reference to these two kinds of science. In this work, as in others, Dilthey makes repeated reference to Goethe, to whom he devoted a chapter on his 1906 monograph on major German writers.) Science can proceed, as it were, ‘to the “outside”, in the sense of an objectification of the content of experience involving elimination of the subjective qualities of the experience’; this is *Erklären*, and this is how natural sciences work. Or science can proceed ‘to the “inside”, that is, the exposition of just these subjective aspects of the experience itself’ – hence, an attention to its expressive qualities – and this is *Verstehen*, as practised in the human sciences. To put it another way, with reference to a different set of terminological distinctions found in Dilthey – namely, *Erleben, Ausdruck*, and *Verstehen* – then *Verstehen* is the interpretation of qualities of ‘lived experience’ (*Erlebnis*) in terms of ‘expressive qualities’ (*Ausdrucksqualitäten*). And, for Dilthey, experience, expression, and understanding constitute the process of the ‘self-interpretation of life’. Life, thus (self-)interpreted, is what Dilthey calls ‘spirit’ or *Geist*; hence the humanities are termed *Geisteswissenschaften*.

Now, it turns out that there is a specifically Swiss – and moreover, Goethe-inspired – dimension to this methodological debate. The distinction between analysis and synthesis, found in Goethe, became, in the thinking of the Swiss historian of law and religion, Johann Jakob Bachofen (1815–87), the basis for a distinction, taken over by Jung, between causal and symbolic explanation. As Lionel Gossman summarizes Bachofen’s view, presented in a paper read to the Basel Historical Society on 15 December 1864 entitled ‘The Basic Laws of the Development of Nations and of Historiography’, ‘causal explanation focuses attention on particular time sequences’, explaining events in terms of what preceded them and what followed, and is ‘analytical’, whereas ‘symbolic understanding supposes a view of the whole’, explaining events ‘as the
manifestation of the whole in the part’, and, being synthetic, involves ‘powers of imagination, insight, and sympathetic understanding that far exceed the methods of analysis’. Thus, for Bachofen, there were, as he put it in ‘My Life in Retrospect’, ‘two roads to knowledge’:

The longer, slower, more arduous road of rational combination and the shorter path of the imagination, traversed with the force and swiftness of electricity. Aroused by direct contact with the ancient remains, the imagination grasps the truth at one stroke, without intermediary links. The knowledge acquired in this second way is infinitely more living and colourful than the products of the understanding.

For Bachofen, the approach that he was advocating was, whatever critics might say, ‘empirical’ – inasmuch as, Gossman explains, the object of investigation is ‘not violated or penetrated, but explored cautiously, with respect for its integrity’. For such an approach, ‘knowing the object is not possession or domination’, but rather ‘a form of loving contemplation, in which the barrier between subject and object falls as the subject recognizes himself in the object’. Hence, for Bachofen, ‘the ideal form of understanding’ involves ‘continuity between the knowing subject and the object of its quest or desire’. In other words, Bachofen’s empiricism implied ‘a kind of Goethean attentiveness to the object world with a view to discovering its internal laws, as opposed to the Kantian and Enlightenment effort to grasp the world’ by means of comparison, examination, distinction, abstraction, deduction, and demonstration. Here we might recall the evocation of Goethe’s own scientific method as a ‘tender empiricism’ (zarte Empirie), which ‘makes itself utterly identical with the object, thereby becoming true theory’; and compare it with Jung’s insistence, time and again, that he was an ‘empiricist’. In turn, the Swiss cultural historian Jacob Burckhardt (1818–97) spoke of the need for ‘attentive contemplation’, a view summarized in his letters to Willibald Beyschlag of 14 June 1842 and to Karl Fresenius of 19 June 1842:

Everything about my study of history, like my passion for travel, my mania for landscapes, and my interest in art, springs from an enormous desire for attentive contemplation [Anschauung] [. . .] turning on the objects of my study a gaze [Anschauung] that becomes with each passing day more and more penetrating and more and more oriented toward the essential.

Here, as elsewhere, Burckhardt liked to use the Goethean term, Anschauung, and in his lecture course on The Aesthetics of the Plastic Arts, he emphasized the role of the imagination in appreciating (ancient) works of art – ‘imagination’, he insisted, ‘must complete the work of the eye’ (die Phantasie muß ergänzen). (Gossman notes that one of Burckhardt’s contemporaries, the
German artist Hans von Marées (1837–87), once remarked that ‘learning to see is everything’ (Sehen lernen ist alles), itself an echo of Diderot’s remark in the Salon de 1765 that ‘one must teach the eye to look at nature; how many people have never seen her, and how many never will’ (il faut apprendre à l’œil à regarder la nature, et combien ne l’ont jamais vue et ne la verront jamais). In fact, Anschauung is, for Gossman, central to the values that Burckhardt admired in his native city, namely:

independence of mind, energy, resourcefulness, commercial flair, but at the same time respect for learning and the accumulated cultural heritage, recognition of the value of order, and a deep conviction that human life is enhanced by reverential contemplation or Anschauung of an ideal and beautiful existence, glimmering through the imperfect appearances of a shared objective world, rather than by self-indulgent subjectivism or concentration on the raw fragments of experience.

And Jung, too, of course, was a child of Basel.

Moreover, this entire problematic of historical interpretation and psychological methodology, the central dichotomies of ‘nomothetic’ versus ‘ideographic’ (Windelband), ‘natural science’ versus ‘cultural science’ (Rickert), ‘explanation’ versus ‘understanding’ (Dilthey), the philosophical vocabulary of ‘expression’, ‘experience’, Geist, Phantasie, Anschauung – all this informs Jung’s early writings. (We shall return to the question of Goethe’s influence on Jung’s archetypal method in volume 2.) So let us turn to the question of the use Jung made of the distinctions between analysis and synthesis, and so on, in his early writings.

In ‘The Analysis of Dreams’ (CW 4 §64–§94), originally published in French in 1909, Jung offered a conventional Freudian interpretation of Gretchen’s song, ‘There was a king of Thule’ (Es war ein König in Thule), from the ‘Evening’ scene in Faust, Part One. He began by suggesting that the latent content of the song is Gretchen’s distrust of Faust’s fidelity; that the image of the king is an analogy-association or symbol for Faust; and that her distrust remains repressed, emerging only in the form of the song (CW 4 §69–§71). Thus Jung saw in Gretchen’s song an example of Freud’s dictum from The Interpretation of Dreams that ‘a dream is the fulfilment of a wish’ (der Traum ist eine Wunscherfüllung) (SE 4, 121):

The hidden thought is Gretchen’s doubt about Faust’s fidelity. The song, unconsciously chosen by Gretchen, is what we have called the dream-material, which corresponds to the secret thought. One might apply this example to the dream, and suppose that Gretchen had not sung but dreamed this romance. In that case the song, with its tragic story of the loves of a far-off king of old, is the ‘manifest content’ of the dream, its ‘façade’. Anyone who did not know of Gretchen’s secret sorrow
would have no idea why she dreamt of this king. But we, who know the dream-thought which is her tragic love for Faust, can understand why the dream makes use of this particular song, for it is about the ‘rare faithfulness’ of the king. Faust is not faithful, and Gretchen would like his faithfulness to her to resemble that of the king in the story. Her dream – in reality her song – expresses in a disguised form the ardent desire of her soul. Here we touch upon the real nature of the feeling-toned complex; it is always a question of a wish and resistance to it.

(CW 4 §69)

Having established the psychological framework of his interpretation, Jung continues to examine other elements of Gretchen’s song in even closer detail, showing how, in this poetic text, the repressed returns:

Carrying our illustration further, we see that in the dream Faust is replaced by the king. A transformation has taken place. Faust has become the far-off old king; the personality of Faust, which has a strong feeling-tone, is replaced by a neutral, legendary person. The king is an association by analogy, a symbol for Faust, and the ‘mistress’ for Gretchen. We may ask what is the purpose of this arrangement, why Gretchen should dream, so to speak, indirectly about this thought, why she cannot conceive it clearly and without equivocation. This question is easily answered: Gretchen’s sadness contains a thought that no one likes to dwell upon; it would be too painful. Her doubt about Faust’s faithfulness is repressed and kept down. It makes its reappearance in the form of a melancholy story which, although it realizes her wish, is not accompanied by pleasant feelings. Freud says that the wishes which form the dream-thought are never desires which one openly admits to oneself, but desires that are repressed because of their painful character; and it is because they are excluded from conscious reflection in the waking state that they float up, indirectly, in dreams.

(CW 4 §71)

Yet in the same year, in a letter to Freud of 2–12 April 1909, Jung began speculating about the existence of what he termed ‘some quite special complex, a universal one having to do with the prospective tendencies in human-kind’. Drawing on ideas that have been shown to derive from the Romantic novelist E.T.A. Hoffmann (1776–1822), Jung went on to develop the notion of a psychology that does not just look back to the past, but also looks forward to the future. ‘If there is a “psychoanalysis”’, he argued, ‘there must also be a “psychosynthesis” which creates future events according to the same laws’.

This notion of a distinction between (psycho)analysis and (psycho)synthesis was to prove fundamental for Jung’s views on dream interpretation (and,
later, was to be developed by Hans Trüb, as well as Roberto Assagioli). For the moment, however, Freud’s reaction in his reply to Jung was not encouraging. He wrote:

I also shake my wise head over psychosynthesis and think: Yes, that’s how the young people are, the only places they really enjoy visiting are those they can visit without us, to which we with our short breath and weary legs cannot follow them.

Ignoring this response, Jung went on to argue, in three seminal texts written between 1911 and 1916, that *Faust* provided a blue-print for interpreting the unconscious – the unconscious which, he would now claim, was not just a personal, but also a collective one. The idea of a wholeness, founded equally upon analysis and synthesis, was one that had been envisaged by Goethe. And it was in respect of his reading of *Faust* that Jung was developing his distinctive theory of the unconscious, seeing in the symbolic realm of the aesthetic in that text a representation of what he would call the ‘collective unconscious’.

**Transformations and Symbols of the Libido**

These three texts representing a clear break with Freudian analysis and, at the same time, marking a new step in Jung’s reception of Goethe – *Transformations and Symbols of the Libido* (*Wandlungen und Symbole der Libido*) (1911/1912), ‘On Psychological Understanding’ (1914), and ‘La Structure de l’inconscient’ (1916) – are central for understanding Jung’s thought in the context of his own intellectual development and of the history of psychoanalysis. In them Jung shows that he now saw *Faust* as particularly open to interpretation from the perspective of analytical psychology.

In the revised version of ‘New Paths in Psychology’, entitled *The Psychology of the Unconscious*, he wrote that, in *Faust*, Part One, Goethe had shown us ‘what it means to accept instinct [das Annehmen des Triebes]’, while, in *Faust*, Part Two, he had shown ‘what it means to accept the ego and its weird unconscious world [das Annehmen des Ich und seines unheimlichen Hintergrundes]’ (CW 7 §43). On this view, in other words, Part One is the Freudian part, dealing with the theory of the drives, whereas Part Two is the Jungian part, dealing with the ‘uncanny background’ to the ego – the ‘self’. In this respect, Jung is echoing Goethe’s own statements in his conversations with Eckermann on 17 February 1831, when he claimed that ‘the first part is almost entirely subjective’, and ‘proceeded entirely from a perplexed impassioned individual, and his semi-darkness is probably highly pleasing to mankind’, but that ‘in the second part there is scarcely anything of the subjective’, for ‘here is seen a higher, broader, clearer, more passionless world, and he who has not looked about him and had some experience will
not know what to make of it’, and on 21 February 1831, when he contrasted
the Walpurgisnacht of Part One with the Klassische Walpurgisnacht of Part Two.72

In 1911 and 1912, Jung returned to the distinction between synthetic and
analytic approaches in his major work on Transformations and Symbols of
the Libido. By setting into motion the separation from Freud, this text, in
effect, launched the cause of analytical psychology. In Freud’s account of the
history of psychoanalysis, ‘On the History of the Psychoanalytic Movement’
(1914), written a couple of years after the publication of Transformations
and Symbols of the Libido, the persistence of Freud’s irritation with Jung is in
evidence. Here Freud portrayed Jung very much in terms of a mystic who,
like Alfred Adler (1870–1937), had abandoned the truth path of psycho-
analysis. Both Adler and Jung were, Freud wrote, guilty of the same basic
correct: ‘both court a favourable opinion by putting forward certain lofty ideas,
which view things, as it were, sub specie aeternitatis’ (SE 14, 58). But whereas
Adler, Freud claimed, had made a contribution to the psychology of the ego,
but paid too high a price by abandoning the fundamental theories of psycho-
analysis, Jung and his followers had ‘illuminated an important instance of the
sublimation of the erotic instinctual forces and of their transformation into
trends which can no longer be called erotic’ (SE 14, 61). Pointedly, if accu-
ately, Freud drew attention to ‘the theological prehistory’ of many of Jung’s
Swiss followers and, in particular, criticized Jungian psychology for having
abandoned the sexual theory of the libido. ‘For sexual libido an abstract
concept has been substituted’, he wrote, ‘of which one may safely say that
it remains mystifying and incomprehensible to wise men and fools alike’
(SE 14, 62). Along with the sexual theory of the libido, Freud wrote, Jung
regarded the incest complex as ‘merely “symbolic” ’ (nur “symbolisch”) (SE 14,
64). In other words, Jung, like Adler, had tried to create ‘a new religio-ethical
system’, which was bound to reinterpret, distort or jettison (umdeuten,
verzerren oder beseitigen) what Freud called ‘the factual findings of analysis’
(SE 14, 62). The Jungian school, Freud insisted, was based on nothing less
than a fundamental misunderstanding. ‘The truth is’, he declared in thunder-
ous tones, ‘that these people have picked out a few cultural overtones from
the symphony of life and have once more failed to hear the mighty and
primordial melody of the instincts’ (SE 14, 62). Yet, against Freud, one might
argue that, in Transformations and Symbols of the Libido, Jung did hear the
‘primordial melody’ of the instincts; he thought, however, that their tune was
a mythological one.

Whereas Freud’s own dreams had formed the central element of The
Interpretation of Dreams, Jung’s Transformations and Symbols of the Libido
was presented as a detailed commentary on the visions of a female patient
called Frank Miller, originally published by Théodore Flournoy (1854–1920)
in 1906.73 Nevertheless, in the introduction to the work, Jung paid tribute to
what he saw as the significance of The Interpretation of Dreams in his very
first triumphant sentences:
Anyone who can read Freud’s ‘Interpretation of Dreams’ without scientific rebellion at the newness and apparently unjustified daring of its analytical presentation, and without moral indignation at the astonishing nudity of the dream interpretation, and who can allow this unusual array of facts to influence his mind calmly and without prejudice, will surely be deeply impressed at that place where Freud calls to mind the fact that an individual psychological conflict, namely, the Incest Fantasy, is the essential root of that powerful, ancient, dramatic material, the Oedipus legend. The impression made by this simple reference may be likened to that wholly peculiar feeling which arises in us if, for example, in the noise and tumult of a modern street we should come across an ancient relic – the Corinthian capital of a walled-in column, or a fragment of inscription. Just a moment ago we were given over to the noisy, ephemeral life of the present, when something very far away and strange appears to us, which turns our attention to things of another order; a glimpse away from the incoherent multiplicity of the present to a higher coherence in history.

(Yet Jung’s work turns out also to represent a return to Faust, as is signalled in the first chapter, when he posits the view that ‘there must be typical myths which are really instruments of a folk-psychological complex treatment [völkerpsychologische Komplexbearbeitung]’, and cites Jacob Burckhardt in support of this insight. Burckhardt, Jung suggested, seemed to have ‘suspected’ or ‘intuited’ (geahnt) a similar view when he said ‘that every Greek of the classical era carried in himself a fragment of Oedipus, just as every German carries a fragment of Faust’ (PU §56). And, in the course of the work, Jung moves away from Oedipus and towards Faust; that is to say, away from the biological mother as the object of incestual desire and towards the Faustian Mothers as the symbol of a spiritual desire for rebirth.

When, in this work, Jung returned to the distinction of his earlier experimental writings between ‘synthetic’ and ‘analytic’ associations, he took up some implications of that distinction. In an important footnote, he defended himself against the charge of ‘mysticism’ (Mystizismus) – precisely the kind of charge that would be levelled against him by Freud. In this footnote Jung outlined the view he had proposed to Freud, that therapy should not just aim at psychological ‘analysis’ but, instead, should seek to realize what he called psychological ‘synthesis’. To begin with, Jung compared the task of analysis with historical method, describing its task as follows:

Doubtless the unconscious contains material which does not rise to the threshold of consciousness. The analysis dissolves these combinations into their historical determinants, for it is one of the essential tasks of analysis to render impotent by dissolution the content of the
complexes competing with the proper conduct of life. Psychoanalysis works backwards like the science of history.

(PU §99, n. 17)

For Jung, however, history has its limitations, and in two important respects. For, Jung’s argument continues, if history in some sense knows nothing of the past, then nor, by the same token, can it know anything of the future (PU §99, n. 17). There is an analogy, Jung suggests with psychology, for ‘just as the largest part of the past is so far removed that it is not reached by history, so, too, the greater part of the unconscious determinants is unreachable’ (PU §99, n. 17). This deficit with regard to knowledge of the future is one Jung believes can be made good:

Both perhaps might be attained with a certain probability; the first as a postulate, the second as an historical prognosis. Insofar as tomorrow is already contained in today, and all the threads of the future are in place, so a more profound knowledge of the past might render possible a more or less far-reaching and certain prognosis of the future.

( PU §99, n. 17)

Jung’s next step is, so he avers, a Kantian one:

Let us transfer this reasoning, as Kant has already done, to psychology. Then necessarily we must come to the same result. Just as traces of memory long since fallen below the threshold of consciousness are accessible in the unconscious, so, too, there are certain very fine subliminal combinations for the future which are of the greatest significance for future happenings, insofar as the future is conditioned by our own psychology. But just so little as the science of history concerns itself with the combinations for the future, which is the function of politics, so little, also, are the psychological combinations for the future the object of analysis; they would be much more the object of an infinitely refined psychological synthesis, which attempts to follow the natural current of the libido.

( PU §99, n. 17; my emphasis)

Here, the same argument as found in Jung’s letter to Freud of 2 April 1909 is restated in terms of a prospective schema, which became the conceptual basis for the distinction between what he saw as two entirely different psychologies. Whereas Freud’s is said to investigate the source of the neurosis (and hence, it is claimed, says nothing new), Jung’s concerns itself with the trajectory of the neurosis and its implications for the future development of the patient (and hence, so Jung thought, would show what it meant). Yet it remains unclear why retrospective enquiry should be any less ‘synthetic’ than prospective
enquiry – until, that is, one remembers that the context of Jung’s distinction between the analytic and the synthetic approach is not so much a scholastic/Kantian, as a Goethean, one.

In his conversation with Eckermann of 13 February 1829, cited above, Goethe distinguished between ‘the understanding’ (Verstand), which is concerned with ‘what has become, what is already fixed’ (mit dem Gewordenen, Erstarren), and ‘reason’ (Vernunft), which is concerned with ‘what is becoming, what is living’ (dem Werdenden, Lebendigen). But he also posited the existence of a ‘highest reason’ (höchste Vernunft), which would concern itself with the source of life, or with what Goethe here called ‘the divine’ (die Gottheit):

The understanding will not reach [nature]; the human being must be capable of elevating himself to the highest reason, to come into contact with the divinity, which manifests itself in the primitive phenomena [Urphänomenen], which dwells behind them, and from which they proceed. The divinity works in the living, not in the dead; in what is becoming and changing, not in what has become and is fixed. Therefore reason, with its tendency towards the divine, has only to do with what is becoming, what is living; but understanding with what has become, what is already fixed, that it may make use of it.\textsuperscript{75}

Significantly, Memories, Dreams, Reflections uses an almost identical term when recounting Jung’s decision, after the publication of Transformations and Symbols of the Libido, to leave his academic work. Here we read that Jung saw himself confronted with the alternative of carrying on with the academic career that lay stretched before him, or following his ‘inner personality’, his ‘higher reason’ (höhere Vernunft), and carrying on this ‘remarkable task’, namely, ‘the experiment of his confrontation with the unconscious’ (MDR, 219). In the particular context of Transformations and Symbols of the Libido, however, Jung’s synthetic-prospective approach itself offers an excellent example of how to exercise what Goethe called ‘highest reason’. For, ultimately, Jung’s chief concern in this work, as in his others, is the development of the synthetic totality of the individual. Although he would, as we shall see, later speak of this totality in (arguably, misleading) terms borrowed from theology, Jung’s method, like his conception of individual wholeness, is, rather, indebted to Goethe.

As well as a return to Faust, Jung’s Transformations and Symbols of the Libido represents an intensification of his interest in this text. In the course of his discussion, Jung mentions Goethe’s Faust on no fewer than twenty-one occasions. Indeed, one of Jung’s commentators, John Kerr, has described ‘the central motif’ of Transformations and Symbols of the Libido as ‘clearly Faustian’, and summarized its intentions as follows:
Casting aside the constraints of Christianity, Jung meant to make a descent into the depths of the soul, there to find the roots of Man’s being in the symbols of the libido which had been handed down from ancient times, and so to find redemption despite his own genial psychoanalytic pact with the devil.\(^7^6\)

Allusions and references to \textit{Faust} are subtly interwoven with Jung’s interpretations of Miss Frank Miller’s fantasies and with the general theory that he elaborates about the nature of the psyche. Looking back on the text in 1950, Jung wrote that ‘the symptoms of the case form the Ariadne thread to guide us through the labyrinth of symbolistic parallels’ (CW 5, p. xxv), a phrase which itself recalls one of the dominant metaphors of eighteenth-century philosophical discourse.\(^7^7\) In Letter 18 of his treatise \textit{On the Aesthetic Education of Humankind} (1795), for example, Schiller writes that beauty is ‘the thread’ that will guide us through ‘the whole labyrinth of aesthetics’.\(^7^8\) Equally, one might say, we can find a Goethean path through the labyrinth, even the thicket, of Jung’s text by following its references to \textit{Faust}.

Having described ‘the indirect course [\textit{der Umweg}] of the libido’ as ‘a way of sorrow’ (\textit{ein Leidensweg}) (PU §106), a phrase which echoes the eighteenth-century ‘doctrine of indirection’,\(^7^9\) and having embarked on the commentary of a poem by Miss Miller (PU §77), Jung does not miss the opportunity to bring in, not only the biblical Book of Job and Milton’s \textit{Paradise Lost}, but also the ‘Prologue in Heaven’ of \textit{Faust}, Part One (PU §106).\(^8^0\) Is there any method to what might seem to some like madness (and has been dismissed by some as such)? Far from being madness, the use of all these references constitutes Jung’s method or technique of amplification which, in ‘New Paths in Psychology’, he described in terms of analysis and synthesis. The ‘fundamental realization’ he had made, he wrote, was that ‘analysis, insofar as it is reduction and nothing more’, must ‘necessarily be followed by synthesis’, and that ‘certain kinds of psychic material’ mean ‘next to nothing’ if they are ‘simply broken down’, but they display ‘a wealth of meaning’ if, instead of being ‘broken down’, that meaning is ‘reinforced and extended by all the conscious means at our disposal’ – by the method, in other words, of ‘amplification’.\(^8^1\) For Jung, ‘the images or symbols of the collective unconscious yield their distinctive values only when subjected to a synthetic mode of treatment’ (CW 7 §122). In the introduction to \textit{Transformations and Symbols of the Libido} itself, Jung paid tribute to the work of Franz Riklin (1878–1938), Karl Abraham (1877–1925), Otto Rank (1884–1939), Alphonse Maeder (1882–1971), Ernest Jones (1879–1958), Herbert Silberer (1882–1922), and Oskar Pfister (PU §4), as well as to Freud’s paper on Leonardo da Vinci (PU §5). In a later work, Jung claimed that this technique was derived from the alchemical procedure of \textit{amplificatio} (CW 12 §403), but it also has much in common with an age-old ancient rhetorical technique.\(^8^2\) In \textit{Memories, Dreams, Reflections}, we find an emphasis on the necessity of the
method of *amplificatio* for the imagination. ‘It is all-important’, we are
told, ‘for a disciplined imagination [{*eine disziplinierte Phantasie*}] to build
up images of intangibles by logical principles and on the basis of empirical
data, that is, on the evidence of dreams’, a technique described as ‘the
method of the necessary statement’ (die Methode der “notwendigen Aussage”)
(MDR, 341).

As we shall see, Jung’s understanding of *Faust* had developed consider-
ably since his first reading, at least as it is presented in *Memories, Dreams,
Reflections*. For, further on in *Transformations and Symbols of the Libido*,
his discussion of Miss Miller’s poem, ‘The moth to the sun’, leads him to
compare it with part of Faust’s description of the evening when walking with
Wagner in the scene ‘Outside the City Gate’ (*Vor dem Tor*) in Part One (PU
§133–§136). Jung’s commentary on these lines begins by reminding us of
Faust’s words when preparing to drink the poison: ‘I will be resolute, and
turn away / For ever from the earth’s sweet day’ (*Ja, kehre nur der holden
Erdensonne / Entschlossen deinen Rücken zu!*). In these lines Jung claims to
find a religious significance, and he appears sympathetic to Faust’s distrustful
stance, arguing that ‘the honouring of the beauty of nature’ had

led the Christian of the Middle Ages to pagan thoughts which lay in an
antagonistic relation to his conscious religion, just as once Mithraism was
in threatening competition with Christianity, for Satan often disguises
himself as an angel of light.

(BU §135)

Broadening his focus, however, Jung sees Faust’s dilemma, both psycholog-
ically and culturally speaking, as in some way typical. In a dialogue with
Wagner in the scene ‘Outside the City Gate’ in Part One, Faust cries out, in
the lines that, according to *Memories, Dreams, Reflections*, Jung had believed
were ‘directed straight at’ him:

In me there are two souls, alas, and their
Division tears my life in two.
One loves the world, it clutches her, it binds
Itself to her, clinging with furious lust;
The other longs to soar beyond the dust
Into the realm of high ancestral minds.

*Zwei Seelen wohnen, ach! in meiner Brust,*
*Die eine will sich von der andern trennen;*
*Die eine hält in derber Liebeslust*
*Sich an die Welt mit klammernden Organen;*
*Die andre hebt gewaltsam sich vom Dust*
*Zu den Gefilden hoher Ahnen.*

65 Jung’s early reception of Goethe and Faust
This passage provides the obvious context for what is virtually a gloss on these lines. ‘The longing of Faust became his ruin’, Jung observes, for ‘the longing for the beyond [die Sehnsucht nach dem Jenseitigen] had brought as a consequence a loathing for life’, and Faust ‘stood on the brink of self-destruction’. At the same time, however, ‘the longing for the beauty of this world [die Sehnsucht nach der Schönheit des Diesseits] led him anew to ruin, into doubt and pain, even to [Gretchen’s] tragic death’. Jung talks about Faust as if he were a real, living person (or perhaps, given his own identification with Faust of which Memories, Dreams, Reflections speaks, Faust was indeed a real, living person, for in him Jung saw himself). Faust’s mistake, then, was that ‘he followed after both worlds with no check to the driving force of his libido, as a man of great passion’ (PU §136).

In this respect, Faust’s dilemma is not simply Jung’s, it is the one, single, universal dilemma of analytical psychology. How can one maintain a balance between the drive inwards, towards the subject, away from the world, towards the ‘other side’ (or, in other words, introversion) and the drive outwards, towards the object, away from the self, towards the beauty of the here-and-now (or, in other words, extraversion)? To maintain a reciprocal relationship between the self and the world is, as Goethe knew, no easy matter: according to Dichtung und Wahrheit, the early struggle to maintain it led to the psychological state in which he wrote The Sufferings of Young Werther (1774). ‘That resolution to let my inner nature follow its own course and to let outer nature influence me in its own capacity,’ we read in Part Three, Book 12, ‘brought me to the strange circumstances under which Werther was conceived and written’ (GE 4, 399), an account which continues as follows:

I was trying to free myself inwardly of everything alien, to observe external things lovingly [das Äußere liebevoll zu betrachten], and to let all beings, from the human down to those barely perceptible, have their effect on me, each in its own way. Thus there arose a marvellous feeling of kinship with individual objects in nature [eine wundersame Verwandtschaft mit den einzelnen Gegenständen der Natur], and a heartfelt accord or harmony with the whole [ein inniges Anklingen, ein Mitstimmen ins Ganze], so that every alternation affected me deeply, whether it was of places or regions, or of times of day and seasons, or of whatever else might occur.

(GE 4, 399)

In his revised version, published as Symbols of Transformation in 1952, Jung was to pose the same problem of ‘the longing for the beyond’ and ‘the longing for the beauty of this world’, in terms of which he had earlier interpreted Faust’s dilemma in Transformations and Symbols of the Libido, in the following – highly Nietzschean – categories:
Whoever loves the earth and its glory, and forgets the ‘dark realm’, or confuses the two (which is mostly what happens), has spirit for his enemy; and whoever flees from the earth and falls into the ‘eternal arms’ has life for an enemy.

Wer die Erde liebt und deren Pracht und das “dunkle Reich” darob vergißt oder gar damit ersetzt (was die Regel bildet), der hat den “Geist” zum Feinde, und wer die Erde flieht, um in die “ewigen Arme” zu fallen, dem ist das Leben feind.

(CW 5 §615)

Yet there is, Jung claimed, something striking as well as paradigmatic about Faust’s dilemma. It may well be that ‘Faust portrays once more the folk-psychological conflict [den völkerpsychologischen Konflikt] of the beginning of the Christian era’, but what is ‘noteworthy’ is that he does so ‘in reverse order’ (PU §136). Unlike St Alypius, the younger friend of St Augustine; unlike Virgil, in his Fourth Eclogue (PU §137); and unlike the monks and the anchorites of Europe as a whole (PU §138), Faust rejects asceticism. For Jung, this rejection constitutes Faust’s ‘inversion’ of the problem of Christianity. ‘Faust takes the reverse course’, he argues, because ‘for him the ascetic ideal means death’. In the case of Faust, he ‘struggles for freedom and wins life, at the same time giving himself over to the evil one’; but, through this, ‘he becomes the bringer of death to her whom he loves most’, to Gretchen. Later, in Part Two, Faust ‘tears himself away from pain and sacrifices his life in unceasing useful work, through which he saves many lives’ (PU §139). According to Jung, this ‘double mission as saviour and destroyer’ is hinted at ‘in a preliminary manner’ in his conversation with Wagner in Part One, when he relates how he and his father had, in their alchemical attempts to make medicine, poisoned thousands (PU §139).

Thus, according to Jung, the cultural and psychological significance of Goethe’s Faust lies in its recapitulation of a problem as fundamental to the modern world as that of Oedipus for the Hellenic world – while not (an implicit criticism of Freud) being identical with that Oedipal problem. What precisely constitutes ‘the deep significance of Goethe’s Faust’ is, for Jung, that Goethe’s character ‘clothes in words a problem of modern humankind which has been turning in restless slumber since the Renaissance’ (PU §141). That problem – the problem of modernity – Jung’s problem – our problem – is, put quite simply, this: ‘What is to be the way out between the Scylla of renunciation of the world and the Charybdis of the acceptance of the world?’ (Was soll der Ausweg sein, zwischen der Scylla der Weltverneinung und der Charybdis der Weltbejahung?) (PU §141). Just as the problem is posed with reference to Faust, so the answer turns out to be formulated in Faustian terms.
‘The Mothers! the Mothers!’

In the introduction to Part Two of *Transformations and Symbols of the Libido*, Jung defines the libido as ‘the driving force of the soul’ (PU §201), and points out that it is often symbolized in the form of something apparently sexual – ‘the phallic symbol of the libido’ (*das phalische Symbol der Libido*) (PU §206). In fact, Jung views sexuality itself as a metaphor for creativity, in the same way that Goethe, in his early poem *Kenner und Künstler*, written for Charlotte von Stein in 1777, views the source of art as a reconfiguration of precisely our animal, instinctual, and sexual forces:

O advise, help me,
That I may become perfect!
Where is the original source of nature,
Upon which I draw to
Feel the sky and life
Right into the tips of my fingers,
That I, with the mind of gods
And the hand of man
May be able to shape and mould,
As with my woman
I, like an animal, can and must?

O ratet, helft mir,
Daß ich mich vollende!
Wo ist der Urquell der Natur,
Daraus ich schöpfend
Himmel fühl’ und Leben
In die Fingerspitzen empor,
Daß ich mit Göttersinn
Und Menschenhand
Vermöɡ’ zu bilden,
Was bei meinem Weib
Ich animalisch kann und muß?89

Then again, Schiller’s distichon ‘To the Poet’ (*An den Dichter*) expresses a similar confidence in the analogy between the poet and the lover: ‘Let language be for you what the body is for the lover: it alone / Is what binds the bodies together and yet keeps them separate’ (*Laß die Sprache dir seyn, was der Körper den Liebenden; er nur / Ists, der die Wesen trennt und der die Wesen vereint*).90

In terms of *Faust*, ‘the phallic symbol of the libido’ turns out to be the key that Mephistopheles gives Faust in the celebrated Mothers scene of Part Two.91 Incidentally, it is to this episode that Freud humorously alludes in his letter of 2 June 1932 to Stefan Zweig, in which he criticizes Joseph Breuer’s
failure to draw the psychoanalytic conclusion during his treatment of ‘Anna O’ (Bertha Pappenheim). As Freud relates,

What really happened with Breuer’s patient, I was able to guess later on, long after the break in our relations, when I suddenly remembered something Breuer had once told me in another context before we had begun to collaborate and which he never repeated. On the evening of the day when all her symptoms had been disposed of, he was summoned to the patient again, found her confused and writhing in abdominal cramps. Asked what was wrong with her, she replied: ‘Now Dr B.’s child is coming!’ At this moment he held in his hand the key that would have opened the ‘doors to the Mothers’, but he let it drop.

‘With all his great intellectual gifts there was nothing Faustian in his nature’, as Freud savagely comments.92

For Jung, the key that Mephistopheles gives Faust in the Mothers scene is typical of ‘primitive libido symbolism’, inasmuch as it shows ‘how immediate is the connection between phallic libido and light’ (PU §335). In this scene, Mephistopheles provides Faust with the phallic key that enables him to gain access to the realm of the Mothers, which is beyond time and space.93 At the end of Chapter 4 in Part Two of Transformations and Symbols of the Libido, Jung quotes extensively, over almost two pages, from the ‘Dark Gallery’ scene in Act 1 of Faust, Part Two. Jung introduces these passages, which are presented with almost no commentary, by means of the following brief explanation:

The myth of the hero [. . .] is, as it appears to me, the myth of our own suffering unconscious, which has an unquenchable longing for all the deepest sources of our own being; for the body of the mother, and through it for communion with infinite life in the countless forms of existence. Here I must introduce the Master who has divined the deepest roots of Faustian longings

(PU §317)

and then the passages simply follow on.94

In his record of his conversation with Goethe of 10 January 1830, Eckermann recalls how, when asked about the meaning of the scene when Faust meets the Mothers, Goethe, ‘as usual, wrapped himself up in mystery, as he looked on me with wide-open eyes and repeated the words: “The Mothers! Mothers! nay, it sounds so strange” ’.95 It does not require much effort to imagine Jung doing much the same thing in his own lectures and seminars. (Not for nothing did Gottfried Benn remark that the Mothers were the ‘favourite German place of residence’.)96 Studying the manuscript of the Mothers scene, Eckermann came to the conclusion that the Mothers
represented ‘the creating and sustaining principle’ and, on the evidence available, this seems close to how Jung understood the scene. For him, the Mothers represented the source of creativity; just as, for the (post-)Freudian Jung, the source of the libido was the (collective) unconscious. In the poetic words of *Transformations and Symbols of the Libido*, ‘it is life from the life of humankind’, since

its springs, which well up from the depths of the unconscious, come, as does our life in general, from the root of the whole of humanity, since we are indeed only a twig broken off from the mother and transplanted.

(PU §315)

Or, as Jung had put it as early as 23 June 1911 in a letter to Freud in which he quoted *Faust*:

Unconscious fantasy is an amazing witches’ cauldron:

‘Formation, transformation,
Eternal Mind’s eternal recreation.
Thronged round with images of things to be,
They see you not, shadows are all they see.’

[“*Gestaltung, Umgestaltung,*  
*Des ewigen Sinnes ewige Unterhaltung,*  
*Umschwebt von Bildern aller Kreatur.*  
*Sie seh dich nicht, denn Schemen seh sie nur.*’]

This is the matrix of the mind, as the little great-grandfather correctly saw.

Or again, in the words of Goethe’s conversation with Friedrich Wilhelm Riemer (1774–1845) of 5 August 1810, ‘the human being cannot remain for long in a conscious state or in consciousness; he has to take flight into the unconscious, for therein lie his roots’ (*der Mensch kann nicht lange im bewußten Zustande oder im Bewußtsein verharren; er muß sich wieder ins Unbewußtsein flüchten, denn darin lebt seine Wurzel*).

According to the Jungian model of the unconscious, life consists, not in being, but in becoming, and hence he compares it to the undulating, weaving motion of the Earth Spirit (*Erdgeist*) in the ‘Night’ scene of Part One, ‘an eternal wave, / Turning, returning, / A life ever burning’ (*Ein ewiges Meer, / Ein wechselnd Weben, / Ein glühend Leben*) (PU §334). Typically, Jung argues, desire for this source of life is projected in terms of the desire for the Mother (PU §340). In the religious tradition of the West, he claims, this desire is expressed in the images of the biblical Apocalypse, to which the ‘Mountain Gorges’ scene of *Faust*, Part Two, and in particular, the prayer of Doctor Marianus, allude (PU §341).
On the basis of these passages from *Faust*, Jung develops his model of the unconscious, going on to argue that such desire for the Mother, and its apparently (but only apparently) incestuous implications, form the basis of all heroic legends. Jung emphasizes that ‘it is most especially the totality of the sun myth’ which offers proof that the fundamental basis of the ‘incestuous’ desire does not aim at cohabitation, but at the special thought of becoming a child again, of turning back to the parent’s protection, of entering into the mother once more in order to be born again.

(PU §342)

So the Mother with which Jung is concerned is not the biological mother, but an archetypal one or, as he puts it, ‘the great primitive idea [das “große urtümliche Bild”] of the mother’, the mother who, ‘in the first place, meant to us our individual world and afterwards became the symbol of all worlds’ (PU §381). This notion of the Mother is explicitly compared by Jung to the Mothers in *Faust*, reminding us that Goethe said they are ‘encircled by images of all creatures’ (umschwebt von Bildern aller Kreatur) (PU §381).101

In this sense, the desire for the Mother is also Faust’s heroic desire, as detected by Jung in the scenes ‘Outside the City Gate’ and ‘Night’ in Part One, for the mystery of rebirth and immortality, the fact of death and the possibility of something lying beyond. ‘Like that of every hero’, Jung writes, the desire of Faust ‘inclines towards the mysteries of rebirth, of immortality’. And therefore, we learn, ‘his course leads to the sea, and down into the monstrous jaws of death, the horror and narrowness of which at the same time signify the new day’ (PU §421).102 In (Jungian) psychological terms, what Faust undertakes, is the act of *introversion*, ‘a source of the reanimation of the mother-imago [Mutterimago]’, such as Jung has already mentioned in his discussion of the Mothers scene. In ‘the willed introversion of a creative mind’, it ‘retreats before its own problem and inwardly collects its forces, dipping at least for a moment into the source of life, in order there to wrest a little more strength from the mother for the completion of its work’. Such an act of introversion is described as ‘a mother–child play with one’s self [ein Mutter-Kind-Spiel mit sich selber], in which lies much weak self-admiration and self-adulation’, in connection with which Jung alludes to a line in a poem by Nietzsche, ‘among a hundred mirrors’ (zwischen hundert Spiegeln).103 This introversion is further described as ‘a narcissistic state, for profane eyes perhaps a strange spectacle [ein wunderliches Schauspiel]’. Yet the therapeutic benefits of this process are immeasurable. ‘The separation from the mother-imago, the birth out of one’s self [die Geburt aus sich selber]’, Jung maintains, ‘reconciles all conflicts through its sufferings’ (PU §469).104

Such a voyage to the psychic depths is, however, not without its dangers. For, as Mephistopheles tells Faust, ‘the danger is great’ (die Gefahr ist
Although the nature of Faust’s descent to the Mothers marks him out as an archetypal hero – he must stamp his feet to descend and return (PU §489) and, as he does so, he is swallowed up like a cloud (PU §549, n. 47) – there is, Jung warns, the danger of remaining stuck in regressive fantasy. Nevertheless, this risk must be taken by the individual if he or she is to rescue the libido, ‘the incomparable treasure’ (den unermesslichen Schatz) (PU §578). As Faust puts it in the scene ‘A Dark Gallery’:

Yet must I turn to stone? Not so I’ll thrive!
Our sense of awe’s what keeps us most alive.
The world chokes human feeling more and more,
But deep dread still can move us to the core.

_Doch im Erstarren such ich nicht mein Heil,
Das Schaudern ist der Menschheit bestes Teil;
Wie auch die Welt ihm das Gefühl verteure,
Ergriffen, fühlt er tief das Ungeheure._

Condensing, _à la_ Freud, two separate texts by Goethe and Friedrich Hölderlin (1770–1843), Jung writes that, ‘where “the danger is great” ’, ‘there “the God is near” ’ (wo “die Gefahr groß” ist, dort ist “der Gott nahe”) – ‘there human beings may find their inner sun, their own sun-like and self-renewing nature, hidden in the mother-womb like the sun in the night-time’ (PU §652).

Jung’s view of the unconscious as set out in _Transformations and Symbols of the Libido_ could be summarized as follows. Whereas, for Freud, the unconscious contains only repressed feelings, infantile fixations and primitive, and archaic urges, by contrast Jung claims that the unconscious is a repository of libidinal (that is, psychic) energy, structured by the archetypes and put at the disposal of humankind through the mechanism of regression. And if, for Freud, regression was essentially something negative and infantile, then for Jung, it was yet a means of psychic development and renewal. In awesome, almost messianic tones Jung declares:

Therefore, when some great work is to be accomplished, before which the weak human recoils, doubtful of his strength, his libido returns to that source – and this is the dangerous moment, in which the decision takes place between annihilation and new life.

(PU §459)

The dangers, however, are not only immense, but also twofold. First, there is the danger that the libido may never return from the collective unconscious, leading to the psychic ‘death’ of the individual (that is, _dementia praecox_, or schizophrenia):
These depths are enticing; they are the mother and – death. When the libido leaves the bright upper world, whether from the decision of the individual or from decreasing life force, then it sinks back into its own depths, into the source from which it has gushed forth, and turns back to that point of cleavage, the umbilicus, through which it once entered into this body. This point of cleavage is called the mother, because from her comes the source of the libido. [...] If the libido remains arrested in the wonder kingdom of the inner world, then the human being has become for the world above a phantom, then he is practically dead or desperately ill.

(PU §459)

Second, there is the danger that the mother, rather than nurturing the individual, instead tempts the individual to the depths, from which he or she shall never return (that is, to death). Thus the figure of the mother acquires a dual role, as both the ‘caring’ mother – and the ‘terrible’ mother:

The libido of humankind is always in advance of our consciousness; unless our libido calls us forth to new dangers, we sink into slothful inactivity or, on the other hand, childish longing for the mother overcomes us at the summit of our existence, and we allow ourselves to become pitifully weak, instead of striving with desperate courage towards the highest. The mother becomes the demon, who summons the hero to adventure, and who also places in his path the poisonous serpent, which will strike him. [...] This danger lurking in the west is known to mean death, which no-one, not even the mightiest, escapes.

(PU §549–§550)

Yet this temptation, for that is what it is, is a necessary one, and this danger is a necessary danger. For such is, in Jung’s view, the only path to new life. ‘If the libido succeeds in tearing itself loose and pushing up into the world above’, he writes, ‘then a miracle appears’. A miracle? Assuredly so. For then ‘this journey to the underworld has been a fountain of youth, and from apparent death springs new fertility’ (PU §459). The image Jung chose to express this fight between life and death was the ancient symbol of the sun:

The sun, victoriously arising, tears itself away from the embrace and clasp, from the enveloping womb of the sea, and sinks again into the maternal sea, into night, the all-enveloping and the all-reproducing, leaving behind it the heights of midday, and all its glorious works. This image was the first, and was profoundly entitled to become the symbolic carrier of human destiny; in the morning of life man painfully tears himself loose from the mother, from the domestic hearth, to rise through battle to his heights, not seeing his worst enemy in front of him, but bearing him
within himself as a deadly longing for the depths within, for drowning in his own source, for becoming absorbed into the mother.

(PU §566)\(^{109}\)

As the passage continues, so Jung, writing several decades before Freud postulated the existence of \textit{Thanatos},\(^ {110}\) envisages a kind of ‘death-drive’ within the individual:

His life is a constant struggle with death, a violent and transitory deliverance from the always lurking night. This death is no external enemy, but a deep personal longing for quiet and for the profound peace of non-existence, for a dreamless sleep in the ebb and flow of the sea of life. Even in his highest endeavour for harmony and equilibrium, for philosophical depths and artistic enthusiasm [\textit{künstlerischer “Ergrieffenheit”}], he seeks death, immobility, satiety, and rest.

(\textit{PU} §566)

So the central message of \textit{Transformations and Symbols of the Libido} could be easily and accurately summarized in the injunction from Goethe’s ‘Sacred Yearning’ (\textit{Selige Sehnsucht}), ‘die and become!’ (\textit{stirb und werde!}).\(^ {111}\)

Furthermore, Jung’s (psychological) notion of regression can be understood in terms of Goethe’s (ethical) model of renunciation. ‘Renunciation’ in Goethe’s work is a central, if contested, theme,\(^ {112}\) yet we have seen that Jung already refers to renunciation in his analysis of Faust’s dilemma (PU §141). The following passage from \textit{Transformations and Symbols of the Libido} can be read as an elaboration of the idea of renunciation. In it Jung refers to the Greek legend according to which the centaur Peirithoos joined Theseus in his descent to Hades to carry off Persephone from the underworld; after their failure and imprisonment, Theseus was rescued by Heracles, but Peirithoos remained below:\(^ {113}\)

If, like Peirithoos, [the individual] tarries too long in this place of rest and peace, he is overcome by torpidity, and the poison of the serpent paralyzes him for all time. If he is to live he must fight and \textit{sacrifice his longing for the past}, in order to rise to his own heights. And having reached the noonday heights, he must also \textit{sacrifice the love for his own achievement}, for he may not loiter. The sun also sacrifices its greatest strength in order to hasten onwards to the fruits of autumn, which are the seeds of immortality; fulfilled in children, in works, in posthumous fame, in a new order of things, all of which in their turn begin and complete the sun’s course over again.

(\textit{PU} §566)

Finally, \textit{Transformations and Symbols of the Libido} contains hints of another
possible reading that takes us beyond the stated, and somewhat melancholy, conclusion of the final pages of the book – that ‘the only one who really understands us is the mother’ (die einzige, die uns wirklich versteht, ist die Mutter) (PU §700). In his chapter on the unconscious origin of the hero, Jung remarks, echoing Faust’s words in the ‘Midnight’ scene of Part Two, ‘Let him stand fast in this world, and look round / With courage: here so much is to be found!’ (Er stehe fest und sehe hier sich um; / Dem Tüchtigen ist diese Welt nicht stumm),\(^\text{114}\) that ‘this world is empty to him alone who does not understand how to direct his libido towards objects, and to render them alive and beautiful for himself’ (leer ist diese Welt nur dem, der es nicht versteht, seine Libido auf die Dinge zu lenken und sie für ihn lebendig und schön zu machen) (PU §284). Indeed, seen in (these insinuated) terms of aesthetics, the message of the entire book is the importance of imagination (or, as Jung terms it, fantasy). The role of fantasy or imagination in the psychic economy of the individual was to remain a central concern of Jung’s psychological theories, where it was developed in later works with specific reference to Goethe, as well as to Schiller.

‘On Psychological Understanding’

In his lecture ‘On Psychological Understanding’ (1914), published as a supplement to the second edition of The Content of the Psychoses (1908; 1914) (CW 3 §388–§424), Jung began to articulate more explicitly the difference between his approach and Freud’s, between an ‘analytic’ approach and a ‘synthetic’ approach, with reference to the problem of interpreting Faust.

Jung’s starting-point in this paper is Freud’s analysis of the case of Daniel Schreber, published in 1911 as ‘Psycho-Analytic Notes on an Autobiographical Account of a Case of Paranoia (Dementia Paranoides)’.\(^\text{115}\) The chief theses of this study were, in Freud’s words, that ‘the neuroses arise in the main from a conflict between the ego and the sexual instinct’, and that ‘the forms which the neuroses assume retain the imprint of the course of development followed by the libido – and by the ego’ (SE 12, 79). For political reasons, perhaps, Freud added in the postscript published in 1912, that

my analysis of a paranoid patient may serve to show that Jung had excellent grounds for his assertion that the mythopoetic forces of mankind are not extinct, but that to this very day they give rise in the neuroses to the same psychical products as in the remotest past ages.

(SE 12, 82)

For his part, in ‘On Psychological Understanding’ Jung attributes the limitations of Freud’s analysis to the fact that although ‘the analytical-reductive procedure’ may work well with some cases, such as hysteria, it is less successful
at dealing with others, such as schizophrenia (dementia praecox). As an example of his feeling ‘that this method does not altogether do justice to the almost overpowering profusion of fantastic symbolization’, Jung cites the case of Faust. When a commentator on Faust ‘traces back all the multifarious material of Part Two to its historical sources’, or when he

gives a psychological analysis of Part One, showing how the conflict in the drama springs from a conflict in the soul of the poet, and how this subjective conflict is itself based on those ultimate and universal problems which are in nowise foreign to us because we all carry the seeds of them in our own hearts,

our response, Jung says, is one of gratitude. ‘Nevertheless’, he adds, ‘we are a little disappointed’ – because such an approach risks being too reductive. After all, he notes, ‘we do not read Faust just to discover that things everywhere are “human, all-too-human” ’ (CW 3 §391).

So what do we, as readers, want? According to Jung, our primary interest lies with the author. We want to discover, he says, ‘how a man like Goethe deals with these human banalities, and how he redeems his soul from bondage to them’ (CW 3 §391). In short, behind all the points of individual detail, there lies the question of the meaning of the whole. ‘Once we have discovered who the “Proktophantasmist” is’ – as already noted, it is Nicolai – and once we know ‘to what historical events and figures the symbolism of Part Two refers, and how closely interwoven all this is with the human personality of the poet’, then, says Jung, ‘we come to regard these determining factors as far less important than the question of what the poet means by this symbolization’ (CW 3 §391).

At this point in his paper, Jung reintroduces the opposition between, on the one hand, ‘retrospective understanding’ (ein Verstehen nach rückwärts), that is, the ‘analytic-reductive’ approach, which reduces ‘the unknown to the known and the complicated to the simple’; and, on the other, what Jung calls ‘prospective understanding’ (ein Verstehen nach vorwärts), that is, a ‘constructive’, or ‘synthetic’, method (konstruktive Methode). Influenced, perhaps, by Dilthey’s argument that what distinguished the humanities (Geisteswissenschaften) from natural science (Naturwissenschaften) was the reliance of the former on Verstehen (‘understanding’ – or interpretation from within) and of the latter on Erklären (‘explanation’ – or interpretation from outside), Jung describes Freud’s method of psychological explanation (psychologische Erklärungsmethode) as ‘strictly scientific’ (streng wissenschaftlich) (CW 3 §392). Yet this ‘scientific’ method is, Jung argues, inadequate to explain something as complex as Faust:

When we apply this method to Faust, it becomes clear that something more is required for a real understanding. We even realize that we have
completely missed the deepest meaning the poet strove to express if we see in it only the universally human – for we can see the universally human wherever we look. What we really want to find in *Faust* is how this human being redeems himself as an individual, and when we have understood that, we have understood Goethe’s symbolism.

(CW 3 §393)

(Critics of Jung will doubtless appreciate the caveat he adds here, when he writes that although it is true that we may ‘make the mistake of thinking that we have understood Goethe himself’, he urges us to be ‘cautious and modest’, and simply to say that ‘we have understood ourselves with the help of *Faust*’ [CW 3 §393].)

To use the terminology deployed by Jung in his lecture, such understanding is ‘subjective’, rather than ‘objective’. However, Jung uses the term ‘objective’ in his discussion in two ways. First, it describes a ‘scientific’, that is, causal, understanding (wir reden zwar von “objektivem” Verstehen, wenn wir nach [dem] Kausalprinzip erklärt haben) (CW 3 §395). And second, it describes a kind of understanding which is ‘real and effective’ (wirklich und wirkend) when, to use a later phrase Jung attributes to Ludwig Feuerbach (1804–72), it stands ‘in accord with that of other reasonable beings’ (in Übereinstimmung mit mehreren anderen vernünftigen Wesen) (CW 3 §416). Such understanding, he continues, is ‘objective’ when it ‘connects with life’ (der Anschluß an das Leben ist erreicht); and, in a footnote, he comments that in this context ‘objective understanding’ is not the same as ‘causal understanding’ (CW 3 §416, n. 15). In terms of the emphasis on a dialectic between subject and object (and, indeed, on an intersubjective level), this second kind of ‘objective’ thinking is close to the ‘objective thinking’ (gegenständliches Denken) espoused by Goethe. In ‘Significant Help Given by an Ingenious Turn of Phrase’ (Bedeutende Fördernis durch ein einziges geistreiches Wort) (1823), Goethe welcomed the commendation afforded his work by the Leipzig professor of psychiatry and anthropology, Johann Christian Heinroth (1773–1843), in his *Textbook of Anthropology* (Lehrbuch der Anthropologie) (1822), of how his thinking ‘works objectively’. What this meant, Goethe explained, is that

my thinking is not separate from objects; that the elements of the object, the perceptions [die Anschauungen] of the object, flow into my thinking and are fully permeated by it; that my perception [mein Anschauen] itself is a thinking, and my thinking a perception.

(GE 12, 39)

Thus, paradoxically, what Jung calls ‘subjective thinking’ corresponds to this second (Goethean) kind of ‘objective’ thinking; it is a form of thinking that relates the object to the subject.
So in 1914, Jung was not satisfied with just historico-literary or psycho-analytic readings, but felt the need for an approach capable of delivering what he regarded as a less superficial explanation:

Anyone who understands Faust ‘objectively’, from the causal standpoint, is – to take a drastic example – like someone who tries to understand a Gothic cathedral under its historical, technical, and finally its mineralogical aspect. But where is the meaning [der Sinn] of the marvellous edifice? Where is the answer to that all-important question: what goal of redemption did the human being of the Gothic period seek in his work, and how have we to understand his work subjectively, in and through ourselves?

(CW 3 §396)\(^{118}\)

For Jung, the essential precondition of understanding something psychological was the awareness that all knowledge is subjectively conditioned; that is to say, ‘the world is not “objective” only; it is also as we see it’ (die Welt ist auch, wie wir sie sehen, und nicht nur schlechthin objektiv) (CW 3 §397). And so Jung opens up the possibility of a reading of Faust that is not ‘causal’ or ‘reductive’ but rather ‘synthetic’ or ‘constructive’:\(^{119}\)

A causal understanding of Faust tells us very clearly how it came to be a finished work of art, but it does not show us its living meaning created by the poet [den vom Dichter erschaffenen lebendigen Sinn], which is only alive because we experience it in and through ourselves [der darum lebendig ist, weil wir ihn an und in uns selber erleben]. Insofar as our actual life, the life we live here and now, is something essentially new and not just a continuation of the past, the main value of a work of art does not lie in its causal development but in its living effect [in seinem lebendigen Wirken]. We should be depreciating a work like Faust if we regarded it merely as something that has come to be, and is finished and done with. Faust is understood only when it is apprehended as something that becomes alive and creative again and again in our own experience [ein immer aufs neue Werdendes und Zu-Erlebendes].

(CW 3 §398)

The essential perceptiveness of Jung’s insight into Faust becomes clear if we compare his comments with the notion of a ‘diachronic’ (as opposed to ‘synchronic’) approach to the text, such as the one proposed by Elizabeth M. Wilkinson.\(^ {120}\)

Such a style of interpretation could also be applied, Jung suggested, to the interpretation of the human psyche. For ‘the human psyche’ (die menschliche Seele) is only in one respect ‘something that has come to be’ (ein Gewordenes) and, as such, subject to the causal standpoint. In other respects,
it is ‘something in the process of becoming’ (*ein Werdendes*), which ‘can only be grasped synthetically or constructively’ (*das nur synthetisch oder konstruktiv erfaßt werden kann*) (CW 3 §399). In other words, we should, Jung believed, read *Faust* as we would ‘read’ the psyche, and ‘read’ the psyche as we would read *Faust*. Or, to be more precise, a careful reading of *Faust* will put us in a position to ‘read’ the psyche.

In Jung’s terms, the psyche occupies the point of intersection (*Durchgangspunkt*) between the past and the future. For the psyche provides us with ‘a picture of the remnants and traces [*Niederschlag*] of all that is past’, and yet in this picture it also gives us ‘a picture of the burgeoning knowledge of all that is to come [*ein Bild der keimenden Erkenntnis alles Kommenden*], insofar as the psyche itself creates the future’ (CW 3 §404). Only the ‘prospective’/’constructive’/’synthetic’ method can, Jung argued, understand the psyche as something that is, to use a Goethean term, ‘something-in-the-process-of-becoming’ (*ein Werdendes*). The subtlety, allusiveness, and resonance of Jung’s language in this paper is such that it requires to be quoted also in the original German:

What has become is on the one hand the result and culmination of all that has been – this is how it appears to the causal standpoint – and on the other it is an expression of what is to come. Since what is to come is only apparently like the past, but in its essence always new and unique – (the causal standpoint likes to reverse this proposition) – so the present expression of what has become is incomplete, germlike, as it were, in relation to what is to come. Insofar as we regard the present content of the psyche as a symbolic expression of what is to come, the need arises to apply a constructive interest to it. I almost felt tempted to say a ‘scientific’ interest. But our science is identical with the causal principle. As soon as we regard the present psyche causally, that is, scientifically, the psyche as something-*that-is-becoming* eludes us.


(GW 3 §405)\(^{221}\)
The point here about ‘expressiveness’ is crucial. In ‘Freud and Jung: Contrasts’ (Der Gegensatz Freud und Jung) (CW 4 §768–§784), a short essay published in the Kölnische Zeitung in 1929, Jung will write that he is concerned, not simply with the truth about the psyche, but with its ‘true expression’ (wahrer Ausdruck). By ‘true expression’, Jung will explain, he means ‘an avowal and a detailed presentation of what is subjectively observed’ (ein Bekennnis und eine ausführliche Darstellung des subjektiv Vorgefundenen). This ‘true expression’, Jung says, constitutes a veritable via media between two interpretative possibilities. Some people put weight on the form of what they observe (die Gestaltung des Vorgefundenen) and, in this case, they believe themselves to be the creator of it. Others emphasize the perception (die Anschauung) and thus speak of the appearance or the phenomenon (das Erscheinende), being conscious of their own receptive attitude. Echoing (and inverting) one of Goethe’s maxims – ‘People say that between two opposed opinions truth lies in the middle. Not at all! A problem lies in-between: invisible, eternally active life, contemplated in peace’122 – Jung will conclude that ‘the truth surely lies in the middle’ between these two approaches, for true expression consists in giving form to what is observed. ‘True expression is formative perception’ (Wahrer Ausdruck ist gestaltende Anschauung) (CW 4 §771).

So what is the real difference between the interpretative standpoints discussed in ‘On Psychological Understanding’? Here Jung has recourse to the important eighteenth-century notion of ‘speculation’. If the causal standpoint ‘reduces’ things to their elements (reduziert auf Einfacheres), the ‘constructive standpoint’ distinguishes itself by, in contrast, elaborating them to a more complicated and – in a Goethean sense – ‘higher’ level (elaboriert Komplizierteres und Höheres) and, in this sense, it is ‘speculative’ (spekulativ). Such speculation should not, Jung insists, be confused with ‘scholastic speculation’, for it claims no universal validity (CW 4 §406–§407). Instead, such speculation is, at least ‘considered from the outside’ (von außen betrachtet), more akin to so-called ‘infantile fantasy’; but, ‘considered from inside’ (von Innen betrachtet), it means – Jung provocatively deploys theological vocabulary – redemption (Erlösung). To make the point that such redemption is not of a conventional religious kind, however, Jung immediately cites Nietzsche: ‘Creation – that is the great redemption from suffering, and life’s easement’ (Schaffen – das ist die große Erlösung vom Leiden, und des Lebens Leichtwerden).123

Later, in 1929, Jung will speak of the libidinal drives – be they erotic, as Freud believed, or power-oriented, as Adler did – as coming into collision with spirit or Geist (CW 4 §776). This spirit, Geist, is regarded by Jung as a liberating force, as a means of escape from what he called ‘the inexorable cycle of biological events’. Or, as he strikingly describes it with reference to Freud’s paper, Der Familienroman der Romantiker (1909), escape from ‘the fleshy bond leading back to father and mother or forward to the children that have sprung from our flesh’ – from ‘incest” with the past and “incest”
with the future’, from ‘the original sin of perpetuation of the “family romance”’. In a passage similarly laden with theological and soteriological vocabulary, Jung writes that, from these shackles, only Geist can free us. ‘We moderns’, he will write, ‘are faced with the necessity of rediscovering the life of the spirit: we must experience it anew for ourselves’ (Wir Modernen sind darauf angewiesen, den Geist wieder zu erleben, das heißt Uerfahrung zu machen). For this is ‘the only way’, he insists, in which we can break ‘the spell that binds us to the cycle of biological events’ (CW 4 §780). For Jung himself, his liberation took the form of an intensification of the ‘family romance’, identifying himself in his writings with Goethe, inasmuch as he structures those writings, particularly Transformations and Symbols of the Libido, around the story of Faust.

If Freud’s analysis of Schreber in his ‘Psycho-Analytic Notes on an Autobiographical Account of Paranoia’ represented a textbook-case of the ‘reductive’ method, then Jung’s account of the fantasies of Miss Miller in Transformations and Symbols of the Libido were intended to be an example of how to use the ‘constructive’ method (CW 3 §415), later called ‘amplification’. ‘On Psychological Understanding’ continues by explaining the appropriateness of these methods in relation to ‘hysterical’ and ‘psychasthenic’ (including schizophrenic) illnesses in terms of extraversion and introversion, terms Jung had defined in 1913, and would explore in greater detail in 1921.

Rather than seeking to develop ‘an extra-psychological theory that is concerned with the objective thing’ (eine außerpsychologische Theorie, welche das objektive Ding betrifft), the constructive method, Jung concluded in his lecture, represents ‘a view of the world that is purely psychological’ (eine Weltanschauung, die nur psychologisch ist). So, rather than producing a ‘scientific theory’, the constructive method, as demonstrated in Transformations and Symbols of the Libido, traces ‘a psychological line of development, a path, so to speak’ (eine psychologische Entwicklungslinie, eine Bahn sozusagen). To trace such a development required, Jung argued, a combination of experience and reflection (or ‘speculation’). ‘If such a work’, he declared, ‘goes far beyond the basic concepts of empiricism, then this lies in the nature of the human psyche’; the psyche has never remained content ‘with experience alone’ (mit der Erfahrung allein). ‘Everything new in the human spirit derives from speculation’, he added. ‘Spiritual development takes place on the way of speculation, but not on the way restricting us to mere experience’ (Die geistige Entwicklung erfolgt auf dem Wege der Spekulation, nicht aber auf dem Wege der Beschränkung auf bloße Erfahrung) (CW 3 §423). Or, in Goethe’s words, ‘experience is only the half of experience’ (Erfahrung ist nur die Hälfte der Erfahrung).

To those who wished to trace the intellectual source of the ‘constructive’ method back to such earlier thinkers as the pre-Socratics, Jung replied that the fundamental concepts employed in the constructive method ‘go back beyond all historical philosophy, to the dynamistic ideas [dynamistische
“Anschauungen” of primitive peoples’ (CW 4 §424). To judge by his frequent, substantial, and highly significant references to Faust, however, Jung’s thinking had also been greatly influenced by his reading of Goethe.

‘La Structure de l’inconscient’

Faust played an important part, albeit in a less obvious and, as I shall suggest, more personal manner, in the third of Jung’s foundational texts, ‘La Structure de l’inconscient’. In this paper, Jung invoked Faust in connection with the strategy – which he associates with Adler, who sees the unconscious in terms of the power drive, and then with Freud, who sees it in terms of infantile sexuality – of cleaving to the persona and abandoning the unconscious. Quoting at length Faust’s words of resignation before the resolution of the wager in the ‘Midnight’ scene in Act 5 of Part Two (which recalls the opening ‘Night’ scene of Part One), including the lines –

I’ve seen enough of this terrestrial sphere.
There is no view to the Beyond from here:
A fool will seek it, peer with mortal eyes
And dream of human life above the skies!

[...]
Thus let him travel all his earthly day:
Though spirits haunt him, let him walk his way,
Let both his pain and joy be in his forward stride –
Each moment leave him still unsatisfied!

– Jung wrote that ‘if one wants to continue to live rationally, one must reconstitute as well as one can this segment of the collective psyche which we call the persona, and quietly give up analysis, trying to forget that one has an unconscious’. Yet, Jung continued, such a strategy is bound to fail. For the flow of the libido, as the source of all psychic elements, cannot be arrested. There is no ‘theory’, or even ‘a magical method’, by which one could ‘tear the libido away from the unconscious’ and thus, in a manner of speaking, ‘get rid of’ the unconscious.

At this point, Jung quotes Faust’s lines from earlier in the same scene when, of all the mysterious Four Grey Women, the most terrifying, Care (Sorge), enters the palace. These include the following evocation by Faust of her terror:

The air is swarming now
With ghosts we would avoid if we knew how.
How logical and clear the daylight seems
Till the night weaves us in its web of dreams!
As we return from dewy fields, dusk falls.
And birds of mischief croak their ominous calls. 
All round us lurks this superstition’s snare; 
Some haunting, half-seen thing cries out: Beware! 
We shrink back in alarm, and are alone. 
Doors creak, and no one enters. 

[In sudden alarm] 
Is someone 

There at the door?133

This powerful scene also attracted the interest of Martin Heidegger, who devoted several sections of Being and Time (1927) to ‘care’, or Sorge, as constitutive of the essential unity of Dasein’s Being.134 In the context of Jung’s paper, it looks as if these quotations are merely decorative; however, there is evidence to suggest that they hint at Jung’s own experiences of ‘the confrontation with the unconscious’ in 1916.

In Memories, Dreams, Reflections, an account is given of the background to the composition of Septem Sermones ad mortuos or ‘Seven Sermons to the Dead’, a text he circulated widely in private but, in public, virtually suppressed.135 In his letter to the Swiss psychotherapist Alphonse Maeder, to whom he had sent a copy, Jung described the ‘Sermons’ as ‘a fragment with far-reaching associations’, and he told his colleague that it had fallen ‘quite unexpectedly’ into his lap, ‘like a ripe fruit at a great time of stress’, and that it had ‘kindled a light of hope and comfort’ for him in his ‘bad hours’ (L 1, 33). Later, however, in his letter to the journal Merkur of 1952 in response to an article by Martin Buber (1878–1965) called ‘Religion and Modern Thought’,136 he sought to distance himself from the Sermons, calling them ‘a sin of my youth, committed nearly forty years ago’ (CW 18 §1501). In the Septem Sermones, Jung aligns himself with the tradition of the Gnostics, in a manner that may well, at least in one respect, have been indebted to Goethe.

For in the Second and Third Sermons, the Dead speak of a figure called Abraxas. In Gnosticism, Abraxas was a secret divinity, a rooster-headed god with the tail of a serpent, whose name, when written in Greek, numerologically signified 365, the number of days in the year.137 But Jung may well have come across Abraxas in the West-Östlicher Divan, where he is mentioned on two occasions.138 Behind the Gnostic vocabulary and decidedly antiquated style of the text of the ‘Sermons’, some of Jung’s key notions about the unconscious receive elliptical articulation. In terms of Goethe’s drama, Faust, in the midst of his quest successively for Gretchen, Helena, and finally the Eternal Feminine, is told by Mephistopheles in Part Two about the realm of the Mothers. Behind the richly various objects of the phenomenal world, so Mephisto tells Faust, he will find Nothing:

Yet even if you’d swum the ocean through 
And known its boundlessness, even then
You would see waves roll by and roll again; 
Even at the dreadful drowning-point, there too 
You would see something. In the still sea-green 
There would be darting dolphins to be seen; 
There’d be the clouds, sun, moon, and starry sky – 
But in the eternal void you’ll say goodbye 
To sight, not hear the step that steps so far, 
Not rest a foot on where you are.139

Faust seems to understand what Mephistopheles is telling him: ‘I / Am sent into your void to magnify / My art and strength there’ (Du sendest mich ins Leere, / Damit ich dort so Kunst als Kraft vermehre), he replies, and indeed he tells Mephisto: ‘I hope to see / Your Nothing turn to Everything for me’ (In deinem Nichts hoff ich das All zu finden).140

As we have already seen in some detail, Jung argues for a startlingly different view of the unconscious from the Freudian conception. For Jung, the absence of consciousness in the Nothing of the unconscious turns out to be full of archetypal plenitude. Similarly, in the Septem Sermones ad mortuos, the Pleroma (Jung’s Gnostic term for the collective unconscious) is described as both everything and nothing: ‘Nothing is the same as fullness. In the endless state fullness is the same as emptiness. The Nothing is both empty and full. [. . .] The Nothing, or fullness, is called by us the pleroma’.141 Whereas, for Goethe, the realm of the Mothers is the source of the aesthetic (that is, Helena), for Jung it comes to represent the realm of the archetype.

Over and above the intellectual and intertextual debt to Goethe, however, the genesis of the text as it is recorded in Memories, Dreams, Reflections finds a striking analogy in the episode from the final act of Faust, Part Two, discussed above. According to this account, in 1916 Jung began to feel ‘an urge to give shape to something’ (einen Drang zur Gestaltung) (MDR, 214). He recalls the occult phenomena which preceded the visionary state in which the text was completed:

It began with a restlessness, but I did not know what it meant or what ‘they’ wanted of me. There was an ominous atmosphere all around me. I had the strange feeling that the air was filled with ghostly entities. Then it was as if my house began to be haunted. [. . .] The atmosphere was thick, believe me! Then I knew something had to happen. The whole house was filled as if there were a crowd present, crammed full of spirits. They were packed deep right up to the door, and the air was so thick it was scarcely possible to breathe. As for myself, I was all a-quiver with the question: ‘For God’s sake, what in the world is this?’ Then they cried out in chorus, ‘We have come back from Jerusalem where we found not what we sought’. That is the beginning of the Septem Sermones.

(MDR, 215–16)
At this point, we read, the text ‘began to flow’ out of Jung, and over the course of three evenings the ‘Sermons’ were completed.

Bearing in mind this background, Jung’s quotation from Faust at such a significant point in ‘La Structure de l’inconscient’ seems anything other than arbitrary. When Faust first sees the Four Grey Women, he thinks of them as spirits, and their conversation sounds to him like ‘a dark and hollow sound, a ghostly sigh’. Just before Care enters, Faust cries: ‘The air is swarming now / With ghosts we would avoid if we knew how’ (Nun ist die Luft von solchem Spuk so voll, / Daß niemand weiß, wie er ihn meiden soll). And before Care breathes on Faust, and blinds him, he exclaims:

Horrible phantoms! Thus you still conspire
Again against mankind and yet again;
Even indifferent days you turn into a dire
Chaotic nexus of entangling pain.
Demons, I know, are hard to exorcize,
The spirit-bond is loath to separate.

Far from being a merely casual reference to Goethe, this scene functions as a key intertext of ‘La Structure de l’inconscient’ and Memories, Dreams, Reflections. Via a central work of his cultural heritage, Jung’s own personal experiences and the genesis of one of his texts are linked with his doctrine of the psyche, as that had been explicated with reference to Faust in Transformations and Symbols of the Libido.

But there is an important difference. Whereas, for Goethe, the realm of the Mothers was tied up with the preconditions of the aesthetic experience, Jung interpreted it in terms of something psychological: the archetype. As a result, there is a tension at work in Jung’s reception of Goethe. (Can this tension be resolved? The relationship between what, for Goethe, was aesthetic and what, for Jung, was archetypal, will be examined in closer detail in volume 2.) Before he continued in his writings his ongoing dialogue with Goethe, however, Jung found in the work of Friedrich Schiller, Goethe’s fellow-writer and cultural theorist, another source of ideas from Weimar classicism which he could use to clarify his own developing theory of the psyche. The area where Jung found Schiller most helpful was in elaborating his conception of typology, particularly in his major study of 1921, Psychological Types. So we must now turn to this work, beginning with a consideration of the typological aspects of the friendship between Schiller and Goethe, and the overall contours of Jung’s reception of Schiller.
Chapter 3

**Schiller and the problem of typology**

The visitor today to Weimar, having sped across Germany on an Intercity train and arrived at the large, new railway-station, can walk straight down the Carl-August-Allee – in GDR days called the Lenin-Straße, but things have changed – named after the duke and friend of Goethe who helped fulfil the plan of his mother, Anna Amalia, to turn eighteenth-century Weimar into a major cultural centre. If we join our visitor at the station, we then cross the Rathenau-Platz, and we will come, via the Karl-Liebknecht-Straße, to the Goethe-Platz. There we can see the German National Theatre, built by Max Littmann and Jakob Heilmann on the site of the former Weimar Court Theatre, in which Schiller’s *Wallenstein’s Lager* was first performed in 1798. Following a fire in 1824, a new theatre was built, which in turn was replaced in 1908 by the neo-classical building we see today. In this building the constitution of the Weimar republic was signed in 1919; following the Second World War, the destroyed building was reconstructed and reopened with a performance of Goethe’s *Faust*, Part One, in 1948. It was here that Thomas Mann delivered speeches on the occasion of the two-hundredth anniversary of Goethe’s birth in 1949 and on the one-hundred-and-fiftieth anniversary of Schiller’s death in 1955, a fact recorded on a commemorative plaque on an exterior wall, which emphasizes that Thomas Mann and the GDR poet, Johannes R. Becher, met here and joined forces in the fight against fascism and to secure a rebirth of classical literature. From Goethe-Platz, too, one can catch a bus to the former concentration camp of Buchenwald. Weimar today stands as a reminder of the darkness of history, as well as a monument to an epoch of intellectual and artistic brilliance.

In front of the Nationaltheater stands the Goethe and Schiller Monument, created by Ernst Rietschel and officially unveiled on 4 September 1857 on the occasion of the hundredth anniversary of the birth of Duke Carl August. The bronze from which the statue is made comes from Turkish cannon-balls, while the pedestal, made of granite from Baden, bears the inscription ‘To the two poets Goethe and Schiller. The Fatherland’. The two poets are depicted standing next to each other, Goethe on the viewer’s left, Schiller on the right. In his right hand Goethe holds a wreath made of laurels, the shrub sacred to
Apollo and a symbol of immortality acquired through victory; according to tradition, laurel leaves conferred the power of second sight and, being sacred to Apollo, were worn by those who had gained a favourable response from the Pythoness at the god’s shrine at Delphi; by extension, they were awarded by the Greeks to the victors in the Pythian games held there every four years. With his right hand Schiller lightly touches the wreath, while in his left he firmly grasps a scroll, symbolizing the commitment to writing, to literature, to a literary culture. In gratitude for creating this iconic image of Weimar classicism, Rietschel was awarded honorary citizenship of the town. Copies of the statue can be found across the United States: in San Francisco, Cleveland, and Milwaukee.

Goethe and Schiller. Standing together. Jointly clasping the wreath of poetic victory. Goethe’s hand grasping, firmly but tenderly, the shoulder of his younger, sicklier friend who died nearly thirty years before he did. (Further along, in the Fürstengruft, the bodies of Goethe and Schiller now lie side by side.) Comrades-in-(cultural-)arms? Good friends? It was, of course, never that simple; it rarely is with friendships, as Carl Jung, once a good colleague and close friend of Sigmund Freud, would have known. So Weimar remains significant for our study, as the backdrop to the relationship between Goethe and Schiller, and as the scene, as Joseph-François Angelloz has written, of Goethe’s ‘greatest metamorphosis’, as ‘his spiritual home’.

The Goethe–Schiller correspondence

‘This person, this Goethe, is simply in my way and he reminds me so often that Fate has treated me harshly’. These are the terms in which Schiller, writing to his friend, Christian Gottfried Körner (1756–1831), on 9 March 1789, spoke about his new acquaintance, Goethe, whom he had met in September of the previous year. He continued by complaining about how easily his genius was supported by his fate and how I must struggle to this very moment! I can now no longer catch up on all that I’ve missed – one can’t re-educate oneself completely after thirty – and I couldn’t even begin this re-education for the next three or four years, because I have to sacrifice myself to my fate for at least another four years.

The ‘fate’ to which Schiller had to ‘sacrifice’ himself was, of course, an academic one, as he had been appointed Professor of History at the University of Jena earlier in 1789. The previous year in his letter of 12 September 1788 Schiller told Körner of his first meeting with Goethe: ‘Finally I can tell you about Goethe, something for which I know you have been waiting very eagerly. I spent last Sunday almost entirely in his company’. Schiller noted Goethe’s physical appearance – ‘he is of average height, stands very
stiffly and moves so, too, his expression is reserved, but his eyes are very expressive, very lively, and one hangs on to his glance with pleasure – his voice –

his voice is extremely pleasant, he speaks in a flowing, witty, and lively way, it is with great pleasure that one listens to him; and, when he is in a good mood, which seems to have been the case on this occasion, he likes to talk and takes an interest in doing so

– his interest in Italy, from which he had just returned – ‘he likes to talk, and with fervent memories, about Italy’ – as well as his interest in the young female artist he had met in Rome, Angelika Kauffmann (1741–1807). This interest, Schiller suggested, was not just a question of art appreciation; Goethe ‘greatly admires Angelika Kauffmann, both from the artistic side as well as because from the heart’. In sum, however, Schiller concluded that there were huge differences in outlook between himself and Goethe:

On the whole, what is indeed my great conception of him has not been diminished since making his acquaintance. But I doubt whether we shall ever become very close. Much of what still interests me, what I still wish for and hope for, is what this age has experienced in him; he is so in advance of me (less in terms of years than in experience of life and personal development) that we shall never be able to meet on our paths, and his entire being is already from the start differently organized from mine, his world is not my world, our ways of thinking seem to be essentially different.

In his letter of 2 February 1789, Schiller had been equally negative, telling Körner that ‘to be around Goethe a lot of the time would make me unhappy’, and accusing Goethe of being ‘an egoist in an unusual degree’. At the same time, Schiller gave expression to a deeper sense of ambivalence:

He is hateful to me, even though at the same time I love his mind from my whole heart and think great things of him. [. . .] A quite peculiar mixture of hate and love is what he has awoken in me, a sensation not entirely unlike what Brutus and Cassius must have felt towards Caesar; I could kill his spirit and also love him from my heart.

And in a striking image, bound to attract the attention of any analyst, Schiller confessed his feelings about Goethe as follows: ‘I think of him as a proud and prudish woman, whom one has to get pregnant, in order to humiliate her in front of the world’. As time progressed, Schiller tried to find various reasons to sustain his suspicion of Goethe; for example, his objection to Goethe’s domestic arrangements with Christiana Vulpius; or, then again,
as he wrote to Körner on 1 November 1790, his problems with Goethe’s philosophical stance:

Nor do I really like his philosophy. It draws too much on the world of the senses [Sinnenwelt], whereas I draw on the psyche [Seele]. In fact his whole way of thinking is too sensuous [sinnlich] and for me involves too much touch [betastet mir zu viel]. But his mind works and searches in all directions and strives to construct for itself a totality, and that makes him for me a great man.

For his part, Goethe underscored the differences in philosophical approach between himself and Schiller in his autobiographical piece, ‘Fortunate Encounter’ (Erste Bekanntschaft mit Schiller) (1794) (GE 12, 18–21). In his account Goethe highlighted the typological difference between himself and Schiller as it had arisen in their conversation, which took place between 20 and 23 July 1794:

[At a meeting of the Society for Scientific Research in Jena] I found Schiller also in attendance. We happened to leave the meeting at the same time, and a conversation ensued. [. . .] We reached his house, and our conversation drew me in. There I gave an enthusiastic description of the metamorphosis of plants, and with a few characteristic strokes of the pen I caused a symbolic plant to spring up before his eyes. He heard and saw all this with great interest, with unmistakable power of comprehension. But when I stopped, he shook his head and said, ‘That is not an observation. That is an idea [Das ist keine Erfahrung, das ist eine Idee].’ Taken aback and somewhat annoyed, I paused; with this comment he had touched on the very point that divided us. [. . .] I collected my wits, however, and replied, ‘Then I may rejoice that I have ideas without knowing it, and can even see them with my own eyes.’

(GE 12, 19–20)

(In retrospect, Goethe saw his meeting with Schiller as the work of his ‘daimon’, his presiding spirit; as he told Eckermann on 24 March 1829,

we might have been brought together earlier or later; but that we met just at the time when I had finished my Italian journey, and Schiller began to be weary of philosophical speculation – this led to very important consequences for us both.

Although he remarked, aphoristically, that ‘the higher a man is, the more he is under the influence of daimons [je höher ein Mensch ist, desto mehr steht er unter dem Einfluß der Dämonen], and he must take heed lest his guiding will
counsel him to a wrong path’, Goethe firmly believed the path that had led him to Schiller was the right one.)

On 13 June 1794 Schiller had invited Goethe to contribute to The Seasons (Die Horen), a new journal, named after the classical figures of the horae, which he was proposing to edit with the philosopher Johann Gottlieb Fichte (1762–1814), the historian Karl Ludwig Wolffmann (1770–1817), and the linguist and aesthetician, Wilhelm von Humboldt (1767–1835). Goethe agreed, and as Schiller came to know Goethe better, so he came to understand that the differences between himself and the ‘sage of Weimar’ (as T.S. Eliot calls him) were less a question of right and wrong, and more a question of complementary qualities. It was, in other words, a question of typology.

For Jung, who elaborated a complex system of typology, Goethe was an example of what he called ‘the intuitive, extraverted feeling type’, while Schiller was representative of ‘the intuitive, introverted thinking type’ (CW 6 §148, fn. 47; cf. CW 6 §104). In his famous letter of 23 August 1794, sent on the occasion of Goethe’s forty-fifth birthday, and hence known as the ‘birthday letter’ (Geburtstagsbrief), Schiller laid out these differences, as he saw them, in terms of just such a typological distinction. Goethe’s chief characteristic for Schiller, this letter seems to say, lay not so much in Goethe’s analytic, as in his synthetic, qualities.

Many things upon which I could not come to a right understanding with myself have received new and unexpected light from the contemplation I have had of your mind (for so I must call the general impression of your ideas upon me). I needed the object, the body, to several of my speculative ideas, and you have put me on to the track for finding it. Your calm and clear way of looking at things keeps you from getting on to the by-roads into which speculation as well as arbitrary imagination – which merely follows its own bent – are so apt to lead one astray. Your correct intuition grasps all things, and that far more perfectly than what is laboriously sought for by analysis; and because this lies within you as a whole, the wealth of your mind is concealed from yourself. For, alas! we only know that which we can take to pieces. Minds like yours, therefore, seldom know how far they have penetrated, and how little cause they have to borrow from philosophy, which, in fact, can only learn from them. Philosophy can merely dissect what is given it, but the giving itself is not the work of the analyser but of genius, which combines things according to objective laws under the obscure but safe influence of pure reason.

(CSG 1, 6)

For Schiller, Goethe’s synthetic approach allowed him to perceive nature as totality; like Achilles in The Iliad who, asked by Agamemnon, the leader of the Greeks, to stay and help the Achaean's, had to choose between the return
to his homeland of Phthia or immortal glory, Goethe had made the worthy, and more heroic, choice. Further on in what was, he admitted, now more than an ‘essay’ than a ‘letter’, Schiller told Goethe as much.

You seek for the necessary in Nature, but you seek it by the most difficult route, and one which all weaker minds would take care to avoid. You look at Nature as a whole when seeking to get light thrown upon her individual parts; you look for the explanation of the individual in the totality of all her various manifestations. From the simple organism you ascend, step by step, up to those that are more complex, in order, in the end, to form the most complicated of all – Man – out of the materials of Nature as a whole. By thus, as it were, imitating Nature in creating him, you try to penetrate into his hidden structure. This is a great and truly heroic thought, which sufficiently shows how your mind forms the whole wealth of its conceptions into one beautiful unity.

(CSG 1, 7)

In another letter, sent shortly afterwards on 31 August 1794, Schiller pursued this difference in typological terms between analysis and synthesis, distinguishing between what he called the ‘intuitive’ mind (that is, Goethe’s) –

Your mind works intuitively to an extraordinary degree, and all your thinking powers appear, as it were, to have come to an agreement with your imagination to be their common representative. In reality this is the most that a man can make of himself if only he succeeds in generalizing his perceptions and in making his feelings his supreme law. This is what you have endeavoured to do, and what in a great measure you have already attained!

(CSG 1, 12)

– and the ‘speculative’ mind (that is, his own):

My understanding works more in a symbolizing method, and thus I hover, as a hybrid, between ideas and perceptions, between law and feeling, between a technical mind and genius. [. . .] If I could obtain such mastery over these two powers [i.e., ‘imagination’ and ‘cold reason’] as to assign to each its limits, I might yet look forward to a happy fate; but, alas! just when I have begun to know and to use my moral energies rightly, illness seizes me and threatens to undermine my physical powers. I can scarcely hope to have time to complete any great and general mental revolution in myself; but I will do what I can, and when, at last, the building falls, I shall, perhaps, after all, have snatched from the ruins what was most worthy of being preserved.

(CSG 1, 12–13)
By speaking of himself as ‘a hybrid’ (*eine Zwitterart*), Schiller hinted at a sense of a split in himself – for in the past ‘the poetic mind generally got the better of me when I ought to have philosophized, and my philosophical mind when I wished to poetize’, and ‘even now it frequently enough happens that imagination intrudes upon my abstractions, and cold reason upon my poetical productions’ (CSG 1, 12) – as well as giving generations of commentators an excuse to argue that the poetic and the philosophical sides of Schiller were never satisfactorily integrated.⁸

Schiller’s *Geburtstagsbrief* and its follow-up served to inaugurate a lengthy and substantial correspondence between the two men, which continued more or less regularly right until Schiller’s death in 1805. Time and again in this correspondence, Schiller turned to the question of the differences between himself and Goethe, as well as to the conflict of the various aspects within himself. In his letter to Goethe of 7 January 1795, for example, Schiller spoke, again contrasting analysis and synthesis, of the differences between literature and philosophy. ‘In the former’, he wrote, ‘all is so joyous, so alive, so harmoniously evolved, and so true to human life’, whereas, in the latter, ‘all is so stern, so rigid, abstract, and so extremely unnatural’; for, he concluded, ‘nature is but synthesis, and philosophy but antithesis’. He confessed that he was fully conscious of ‘the infinite difference between Life and Reasoning’ – he told Goethe, ‘I cannot, in such melancholy moments, help perceiving a want in my own nature which in happier hours I am forced to think of only as a natural quality of the thing itself’. Nevertheless, there remained the idea, which haunts all of Schiller’s aesthetic writings, of totality, and of the artist as the human individual who becomes whole: ‘This much, however, is certain – the poet is the only true Man [der einzig wahre Mensch], and the best philosopher is but a caricature in comparison with him’. Such totality involves aesthetics, because ‘the beautiful itself is derived from Man as a whole’ (CSG 1, 45).

Almost two years later, Schiller wrote to Goethe on 17 January 1797, thanking him for his recent visit, which had led Schiller ‘again into the world’ from which he had felt himself ‘wholly separated’, and suggesting that Goethe’s works themselves revealed a development from analysis through to totality:

I should like particularly just now to know the chronological order of your works. I should be surprised if – in the development of your character – a certain necessary course in the nature of Man were not observable in them. You must have passed through a certain, and not very short, period, which I should call your analytic period, where your endeavours were towards completeness, through division and separation – where your nature, so to say, was at variance with itself, and sought to reinstate itself through Art and Science.

(CSG 1, 284)
In this letter, Schiller used the idea of rebirth, thus anticipating the central theme of Goethe’s account in the *Italian Journey* of his experiences in Rome: ‘It seems to me that now, when fully developed and mature, you are returning to your youth, and will unite the fruit with the blossom. This second period of youth’, Schiller assured Goethe, ‘is the youth of the gods, and immortal like them’ (CSG 1, 285).

A year or so later, on 6 January 1798, Goethe congratulated Schiller on his progress with *Wallenstein*, and reflected that ‘the fortunate meeting of our natures has already been of many an advantage to us both’. He thanked Schiller for having taught him to look afresh at himself, and for having granted him ‘a second youth’. As Peter-André Alt has emphasized, the productive nature of their friendship was bound up with the complementary character of their respective temperaments and interests.9 ‘If I have served you as the representative of much objective matter, you have led me back to myself from too exclusively contemplating outward things and their circumstances’, Goethe told Schiller:

You have taught me to look at the many-sidedness of the inner man more fairly, you have given me a second youth and re-fashioned me into a poet, which I may be said to have ceased to be.

(CSG 2, 6)

What clearly emerges from Goethe’s and Schiller’s letters to each other is the sense of the complementary nature of their two characters – and it was precisely this aspect of their correspondence that struck Jung. Reading Schiller’s letter to Goethe of 31 August 1794, the *Geburtstagsbrief*, for instance, Jung observed how Schiller’s ‘extraordinary admiration for Goethe’s mind’, and ‘his almost feminine empathy and sympathy with his friend’s intuition’, must have sprung from ‘a piercing awareness of this conflict’ in his own nature, which he must have ‘felt doubly hard’ in comparison with ‘the almost perfect synthesis of Goethe’s’ (CW 6 §118). And on the basis of this letter, Jung noted how, in the figure of Goethe, Schiller found both ‘an accentuated complement or fulfilment of his own nature, at the time sensing the difference’ (CW 6 §143), which he indicated to Goethe in the *Geburtstagsbrief* as follows:

Do not expect to find any great store of ideas in me; this is what I shall find in you. My need and endeavour is to make much out of little, and when you once come to know my poverty in all so-called acquired knowledge, you will perhaps find I have sometimes succeeded in doing this; for the circle of my ideas being small, I can the more rapidly and the more frequently run through it, and for that very reason can use my small resources with more effect, and can, by means of form, produce that variety which is wanting in the subject-matter. You strive to
simplify your great world of ideas, I seek variety for my small means. You have to govern a whole realm, I but a somewhat numerous family of ideas, which I would be heartily glad to be able to extend into a little world.

(CSG 1, 12)

Equally, in Schiller’s letter to Goethe of 5 January 1798, Jung saw an example of how ‘a certain limitation and impoverishment’ can result from ‘the abstracting attitude of consciousness, which in pursuit of its ideal makes an experience of every occurrence and from the sum of experience a law’, which is characteristic of ‘the introvert’ (CW 6 §142). For Schiller, according to Jung, ‘clearly sensed this in relation to Goethe’, since Schiller felt Goethe’s ‘more extraverted nature’ as ‘something objectively opposed to himself’. Speaking in this letter about the completion of the draft of Wallenstein, Schiller wrote:

There are obvious proofs that I have gone beyond myself, which is the result of the intercourse with you; for it is only the frequent and continued communion with an objective nature so opposite to my own, my active striving after it, and the combined effort of contemplating it and of reflecting upon it, that could enable me to keep the subjective limits of my own nature so far apart.

(CSG 2, 4)

In his turn, Goethe sought to express the personal differences with Schiller in complementaristic terms, as he did in his letter of 6 January 1798, cited above. Goethe could do this, Jung believed, because he, like Schiller, understood their relationship in terms of typology; in support of this view, Jung quoted the draft letter to Schiller of 27–28 April 1798, where Goethe ‘significantly’ says of himself:

As a contemplative man [ein beschauender Mensch] I am an arrant realist, so that I am capable of desiring nothing from all the things that present themselves to me nor that anything be added to them. I make no sort of distinction among objects beyond whether they interest me or not. On the other hand in every sort of activity I am, one might almost say, completely idealistic: I ask nothing at all from objects, but instead I demand that everything shall conform to my conceptions.10

During the time of their friendship, Goethe and Schiller not only collaborated on the periodical Die Horen, but also competed with each other in producing ballads in 1797 (das Balladenjahr) and in analysing them in their correspondence, and Schiller encouraged Goethe to return to his unfinished work on Faust. In his letter of 23 November 1800 to Charlotte von Schimmelmann,
Schiller expressed his deep appreciation of what his friendship with Goethe had brought him:

Whatever there is good about me has been planted in me by a few excellent people, a favourable destiny guided them to me in the decisive periods of my life, my friendships are also the story of my life. [. . .] Even now, after a period of six years, I still consider my friendship with Goethe to be the most beneficial event in my whole life. [. . .] I can certainly say that, in the six years that I have spent with him, I have never been mistaken, even for a moment, about his character. There is a high truthfulness and honesty in his nature, and the highest seriousness about rightness and goodness; for this reason gossips and hypocrites and sophists have always found themselves uncomfortable in his presence.11

And when, on 9 May 1805, Schiller died, Goethe became even more acutely aware of what he, too, had gained from their relationship, as his letter of 1 June 1805 to Carl Friedrich Zelter makes clear: ‘In the intervening time when I have not written to you there have been few good days. I thought I was going to lose myself, and now I am losing a friend and in him the half of my existence. In fact I should begin a new way of life’ – Goethe was now 56 years old – ‘but at my age there is no longer a way to do this. So I can only see ahead of me each day, and I do whatever I can not to think of long-term consequences’.12

In his ‘ “Epilogue” to Schiller’s The Song of the Bell’, originally composed in July 1805 for public recitation and revised (on the occasion of the tenth anniversary of Schiller’s death) in 1815 as a tribute and a response to Schiller’s great, if much-parodied, poem of 1799, Goethe portrays his friend in the final stanza as a cosmic force, comparing him to a brilliant comet that illuminates the universe:

So for us he remains, who so long ago –
Ten years already! – went away from us.
We have all prospered in our experience,
May the world thank him, for what he taught it;
Already it has spread, to crowds of people,
What was most his, belongs to him alone.
He shone before us, disappearing like a comet,
Unending light combining with his own.

So bleibt er uns, der vor so manchen Jahren –
Schon zehne sind’s! – von uns sich wegekehrt!
Wir haben alle segenreich erfahren,
Die Welt verdank’ ihm, was er sie gelehrt;
Wagner and Nietzsche, Freud and Jung

If the correspondence between Goethe and Schiller stands as a monument as much to their friendship as to their literary talent, its resonance can be felt in the letters exchanged about a century later between two other men, who shared a passion for German culture in general and the classicism of Goethe and Schiller in particular: the philologist-turned-philosopher, Friedrich Nietzsche, and the composer-turned-cultural saviour, Richard Wagner. Like Schiller to Goethe, Nietzsche sent Wagner a *Geburtstagsbrief* (dated 22 May 1869, for Wagner’s fifty-sixth birthday), in which he expressed admiration for the wholeness of his addressee:

> If it is the fate of the genius to be for a while of the few: then these few may consider themselves fortunate and honoured in a particular way, because it is permitted them to see the light and to warm themselves at it, while the masses still stand in the cold fog and freeze. [. . .] Now I have dared to count myself among these few, after I saw that almost everyone with whom one came into contact seemed to be unable to grasp your personality as a whole, to feel the unified, deeply ethical pulse that runs through your life, writings, and music.

And just as Schiller, in his letter to Körner of 2 February 1789, had written of Goethe that ‘he makes his existence known in a generous way, but only like a god, without giving of himself’, so Nietzsche, in his letter to Carl von Gersdorff of 4 August 1869, spoke of Wagner in terms of a divinity. ‘There prevail in Wagner’, he enthusiastically declared, ‘such unlimited idealism, such deep and moving humanity, such sublime seriousness of purpose, that I feel myself in his company as if in the company of the divine’. Whereas, in the case of Schiller, the comparison was meant negatively, in the case of Nietzsche its intended connotation was (presumably) positive; and, of course, despite its inevitable problems, the relationship between Goethe and Schiller took a different trajectory from that between Nietzsche and Wagner, which ended in feuding and bitter recrimination. For Jung, Nietzsche’s attitudes towards Wagner, ‘his deification and subsequent hatred’ of the composer, offered a good example of what Jung termed *enantiodromia*, ‘the emergence of the unconscious opposite in the course of time’ (CW 6 §709).

Moreover, Jung knew what it was like to change one’s mind about a friendship, after he had been one of Freud’s most favoured correspondents. Their exchange of letters had begun, as it had in the case of Schiller and Goethe...
(see the former’s invitation and the latter’s reply on 13 and 24 June 1794), in a purely formal manner. In 1906 Jung sent Freud a copy of his just-published *Diagnostic Association Studies* (1906), for which Freud thanked Jung in a letter of 11 April 1906.\(^{17}\) This formal exchange had been followed up with several meetings in Vienna and elsewhere, and quickly became an intensive exchange of interests, ideas – and feelings.\(^{18}\) Strangely enough for psychoanalysts, they were happy to engage in such identifications as father and son (see Jung’s letter to Freud of 20 February 1908), Moses and Joshua (see Freud’s letter to Jung of 17 January 1909), and analyst and analysand (see their letters of 29 November and 3 December 1912).\(^{19}\)

Rather than the model of the Goethe–Schiller friendship, however, the Freud–Jung correspondence follows the model of the Nietzsche–Wagner friendship, inasmuch as it ended in mutual recrimination – a break presaged, in fact, as early as Jung’s letter to Freud of 3 March 1912, when he quoted from Nietzsche’s *Zarathustra*, ‘one repays a teacher badly if one remains only a pupil’,\(^{20}\) and subsequently rendered irreparable by the publication in 1911 and 1912 of *Transformations and Symbols of the Libido*.

As *Memories, Dreams, Reflections* suggests, however, defining the difference between his own approach to psychology and Freud’s (not to mention Adler’s) led Jung to develop the idea of different psychological types and, in turn, the concepts of polarity and psychic energy (MDR, 178). If *Transformations and Symbols of the Libido* had cost Jung his friendship with Freud, then *Psychological Types* was – and is – necessary for understanding inter alia why that relationship had failed. Furthermore, it also marked a new step in Jung’s reception of Weimar classicism and, in particular, his reception of Schiller.

### Jung’s reception of Schiller

The stages of Jung’s reception of Schiller correspond roughly to the three phases in the development of his psychology: his early writings (from 1901 to 1909); his transitional writings (from 1911 to 1925); and his mature writings (from the 1930s onwards). To begin with, Schiller’s presence in Jung’s earlier writings on psychology is, due to their largely clinical intentions, marginal. For his part, Schiller had studied medicine at the Military Academy of the Duke of Württemberg from 1776 to 1780, writing a dissertation on the *Philosophy of Physiology* (1779), rejected by the examiners, and an *Essay on the Connection between the Animal and the Spiritual Nature of Man* (1780) (accepted by them).\(^{21}\) Similarly, Jung began his career as a psychiatrist and empirical scientist, working at the famous Burghölzli clinic and conducting experiments on word association, before becoming closely involved with Freudian psychoanalysis.\(^{22}\) In these early works the figure of Schiller was, more often than not, bound up with the pathological phenomena Jung observed in his patients. For example, in ‘On Spiritualistic Phenomena’
(1905), Jung recounted how a 24-year-old woman had experienced a vision of Schiller reading his poetry to her (CW 18 §712). Then again, in ‘The Psychology of Dementia Praecox’ (1907), Jung’s case-study of paranoid dementia, he analysed a word-association test which apparently involved a motif from Schiller’s ‘The Song of the Bell’ (CW 3 §224–§225 and §274–§275) and a reference to ‘The Cranes of Ibycus’ (1798) (CW 3 §254), an analysis which he recapitulated in ‘The Content of the Psychoses’ (1908/1914) (CW 3 §375–§376; cf. §372). Schiller’s poems were once so well known in German-speaking culture, it is not surprising that resonances of his works could be heard in the word-association tests Jung conducted on his patients. When Jung mentioned this case again in ‘Psychic Conflicts in a Child’ (1910/1916/1939/1946), he emphasized how his 15-year-old female patient had, in the course of her analysis, repeatedly referred to ‘The Song of the Bell’. On this occasion, Jung now remembered that the poem contains the following lines about a funeral (CW 17 §7) –

Alas! it is the wife, so precious,
alas! it is the faithful mother,
that the dark prince of the shadows
leads away from the arms of the husband [. . .]

Ach! die Gattin ist’s, die teure,
Ach! es ist die treue Mutter,
Die der schwarze Fürst der Schatten
Wegführt aus dem Arm des Gatten [. . .]

– and he was able to relate these lines to the cause of his patient’s psychosis; namely, in this case, that she wished in some sense ‘to be rid of’ her own ‘faithful mother’, while she, as a daughter, identified with ‘the wife, so precious’ (CW 17 §8).

After his break with Freud, marked by the publication of Transformations and Symbols of the Libido, Jung’s use of Schiller became more complex. Arguably, Freud’s identification with Goethe, and Jung’s own cultivation of the family legend that his grandfather was a natural son of Goethe, may, to a greater or lesser extent, have also played a role in Jung’s decision to foreground the other great figure of Weimar classicism.

As he began to work out a fundamentally different approach from that of Freud, Jung began to identify at least three of the basic concepts of analytical psychology with Schillerian notions. First, in ‘On Psychic Energy’ (begun in 1912 and completed in 1928), Jung claimed that his understanding of the libido as psychic energy was, at least in part, derived from Schiller, who ‘thinks in terms of energy, so to speak’, and ‘operates with ideas like “transfer of intensity” ’ (CW 8 §26).23 Second, in ‘The Role of the Unconscious’ (1918), Jung hinted at a connection between his notion of
the symbol and Schiller’s, even though he set up a distinction between the aesthetic and the symbolic:

The right way may perhaps be found in the approximation of the two worlds [i.e., the ‘inner’ and the ‘outer’]. Schiller thought he had found this way in art, in what he called the ‘symbol’ of art. The artist, therefore, should know the secret of the middle path. My own experiences have led me to doubt this. I am of the opinion that the union of rational and irrational truth is to be found not so much in art as in the symbol per se; for it is the essence of the symbol to contain both the rational and the irrational.

(CW 10 §24)

Jung’s problematic refusal to see art in symbolic terms returns, as we shall see, in his major discussion of Schiller’s aesthetics three years later in 1921.

Finally, in his lecture ‘On the Relation of Analytical Psychology to Poetry’ (1922/1931), Jung developed his typological distinction between introversion and extraversion (see p. 102) on the basis of Schiller’s classification of the naive and the sentimental. (With regard to Schiller’s oeuvre, Jung argued that his dramas and most of his poetic work exemplified the introverted attitude [CW 15 §111].)

Once Jung had worked out the implications of his divergence from Freud and fully developed his own psychological system, Schiller could be integrated into analytical psychology and used to elucidate its core concepts. In one of his classic essays, ‘The Development of Personality’ (Vom Werden der Persönlichkeit), Jung expounded his concept of the personality with specific reference to Schiller’s major treatise, On the Aesthetic Education of Humankind in a Series of Letters (Über die ästhetische Erziehung des Menschen in einer Reihe von Briefen) (1795), henceforth referred to as the Aesthetic Letters.25 His paper opened with a quotation from Goethe’s West-östlicher Divan (1819):

Joy of earthlings is perfected
In the personality.

Jung went on to identify the problem of the personality with the central question Schiller had investigated in the Aesthetic Letters, a work whose significance in this regard, he claimed, had been overlooked:

The yearning for personality has therefore become a real problem that occupies many minds today, whereas in former times there was only one man who had a glimmering of this question – Friedrich Schiller, whose letters on aesthetic education have lain dormant, like a Sleeping Beauty of literature, for more than a century.

(CW 17 §284)
(Another of the philosophical princes in the twentieth century who would awaken the ‘sleeping beauty’ of the Aesthetic Letters was Martin Heidegger, who held a seminar on Schiller in the winter semester of 1936/1937 in Freiburg.)

More specifically, Jung drew a link between the problem of the personality and Schiller’s central preoccupation in his treatise, namely, education:

Personality is the act of the highest courage to face life, of absolute affirmation of being an individual, and the most successful adaptation to the universal conditions of existence, coupled with the greatest possible freedom of self-determination. To educate someone to this seems, to me, to be no light matter. It is surely the hardest task the modern intellectual world has set itself. Certainly, it is dangerous, too, dangerous to a degree that Schiller, who was the first prophetically to venture upon these problems, never imagined.

(CW 17 §289)

Thus Jung, while acknowledging Schiller’s pioneering or ‘prophetic’ work, at the same time voices the criticism that his investigations were not sufficiently thorough. This ambivalent attitude towards Schiller – simultaneously claiming him as a predecessor, yet attempting to supersede him – can be seen in his most extended and elaborate engagement with Schiller, in the chapter in Psychological Types (1921) entitled ‘Schiller’s Ideas on the Type Problem’. In the rest of this chapter, and continuing in the next, we shall attempt to elucidate Jung’s complex reading in Psychological Types of Schiller’s Aesthetic Letters.

Context of Schiller’s Aesthetic Letters and Jung’s Psychological Types

In political terms, the context of Schiller’s treatise On the Aesthetic Education of Humankind, originally written as a series of letters for his benefactor, Prince Friedrich Christian, Duke of Schleswig-Holstein-Augustenburg, was the French Revolution of 1789. Commenting on §3 of Letter 7, Jung wrote in Psychological Types:

The contemporary revolution in France gave this statement a living, albeit bloody background: begun in the name of philosophy and reason, with a soaring idealism, it ended in blood-drenched chaos, from which arose the despotic genius of Napoleon. The Goddess of Reason proved herself powerless against the might of the unchained beast.

(CW 6 §116)

As Jung was keen to emphasize, however, Schiller’s treatise is motivated by concerns of a personal as well as a political nature; above all, the sense
of conflict within himself between imagination (intuition) and abstraction (thinking), as he had come to understood it in terms of his relationship to Goethe. Citing §4 of Letter 8, Jung commented (making reference to the figure of the ‘Proktophantasmist’ from Faust, Part One):

Schiller felt the defeat of reason and truth and therefore had to postulate that truth herself should become a power. [. . .] We feel in these words of Schiller the proximity of the French Enlightenment and the fantastic intellectualism of the Revolution. ‘Our age is enlightened’ – what an overvaluation of the intellect! ‘The spirit of free enquiry has dissipated those false conceptions’ – what rationalism! One is vividly reminded of the Proktophantasmist in Faust: ‘The world has been enlightened! You must disappear!’ Even though the men of that age were altogether too prone to overestimate the importance and efficacy of reason, quite forgetting that if reason really possessed such a power, she had long had the amplest opportunity to demonstrate it, the fact should not be overlooked that not all the influential minds of the age thought that way; consequently this soaring flight of rationalistic intellectualism may equally well have sprung from a particularly strong subjective development of this same propensity in Schiller himself.

(CW 6 §116–§117)

Schiller’s personal, psychological profile was characterized by Jung in terms of ‘a predominance of intellect’, that predominance being, not at the expense of his ‘poetic intuition’, but rather at the cost of his ‘feeling’ (CW 6 §117).

For Jung, then, the French Revolution had provided Schiller with an opportunity to explore what was of the most acute personal concern to him:

From the spectacular example of the French Revolution, which had just then reached the climax of terror, Schiller could see how far the sway of the Goddess of Reason extended, and how far the unreasoning beast in humankind was triumphant. It was doubtless these contemporary events that forced the problem on Schiller with particular urgency; for it often happens that, when a problem which is at bottom personal, and therefore apparently subjective, coincides with external events that contain the same psychological elements as the personal conflict, it is suddenly transformed into a general question embracing the whole of society.

(CW 6 §119)

As corroboration of his conjecture that it had been ‘the impressions of contemporary events’ that had given Schiller the courage to undertake his attempt to solve ‘the conflict between the individual and the social function’ (CW 6 §120), Jung cited the example of Rousseau’s Émile, ou de l’éducation (1762) (CW 6 §120–§124). Of course, it was a quotation from Rousseau (to be
precise, from *Julie, ou la Nouvelle Héloïse* [1761]), that had appeared on the title-page of the version of the *Aesthetic Letters* published in the journal *Die Horen*: *si c’est la raison, qui fait l’homme, c’est le sentiment, qui le conduit* (if reason makes humankind, it is feeling that guides us).

Right at the end of *Psychological Types*, in his conclusion to the volume, Jung invoked the revolutionary principles of *liberté, égalité, fraternité*, to sum up the conditions in the bourgeois democracy of modern society. As well as expressing scepticism about the political Left, and the aim of abolishing inequality, Jung hinted that, in his view, modern society had become too *extraverted*:

> No outward form of life could be devised, however equitable and just it might appear, that would not involve injustice for one or the other human type. That, in spite of this, every kind of enthusiast – political, social, philosophical, or religious – is busily endeavouring to find those uniform external conditions which would bring with them greater opportunities for the happiness of all seems to me connected with a general attitude to life too exclusively oriented to the outer world.

*(CW 6 §845)*

That said, Jung was committed to a view of the world that saw social development in terms of *progress*, for he went on to speak, only three years after the end of the First World War (a topic noticeably absent from the pages of *Psychological Types*), of ‘the advance of civilization’ as having led ‘from the law of the jungle to the establishment of courts of justice and standards of right and wrong which are above the contending parties’ *(CW 6 §847).*

In fact, Jung’s system is more concerned with political or social issues than is sometimes acknowledged, although this is an area of expanding debate. I am not referring to his alleged entanglement with National Socialism, nor to his inclination towards an ‘ultra-conservativism’, nor to such attempts at political intervention as his call for the mobilization of all Swiss males in 1939 or his willingness to allow his name to go forward as a candidate to the Swiss parliament for the Landesring der Unabhängigen (National Group of Independents). Instead, I mean Jung’s engagement with social issues in such lectures and articles as ‘The Love Problem of a Student’ (1922) *(CW 10 §197–§235)*, ‘Woman in Europe’ (1927) *(CW 10 §236–§275)*, and ‘Marriage as a Psychological Relationship’ (1931) *(CW 17 §324–§345)*. Aside from the inevitable and historically conditioned limitation of some of Jung’s statements, his views on, say, sexual freedom evince a refreshing open-mindedness and, on occasion, an astonishing radicalness. Moreover, as we shall see, Jung’s theory of the relation between the *persona* and the *personality* (*Persönlichkeit*) demonstrates a nuanced insight into the self-presentation of the individual in everyday life.

In this epilogue that concludes *Psychological Types*, Jung argued for the
principle of relativism, in a way that recalls the view expressed by Wilhelm Dilthey that ‘the final pronouncement of the historical world view is that human accomplishment of every sort is relative, that everything is moving [as a process and nothing is stable’ (die Relativität jeder Art von menschlicher Auffassung ist das letzte Wort der historischen Weltanschauung, alles im Prozeß fließend, nichts bleibend). Thus philosophical differences turn out in the end to be, for Jung, psychological differences:

It would be of considerably greater value if the dispute [between philosophical viewpoints] were transferred to the psychological realm, from which it arose in the first place. The shift of position would soon show a diversity of psychological attitudes, each with its own right to existence, and each contributing to the setting up of incompatible theories. So long as one tries to settle the dispute by external compromises, one merely satisfies the modest demands of shallow minds that have never yet been enkindled by the passion of a principle. A real understanding can, in my view, be reached only when the diversity of psychological premises is accepted.

(CW 6 §846)

This principle of pluralism was no less necessary, Jung contended, in the field of psychological theory itself. For in the case of psychology the unusual condition obtains that, in the construction of its concepts, the psychic process is ‘not merely the object but at the same time the subject’ (nicht bloß Objekt, sondern zugleich auch Subjekt) (CW 6 §849).

For Jung, the consequence that ‘one psychological process has to explain another’ involves the denial of the existence of any sort of ‘extra-terrestrial Archimedean point by means of which the intellect can lift itself off its own hinges’ (CW 6 §855). Whereas a simple natural process might be explicable in simple terms, complex psychic processes are very different. Not only is it impossible objectively to register them by any kind of apparatus, but also the explanation is produced by the very subjective process itself (CW 6 §850). In other words, ‘the author of the concept can produce only such a concept as corresponds to the psychic process he is endeavouring to explain’ (der Autor des Begriﬀes kann nur einen solchen Begriﬀ erzeugen, welcher zu dem psychischen Vorgang, den er zu erklären trachtet, stimmt), but ‘the concept will correspond only when it agrees with the process to be explained in the thinking subject himself’ (der Begriﬀ wird aber nur dann stimmen, wenn er mit dem zu erklärenden Vorgang im denkenden Subjekt selbst übereinstimmt) (CW 6 §850). So how, say, a vision comes about can never be experienced objectively, it can be explained only in terms of how the investigator understands it. Herein lies, for Jung, the problem. Such an explanation accounts only for how I represent the vision to myself. But how do I know that the process of the vision is identically or even similarly represented in the Other? Jung touches
here on vital questions of relativism, sense perception and mental perception, and phenomenology.

To put this point in more concrete terms, Jung saw himself as elaborating a view of the psyche that took account both of its homogeneity and of its heterogeneity. The homogeneity of the psyche is expressed in the concept of the collective unconscious, ‘as a universal and homogeneous substratum whose uniformity is such that one finds the same myth and fairytale motifs in all corners of the earth’ (CW 6 §851). Set against this homogeneity, however, is the equally great heterogeneity of the conscious psyche – a point, as Jung rightly believes, requiring very little proof. (Look around.) If one sets out to establish the homogeneity of the psyche, then one must investigate the foundations of consciousness; and a theory which explains the psyche in terms of its foundations will, Jung argues, lead one to explain things in terms of where they come from – in other words, to the ‘reductive’ approach:

In order to discover the uniformity of the human psyche, I have to descend into the very foundations of consciousness. Only there do I find that in which all are alike. If I build my theory on what is common to all, I explain the psyche in terms of its foundation and origin. But that does nothing to explain its historical and individual differentiation. With such a theory I ignore the peculiarities of the conscious psyche.

(CW 6 §852)

Explaining the psyche in terms of its historical origins can be reductive in two senses: the human being is reduced, either to his or her ‘phylogenetic prototype’, or dissolved into his or her ‘elementary processes’. When we try to reconstruct the human being, what emerges, says Jung, with polemical vigour, is either ‘an ape’, or ‘an accumulation of elementary processes whose interplay yields a meaningless and aimless reciprocal activity’.

By contrast, if one works on the basis of the heterogeneity of the psyche, then one will explain things in terms of their function, or where they are leading to – in other words, the ‘constructive’ approach:

If I want to project a picture of the psyche in its totality, I must bear in mind the diversity of psyches, since the conscious individual psyche belongs just as much to a general picture of psychology as does its unconscious foundation. In my construction of theories, therefore, I can, with as much right, proceed from the fact of differentiated psyches, and consider the same process from the standpoint of differentiation which I considered before from the standpoint of uniformity. [. . .] From this angle I shall always be intent on where a thing is going to, not where it comes from; whereas from the former angle I never bothered about the goal but only about the origin.

(CW 6 §853)
Thus the same psychic process can be explained in two contradictory and mutually exclusive theories, neither of which can be declared wrong. How else, Jung asks, can one account for the uniformity of the psyche on the one hand and its diversity on the other?

Since reality ‘neither consists in nor adheres to theories’, both views, apparently divided, are united in it. Reality is both ‘reductive’ and ‘constructive’, both ‘causal’ and ‘final’, both ‘objective’ and ‘subjective’, both ‘analytic’ and ‘synthetic’. ‘Each view’, Jung writes, ‘is a product of the past and carries a future meaning’. ‘Of neither’, he claims, ‘can it be said with certainty whether it is merely the end and not also a beginning’. So ‘for anyone who thinks there is only one true explanation of a psychic process’, he adds, ‘the vitality of psychic contents’, requiring (at least) two different theories, ‘is a matter for despair’ (CW 6 §854). As Goethe’s maxim reminds us, ‘people say that between two opposed opinions truth lies in the middle. Not at all! A problem lies in-between: invisible, eternally active life, contemplated in peace’. And Jung concludes this part of his argument with a strikingly Goethean image, capturing the message of the opening scene of Faust, Part Two, where Faust sees the rainbow arc above the waterfall –

From cliff to cliff it pours down never-ceasing,
It foams and streams a thousand thousandfold,
Spray upon spray high in the air releasing.
But from this tumult, marvellous to behold,
The rainbow blooms, changing yet ever still;
Now vanishing and now drawn clear and bold.
How cool the moisture of its scattering spill!
I watch a mirror here of man’s whole story,
And plain it seems, ponder it as you will: Our life’s a spectrum-sheen of borrowed glory
[Am farbigen Abglanz haben wir das Leben].

– when he writes that ‘everything that is alive in the psyche shimmers in rainbow hues’ (jedes lebendige Etwas in der Seele schillert in mehreren Farben) (CW 6 §854). And this psychic iridescence means that ‘we should not pretend to understand the world only by the intellect; we apprehend it just as much by feeling’ (man gebe sich nicht den Anschein, als ob man die Welt nur aus dem Intellekt begreifen würde; man begreift sie ebenso sehr auch aus dem Gefühl) (CW 6 §856). Thus, the theoretical concerns advanced in such early writings as ‘On Psychological Understanding’ (1914) – and already elaborated in Transformations and Symbols of the Libido, which Jung described in Psychological Types as an attempt to demonstrate both the ‘reductive’ and ‘constructive’ approaches (CW 6 §854) – still lie at the heart of Jung’s project, and inform his thinking on typology.

If the personal background to the composition of Psychological Types was
the break with Freud, and Jung’s own experience of ‘intense introversion’ or his ‘confrontation with the unconscious’ (Auseinandersetzung mit dem Unbewußten), to use that euphemistic phrase once more, then, in political terms, the First World War forms the major event of global significance around which, in terms of chronology, Jung’s writings on typology cluster (although one could never tell this from those writings). In particular the lecture ‘A Contribution to the Study of Psychological Types’ (CW 6 §858–§882) was delivered by Jung at the Psychoanalytic Congress in Munich in September 1913, just nine months away from the outbreak of the First World War, and, in 1921, Psychological Types was completed three years after the end of the war.

As (on the level of European affairs) Europe moved slowly towards war, so, on the level of Jung’s personal and professional life, there were profound changes taking place during the same period. On 28 June 1914, Archduke Ferdinand was assassinated in Sarajevo; on 1 August, Germany declared war on Russia and, on 3 August, against France. For Jung, 1913 had seen the final break with Freud and, in the same year, he had decided to resign from his lectureship at Zurich University; in 1914, he resigned as president of the International Psychoanalytic Association; and, at the same time, he was experiencing marital problems in the wake of his affair with Sabina Spielrein. During the period 1913–14, if we are to believe Memories, Dreams, Reflections, Jung experienced terrible visions. First, there was a vision of a sea of blood; second, a sequence of dreams of a bitter frost killing all living things; and finally, a dream in which the frost transformed a leaf-bearing tree – his tree of life – into sweet grapes, full of healing juices, which he plucked and offered to a waiting crowd (MDR, 199–200). Initially, Jung rejected a connection between these visions and political developments, asking himself whether these visions pointed to a revolution, but deciding they could not. ‘And so I drew the conclusion’, we read in Memories, Dreams, Reflections, ‘that they had to do with me myself, and decided that I was menaced by a psychosis’. The idea of war apparently did ‘not occur at all’ to him (MDR, 200). Subsequently, however, with the invasion of Belgium and the British declaration of war against Germany, Jung came to believe there was indeed a connection, and he saw in the outbreak of war a call to psychological duty:

On 1st August the World War broke out. Now my task was clear: I had to try to understand what had happened and to what extent my own experience coincided with the human collectivity. Therefore my first obligation was to reflect on myself. A beginning was made by writing down the fantasies that had come to me during my building game. This work took precedence over everything else.

(MDR, 200)

According to Memories, Dreams, Reflections, it was only towards the end of the First World War and in the period shortly afterwards, circa 1918–19, that
Jung ‘gradually began to emerge from the darkness’ (MDR, 220). In 1916, he had written the \textit{Septem Sermones ad mortuos}; shortly thereafter, he had painted his first mandalas; and, when ‘the stream of fantasies ebbed away’, and he was ‘no longer held captive inside the magic mountain’ (\textit{nicht mehr im Zauberberg gefangen}) (MDR, 233), Jung began to take what he called an ‘objective view’ of the experience (\textit{sich objektiv dazu einstellen}) and reflect on it. The fruit of these reflections, in the first instance, was \textit{The Relations between the Ego and the Unconscious} (1928); and, at the same time, Jung tells us, he was busy with preparatory work on \textit{Psychological Types} (MDR, 233). So, it is to this work we must once again turn to examine in more detail Jung’s conception of typology.

\textbf{Introversion and extraversion}

As well as constituting his most substantial discussion of Schiller, \textit{Psychological Types} marks a broadening of Jung’s use of Goethe. Whereas the major psychological process studied in \textit{Transformations and Symbols of the Libido} is regression, \textit{Psychological Types} concentrates on the two related categories of introversion and extraversion. As we have seen, Jung claims to have developed these categories, at least in part, on the basis of his reading of the correspondence between Schiller and Goethe.

The book opens with a quotation from \textit{On the History of Religion and Philosophy in Germany} (1835) by the Romantic writer Heinrich Heine (1797–1856). ‘Plato and Aristotle!’ Heine exclaims, ‘these are not merely two systems, they are types of two distinct human natures, which from time immemorial, under every sort of disguise, stand more or less inimically opposed’ (CW 6, p. 2). In saying this, Heine was following Goethe’s \textit{Doctrine of Colour} (\textit{Zur Farbenlehre}) (1805–10), which contrasts Plato with Aristotle as ‘separate representatives of marvellous, not easily united characteristics’.\footnote{40} In his turn, Jung takes over this traditional opposition of Plato and Aristotle, and turns it into a distinction between the introverted and extraverted personality. In so doing, he not only makes a distinction between two types, but also renders this polarity internal to the personality.

Thus the key distinction with which Jung operates in \textit{Psychological Types} is that between \textit{introversion} and \textit{extraversion}. In his opening pages, Jung defines these two categories in terms of the relationship between subject and object. In the case of extraversion, the interest of the subject moves towards the object – ‘an outward movement of interest towards the object’ (CW 6 §4) – while in the case of introversion, the interest of the subject moves away from the object and towards himself or herself, ‘a movement of interest away from the object to the subject and his or her own psychological interests’ (CW 6 §4).\footnote{41} In brief, one might say that if the extraverted attitude has objects for objects, the introverted attitude has archetypes for objects.

Over several dense and richly written pages in the ‘Definitions’ section of
his book, Jung evokes the pleasures, but also hints at some of the dangers, of introversion. ‘The introverted attitude’, he writes, ‘is normally oriented by the psychic structure, which is in principle hereditary and is inborn in the subject’ (CW 6 §623). ‘These subjective tendencies and views’, he explains, ‘are stronger than the object’s influence, their psychic value is higher, so that they superimpose themselves on all impressions’ (CW 6 §625). What seems of paramount importance to introverted thinking is ‘the development and presentation of the subjective idea, of the initial symbolic image hovering darkly before the mind’s eye [vor seinem inneren Blick], so that its aim is never an intellectual reconstruction of the concrete fact, but a shaping of that dark image into a luminous idea [einer Ausgestaltung des dunkeln Bildes zur lichtvollen Idee]’ (CW 6 §628). Because ‘it will be impossible for the represented idea to deny its derivation from the dim archaic image [dem dunkeln archaischen Bild]’, this idea ‘derives its convincing power from the unconscious archetype which, as such, is eternally valid and true’ (CW 6 §629). If introverted thinking suffers from a certain ‘impoverishment’, there is ample compensation in the form of ‘a wealth of unconscious facts’ (CW 6 §630).

On the intuitive side of this kind of thinking, Jung cites the examples of Alfred Kubin (1877–1959) and Gustav Meyrink (1868–1932), and on the intellectual side, Kant and Nietzsche (as opposed to those famous extraverts, Charles Darwin (1809–22) and Georges Cuvier (1769–1882)). In conclusion he writes that ‘this rich and varied world with its overflowing and intoxicating life is not purely external, but also exists within’ (die reiche und vielbewegte Welt und ihr überquellendes und berauschendes Leben ist nicht nur außen, sondern auch innen) (CW 6 §665). This final remark sounds like an echo of Goethe’s principle in his late poem, ‘Epirrhema’ (1820), which opens with the following lines:

You must, when contemplating
[Nature,][113]
Attend to this, in each and every
[feature:]
There’s nought outside and
[nought within,
For she is inside out and outside in.
Thus will you grasp, with no delay,
The holy secret, clear as day.

Müset im Naturbetrachten
Immer eins wie alles achten:
Nichts ist drinnen, nichts ist [draußen;
Denn was innen, das ist außen.
So ergreifet ohne Säumnis
Heilig öffentlich Geheimnis.42

According to the poem, its insight constitutes an example of the ‘open secret’ (offenbares Geheimnis) discussed in Chapter 2 with reference to Goethe and Jung. In his lecture ‘Psychological Aspects of the Mother Archetype’ (1938/1954) Jung quotes again from this poem, but adds a twist of his own: ‘“All that is outside, also is inside”, we could say with Goethe. But this “inside”, which modern rationalism is so eager to derive from “outside”, has
its own structure, which precedes all conscious experience as an *a priori* (CW 9/1 §187).

Now although Jung does not mention it, one of Schiller’s earliest works on aesthetics takes the relationship between subject and object as its starting-point. In the so-called *Kallias-Briefe*, a series of six letters written to Christian Gottfried Körner dated 25 January, 8, 18, 19, 23 and 28 February 1793, Schiller outlined his ideas for a treatise on beauty, which never actually appeared, but whose central tenets were integrated into the *Aesthetic Letters*. In his first *Kallias-Briefe* of 25 January, Schiller commented on the difficulty of the search for an objective definition of Beauty, and distinguished between three different possibilities of describing beauty, associating them with three different sets of thinkers – ‘sensuous subjective’ (*sinnlich subjectiv*), associated with Edmund Burke, ‘subjective rational’ (*subjectiv rational*), associated with Kant, and ‘rational objective’ (*rational objectiv*), associated with Baumgarten and Mendelssohn – to which he then added a fourth, his (Goethean) own, ‘sensuous objective’ (*sinnlich objectiv*). And in his final letter of 28 February, Schiller defined great art in terms of *reine Objektivität*, writing that ‘pure objectivity of representation’ is ‘the essence of good style’ and ‘the highest basic principle of the arts’. In fact, Goethe had made precisely the same point about style in his essay ‘Simple Imitation, Manner, Style’ (1789), where he wrote that, ‘while simple imitation therefore depends on a tranquil and affectionate view of life, manner is a reflection of the ease and competence with which the subject is treated’, but that style ‘rests on the most fundamental principle of cognition, on the essence of things – to the extent that it is granted us to perceive this essence in visible and tangible form’. Yet in his intervening letters, particularly that of 8 February, Schiller argued that an object is beautiful only when it appears to be free, thus defining beauty as ‘freedom in appearance’ (*Freiheit in der Erscheinung*). Whereas, for Schiller, the subject–object problem was a problem of aesthetics, for Jung it became a problem of psychology – which suggests there may be a deeper connection between psychology and aesthetics.

In *Psychological Types* Jung is at pains to stress that both introversion and extraversion are ‘opposing mechanisms’ (*gegensätzliche Mechanismen*), and he compares them to the Goethean processes of ‘systole’ and ‘diastole’:

> These opposite attitudes are in themselves no more than opposite mechanisms: a diastolic going-out and seizing of the object, and a systolic concentration and release of energy from the object seized. All human beings possess both mechanisms as an expression of their natural life-rhythm, a rhythm which Goethe, surely not by chance, described physiologically in terms of the heart’s activity.

(CW 6 §6)

In his scientific writings Goethe discusses systole and diastole on various
occasions. For example, in the section entitled ‘Physiological Colours’ in the ‘Didactic Section’ of his *Doctrine of Colour*, he writes that ‘inhaling presupposes exhaling and vice versa; each systole presupposes its diastole’, which is ‘the eternal rule of life’ (GE 12, 173). In the section entitled ‘Relationship to Other Fields’, he notes that ‘to make two of what is one, to unify what is divided – this is the life of nature, the eternal systole and diastole, the eternal synkrisis [union] and diacrisis [separation], the inhaling and exhaling of the world in which we live, weave, and exist’ (GE 12, 274). Likewise, in a section of his *On Morphology* entitled ‘Pursuance’, Goethe noted that the rhythm of diastole and systole was fundamental to the experience of life: ‘an idea’, he asseverated,

cannot be represented in experience, it can hardly be proved, but whoever does not possess it will never become aware of how it manifests itself in appearance; whoever does possess it will easily get used to going far beyond appearance, and of course then must return, after such a diastole, in order not to lose oneself, back to reality, and will proceed alternately through the whole of life.

And he expressed the idea in poetic form in his *West-östlicher Divan* thus:

> In all our breathing are two kinds of blessing:  
> Inhaling air and thereafter expressing.  
> That will oppress, this one refresh:  
> Life’s such a process in marvellous mesh.  
> Thank thou the Lord, hard though he be,  
> Thank him as well when he’s setting you free.  

> *Im Atemholen sind zweierlei Gnaden:*  
> *Die Luft einziehen, sich ihrer entladen;*  
> *Jenes bedrückt, dieses erfrischt;*  
> *So wunderbar ist das Leben gemischt.*  
> *Du danke Gott, wenn er dich preßt,*  
> *Und dank’ ihm, wenn er dich wieder entläßt.*

For Goethe, this pattern could be seen in the natural life-rhythms of breathing in and out, the beating of the heart, the eye’s need for light and dark, magnetic repulsion and attraction, or, indeed, ‘formation, transformation’, ‘thinking’ (*Denken*) and ‘doing’ (*Tun*), ‘losing oneself’ (*Entselbstigung*) and ‘finding oneself’ (*Verselbstung*). They are thus closely related to Goethe’s principle of ‘polarity’, which in his ‘Commentary on the Essay “On Nature”’ (1828) he described, along with ‘intensification’ (*Steigerung*), as constituting ‘the two great driving forces in all nature’ (GE 12, 6). In fact, in his letter to Schiller of 24 January 1798 Goethe suggested, in the context of the history
of science, that the pattern of systole and diastole applied, not just to the individual, but to history as a whole. He wrote:

If one looks at the sequence of intellectual moments of which the history of science actually consists, then one no longer laughs at the notion of writing an a priori history, for everything really does develop out of the progressive and regressive qualities of the human mind, out of the striving, and then self-restraint, of nature.

Similarly, in Jung’s system, the two attitudes of extraversion and introversion are not merely external distinctions, but represent a polarity which, as already suggested, Jung renders internal to the psyche. According to the Jungian principle of complementarism, a healthy psyche will demonstrate both attitudes in a reciprocal harmony. As Jung, echoing these Goethean and Schillerian concepts of self-regulation, put it in ‘On the Psychology of the Unconscious’ (1917/1918/1925/1936/1942), ‘there is no balance, and no system of self-regulation, without opposition’. For Jung, what characterizes the psyche is that it is ‘a system with self-regulation’ (CW 7 §92).\textsuperscript{56} And the conception of the psyche in organic terms is one that Jung would have found in Schiller.\textsuperscript{57}

Jung writes that ‘a rhythmical alternation of both forms of psychic activity would perhaps correspond to the normal course of life’, but he is sufficiently realistic to realize this cannot be the case. Hence the predominance of one mechanism over the other, and the production of the \textit{types}:

The complicated outer conditions under which we live, as well as the even more complicated conditions of our individual psychic make-up, seldom permit a completely undisturbed flow of psychic life-activity. Outer circumstances and inner disposition frequently favour the one mechanism, and restrict or hinder the other. One mechanism will naturally predominate, and if this condition becomes in any way chronic a \textit{type} will be produced; that is, an habitual attitude in which one mechanism predominates completely, although the other can never be completely suppressed, because it is absolutely integral to psychic life-activity.

(CW 6 §6)

On the level of the individual, Jung emphasizes the compensatory interaction of introversion and extraversion in terms of the attitude of consciousness and the attitude of the unconscious (CW 6 §568). Particular care, Jung believes, needs to be taken with the attitude of the unconscious. And, of course, this must be the case, or else why would we need analysts?

In the case of conscious extraversion, for example, Jung writes that the attitude of the unconscious ‘as an effective complement’ to the conscious extraverted attitude is ‘of an introverted character’. The unconscious ‘concen-
brates the energy’ – that is, the libido – on the ‘subjective factor’, on those needs and claims which the excessively extraverted conscious attitude suppresses – or represses (CW 6 §570). Such compensation, Jung adds, can lead to destruction . . . or it can lead to the (re)establishment of the equilibrium that is the basis of the healthy psyche (CW 6 §574–§575). Thus in the case of the extraverted thinking type, for instance, feeling is repressed, but the more feeling is repressed, the greater its deleterious effect on thinking, leading eventually to intellectual dogmatism and a stagnation of thought. In the case of extraverted feeling, by contrast, it is thinking that is repressed. The danger here is that the subject becomes so wrapped up in its feeling processes that it becomes absorbed by them; the result is artificiality, unreliability, or, in the worst case, hysteria.

Likewise, extraverted sensation is said to repress intuition, which can assert itself, Jung claims, in the form of projections; and extraverted intuition seems to repress sensation, thinking, and feeling. In clinical terms, failed attempts at compensation can lead to, at best, bad moods; at worst, hysteria, neurotic compulsion, compulsive hypochondria, phobias, and complete breakdown. Likewise, in cases of introverted functions, where the individual tends to interpose his or her subjective view between the perception of the object and his or her own action (CW 6 §563, cf. §620), the predominance of the subjective factor in the consciousness of the introvert leads the unconscious, by way of compensation, to try and reinforce the influence of the object (CW 6 §626). The dangers lurking here, Jung writes, range from psychasthenia, neurasthenia, and compulsion neurosis, to seeing the entire objective world as a comedy – ‘only in extreme cases, however, is this dilemma reached’ (CW 6 §653).

Moreover, Jung places emphasis on the significance of the interaction of the types. Because ‘the world exists not merely in and for itself, but also as it appears to me’ (die Welt ist nicht nur an und für sich, sondern auch so, wie sie mir erscheint), and because ‘no two people see the same object in the same way’, their interaction involves both objective and subjective factors (CW 6 §621). Thus, on the intersubjective level, Jung develops a theory of gender relations based on the premise that one partner offers a form of unconscious compensation for the attitude of the consciousness of the other. For example, in the case of the male extraverted thinking type, ‘the unconscious counterposition is embodied in a woman’; in the case of the male introverted thinking type, there can develop ‘a vague fear of the feminine sex’; and, in the case of the female introverted feeling type, such a woman can acquire ‘a mysterious power that may prove terribly fascinating to the extraverted man, for it touches his unconscious’ – ‘this power comes from the deeply felt, unconscious images’ (CW 6 §591, §637, §642).

More positively, there can be the experience of rapport, a psychic relationship between rational and irrational types, the possibility of which Jung entertains as ‘a feeling of agreement in spite of acknowledged differences’.

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While rational types regard the feeling of rapport as an insight or act of cognition which represents the point of agreement in conceptual form, for irrational types rapport is based, not on judgement, but ‘on the parallelism of events, of what actually happens in life’, and hence the difference in their attitude to the transitory nature of any such relationships.

To the rational type it is often a bitter thought that the relationship will last just so long as external circumstances happen by chance to provide a mutual interest. This does not seem to him particularly human, whereas it is precisely in this that the irrational type sees a human situation of particular beauty [or: a humanity of quite singular beauty] [eine besonders schöne Menschlichkeit].

(CW 6 §618)

To put it another way, the rational type is like the young poet in Freud’s essay ‘On Transience’ (1916), who finds that ‘all he would otherwise have loved and admired seemed to him to be shorn of its worth by the transience which was its doom’, but the irrational type has read Freud’s essay and absorbed its message that ‘transience value is scarcity value in time’, and that ‘limitation in the possibility of an enjoyment raises the value of the enjoyment’ (SE 14, 305). Because such relationships between rational and irrational types can come about, however, as a result of unconscious mutual projection, such projection can also, Jung notes, ‘become a source of many misunderstandings’ – a remarkable understatement, in the light of the history of his relationship with Freud.

A similar attempt at theorizing the interaction of types can be found in Goethe’s work, both in his autobiographical and in his scientific writings. Henri Bortoft has suggested that ‘what Goethe discovered as a result of his encounter with Schiller, with his Kantian background’ (as Goethe’s account, ‘Fortunate Encounter’, records), was ‘the active role in all acts of cognitive perception of what he called a Vorstellungsart, a way of conceiving, or a mode of illumination, whereby the world becomes visible in a particular way’. By the same token, Schiller’s work on poetological typology – his essay On Naive and Sentimental Poetry (1796) – made Goethe, as he explained to Carl Friedrich von Reinhard, aware of his own ‘one-sidedness’ (Einseitigkeit), and better understand his relationship to his contemporaries.

Time and again in Psychological Types, Jung inveighs against ‘one-sidedness’ (Einseitigkeit). This ‘one-sidedness’ of ‘attitude’ or ‘orientation’ stands in contrast to the optimum of ‘the contrasting relationship to the object’ (gegensätzliches Verhalten zum Objekt) (CW 6 §5) of both systole and diastole, both introversion and extraversion, in which the rights and demands of both Self and World are respected and met. In fact, the term Einseitigkeit frequently occurs in Goethe’s writings on morphology. For example, in his ‘Preliminary Works on Morphology, I’ (Vorarbeiten zur
Morphologie I), he wrote that ‘as each person usually sees things from one side, so various hypotheses arose, which were more or less useful in expressing the secrets of nature, and remained useful for a longer or shorter time’. As Bortoft has argued, ‘through his historical investigations’ Goethe ‘came to recognize the role of Vorstellungsarten, the ways of conceiving, in the very constitution of scientific knowledge’, hence, Goethe believed, the rejection by the scientific community of his early work on colour, the ‘Contributions to Optics’ (Beiträge zur Optik) (1791–2). There was, however, a more general principle of Einseitigkeit to be discerned at work in any individual; as Goethe explained in his review of Ernst Stiedenroth’s A Psychology in Clarification of Phenomena from the Soul (1824), ‘we are well enough aware that some skill, some ability, usually predominates in the character of each human being’, and ‘this leads necessarily to one-sided thinking [Einseitigkeiten der Vorstellungsart]’ – since, as he put it, ‘man knows the world only through himself’ (der Mensch [kennt] die Welt nur durch sich) and ‘thus has the naive arrogance to believe that the world is constructed by him and for his sake’ (GE 12, 45). In this respect, then, as in so many others, Jung’s psychological principles are deeply Goethean.

Complementaristic, holistic – Jung’s vision of the integrated psyche is, seen in its proper historical perspective, by no means new. For, as Elizabeth M. Wilkinson and L.A. Willoughby have pointed out, the philosophes and psychologists of the eighteenth century saw it as their task to replace ‘the picture of the psyche as a collection of discrete faculties’ with ‘a picture of the psyche as a unity and continuity’. For instance, Diderot claimed, as Ernst Cassirer noted in his influential study on the Enlightenment, that the true power of the soul sprang, not from the destruction, but from the harmonious balance of the passions. Diderot maintained:

Ce serait donc un bonheur, me dira-t-on, d’avoir les passions fortes. Oui, sans doute, si toutes sont à l’unisson. Etablissez entre elles une juste harmonie, et n’en appréhendez point de désordres. Si l’espérance est balancée par la crainte, le point d’honneur par l’amour de la vie, le penchant au plaisir par l’intérêt de la santé, vous ne verrez ni libertins, ni téméraires, ni lâches.

Equally, Schiller claimed in his Aesthetic Letters that human perfection resides in ‘the harmonious energy of sensuous and spiritual powers’ (Letter 17 §2). Furthermore, he explained that such wholeness could be brought about, albeit transiently, only through the aesthetic – ‘only the aesthetic mode of perception makes the individual a whole’ (Letter 27 §10). For Schiller, the aesthetic is ‘a modality of the total psyche, not a function of any one of its faculties’.

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Imagination

Before beginning his discussion of Schiller in Chapter 2 of Psychological Types, Jung provides a survey of intellectual-historical typography, examining psychology in antiquity (the Gnostics, Tertullian, Origen) and the problem of nominalism and realism in the Middle Ages. In antiquity, the debate over the problem of universals distinguished between the view associated with Plato of *universalia ante rem* (that is, universals exist independent of things in the mind of God), the view associated with Aristotle of *universalia in re* (that is, universals exist as intelligible forms in things), and the conceptualist view of *universalia post rem* (that is, universals exist as concepts in the human mind abstracted from things). In the first two positions, the existence of (Platonic) Ideas is not disputed; in other words, the Ideas are assumed to be real. Thus these positions may be described as *realist*. In medieval Scholasticism, the problem of universals was taken up in the eleventh century by Johannes Roscellinus (died c.1125), who advanced an extreme conceptualist position called *nominalism*, according to which universals are nothing but names or ‘the breath of the voice’ (*flatus vocis*). This view led Roscellinus too close to the heresy of Tritheism, which he abjured at a council in Soissons (1092). Jung’s interest in Roscellinus, however, lay elsewhere. Jung contended that between, on the one hand, the nominalist position of Roscellinus (and later William of Ockham), to whom Jung ascribed the position *esse in re* (that is, essence exists in the thing) and, on the other, the realist position of Guillaume de Champeaux (an Aristotelian) and Anselm of Canterbury (a Platonist), to whom Jung ascribed the position *esse in intellectu* (that is, essence exists in the mind), there could be no resolution. Jung invoked the logical axiom of the excluded third (*exclusi tertii principium* – *tertium non datur*) (CW 6 §56). Yet like Schiller who, in the Aesthetic Letters, described a third fundamental drive between the sensuous drive and the formal drive as ‘a completely unthinkable concept’ (Letter 13 §1) and then went on to think it, Jung proceeded to propose a third intermediate standpoint between *in re* and *in intellectu*, which he called *esse in anima* (CW 6 §66). By *anima*, Jung means the soul or, to use more contemporary psychological terminology, the psyche:

For its solution a third, mediating standpoint is needed. *Esse in intellectu* lacks tangible reality [*die tastbare Wirklichkeit*], *esse in re* lacks mind [*der Geist*]. Idea and thing come together, however, in the human psyche, which holds the balance between them. What would the idea amount to if the psyche did not provide its living value [*lebendigen Wert*]? What would the thing be worth if the psyche withheld from it the determining force of the sense-impression [*die bedingende Kraft des sinnlichen Eindruckes*]? What indeed is reality if it is not a reality in ourselves, an *esse in anima*?

(CW 6 §77)
Now, in terms of epistemology, Jung, like Schiller, presents himself as working within the Kantian tradition.

The background to what Jung says about the imagination is to be found in Kant’s discussion of this faculty in the first Critique.\(^7\) In that work, Kant makes a distinction between the productive and reproductive powers of the imagination, arguing that ‘only the \textit{productive synthesis of the imagination} can take place \textit{a priori}; for the \textit{reproductive synthesis} rests on conditions of experience’.\(^7\) Such synthesis is, Kant explains, the effect of the imagination and, more precisely, of ‘a blind though indispensable function of the soul, without which we would have no cognition at all, but of which we are seldom even conscious’.\(^7\) Furthermore, according to Kant, the imagination in its productive modality has a transcendental function. He writes:

> The imagination is therefore also a faculty of a synthesis \textit{a priori}, on account of which we give it the name of productive imagination, and, insofar as its aim in regard to all the manifold of appearance is nothing further than the necessary unity in their synthesis, this can be called the transcendental function of the imagination.\(^7\)

As a result, Kant attributes a constitutive role to imagination in the construction of experience, when he argues:

> Both extremes, namely sensibility [\textit{Sinnlichkeit}] and understanding [\textit{Verstand}], must necessarily be connected by means of this transcendental function of the imagination, since otherwise the former would to be sure yield appearances but no objects of an empirical cognition, hence there would be no experience.\(^7\)

The transcendental function of the imagination unites the forms of the understanding (the categories) and sensuous intuitions in the ‘schematism’, which combines the universality of a concept with the particularity of the content of that concept. ‘This mediating representation must be pure (without anything empirical) and yet \textit{intellectual} on the one hand and \textit{sensible} [\textit{sinnlich}] on the other’, he explains, and ‘such a representation is the \textit{transcendental schema’}.\(^7\)

According to Kant, the ability to subsume the particular under the universal is the faculty of judgement (\textit{Urteilskraft}), whereas the vital role of the schematism relies on the activity of the imagination. In terms that might well have appealed to Jung, Kant described the schematism as ‘a hidden art in the depths of the human soul, whose true operations we can divine from nature and lay unveiled before our eyes only with difficulty’ (\textit{eine verborgene Kunst in den Tiefen der menschlichen Seele, deren wahre Handgriffe wir der Natur schwerlich jemals abraten, und sie unverdeckt vor Augen legen werden}).\(^7\)

Thus, according to Kant, knowledge has two sources – conceptual thought
and sensory intuition – and involves four faculties – sensuousness (Sinnlichkeit), understanding (Verstand), reason (Vernunft) and, last but not least, imagination (Einbildungskraft), which reproduces and organizes the data provided by sensory intuition for the understanding.  

In Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics (1929), Heidegger argued that, in the years between the first (1781) and second (1787) editions of the first Critique, Kant came to downplay the role of the imagination. ‘Not only did imagination fill him with alarm’, Heidegger contended, ‘but in the meantime he had also come more and more under the influence of pure reason as such’. But if, for Heidegger, Kant can thus be consigned to those who have ‘forgotten Being’, instead Jung, like Goethe and Schiller before him, undertakes the more precise task of attempting to rehabilitate the function of the imagination. For Jung, the imagination has both a Kantian dimension, in the form of the idea of transcendental apperception, and a neo-Kantian one, when he speaks of the power of the imagination to produce ‘living’ reality. In other words, much more is at stake than just epistemology. In this respect Jung’s neo-Kantianism is comparable with the project of Ernst Cassirer (1874–1945) to develop a ‘philosophy of symbolic forms’:

Along with the pure function of cognition we must seek to understand the function of linguistic thinking, the function of mythical and religious thinking, and the function of artistic perception, in such a way as to disclose how in all of them there is attained an entirely determinate formation, not exactly of the world, but rather making for the world [eine ganz bestimmte Gestaltung nicht sowohl der Welt, als vielmehr eine Gestaltung zur Welt], for an objective meaningful context and an objective unity that can be apprehended as such. Thus the critique of reason becomes the critique of culture. It seeks to understand and to show how every content of culture, insofar as it is more than a mere isolated content, insofar as it is grounded in a universal principle of form, presupposes an original act of the human spirit [eine ursprüngliche Tat des Geistes].

Thus, analogously to Kant, and by extension to Cassirer, Jung argues that sensory intuition and the rational idea must be bound together by a mediating function:

Living reality is the exclusive product neither of the actual, objective behaviour of things, nor of the formulated idea, but only of the combination of both in the living psychological process, through esse in anima. Only through the specific vital activity of the psyche does the sense-impression attain that intensity, and the idea that effective force, which are the two indispensable constituents of living reality. This autonomous activity of the psyche, which can be explained neither as a reflex action to
sensory stimuli nor as the executive organ of eternal ideas, is, like every vital process, a continually creative act.

(CW 6 §77–§78)

Furthermore, Jung calls this activity of the psyche *Phantasie*, a term interchangeable in the eighteenth century with *Einbildungskraft* and *Imagination*.

Correspondingly, in the *Aesthetic Letters*, Schiller claims to take his stand on Kant (Letter 1 §3), and the faculty of ‘imagination’ (*Einbildungskraft*) occupies a central position in his arguments. So he says that ‘the sensibility of the psyche [die Sensibilität des Gemüts] depends for its intensity upon the liveliness, for its scope upon the richness, of the imagination [*Einbildungskraft*]’ (Letter 6 §10). Jung’s use of the term *Eigentätigkeit* as implying self-regulation already suggests that he is following Schiller, rather than Kant. And Jung clearly goes beyond Kant in his emphasis on the creativity of *Phantasie* and its ability to mediate thinking and feeling, intuition and sensation, lifting it to a position of pre-eminence above all the other faculties:

Fantasy is just as much feeling as thought, it is intuition just as much as sensation. There is no psychic function that, through fantasy, is not inextricably bound up with the other psychic functions. Sometimes it appears in primordial form, sometimes it is the ultimate and boldest product of all our faculties combined. Fantasy, therefore, seems to me the clearest expression of the specific activity of the psyche. It is pre-eminently the creative activity from which the answers to all answerable questions come; it is the mother of all possibilities, where, like all psychological opposites, the inner and outer worlds are joined together in living union [*Innenwelt und Außenwelt lebendig verbunden sind*].

(CW 6 §78)

‘The inner and outer world, joined together’ (*Innenwelt und Außenwelt lebendig verbunden*) – ‘There’s nought outside and nought within, / Nature’s inside out and outside in’ (*Nichts ist drinnen, nichts ist draußen, / Denn was innen, das ist außen*) – such is Jung’s ‘holy open secret’ about the nature of the psyche and its specific activity, fantasy.

Jung gives his definition of *Phantasie* a specific analytical psychological twist when he claims that it is ‘the bridge between the irreconcilable claims of subject and object, introversion and extraversion’, and that ‘in fantasy alone both mechanisms are united’ (CW 6 §78). Thus, according to Jung, fantasy or imagination performs an essential mediating function between, on the epistemological level, the subject and the object, as well as between, on the intra-subjective as well as the intersubjective levels, the mechanisms of introversion and extraversion. Eight years on, in his lecture on ‘The Aims of Psychotherapy’ (1929), we will find Jung insisting on the importance of *Phantasie* in similar terms, implicitly equating *Phantasie* and *Einbildungskraft*.
as he does so. In this lecture Jung will, with scant regard for political correctness, describe fantasy as ‘the maternally creative side of the masculine mind’; and, less gender-specific in tone, note that ‘all human works have their origin in the creative imagination [in der schöpferischen Phantasie]’. True, there are ‘unprofitable, futile, morbid, unsatisfying’ – sexual? – fantasies, whose ‘sterility’ is evident to all, but usually fantasy is unlikely to go down a wrong path, since it is ‘too deeply and too intimately’ bound up with ‘the tap-root of human and animal instinct’. Given which, he will ask, why should we think any the less of fantasy (Einbildungskraft)? With a nod to Schiller, and a point to which we shall return in a moment, Jung will cite Schiller’s statement that ‘a human individual is only fully a human being when he or she is at play’ in support of his own view that ‘the creative activity of imagination [Einbildungskraft] frees the human individual from bondage to the “nothing but” and raises him or her to the status of one who plays’.

Jung’s discussion of the problem of types in history concludes with three main points about Phantasie which anticipate these later remarks in ‘The Aims of Psychotherapy’ and correspond closely to Schiller’s notion of the aesthetic in his Aesthetic Letters. First, Jung places great emphasis on the psychic totality achieved by a third function mediating between thought and sensation. Unlike the pantheistic view famously parodied in Goethe’s Faust, Part One, ‘feeling’ is not, for Jung, ‘everything’ – but maybe the imagination is. So when Faust says ‘feeling is everything’, Jung argues that this is no more than an expression of ‘the antithesis of the intellect’, but not the attainment of ‘that totality of life and of his own psyche’ in which ‘feeling and thinking are united in a third and higher principle’, in ‘a practical goal or the creative fantasy that creates the goal’ (CW 6 §85). Correspondingly, in the Aesthetic Letters, Schiller argues that the aesthetic is a middle disposition between sensation and thought, where both sense and reason are active. And, according to Schiller, the aesthetic relates to the totality of human functions. ‘Our psyche passes’, he writes, ‘from sensation to thought via a middle disposition in which sense and reason are both active at the same time’. Any thing can relate to our sensual condition (its physical character), or to our intellect (its logical character), or to our will (its moral character), or it can relate to ‘the totality of our various functions without being a definite object for any single one of them’, and this is its ‘aesthetic character’ (Letter 20 §4, and fn.).

Second, Jung cautions, reiterating an eighteenth-century commonplace, against the dangers of uncontrolled Phantasie. He warns that creative fantasy ‘can degenerate [entarten] into the rankest of growth’ if it is not ‘restrained within just bounds’ (CW 6 §86). In fact, Jung saw the suppression of ‘unfettered fantasy’ (die freischaffende Phantasie) as ‘an historical necessity’ in the course of Christian development or its Kulturprozeß (CW 6 §86). Correspondingly, in the Aesthetic Letters, Schiller admits that an excess of imagination, not subject to aesthetic form, is a danger to the intellect; as he more colourfully puts it, ‘a riotous imagination ravages the hard-won fruits
of the intellect’ (Letter 6 §6). And in On Naive and Sentimental Poetry he is explicit in his condemnation of the dangers of Phantasterei, of ‘deluded visionary raving’ which ‘leads into a never-ending fall into a bottomless pit’ and can only end ‘in complete destruction’.

Third, Jung defines the ‘dynamic principle’ of Phantasie as das Spielerische, that is, play. Inasmuch as it is characteristic of the child, so Jung claims, play appears to be inconsistent with the principle of serious work (ernste Arbeit). But, he continues, this is not so, since without ‘this playing with fantasies’ (dieses Spiel mit Phantasien) no creative work has ever been born (CW 6 §93). Indeed, Jung attributes the greatest significance to play, claiming that our debt to ‘the play of imagination’ (das Imaginationsspiel) is ‘immeasurably great’. It is therefore, he argues, ‘short-sighted’ to treat fantasy as of little worth solely on account of its ‘daring or unacceptable character’. ‘It should not be forgotten’, he declares, ‘that it is precisely in the imagination that a human being’s highest value may lie’ (CW 6 §93).

In the wake of Jung’s declaration, a number of psychologists and psychotherapists, including Donald Winnicott (1876–1971) and Jean Piaget (1896–1980), have emphasized the therapeutic uses of play. Following his own split with Freud, Jung experienced his own traumatic collapse, from which he helped himself to recover, according to the account in Memories, Dreams, Reflections, by playing with stones, just as he had as a child. In order for Jung, as an adult, to re-establish contact with his earlier childhood life when he was 11 years old, he returned to the games he had once played at that time. After lunch, he began to build with the stones, until his patients arrived; and if they left early enough, he went back to playing with the stones. In the course of this play activity he found that his thoughts became clearer, and that he was able ‘to grasp the fantasies’ he could ‘intuitively feel’ (ahnungsweise fühlen) within him (MDR, 197–8). Subsequently, Doris Kalff (1904–90), founder of the International Society for Sandplay Therapy, devised a technique of sandplay based on Jungian principles, and this has become an expanding area of Jungian therapeutic practice.

Later in Psychological Types, during his discussion of Schiller, Jung distinguishes between ‘wanting to play’ (Spielenwollen) and ‘having to play’ (Spielenmüssen). He devises the category of ‘serious play’ (ernstes Spiel), defined as ‘a playful manifestation of fantasy from inner necessity, without the compulsion of circumstance, without even the compulsion of the will’ (CW 6 §196), thus fusing the ‘seriousness’ (Ernst) and the ‘play’ (Spiel) so frequently contrasted in Goethe and Schiller. Correspondingly, in his Aesthetic Letters, Schiller introduced the notion of the ludic drive (Letter 14 §3–§6), where he makes the famous claim that ‘the human being only plays when he or she is in the fullest sense of the word a human being, and a human being is only fully one when he or she plays’ (der Mensch spielt nur, wo er in voller Bedeutung des Wortes Mensch ist, und er ist nur da ganz Mensch, wo er spielt) (Letter 15 §9). Furthermore, Jung identifies the function that is
‘repressed’ in Freudian and Adlerian psychology with ‘the principle of imagination’ (das Prinzip der Imagination) in his own psychology, characterizing it as ‘unconscious, and hence undeveloped, embryonic, and archaic’ (unbewußt, daher unentwickelt, embryonal und archaisch) (CW 6 §93). Correspondingly, in his Aesthetic Letters, Schiller describes the early stages of the ludic drive as an uncultivated taste for ‘what is new and startling, the colourful, the daring, and the bizarre, the violent and savage’ (Letter 27 §4). Using explicitly psychological terms Wilkinson and Willoughby defined the ludic drive as something that is ‘brought to birth in reality through the complex interaction of the two fundamental, and opposed, drives of the psyche’.91 In his essay ‘On the Necessary Limitations of the Use of Beautiful Forms’ (1795), Schiller would argue that even free play is directed by (aesthetic) laws. In a passage cited by Jung, Schiller suggests that

since, in the individual of aesthetic refinement, the imagination, even in its free play, is governed by law, and the senses permit themselves enjoyment not without enjoying the consent of reason, the reciprocal favour is easily required of reason that, in the seriousness of its law-making, it shall align itself with the interests of the imagination, and not command the will without the consent of the sensuous drives.92

In other words, before Jung has even begun his explicit discussion of Schiller in Psychological Types, at least two fundamental concepts of Schillerian aesthetics – imagination and play – have been woven by Jung into his argument. In the chapter entitled ‘Schiller’s Ideas on the Type Problem’, two further central ideas – appearance and the symbol – will emerge in the course of Jung’s discussion.

The superior and the inferior functions

Jung opens his chapter on Schillerian typology by acclaiming the co-founder of Weimar classical aesthetics as the first, to his knowledge, to have attempted to discriminate between typical attitudes on such a scale and to represent their singularities so completely (CW 6 §101). Praising Schiller’s Aesthetic Letters for their depth and acuity, Jung’s encomium paid tribute to their ‘profundity of thought, psychological penetration, and wide view of a possible psychological solution of the conflict’. Never before, he claimed, had they been discussed in a psychological context, so Jung proposed to discuss and evaluate them at some length (CW 6 §102).

According to Jung, Schiller’s contribution to psychology is considerable, providing psychologists with points-of-view which they have only just begun to appreciate. True to – even preoccupied by – his own typological principles, however, Jung immediately claims that Schiller himself was characteristic of a particular psychological type, the introverted thinking type (CW 6 §104).
As an introverted type, Jung claims, Schiller would have been more subject-oriented and less object-oriented, enjoying ‘a better relation to ideas than to things’ (CW 6 §103). As a result, Jung argues, Schiller approached the problem of types ‘from his own inner experience’ (CW 6 §104), just as Wilkinson and Willoughby suggest that ‘a vital need’ to offer a ‘private and public demonstration of the importance of his artistic calling’, as well as ‘profound ambivalence’ towards ‘the philosopher in himself’, towards ‘the analytical methods and doctrines’ of Western philosophy, and, above all, towards Kant, were the chief motivations behind Schiller’s treatise.93 In making the claim he does, Jung is, in effect, saying no more than Schiller himself admitted in his letters to Körner of 1 December 1788 and to Goethe of 31 August 1794, where he confessed that his writing was determined by a specific combination of philosophical and poetic faculties, and that he himself was ‘a hybrid’, hovering ‘between ideas and perceptions, between law and feeling, between a technical mind and genius’.

Nevertheless, it is no understatement on Jung’s part when he says that his argument follows Schiller’s very closely and that even the critique he offers is, in part, a form of transcription of Schiller’s argument. Rather than with the general question of introversion and extraversion, Jung was concerned with ‘the typical conflict of the introverted thinking type’ which he saw in Schiller (CW 6 §104), whereas, by contrast, Goethe is reckoned to be an extraverted feeling type (CW 6 §103, §142, and §309). In particular he read Letter 11 of the Aesthetic Letters as representative of the standpoint of the introverted type (CW 6 §138–§148). It is not surprising that Schiller’s should have proved to be such a fascinating case-study for him, for Jung considered himself an introverted thinking type (CW 6 §104).94

Jung describes his remarks as being intended as a transcription into a form of expressions which divests Schiller’s formulations of their subjective limitations. For Jung recognizes that his argument clings closely to Schiller’s, and my own discussion here is intended to bring out both the similarities between Jung’s analysis (and his solution) and those of Schiller, as well as to defend Schillerian aesthetics against the objections that Jung makes to it. As a result, we shall follow the order of Jung’s remarks as closely as possible, while avoiding the repetition and occasional circularity of his argumentation. Now, Jung begins by discussing the role of the superior and the inferior functions. In the glossary appended to Psychological Types, he defined the ‘inferior function’ (minderwertige Funktion) as ‘the function that lags behind in the process of differentiation’ and hence becomes unconscious (CW 6 §763). When the function becomes unconscious, its specific energy transfers to the unconscious, activating it and giving rise to ‘fantasies on a level with the archaicized function’. Psychoanalysis involves bringing these fantasy formations into consciousness, thus bringing the inferior function into consciousness and making further development possible (CW 6 §764).

According to Jung, Schiller’s starting point in the Aesthetic Letters is the
origin of the bifurcation of the two mechanisms of introversion and extraversion. In Schiller’s terminology, the diremption of reason (thinking) and the senses (feeling) can be traced back to the differentiation of the individual. In Letter 6, Schiller famously compared this differentiation to a wound, claiming ‘it was civilization itself which inflicted this wound upon modern humankind’ (Letter 6 §6). This image, itself an allusion to Rousseau’s *Discours sur les sciences et les arts* (1750), is extended by Jung in his comparison between ‘the breakdown of the harmonious cooperation of psychic forces in instinctive life’ and the wound of Amfortas in Richard Wagner’s opera *Parsifal* (CW 6 §104). ‘What Wagner tried to say in artistic terms’, Jung suggests, ‘Schiller laboured to make clear in his philosophical reflections’ (CW 6 §114). On Jung’s account of the *Aesthetic Letters*, Schiller sees this differentiation as endemic to cultural development, placing the responsibility for the decline of the modern individual onto culture (CW 6 §106). Jung agrees with Schiller’s analysis of the condition of modernity in Letter 6 (CW 6 §107), so we must examine this analysis in more detail.

In Letter 6, Schiller argues that the differentiation of functions entailed by culture has fragmented human beings and ‘alienated’ them. As Vicky Rippere has demonstrated, this notion of alienation was a commonplace of eighteenth-century discourse. For Schiller, the fragmentation of human beings has turned them into clockwork models, engaged in a purely mechanistic life (Letter 6 §7). The forces which split us into two derive, according to Schiller, from both outside and within the individual (Letter 6 §10). Yet he also argues that this antagonism of faculties was both historically necessary and has proved to be the great instrument of culture (Letter 6 §11–§12). Indeed, Schiller claims that one-sidedness might lead individuals into error ‘but the species as a whole into truth’ (Letter 6 §13). To this extent Schiller’s analysis of modernity in Letter 6, together with his earlier assertion in Letter 5 – that ‘civilization, far from setting us free, in fact creates some new need with every new power it develops in us’ (5 §5) – can be seen to anticipate Freud’s great work of cultural critique, *Civilization and its Discontents* (1930), so it is not surprising that, in *Eros and Civilization* (1956), Herbert Marcuse (1898–1979) drew on Schiller in his response to Freud. At the same time, however, the one-sidedness of which Schiller speaks is very close to the ‘one-sidedness’ (*Einseitigkeit*) that Jung associates with barbarism (CW 6 §118).

It is important, therefore, to distinguish between two kinds of barbarism which Jung discusses in *Psychological Types*. On the one hand, there is a barbarism born of the overdevelopment of a differentiated psychological function or the barbarism of ‘one-sidedness’, when the will is ‘determined unilaterally by one function’ (CW 6 §178). More precisely, this kind of barbarism is said to be a condition of unconscious one-sidedness, as opposed to conscious and controlled ‘one-sidedness’, for ‘a conscious capacity for one-sidedness is a sign of the highest culture’, but ‘involuntary one-sidedness’ is a sign of barbarism (CW 6 §346). In his discussion of Schiller’s two basic
drives (see Chapter 4), Jung argues that the predominance of either is barbaric, whether it be too much sensuality, or too much reason (CW 6 §160). On the other hand, a rather different kind of barbarism emerges by allowing the inferior (unconscious) repressed functions to return. Jung puts a question mark over such simple de-repression on the grounds that it would result in an outburst of untamed energy as the force of the repressed is unleashed. That, he says, would be ‘a catastrophe for culture as we understand it today’ (CW 6 §172).

Thus, as far as Jung is concerned, contemporary humankind is caught in a double bind. For while one-sidedness and its concomitant repression causes barbarism, the de-repression involved in counteracting this one-sidedness is equally likely to bring about a state of barbarism. In a later section, Jung comments that the dismissive attitude of the West towards Indian philosophy in general and the Upanishads in particular is a mark of ‘our barbarian nature’, as evidenced by our lack of trust in the laws of human nature. This lack of trust, he suggests, is connected with the fact that ‘under the barbarian’s thin veneer of culture the wild beast lurks in readiness’. But this beast, reminiscent of ‘the beast of prey, the splendid blond beast prowling about avidly in search of spoil and victory’ in Nietzsche’s On the Genealogy of Morals (1887), cannot be tamed ‘by being locked up in a cage’; as Nietzsche writes, ‘the animal has to get out again and go back to the wilderness’. But if, as Jung suggests, merely loosing the beast brings, ‘not freedom, but bondage’, then we must look to a move from morality to ethics, ‘when the basic root and driving force of morality [Sittlichkeit] are felt by individuals as constituents of their own nature and not as external restrictions’ (CW 6 §357).

Jung’s two kinds of barbarism correspond only very approximately to Schiller’s distinction between savagery, in which feeling predominates over principle (Letter 4 §6), and barbarism, in which principle destroys feeling (Letter 6 §6; cf. Letter 10 §1). But the general argument in Psychological Types about the basis of ‘collective culture’ on ‘subjective slave culture’, while developing Schiller’s analysis of culture in the Aesthetic Letters, is not only very close to what Freud would write in Civilization and its Discontents, but again recalls one of the sources of that work, and much of Jung’s, Nietzsche’s On the Genealogy of Morals. On this account, the external form of society in classical civilization was transferred into the subject, so that a condition was produced within the individual which in the ancient world had been external, namely a dominating, privileged function which was developed and differentiated at the expense of an inferior majority.

On the plus side, a ‘collective culture’ came into exist, with ‘human rights’ of a kind inconceivable in antiquity. On the minus side, however, a ‘subjective
slave culture’ comes into being, arising from ‘a transfer of the old mass enslavement into the psychological sphere’. And the result?

While collective culture was enhanced, individual culture was degraded. Just as the enslavement of the masses was the open wound of the ancient world, so the enslavement of the inferior functions is an ever-bleeding wound in the psyche of modern humankind.

(CW 6 §108)

As well as leading to an antagonism internal to the individual, Jung argues, the state of culture leads to a division between the individual and society at large. In the hundred and twenty years between Schiller’s Aesthetic Letters and Psychological Types, ‘conditions with respect to individual culture’, Jung writes, ‘have gone from bad to worse’. (And in the eighty or so years between Psychological Types and now?) Although our ‘collective culture’ is more highly developed than at any other time, it is, for that very reason, ‘increasingly injurious to individual culture’. As a result, the gap between the essence and the appearance of the individual, between what we truly are and how we have to behave as collective beings, grows ever wider (CW 6 §111). According to Jung, Schiller personally had an acute sense of conflict within himself, and this inner antagonism generated ‘a longing for the unity or homogeneity’ that would ‘redeem’ those suppressed and enslaved functions and thus bring out ‘a restoration of harmonious living’ (CW 6 §114). Quoting from Schiller’s letter to Goethe of 31 August 1794, Jung argues that Schiller himself sensed his conflict between imagination and abstraction or between intuition and intellect (CW 6 §117).

Thus Jung, like Schiller, argues that culture effects a differentiation of functions in several respects. In other words, the process of civilization involves a redirection of libido; and, as we shall see, the formation of symbols which facilitates this redirection also provides the means for reintegrating humankind’s one-sided faculties. In Letter 6, Schiller makes clear that the totality of nature which has been lost to the modern individual nevertheless can – and must – be regained. ‘It must be open to us’, he writes, ‘to restore by means of a Higher Art the totality of our nature which the arts themselves have destroyed’ (Letter 6 §15). Jung recognizes in Schiller’s programme as that emerges, even if it is ‘nowhere openly stated’, in the Aesthetic Letters the espousal of an ancient ideal, ‘the resumption of a classical mode of life and understanding of life [antiker Lebensart und Lebensauffassung]’ (CW 6 §114). Yet why Jung should think that this programme was never explicitly stated remains unclear, especially given Schiller’s prominent collaboration with Goethe in Weimar.

Or, as Jung also put it, Schiller was looking for ‘the deliverance from evil’ (CW 6 §114). Evil, in this context, is identified by Jung, quoting the words of Emperor Julian, ‘the Apostate’ (332–63), in his discourse on King Helios,
with the fact that ‘the heart of man is “filled with raging battle” ’ (CW 6 §114). For Jung, Julian’s formula was and is, psychologically speaking, apposite: ‘filled with raging battle’ characterizes not only just Julian himself, but his whole age, ‘the inner laceration of late antiquity, which found its external expression in an unprecedented chaotic confusion of hearts and minds’; it was from this that Christianity promised deliverance (CW 6 §114). And herein lies the problem, according to Jung, in that Christianity provided ‘redemption’ (Erlösung), rather than a ‘solution’ (Lösung) – in other words, it detached one valuable function from all the others and excluded them. (One thinks of Jung’s evocation in Transformations and Symbols of the Libido of Alypius and Augustine, of the monastic and hermitic traditions of Europe, a ‘turning to asceticism’ that ‘brought a new misfortune to many’ (PU §137–§138).) For this reason, Christianity was rejected by Schiller, a rejection for which we find a justification in Letter 7. ‘This elemental strife in the ethical man, the conflict of blind drives, must first be assuaged’, Schiller argues, ‘crude antagonisms must first have ceased within him, before we can take the risk of promoting diversity’, and

the independence of his character must be assured, and submission to external, despotic forms of authority must have given way to a decent freedom, before the diversity within him can be subjected to the unity of the ideal.

(Letter 7 §2)

‘Thus’, Jung glosses this passage, ‘it is neither a detachment [Loslösung] nor a redemption [Erlösung] of the inferior function, but an acknowledgement of it, a coming-to-terms [Auseinandersetzung] with it, as it were, that unites the opposites on the path of nature’ (CW 6 §115).

As we have seen, Jung regarded the personal context of Schiller’s argument in the Aesthetic Letters as his own sense of conflict, and the political one as the French Revolution (CW 6 §117). And, if a sense of the antagonism between the individual and society lay at the root of Schiller’s Aesthetic Letters, it also provided the starting-point for Rousseau’s Emile, ou de l’éducation (1762), whose approach Jung contrasts with Schiller’s. In Emile, Jung wrote, Rousseau looks back to the putative l’homme naturel, which Jung dismisses as ‘the primitive collective mentality’ that Lucien Lévy-Bruhl (1857–1939) described as participation mystique (CW 6 §123). By contrast, Schiller is said to look back to the ancient Greeks, and Jung cites a famous passage from Letter 9 in which, he says, ‘the inclination towards the Greek example could hardly be more clearly expressed’ (CW 6 §126):

Let some beneficent deity snatch the suckling betimes from his mother’s breast, nourish him with the milk of a better age, and suffer him to come
to maturity under a distant Grecian sky. Then, when he has become a
man, let him return, a stranger, to his own century; not, however, to
gladden it by his appearance, but rather, terrible like Agamemnon’s son
[i.e., Orestes], to cleanse and purify it. [. . .] Here, from the pure aether of
his genius, the living source of beauty flows down, untainted by the
corruption of the generations and ages wallowing in the dark eddies
below.

(Letter 9 §4)

As Wilkinson and Willoughby have pointed out, the contrast between ‘the
harmonious synthesis of spirit and matter in the Greek with the one-sided
materialism of the moderns’ in his earlier (and controversial) poem, ‘The
Gods of Greece’ (Die Götter Griechenlands) (1788), forms ‘the poetic coun-
terpart’ of Schiller’s ‘denunciation of the modern “fragmentation” ’ in his
Aesthetic Letters.102 Furthermore, Schiller’s view of the Greeks in general
owes much to the Thoughts on the Imitation of Greek Works in Painting
and Sculpture (1755) by Johann Joachim Winckelmann (1717–68) and
Humboldt’s On the Study of Antiquity, Particularly the Greeks (1793) and,
in this passage in particular, to Herder’s Idea for a Philosophy of History of
Humankind (1784–91), volume 4, Book 2.103 Elsewhere, Schiller hints at
Goethe as the modern successor to that totality, telling Goethe on 20 October
1794: ‘You will, in these Letters, find a portrait of yourself, beneath which
I would gladly have subscribed your name [. . .] no one, whose judgement can
be of any value to you, will mistake it’ (CSG 1, 23).

Thus Jung is wrong to suggest that Schiller’s thinking is merely typical of
a backward orientation, for there is a panoply of cultural commonplaces
underpinning the argument in the Aesthetic Letters which Jung has apparently
overlooked. Nor is there evidence for his claim, made on no fewer than
three occasions, that the poet in Schiller has overtaken the philosopher (CW
6 §126, §129, §135–§136). The view of Weimar classicism that truth was a
matter for poetry and philosophy combined is well expressed by Goethe and
Schiller in one of their Xenien entitled ‘Scientific Genius’ (Wissenschaftliches
Genie): ‘Is only the poet born? The philosopher is, as well, / In the end,
all truth is only constructed, perceived’ (Wird der Poet nur geboren? Der
Philosoph wird’s nicht minder, / Alle Wahrheit zuletzt wird nur gebildet,
geschaut).104 By making this criticism, Jung reveals less about Schiller than
about his own inability to respond to the exigencies of ‘aesthetic discourse’
(schöner Vortrag).105 Moreover, Jung tries to put his own psychological – and
archetypal – construction on Schiller’s putative yearning for ancient Greece,
suggesting that it is less the man of Greek antiquity that he has in mind, and
more ‘the old pagan in ourselves, that bit of eternally unspoiled nature and
pristine beauty, which lies unconscious, but living, within us’; more, he adds,
warming to his theme, ‘the archaic man in ourselves, who, rejected by our
collectively oriented consciousness, appears to us as ugly and unacceptable,
but who is nevertheless the bearer of that beauty we vainly seek elsewhere’ (CW 6 §129).

In some respects, of course, Jung’s archetypal Greek is not so very different from Schiller’s cultural construct. Is it, in fact, the archetypal nature of Schiller’s ancient Greek that Jung seeks to articulate by describing him as a symbolic product (CW 6 §129)? This archetypal nature of the image of the total human being would seem already to have been acknowledged by Schiller in Letter 4, where he writes that ‘every individual human being’ carries within him or her, ‘potentially and prescriptively, an ideal human, the archetype of a human being’ (Letter 4 §2). And in Letter 9, in the context of aesthetic illusion, Schiller refers explicitly to a notion of the archetype when he says that ‘humanity has lost its dignity; but Art has rescued it and preserved it in significant stone’, and that ‘truth lives on in the illusion of Art, and it is from this copy [Nachbild] that the original image [Urbild] will once again be restored’ (Letter 9 §4).

Jung also fails to take proper account of Schiller’s discussion of human-kind’s relation to nature. Quoting Rousseau’s *Emile* – *Il faut opter entre faire un homme ou un citoyen; car on ne peut faire à la fois l’un et l’autre* (One must choose whether to make a human being or a citizen, for one cannot make both at the same time) (CW 6 §134) – Jung comments that both nature and culture exist as necessities in us, for ‘we cannot only be ourselves, we must also be related to others’ (CW 6 §135), thus apparently overlooking Letter 3, where Schiller discusses humanity in the state of nature (Letter 3 §2), and goes on to argue that, whereas the ‘physical human’ does in fact exist (*ist wirklich*), the existence of the ‘moral human’ is still problematic (*ist nur problematisch*) (Letter 3 §3), and to ask how society can be reformed without the violent destruction of the natural state (Letter 3 §4). In Letter 7, Schiller describes his task – and humanity’s – as both a return to and an overcoming of nature. He declares:

> The character of the age must therefore first lift itself out of its deep degradation: on the one hand, emancipate itself from the blind forces of Nature; on the other, return to her simplicity, truth, and fullness – a task for more than one century.

(Letter 7 §3)

So, as we can see from this passage, Jung is very close indeed to Schiller’s programme as that is set out in the *Aesthetic Letters*:

From all this it is abundantly clear that any attempt to equalize the one-sided differentiation of the human being of our times has to reckon very seriously with an acceptance of the inferior, because undifferentiated, functions. No attempt at mediation will be successful which does not understand how to release the energies of the inferior functions and to
lead them towards differentiation. This process can take place only in accordance with the laws of energy, that is, a gradient must be created which offers the latent energies a chance to come into effect.

(CW 6 §130)

What Schiller conceives as a task for more than one century – the restoration by means of a Higher Art of the totality of our nature which art itself has destroyed – is the goal of aesthetic education. This clearly programmatic intent of the Aesthetic Letters had been announced to Körner in a letter of 3 February 1794. Just as Kant had spoken of the critical philosophy in foundational terms – claiming, for example, in his preface to the second edition (1787) of the first Critique, that ‘criticism’ (Kritik) would have numerous inestimable benefits, including ‘blocking off the source of errors’ and ‘putting an end for all future time to objections against morality and religion in a Socratic way, namely by the clearest proof of the ignorance of the opponent’, and, in his open letter of 7 August 1799 on Fichte’s Wissenschaftslehre, had written of ‘the system of the critique’ as ‘resting on a fully secured foundation, established forever’ – so Schiller, in his letter to Körner of 3 February 1794, had expressed pride in having provided the ultimate, once-for-all-time defence of beauty: ‘Because of the rigour with which I have set to work, I believe I have completely secured the true sphere of beauty against every claim that could be made against it in the future’.111

In Letter 9, Schiller announces the role of Fine Art (die schöne Kunst) in the restoration of that totality; and in Letter 10, Schiller reveals that his own age was to be rescued from its ‘twofold straying’ – coarseness (Rohigkeit) on the one hand, enervation and perversity (Erschaffung und Verkehrtheit) on the other – by beauty, which ‘enchains nature in the savage’ and ‘sets it free in the barbarian’ (Letter 10 §1). It is true that, in Letter 10, Schiller gives voice to those who raise objections to beauty, accusing it of encouraging a dangerous tendency to neglect reality as well as acting deleteriously on the laws of social intercourse. Indeed, Schiller concedes that, seen historically, aesthetic culture has flourished when political freedom and civic virtue have suffered (Letter 10 §4). Yet Schiller permits these criticisms, only to answer them later in Letter 26 §13. Thus Jung ignores the rhetorical strategy of the Aesthetic Letters, as well as the implications of its structure, when he claims that ‘as before it was the poet, so now it is the thinker that carries Schiller away: he mistrusts beauty’ (CW 6 §128):

With the recognition of the psychological fact that living beauty spreads her golden shimmer only when soaring above a reality full of misery, pain, and ugliness, Schiller cuts the ground from under his own feet; for he had undertaken to prove that what was divided would be united by the vision, the enjoyment, and the creation of the beautiful. Beauty was to be
the mediator which should restore the primal unity of human nature. On the contrary, all experience goes to show that beauty needs her opposite as a condition of her existence.

(CW 6 §127)

But is it true, as Jung suggests, to say of Schiller that he mistrusts beauty? And is he right to say that Schiller believes beauty only ‘spreads her golden shimmer’ when ‘soaring above reality’?

To answer these questions, we shall need to take a closer look at Letter 10, and examine more closely Schiller’s conception of beauty, the drives, and the symbol – and the remarkable amount of common ground between Schiller (as a poet and a philosopher) and Jung (as a psychoanalyst and as a poet of the soul). And we shall turn to these aspects of Jung’s analysis of Schiller’s Aesthetic Letters in Chapter 4.
Chapter 4

Schiller and the problem of beauty

The word ‘aesthetic’ derives from the Greek aisthētikos, from aisthēta, ‘things perceptible by the senses’. In the sense of a system of principles, the term ‘aesthetics’ – in German, Ästhetik – was first used by the German philosopher Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten (1714–62) in his Aesthetica, the first volume of which appeared in 1750.1 We could thus describe aesthetics as a specifically German discipline. In this work Baumgarten defined ‘aesthetics (the theory of the free arts, epistemology of the lower senses, the art of beautiful thought, and the art of the analogue of reason)’ as ‘the science of sensory knowledge’.2 (We should not forget that Jung decided to use for one of his works the title of a subsection of work by Baumgarten, Metaphysica (1739/1766) – Existentia animae, or Die Wirklichkeit der Seele!)3

In his letter of 25 January 1795 to the philosophical writer, Christian Garve (1742–98), Schiller defended his use of the word ‘aesthetic’ (ästhetisch), so prominent in the title of his recently completed treatise On the Aesthetic Education of Humankind. Schiller assured his friend that he had no desire to make his writings more difficult by the use of foreign phrases, and he offered some simple definitions. Those relations between ourselves and other people that are determined by duty fall into the category of the ‘moral’; where simple, natural needs determine our behaviour, we are dealing with the category of the ‘physical’; but where we treat each other as appearances and respect the impression they make that appeals to our sense of beauty, then we have the category of the ‘aesthetic’.4 Far from being a mode of escape from the world, then, aesthetics for Schiller is bound up with our very existence in the world, in the here-and-now of our relations with other people – and the way we relate to ourselves.

At the end of Chapter 3 we saw that Jung, in his major discussion of Schiller in Psychological Types, had reached a stage where he suspected Schiller of ‘mistrusting’ beauty. Jung cites two passages from Letter 10 of the Aesthetic Letters. First, where Schiller writes that ‘wherever we turn our eyes in past history we find taste and freedom shunning each other, and beauty founding her sway solely upon the decline and fall of heroic virtues’ (Letter 10 §5). (As examples of flourishing arts and political decline, Schiller...
cites the Golden Age of Athens, the Roman civil wars, the caliphate of Harun al Rashid, and the rise of the Medici in Italy – truly an intercultural argument! And second, where Schiller argues that ‘if we only heed what past experience has to teach us about the influence of beauty, there is certainly no encouragement to develop feelings which are so much of a threat to the true civilization of humankind’, and that, ‘even at the risk of coarseness and harshness’, it would be better for us to ‘dispense with the melting power of beauty’, rather than ‘see ourselves, with all the advantages of refinement, delivered up to her enervating influence’ (Letter 10 §6).

Yet Jung does not cite Schiller’s earlier sentence in this letter, to the effect that it is ‘precisely this energy of character, at whose expense aesthetic culture is commonly purchased, which is the mainspring of all that is great and excellent in humankind’ (Letter 10 §6). Nor does he seem to appreciate Schiller’s caution about ‘experience’ as ‘the judgement-seat’ before which such matters are decided, and the transcendental turn that Schiller’s argument takes in the conclusion to this letter (Letter 10 §7). As part of this transcendental argument Schiller moves away from examples of beauty and turns towards the abstract concept of Beauty, unrelated to empirical causes or, in other words, the pure rational concept of Beauty (dieser reine Vernunft-begriff der Schönheit). As such a concept, beauty has to be shown to be ‘a necessary condition of Human Being’ (Letter 10 §7).

Beauty

This section of Schiller’s Aesthetic Letters explores a definition of beauty which, in the light of his Kallias-Briefe, Schiller took up in his further correspondence with Christian Gottfried Körner (1756–1831). In his letter of 25 October 1794, Schiller wrote that beauty was an object of the imagination but that, at the same time, the sensation of beauty was something entirely subjective. ‘The beautiful is an affect of the imagination or, if you like, an object of it,’ he told Körner, ‘it is something entirely subjective whether we perceive the beautiful as beautiful, but objectively it should be so’. In the same letter, Schiller made it clear that beauty was less an ‘empirical concept’ (Erfahrungsbe griff) and more an ‘imperative’.5 Thus both in the Kallias-Briefe and in Schiller’s letter of 1794, beauty has nothing to do with the properties of the subject, or those of the object, but everything to do with the appearance of the object to the subject. In other words, beauty has to do with aesthetic illusion or ‘semblance’ (Schein). This definition of beauty – ‘freedom in appearance’, Freiheit in der Erscheinung – informs Schiller’s later discussion in the Aesthetic Letters.

By seeking to pursue ‘this transcendental way’ (Letter 10 §7), Schiller is clearly making a Kantian move of sorts. It is a move, however, which Jung, so it seems, either does not understand as such or, if he does, immediately rejects.6 For he writes that Schiller’s ‘subjective resistance’ to ‘what experience
has shown to be the ineluctable downward way’ compels him to ‘press the logical intellect into the service of feeling’ and produce a formula to make it possible to attain his original aim (presumably, the justification of beauty), ‘despite the fact that its impossibility has already been sufficiently demonstrated’ (CW 6 §132). Similarly, he argues that Schiller’s ‘transcendental way’ should not be understood as ‘reasoning in the critique of knowledge’, but symbolically – ‘as the way that someone always follows when encountering an obstacle that cannot be overcome by reason, or confronted with an insoluble task’ (CW 6 §136).

So Jung urges that Schiller qua thinker should have understood himself qua poet in a symbolic sense (CW 6 §129), and Jung proposes a ‘symbolic’ reading of Schiller’s Aesthetic Letters. On this account, Schiller’s argument should not be taken ‘in a literal sense’, but as ‘a symbol, which, in accordance with Schiller’s philosophical inclination, appears under the guise of a philosophical concept’ (CW 6 §126). Had Jung only recognized it, the proximity of what, here, he calls ‘the symbolic’ to the characteristics of ‘aesthetic discourse’ (schöner Vortrag) – to that mode of discourse deployed by Goethe and Schiller ‘in order to re-enact, in language at least, something of the complex interchange in natural process, while at the same time describing with eminent clarity the character of its products’7 – might have tempered his criticism of Schiller. Moreover, Schiller’s concept of the symbol turns out to be a striking anticipation of Jung’s. For Jung, the solution to Schiller’s ‘insoluble task’ lies precisely in accepting the symbol, and he has recourse to one of his favourite energic metaphors. ‘Whenever a damming up of libido occurs’, he writes, ‘the opposites, previously united in the steady flow of life, fall apart and henceforth confront one another like antagonists eager for battle’. These opposites, then, ‘exhaust themselves in a prolonged conflict, the duration and upshot of which cannot be foreseen’, but something new comes about. For from ‘the energy which is lost to them’ is built ‘that third thing which is the beginning of the new way’ (CW 6 §136). Yet when Jung writes that ‘the solution’ to ‘the contradiction’ between desire and experience ‘does not lie in the possibility of thinking it or in the discovery of a rational truth, but in the discovery of a way that real life can accept’ (CW 6 §136), that way is, for Schiller, the aesthetic. And significantly – for he thereby evokes the Schillerian concept of play – Jung talks about such a way in terms of ‘the play of opposites’ (das Spiel der Gegensätze) in the psyche (CW 6 §137).

In his gloss on Letter 11, Jung rightly notes that Schiller is concerned not just with ‘the discord between the State and the individual’, but with ‘the duality of “person and condition” ’ or the diremption of the self and its determining attributes (CW 6 §138; cf. Letter 11 §1–§2). Commenting on Schiller’s famous remark that ‘a disposition to the divine [die Anlage zur Gottheit] is undoubtedly carried by humans within them’ (Letter 11 §7), Jung argues that for Schiller, as an introvert, God was identified with the ego – ‘his god, his highest value, is the abstraction and conservation of the
ego’ (CW 6 §141). Furthermore, Jung notes that, for Schiller, the way to this divine lies ‘through the senses, through affectivity, through changeability, through the living process’. Yet as far as Schiller is concerned, the senses are by no means ‘the function of secondary importance’ (die sekundär wichtige Funktion) that Jung erroneously suggests they are. Rather, the task of humankind, as Schiller conceives it, is that we should ‘externalize all that is within’ (alles Innere veräußern) and ‘give form to all that is outside’ (alles Äussere formen) (Letter 11 §9). As Jung points out, this formulation finds a parallel in Goethe’s draft letter to Schiller of 27–28 April 1798, in which Goethe writes, ‘I ask nothing at all from objects, but instead I demand that everything shall conform to my conceptions’. The thought of the (intuitive) extraverted (feeling) type, says Jung, can be just as autocratic as the action of the (intuitive) introverted (thinking) type, and he goes on to make the objection that ‘somewhere or other the human individual must be related, must be subject to something, otherwise he or she would be really god-like’ (CW 6 §149). Would Schiller allow the development of the subject to go so far that violence is done to the object? Would Schiller concede to the archaic, inferior function an unlimited right to existence, in the way that, so Jung claims, Nietzsche did?

Jung’s objection – that unlimited self-expression of the subject gives rise to the possibility of violence – is met by Schiller’s argument in Letter 27 that, through beauty, physical play becomes aesthetic play. ‘From the compulsion of want, or physical earnestness’, Schiller writes, nature ‘makes the transition via the compulsion of superfluity, or physical play, to aesthetic play’ (Letter 27 §3). As Schiller’s words stand, however, this formula is, in Jung’s eyes, ‘naive and idealistic’, unsustainable in the period, inaugurated by Nietzsche, of ‘psychological criticism’ (psychologischer Kritizismus) (CW 6 §149) – and unsustainable in the period after the First World War?

Failing to understand that the aesthetic lies in the coordination of sense and reason, Jung makes his objection based on a misunderstanding of how Schiller intends to deal with the ‘inferior function’. To understand the manner of accomplishing the twofold task of humankind, as Schiller calls it – ‘giving reality to the necessity within, and subjecting to the law of necessity the reality without’ (Letter 12 §1) – we must turn, however, to Schiller’s notion of the drives and Jung’s reception of Letters 12 to 16. Thereby we shall be able to meet Jung’s contention that Schiller was unable to deal with the ‘underworld’ symbolically evoked in his ballad ‘The Diver’ (Der Taucher) (1797) and which was conjured up, so Jung maintains, by Nietzsche in Also sprach Zarathustra. Yet even in his critique of Schiller, Jung cannot stop himself using a key image found in Weimar classical aesthetics, especially Goethe’s poetry, that of the ‘veil’.

When Schiller lived, the time for dealing with the underworld had not yet come. Nietzsche at heart was much nearer to it; to him it was certain that
we were approaching an epoch of unprecedented struggle. For that reason he tore, as the only true pupil of Schopenhauer, the veil of naïveté, and conjured up in his Zarathustra some of the things that were destined to be the most vital content of the coming age.

(CW 6 §151)

The drives

In Letter 12 of the Aesthetic Letters, Schiller distinguishes between two basic drives: the ‘sensuous drive’ (der Stofftrieb) and the ‘formal drive’ (der Formtrieb). Jung begins his discussion of the drives with the sensuous drive, arguing that it is characteristic of Schiller’s psychology that this drive is associated with ‘sensation’ (Empfindung) rather than active and sensuous ‘desire’ (Begehren). Jung points out that, in Schiller, no sharp distinction is made between Empfindung and Gefühl (CW 6 §153). To express this fusion of functions in Schiller, Jung talks of Gefühlsempfindung or ‘feeling-sensation’ (CW 6 §155). According to Jung, only Schiller’s exclusion of sensuousness from the idea of the person enables him to conceive of the person as ‘an absolute and indivisible unity’ (Letter 12 §4). Moreover, when Jung discusses the formal drive, he argues that ‘formative thought’ (der formende Gedanke) is an overvaluation of permanence and constancy, at least in terms of ‘the meaning and value of the personality’. ‘Might it not be’, he asks, ‘that change, becoming, and development represent actually higher values than mere “defiance” of change [“Trotz” gegen den Wechsel]?’ (CW 6 §157), a point developed later by Schiller himself (Letter 12 §5).

Highlighting Schiller’s claim in Letter 12 that, under the supremacy of reason, ‘we are no longer individuals; we are species’ (wir sind nicht mehr Individuen, sondern Gattung) (Letter 12 §6), Jung argues that to identify with one differentiated function is to remain in a collective state (CW 6 §161). And he suggests that the unity of the individual personality, thus conceived, is merely ‘a desideratum of the intellect’, whereby the superior function (the intellect) excludes the inferior function (the senses), leading precisely to ‘the mutilation of human nature’ which was Schiller’s starting-point (CW 6 §156). Yet to argue thus is gravely to misrepresent Schiller’s position. For even if the self changes, something identical must remain in it, otherwise it would not still be the self. And Schiller addresses himself to the division between reason and the senses, not by obliterating the distinction, but by arguing for a coordinated synthesis of both faculties.

In Letter 13 of the Aesthetic Letters, to which Jung next draws our attention, Schiller puts forward the argument that one drive (that is, the sensuous drive or the formal drive) – or, as Jung would say, one function (that is, feeling-sensation or reason) – can substitute itself for another (CW 6 §162; cf. Letter 13 §4). Here Jung fails to notice the key notion of reciprocal subordination between these two drives, which Schiller underlines in an
all-important footnote to this letter when he writes ‘subordination there
must, of course, be; but it must be reciprocal’ (Letter 13 §2, fn. 1). From this
reciprocal action between the two drives arises the third drive, the ‘ludic drive’
(der Spieltrieb), which consists in the coordination of the two drives. Jung
notes Schiller’s recognition of ‘the equal rights of sensuousness and spiritual-
ity’ (cf. Letter 13 §6), and he approves of ‘the idea of a “reciprocity” between
the two instincts, a community of interest, or a *symbiosis*’ (CW 6 §166).
Indeed, Schiller argues that the reciprocal relation between the two drives
represents the very idea of humanity:

Such reciprocal relation between the two drives is, admittedly, but a task
enjoined upon us by reason, a problem which humankind is only capable
of solving completely in the perfect consummation of its existence. It is,
in the most precise sense of the word, the *idea of our human nature*, hence
something infinite, to which in the course of time we can approximate
ever more closely, but without ever being able to reach it.

(Letter 14 §2)

Jung interprets these remarks as meaning that Schiller approaches the prob-
lem of the reciprocity of the drives as ‘a problem of reason’. In order that the
opposites be reconciled, Jung argues, some higher faculty than *ratio* – indeed,
maybe a mystical one – must come into play; for, in his view,

opposites can be united only in the form of a compromise, or *irrationally*,
some new thing arising between them which, although different from
both, yet has the power to take up their energies in equal measure as an
expression of both and of neither.

Such a thing is not a product of life, he insists, it can only be created through
living (CW 6 §169).

So, as Jung realizes, Schiller recognizes there is a way to reconcile the
opposites, although it is not, as Jung would have us believe, mystical. Rather,
it is aesthetic. For just as, in Letter 3, Schiller postulated ‘a third character’
which, ‘without in any way impeding the development of moral character’,
might ‘serve as a pledge in the sensible world of a morality as yet unseen [*zu einem sinnlichen Pfand der unsichtbaren Sittlichkeit diente*]’ (Letter 3 §5), so in
Letter 14 he talks about the product of the ludic drive – the symbol (Letter 14
§2). And in Letter 15, the symbol turns out to be ‘living form’ or, to put it
another way, beauty.

**The symbol**

Jung comes closest to recognizing the significance of the aesthetic for Schiller
in his discussion of the symbol. In Letter 15, Schiller borrows the notion of
the ‘mediating representation’ (vermittelnde Vorstellung) or ‘transcendental schema’ (transzendentales Schema) from the section entitled ‘the schematism of pure reason’ in Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, and develops his own notion of an aesthetic schema, called ‘living form’ (lebende Gestalt). Like Kant’s schema, Schiller’s ‘living form’ is partly intellectual, partly sensuous – lebend points to the sensuous drive and Gestalt to the formal drive – and is produced in the imagination. Furthermore, Schiller identifies the ‘living form’ with beauty, describing it as ‘a concept serving to designate all the aesthetic qualities of phenomena and, in a word, what in the widest sense of the term we call beauty’ (Letter 15 §2). In Jungian terms, too, this ‘living form’ is the symbol in which the opposites are united (CW 6 §171). Via Schiller’s formulations, Jung expounds his own doctrine of the symbol as follows:

The essence of the symbol consists in the fact that it represents in itself something that is not wholly understandable, and that it hints only intuitively at its possible meaning [Sinn]. The creation of a symbol is not a rational process; for such a process could never produce an image that represents a content which is at bottom incomprehensible. To understand a symbol we need a certain amount of intuition which apprehends, if only approximately, the meaning [Sinn] of the symbol that has been created, and then incorporates it into consciousness.

(CW 6 §171)

For Schiller, the instinct to produce symbols is the ludic drive and the faculty which produces them is the imagination. In Psychological Types, Jung groups together the drive and the organ under the term ‘fantasy activity’ (Phantasietätigkeit). Jung wonders, however, whether beauty and play are inevitably linked, asking ‘who can guarantee that a person, when he or she begins to play, will make the aesthetic temper and the enjoyment of genuine beauty his or her goal?’ (CW 6 §172). Pointing to the distinction (see Letter 27 §4) between the aesthetic ludic drive and the physical ludic drive, Jung concludes that Schiller must have been aware of the possible dangers (CW 6 §173). Quoting the Latin tag, similia similibus curantur, Jung disagrees, however, that aesthetic play, and the state it opens up of ‘absolute determinability’ (absolute Bestimmbarkeit) – Schiller speaks of ‘unlimited determinability’ (unbegrenzte Bestimmbarkeit) (Letter 20 §3) – are capable of performing the mediatory function which Schiller ascribes to them (CW 6 §173).

According to Jung, it is essential to establish ‘where a human individual stands in his or her innermost being’ (CW 6 §173). For although, as we have seen, the human being is divided between the senses and reason, the body and the mind, he or she must also be self-identical. From Schiller’s remarks in Letter 19 §9, Jung extracts the notion of ‘the possibility of separating out an individual nucleus’ (die Ausscheidbarkeit eines individuellen Kerns) (CW 6 §174). In this same letter, Schiller goes on to identify the essence of humankind
with its will (Letter 19 §10). For Jung, however, it is a sign of ‘the barbarian state’ of humankind that the will is unilaterally determined by one function, ‘for the will must have some content, some aim, and how is this aim set?’ (CW 6 §178).

This is the core of the problem for Jung, and for Schiller. If, on the one hand, we ‘allow sensuous desire to be a motive of the will’, then we ‘act in accordance with one instinct against our rational judgment’, yet if, on the other, we ‘leave it to our rational judgment to settle the dispute’, then ‘even the fairest arbitration will always be based on that, and will give the formal instinct priority over the sensuous’ (CW 6 §178). As such, the aim of the will is determined either, on the one hand, by an intellectual or rational judgement or, on the other, by an emotional judgement or a sensuous desire. Jung’s argument here is entirely consistent with Schiller’s. And, up to a point, so is his conclusion that, in order to resolve this conflict, the content of the will must be symbolic, since ‘the mediating position between the opposites can be reached only by the symbol’ (CW 6 §178).

Arguing that, taken separately, neither the rational functions nor the sensuous functions are themselves capable of creating symbols (CW 6 §179), Jung turns, as a consequence, to the unconscious in order to find a symbolic content, for ‘that alone can produce an irrational solution of a logical antithesis’ (CW 6 §180). But where can we find such a content? Implicitly recalling the Mothers scene of Faust, Part Two, to which he will shortly make explicit reference, Jung urges that to find this we must ‘go deeper’, we must ‘descend into the foundations of consciousness which have still preserved their primordial instinctivity – that is, into the unconscious, where all psychic functions are indistinguishably merged in the original and fundamental activity of the psyche’ (CW 6 §180).

For Jung, the unconscious is ‘that maternal womb of creative fantasy’ (jene Mutterstätte der schöpferischen Phantasie), the function of which is, as described above, to produce ‘symbols that can serve to determine the mediating will’ (CW 6 §182). According to Jung, the mediating function of the symbol is activated when the symbol does not remain unconscious, but is consciously invested with libido. ‘Under normal conditions’, he writes, ‘energy must be artificially [künstlich] supplied to the unconscious symbol in order to increase its value and bring it to consciousness’ (CW 6 §183). Here the adverb künstlich can be translated as ‘artificially’ but, significantly, it also implies artistic technique or an aesthetic aspect.

Returning to the notion of ‘differentiation’ (Unterscheidung) which he had earlier discerned in Schiller (CW 6 §174), Jung emphasizes the differentiation between the (psychic) opposites and the self (das Selbst). The decision of the will to choose, not between the opposites (reason or the senses, conscious or unconscious), but for the self, is understood by Jung as introversion – the great theme of his earlier work, Transformations and Symbols of the Libido (1911/1912). For where ‘the will does not decide between the opposites, but
purely for the self’, then ‘the disposable energy is withdrawn into the self – in other words, it is introverted’ (CW 6 §183).

According to Jung, unconscious material which is activated by introversion contains ‘images of the psychological development of the individuality in its successive states’ (CW 6 §184). (Many years later, Jung would exemplify the psychological development of the individual in a series of images drawn from alchemy in *The Psychology of the Transference* [1946].) As a result, Jung relates the mediation of opposites through the symbolic to a term he had first used in 1916, the ‘transcendent function’ (CW 6 §184; cf. §205).17 And in his definition of the symbol in the glossary of analytical psychological terminology appended to *Psychological Types* (CW 6 §814–§829), he carefully distinguishes between the semiotic, the allegoric, and the symbolic (CW 6 §815; cf. CW 6 §93, n. 44).18 In that definition, the symbol shares many of the attributes which it was given by Schiller:

> The raw material [Rohstoff] shaped by thesis and antithesis, and in the shaping of which the opposites are united, is the living symbol [das lebendige Symbol]. In its raw material, which for a long time cannot be dissolved, lies its prospective significance [sein Ahnungsreiches], and in its shape [Gestalt], which its raw material receives through the influence of the opposites, lies its effect on all the psychic functions.

(CW 6 §828)

Again, we can detect echoes of those Weimar classical distinctions between *Stoff*, *Gehalt*, and *Gestalt*,19 and in his letter to A. Zarine of 3 May 1939, Jung will distinguish between the semiotic and the symbolic in a way that brings his definition of the symbol extremely close to Goethe’s when he writes that ‘a semiotic representation cannot be transformed into a symbol, because a semeion is nothing more than a sign, and its meaning is perfectly well known, whereas a symbol is a psychic image expressing something unknown’ (L 1, 269). Compare that definition with Goethe’s in his *Maxims and Reflections* when he writes –

> This is true symbolism, where the particular represents the more general, not as dream and shadow, but as a living-momentary revelation of the unfathomable

> Das ist die wahre Symbolik, wo das Besondere das Allgemeinere repräsentiert, nicht als Traum und Schatten, sondern als lebendig-augenblickliche Offenbarung des Unerforschlichen20

– or when he says of symbolism that

> Symbolism transforms the phenomenon into an idea, the idea into an
image, and in such a way that the idea-in-the-image remains infinitely effective and unattainable – and though it be expressed in every language, it will remain inexpressible.

Die Symbolik verwandelt die Erscheinung in Idee, die Idee in ein Bild, und so, daß die Idee im Bild immer unendlich wirksam und unerreichbar bleibt und, selbst in allen Sprachen ausgesprochen, doch unaussprechlich bliebe.\textsuperscript{21}

From a Schillerian, as well as a Goethean, perspective, however, Jung’s definition overlooks the aesthetic nature of the symbol. This has implications for Jung’s understanding of the role of beauty in Schiller’s \textit{Aesthetic Letters}.

Erroneously, Jung separates the ludic drive from the notion of the aesthetic, replacing it with the concept of the mystical (CW 6 §196). Any mysticism in the ‘aesthetic mood’ (\textit{ästhetische Stimmung}) (CW 6 §195),\textsuperscript{22} however, is read into it by Jung, not put there by Schiller. But this argument works both ways. For, by the same token, we might no less be able to interpret some at least of the apparently mystical elements in Jung as, in fact, aesthetic. That said, however, in \textit{Psychological Types} Jung further modulates aesthetic ‘mood’ or ‘disposition’ (\textit{ästhetische Stimmung}) into aesthetic ‘devotion’ (\textit{ästhetische Andacht}) (CW 6 §200). As an example of aesthetic ‘devotion’, Jung cites Schiller’s praise of Juno Ludovisi, a bust of the Roman goddess of Nature (CW 6 §200; cf. Letter 15 §9).

As the goddess of Nature, Juno was associated in Roman mythology with matrimony and fertility. For the Romans, each woman had her ‘Juno’ and each man his ‘Genius’, a notion which Jung adopted in his theory of ‘anima’ and ‘animus’. During his visit to Italy, Goethe had admired the bust of Juno in the Villa Ludovisi in Rome, and had a cast of its ‘colossal head’ made. In his entry for 6 January 1787 in the \textit{Italian Journey}, he wrote of the sculpture: ‘This was my first love in Rome, and now I own it. No words can give an idea of it. It is like a song of Homer’s’ (GE 6, 126).\textsuperscript{23} In Schiller’s argument in the \textit{Aesthetic Letters}, the bust of Juno overcomes the division between ‘Venus Cytherea’ and ‘Venus Urania’, that is, between the Venus of ‘profane’ and the Venus of ‘sacred’ love (Letter 6 §8). In its iconic status, this sculpture fulfils a function analogous to that played by the statue of the Apollo Belvedere in Schopenhauer’s \textit{The World as Will and Representation} (1819).\textsuperscript{24} For Jung, it comes as no surprise that Schiller chooses a ‘divine image’ as an example of the symbol or ‘living form’ (CW 6 §202).

On Jung’s account, this passage, where Schiller mentions that the female god demands our Anbetung, illustrates the religious characteristic of ‘aesthetic devotion’ (CW 6 §200). According to Jung, the psychological process involved in such devotion is the ‘sinking of libido into the unconscious’ (\textit{die Versenkung der Libido ins Unbewußte}) (CW 6 §201) and the reactivation of childhood complexes, that is, introversion, or, as Jung also describes it, ‘a
regressive movement of libido toward the primordial’ (CW 6 §202). Out from this encounter with the unconscious emerges the symbol, ‘the image of the incipient progressive movement’ and ‘a comprehensive resultant of all the unconscious factors’ (CW 6 §202). As in *Transformations and Symbols of the Libido*, Jung turns to Goethe’s *Faust*, Part Two, for a paradigm of introversion and the production of the symbol. Only, this time, Jung cites, not the Mothers scene itself, but a directly resulting episode, the scene of Paris and Helena.

Goethe makes the divine images of Paris and Helena float up from the tripod of the Mothers – on the one hand, the rejuvenated pair; on the other, the symbol of a process of inner union, which is precisely what Faust passionately craves for himself as the supreme inner atonement. This is clearly shown in the ensuing scene, and is also evident in the further course of the drama.

(CW 6 §202)

We shall have more to say about Jung’s analysis of this scene in the second volume, when we examine Jung’s reading of *Faust* in terms of alchemy. For the moment, let us note that Jung attaches immense importance to the psychological function of the symbol in the development of humankind. Indeed, he goes so far as to say that ‘humanity came to its gods by accepting the reality of the symbol [das Tatsächlichnehmen des Symbols], that is, it came to the reality of thought [Tatsächlichkeit des Gedankens], which has made humankind lord of the earth’ (CW 6 §202).

In *Transformations and Symbols of the Libido*, and in his essay ‘On Psychic Energy’, Jung explains the role of the symbol in the development of civilization. For Jung, a symbol is a psychological mechanism that transforms (psychic) energy, ‘canalizing’ surplus libido and rendering it available for cultural rather than natural processes (CW 8 §88):25

The history of culture has amply demonstrated that humankind possesses a relative surplus of energy that is capable of application apart from its merely natural flow. The fact that the symbol makes this deflection possible proves that not all the libido is bound up in a form governed by natural laws, but that a certain quantum of energy remains over, which could be called excess libido. [. . .] [Symbols] are stepping-stones to new activities, which must specifically be called cultural activities, in contrast to the instinctual functions that run their law-governed course.

(CW 8 §91)

A similarly significant role is played by the aesthetic in Schiller’s account of human development in his *Aesthetic Letters*. Indeed, Schiller notes that, of all the visible signs of our entry into humanity (*Menschlichkeit*), the emergence
of the aesthetic, as ‘delight in semblance [Schein], and a propensity to orna-
mentation and play [Spiel]’ (Letter 26 §3), is the most important.

Furthermore, according to Schiller, it is one of the most important tasks of
education to lead humankind from the state of nature to morality through
the aesthetic. He describes this task as being ‘to subject humans to form, even
in our purely physical life’, and ‘to make us aesthetic in every domain over
which beauty is capable of extending its sway’, since ‘it is only out of the
aesthetic, not out of the physical, state that the moral can develop’ (Letter 23
§6). Yet Jung either overlooks this obvious parallel between his theory of
cultural development and Schiller’s discussion of the role of the aesthetic in
the development of humankind – once again, his questionable understanding
of Schiller’s conception of the aesthetic is responsible for his oversight – or
he chooses to disguise the similarity with his insistence on a different vocabu-
larv. In structural terms, however, the parallels between their arguments are
striking.

Nevertheless, Jung gives particular attention to a passage in Letter 20,
where Schiller puts forward the doctrine of indirection, derived from the
philosopher and cultural historian, Johann Gottfried Herder (1744–1803),
who had acted as Goethe’s mentor in Strasbourg. (As we shall see in the
second volume, Jung’s indebtedness to Herder extends beyond the distinction
of ‘feeling’ (Fühlen) and ‘sensation’ (Empfindung) to the energetic conception
of the psyche.) According to Schiller, we cannot ‘pass directly from feeling
[Empfinden] to thought [Denken]’, we must ‘first take one step backwards [einen
Schritt zurücktun]’; for, ‘only through one determination being annulled again
can a contrary determination take its place’ (Letter 20 §3). Known as the
document of ‘indirection’, Schiller here recapitulates a commonplace of
eighteenth-century psychology,26 to which Jung had already alluded in Trans-
formations and Symbols of the Libido when he spoke of ‘the indirect course
[der Umweg] of the libido’ (PU §106). In Psychological Types Jung continues
the translation of this doctrine into his own psychological language, describ-
ing ‘the step backwards’ as ‘the differentiation from the contending instincts,
the detachment and withdrawal of libido from all inner and outer objects’
(CW 6 §186). For in order to reach the unconscious, the libido must detach
itself both from outer sensuous objects as well as from such inner objects as
ideas. In other words, Jung finds in Schiller’s notion of ‘a step backwards’
confirmation of his own theory of ‘introversion into the unconscious’
(CW 6 §186).

From Letter 20, Jung extracts four elements which correspond to notions
in his own psychological system. First, what Schiller calls ‘unlimited determi-
nability’ (unbegrenzte Bestimmbarkeit) is the unconscious, in the sense that it
is an empty state of consciousness where, according to Jung, ‘everything acts
on everything else without distinction’ (CW 6 §187). Second, what Schiller
calls ‘the greatest possible content’ (der größtmögliche Gehalt) corresponds
to another aspect of the unconscious or, more precisely, to its contents. In
the Gnostic vocabulary of Jung’s *Septem Sermones ad mortuos* (1916), the unconscious (‘the pleroma’) is both fullness and emptiness. Thus, in Schiller, Jung finds the idea of ‘the union of unconscious and conscious’ (CW 6 §187). Third, what Schiller calls ‘something positive’ (*etwas Positives*) which emerges from this state corresponds to what Jung defines as ‘a symbolic determinant of the will’ (CW 6 §187). Finally, what Schiller calls ‘a middle disposition’ (*eine mittlere Stimmung*) and identifies as ‘the aesthetic state’ (*ästhetischer Zustand*) (Letter 20 §4) corresponds to the ‘void’ produced by ‘the cancelling of the opposites’, which Jung calls ‘the unconscious’ (CW 6 §187), allowing him to draw a link between the unconscious activity of the opposites and Schiller’s claim that ‘in the aesthetic state the individual is nought [Null]’ (Letter 21 §4).

Quoting Schiller’s description of the aesthetic state, Jung balks at the idea that, in ‘the enjoyment of genuine beauty’ (*dem Genuß echter Schönheit*),

we are at such a moment master in equal degree of our passive and of our active powers, and we shall with equal ease turn to seriousness [*zum Ernst*] or to play [*zum Spiele*], to repose or to movement, to compliance or to resistance, to abstract thought or to contemplation.

(Letter 22 §2; cf. CW 6 §207)

To this statement, Jung objects that it is ‘in direct contradiction’ to Schiller’s definition of the ‘aesthetic condition’ in Letter 21, where the human being is said to be ‘empty’, to be ‘undetermined’, to be ‘nought’, whereas here it is, in Jung’s terms, ‘determined in the highest degree by’ – in Schiller’s, ‘surrendered [dahingegeben] to’ – beauty (CW 6 §208). Once again, however, Jung appears to have overlooked the complexity of Schiller’s argument. For if, in Letter 21 §4, Schiller says that, in the aesthetic mode of the psyche, the human being is ‘nought’, he also says, in Letter 22, that this aesthetic mode is, in another respect, ‘a state of supreme reality’ (*ein Zustand der höchsten Realität*). Of all the ways the psyche has of exercising its functions, the aesthetic alone, Schiller says, ‘leads to the absence of all limitation’ and is ‘a whole in itself’ (*ein Ganzes in sich selbst*) (Letter 22 §1). For when, in ‘the aesthetic state’, we ‘surrender’ to ‘the enjoyment of genuine beauty’, it is also here that we feel ‘torn out of time’, and it is here that ‘our human nature expresses itself with a purity and integrity, as though it had as yet suffered no disruption through the intervention of external forces’ (Letter 22 §1).

As Jung rightly suspects, this ‘mediating aesthetic function’ (*mittlere ästhetische Funktion*) in Schiller’s aesthetics corresponds to the ‘symbol-forming activity’ (*symbolbildende Tätigkeit*) that Jung calls ‘creative fantasy’ (*schöpferische Phantasie*) (CW 6 §187). Despite this and other correspondences delineated above, Jung accuses Schiller at this point of contradicting
himself – because he allegedly lacks the concept of the unconscious (CW 6 §187). Although he refers to Schiller’s earlier definition of the ‘aesthetic’ character of a thing as relating to ‘the totality of our various functions without being a definite object for any single one of them’ (Letter 20 §4 fn.), Jung describes this definition – for no good reason, as far as I can see – as ‘vague’ (vage). Jung says that Schiller would have done better to return to his earlier concept of the symbol, but this is Schiller’s concept of the symbol, for symbol = ‘living form’ = beauty.

Now, the extent of Jung’s apparent misunderstanding of Schiller’s conception of the aesthetic is further revealed by his own rejection of beauty and by his simultaneous acceptance of Schiller’s definition of the symbol, for it is precisely Schiller’s argument that ‘living form’ is beauty (Letter 15 §2). And Jung adds to this confusion by claiming that the ‘primordial image’ (das urtümliche Bild), ‘floating before him internally’ (das ihm innerlich vor- schwebte), has nothing to do with the aesthetic. Jung’s argument at this point is complicated by his recourse to ideas from Eastern philosophy, specifically Hindu and Taoist thought, areas of which he accused Schiller of ignorance. Thus Jung objects to Schiller’s characterization of the mode of psychic activity under discussion at one moment as ‘aesthetic’, and at another as ‘symbolic’, unable to see that both are different ways of saying the same thing (CW 6 §188).

To compound this confusion even further, Jung fails to appreciate that Schiller himself was capable of casting his aesthetic theories into psychological vocabulary, as we can see in the case of Schiller’s letter to Goethe of 27 March 1801, where he writes that ‘unconsciousness combined with reflection constitutes the poetic artist’ (der vollkommene Dichter spricht das Ganze der Menschheit aus), a remark comparable with Jung’s later thoughts in his lecture ‘On the Relation of Analytical Psychology to Poetry’ (1922) on the archetypal significance of art. Unjustly, then, Jung places Schiller’s Aesthetic Letters in the category of what he calls Ästhetismus.

**Aestheticism and aesthetism**

As we have seen from his letter to Garve, Schiller was aware of the need for clarity regarding the term ‘aesthetic’. But what does Jung mean when he uses the term Ästhetismus to describe Schiller’s position? In a footnote Jung distinguishes aesthetism from aestheticism as follows, using ‘aesthetism’ as an abbreviated expression for an ‘aesthetic view of the world’, and ‘aestheticism’ in the more pejorative sense of a pose of excessive sensitivity (CW 6 §194, fn. 94) – such as that implied, for example, in Heine’s poem from the Book of Songs (Buch der Lieder) (1827), ‘They sat and drank at the tea-table’. Nevertheless, bearing in mind the sense in which he uses it, it seems that, for
Jung, ‘the aesthetic’, das Ästhetische, is merely aesthetic. And to an extent, Jung’s criticism is justified, to the extent that beauty can indeed be trivial (bloß ästhetisch).\(^3\)

Although the actual phrase bloß ästhetisch is not used by Schiller, the idea can be found in his Aesthetic Letters.\(^3\) At one point, Schiller talks about blosser Schein, ‘sheer semblance’, in the sense of the ‘real’ aesthetic (Letter 26 §7), as opposed to bloss[er] Betrug, ‘mere deception’, or the ‘false’ aesthetic, such as that of the trompe l’œil (Letter 26 §5). The distinction, then, is between ‘true’ (aufrichtig) and (logically) ‘false’ (falsch) semblance: in Letter 26, Schiller distinguishes between ‘dishonest’ and ‘honest’ semblance; between, on the one hand, ‘the lying colours which mask the face of truth and are bold enough to masquerade as reality’, and, on the other, ‘beneficent semblance’ (wohlättiger Schein), ‘with which we fill up our emptiness and cover up our wretchedness’, and ‘ideal semblance’ (idealer Schein), ‘which ennobles [veredelt] the reality of common day’ (Letter 26 §14). Nevertheless, both kinds of aesthetic – ‘true’ (aufrichtig) as well as ‘false’ (falsch) – are bloß ästhetisch in different, but pejorative, senses. In the case of the latter, we are dealing with a degraded notion of ästhetisch as ‘false refinement’,\(^3\) such as kitschy decoration; and when, as in the former case, the (truly aesthetic) aesthetic is not related (in time) to other significant modes of being (practical, moral – which is Jung’s main concern – and intellectual), it becomes inappropriate and life-threatening. Therefore even the ‘truly’ aesthetic can be negative, if it is not properly placed in a hierarchy of values, which shifts according to circumstances. As Schiller acknowledges in Letter 21, to be ‘nought’ or Null is, from many points of view, disastrous – for beauty ‘produces no particular result whatsoever, neither for the understanding nor for the will, it accomplishes no particular purpose, neither intellectual nor moral, it discovers no individual truth, helps us to perform no individual duty’, and, in Schiller’s trenchant comment, ‘it is, in short, as unfitted to provide a firm basis for character as to enlighten the understanding’.

Yet the power of beauty is said to lie in its potential to open us up to true freedom:

> By means of aesthetic culture, therefore, the personal worth of an individual, or his dignity, inasmuch as this can depend solely upon himself, remains completely indeterminate; and nothing more is achieved by it than that he is henceforth enabled by the grace of nature to make of himself what he will – that the freedom to be what he ought to be is completely restored to him.

(Letter 21 §4)

We might well compare the argument here with the clinical point made by Jung in ‘The Psychology of the Child Archetype’ (1940), where he notes the physical and mental impairments that can flow from ‘mere’ fantasies, argues
that ‘fantasies’ have an aetiological significance that should not be underestimated, and concludes that, in the medical sphere, fantasies are ‘real things’ (reale Dinge), ‘with which the psychotherapist has to reckon very seriously indeed’ (CW 9/i §290).

Now Jung rejects what he calls aesthetism for the following three reasons. First, it allegedly presupposes what it seeks to create, namely, the love of beauty. Earlier in his chapter on Schiller, Jung had accused Schiller of the traditional fallacy of petitio principii, arguing that the human instinct will not play exclusively with beauty, for then the human individual would no longer be a barbarian, but would be, so to speak, always already aesthetically educated, ‘whereas the question at issue is: how is he to emerge from the state of barbarism?’ (CW 6 §173). In so arguing, Jung does no more than restate the question which Schiller himself had posed in his Aesthetic Letters, by asking how it is that beauty can both chain nature in the savage and release it in the barbarian (Letter 10 §1). His answer to this question is elaborated in Letters 23 and 24, which explicate his understanding of the relationship between the physical, the aesthetic, and the moral (for further discussion of this point, see the discussion below of Schiller’s tripartite schemes). Further on, Jung repeats his doubts as to how the aesthetic state is to be achieved (CW 6 §191), but this is mere repetition and not a new objection.

Second, aesthetism is said by Jung to look away from evil, away from ugliness and difficulty, and to aim merely at pleasure (Genuß), even if that pleasure is ‘noble’ (edel). Following his review in 1791 of a collection of the poetry by Gottfried August Bürger (1747–94), the motif of ‘ennoblement’ (veredeln) became central in Schiller’s aesthetics. In the Aesthetic Letters, it implies the raising of the individual to the level of the universal, as well as obviously having an alchemical connotation. Moreover, Schiller’s use of the term ‘to abstract’ (absondern) in his description of ‘reciprocal subordination’ (Letter 3 §§), his use of the word ‘to enhance’ (steigern) in his discussion of the sublation of freedom in aesthetic effect (Letter 22 §4), and his reference to the role of ‘the Mysteries of Science’ (die Mysterien der Wissenschaft) in the development of the realm of aesthetic semblance (Letter 27 §11) – all have overtones of alchemy or freemasonry, areas probably Goethe brought to his attention. In the eighteenth century, the chief significance of alchemy resided, as Goethe ‘clearly discerned’ (it has been argued), in ‘its esoteric implications for the health of the psyche’. It is not hard to relate the ‘equipoise of psychic forces’ that is achieved, according to Schiller, in aesthetic contemplation, to Goethe’s words, in the section of his ‘History of the Theory of Colours’ entitled ‘Alchemists’, about the supreme achievement of education, where he writes that there are ‘desires’ which ‘passionately rage in human nature and can only be brought into balance through the highest education [die höchste Bildung]’. And, for his part, as we shall see in volume 2, Jung became increasingly fascinated with alchemy – not simply via Goethe
and Schiller, but from the original alchemical texts – which, he argued, provided techniques for the symbolic projection of psychic processes.

Aside from this possible alchemical connection, Jung argues that aesthetism is unable to help humankind out of the conflict between the beautiful and the ugly; for that, he believes, another attitude than the aesthetic is needed (CW 6 §194). At the heart of the problem lies Jung’s rejection of Schiller’s equation of ‘aesthetic disposition’ (ästhetische Stimmung) and beauty (CW 6 §206; cf. Letter 21 §4). With reference to Schiller’s definition of ‘aesthetic character’ (ästhetische Beschaffenheit) as relating to the totality of our various functions, Jung objects to Schiller’s ostensible failure to take into account the problem of ugliness: ‘the beautiful’, he writes, cannot coincide with ‘the aesthetic’, and just as some of our human faculties are beautiful and some are ugly, so ‘the sum of all colours is grey – light on a dark background or dark on light’ (CW 6 §206). Or as he also puts it, Schiller runs up against the barrier of ugliness, over which he could not step; a barrier personified by the figure of ‘the ugliest man’, as he is called in Nietzsche’s Zarathustra.41

By conflating the precise sense in which Weimar classicism in general, and Schiller in particular, talks about beauty, with the sense in which the term was used by late-nineteenth-century French advocates of l’art pour l’art, Jung fails to appreciate the full meaning that accrues to the term ‘aesthetic’ in the Aesthetic Letters. Ugliness is not excluded from Schiller’s account in his Aesthetic Letters; rather, ugliness is to be regarded as an absence of beauty, instead of being hypostatized into a separate category. In Kantian terms, we might say, beauty is a ‘necessary postulate’, whereas ugliness, by contrast, is merely a ‘hypothetical postulate’ of being.42

Finally, and most important, Jung accuses aesthetism of a lack of moral motive power. Schiller, he claims, tries but fails to introduce ‘an absolute moral motive’ (CW 6 §194). This final criticism proves to be as unsustainable as the previous two. In the Kallias-Briefe, as we saw in Chapter 3, Schiller had defined beauty as ‘freedom in appearance’ (Freiheit in der Erscheinung). Thus there is a close connection for Schiller between aesthetics and ethics, for Schiller’s definition of Beauty ‘transposes’ Kant’s notion of moral freedom into aesthetic terms.43 In the Kallias-Briefe, Schiller considered the idea that human actions can be beautiful at some length. On 18 February 1793, he wrote that ‘although beauty clings only to appearance, nevertheless moral beauty is a concept to which something in experience corresponds’.44 Evidently, an act of will is, as a free act, also a moral act, but thereby only the rational aspect of the human being is engaged. Against this, Schiller argued that a moral action can also be beautiful if the sensory aspect of the individual appears to be free.

Such an act, according to Schiller, would be performed, not just out of duty, but also – apparently, at least – out of inclination. In his Kallias-Briefe of 19 February 1793, Schiller elaborated the formula that ‘a free action is a beautiful action when the autonomy of the mind and the autonomy of
appearance coincide’. In the essay entitled ‘On Grace and Dignity’ (1793), Schiller reformulated this notion of beauty in human conduct when he defined the ‘beautiful soul’ (schöne Seele) as one in which ‘sensuousness and reason, duty and inclination are in harmony, and grace is their expression as appearance’.

Two years later, in the Aesthetic Letters, the relationship between the aesthetic and the moral is equally clear, if slightly more complicated. In Letter 23, Schiller declares that ‘there is no way of making the sensuous human rational except by first making him or her aesthetic’ (Letter 23 §2). The task of the aesthetic is defined in extremely precise terms. According to Schiller, the contemplation of beauty represents a happy medium between the realm of law and the realm of exigency (Letter 15 §5); beauty is said to restore harmony to those who are over-tensed and energy to those who are relaxed (Letter 17 §2); yet beauty, Schiller claims, produces neither knowledge nor character, being irrelevant for both the understanding and the moral will (Letter 21 §4). And in Letter 22, Schiller emphasizes the extent of what the aesthetic can do by demarcating what it cannot hope to do (Letter 22 §4). The mediating function of beauty is made clear in the Aesthetic Letters by two tripartite schemes.

**The tripartite schemes in the Aesthetic Letters**

In the first of these two tripartite schemes, Schiller is concerned with the relationship of the drives internal to the individual, where beauty mediates between reason and the senses. Earlier in Letter 18, Schiller claimed, as he had done in his 1784 lecture ‘What Effect can a Good Theatrical Stage Actually Have?’, that beauty forms a link between ‘the two opposite conditions of feeling and thinking’ (Letter 18 §2). In this lecture, later published as ‘The Theatrical Stage viewed as a Moral Institution’ (1802), Schiller further defined beauty as the mediating function between reason and the senses, writing that human nature

\[ \text{(Our psyche \[Gemüt\] passes)} \]

 demanded a mediating condition, which unified both contradictory ends, modified the harsh tension into gentle harmony, and facilitated the alternating transition from one condition into the other. The task is achieved now by the aesthetic sense, or the feeling for the beautiful.

Yet in Letter 18, Schiller claims that between ‘the two opposite conditions of feeling and thinking’ there can be ‘absolutely no middle term’ (Letter 18 §2).

Of course, there is no middle term – but what there is, however, is ‘beautiful semblance’ (schöner Schein). In a modification of this initial premise, the aesthetic is defined in Letter 20 as the middle disposition between sensation and thought. ‘Our psyche [Gemüt] passes’, Schiller writes, ‘from sensation to thought via a middle disposition in which sense and reason are both active at
the same time’ (Letter 20 §4). In the aesthetic mode, both the senses and reason are active, for a thing ‘can relate to the totality of our various functions without being a definite object for any single one of them’, and ‘that is its aesthetic character’ (Letter 20 §4 fn.). As Schiller had earlier claimed, the ludic drive brings feelings and passions into harmony with reason, reconciling reason with the senses (Letter 14 §6).

In the second of Schiller’s tripartite schemes, the mediating function is expressed, not from the point of view of the drives, but in terms of three different moments. As Schiller makes clear in his footnote to Letter 25, these moments are to be understood ontogenetically (that is, on the level of individual development), phylogenetically (on the level of collective or historical development), and transcendentally (as a necessary condition for all acts of perception) (Letter 25 §1 fn.). These moments are the physical state, the aesthetic, and finally the moral.

To begin with, in the physical state, nature has free rein over sensuous humankind, we simply ‘suffer’ the ‘dominion of nature’. Next, in the aesthetic state, humankind emancipates itself from this dominion of nature. And finally, in the moral state, rational and moral humankind acquires ‘mastery’ over nature (Letter 24 §1). As Schiller points out in Letter 23, the transition from the first (that is, the physical) stage to the second (that is, the aesthetic) is much more difficult than the transition from the second (the aesthetic) stage to the third (that is, the moral). For the step from the second to the third involves a decision of the will, but the step from the first to the second does not:

The step from raw matter to beauty, in which a completely new kind of activity has to be opened up within us, must first be facilitated by the grace of nature [muss die Natur erleichtern], for our will can exert no sort of compulsion upon a temper of mind which is, after all, the very means of bringing the will into existence.

(Letter 23 §5)

Thus these three stages of humanity could be summarized as from Nature via Beauty to Truth. Although the aesthetic can never supply the directives for moral choice, it can legitimately modify the enactment of a moral decision, thus having an executive, if not a legislative, relationship to morality (Letter 23 §7). Or, to put it another way, the relationship between the aesthetic and the moral is subordinative, not superordinative. And so, for Schiller, ‘it is only out of the aesthetic, not out of the physical, state that the moral can develop’ (Letter 23 §6). Via the aesthetic – and only via the aesthetic – humankind attains its proper status (Letter 24 §8). Through beauty we become truly human.

At the end of his discussion in Psychological Types of Schiller’s Aesthetic Letters, even Jung is compelled to recognize the moral end of Schiller’s
aesthetic education, conceding that Schiller was intent on ‘making the sensuous individual into a rational being by first making him or her aesthetic, as he says’ (CW 6 §209; cf. Letter 23 §2). Nevertheless, Jung thinks that Schiller’s aesthetics offer a solution to the problem of the opposites in a different way from the one proposed above. By interpreting Schiller’s notion of beauty in terms of a ‘religious ideal’, Jung claims that beauty became Schiller’s religion, and that his ‘aesthetic mood’ (ästhetische Stimmung) could equally well be called ‘religious devotion’ (religiöse Andacht). ‘Without definitely expressing anything of that kind, and without explicitly characterizing his central problem as a religious one’, Jung suggests, Schiller’s ‘intuition’ nevertheless arrived at the religious problem, ‘the religious problem of the primitive’ (CW 6 §195).

And, according to Jung, Schiller touched on this problem in his letters. Is Schiller’s position a religious one? Well, in the Tabulae votivae we find the following distich that well summarizes his attitude to religion: ‘To which religion do I belong? To none / Of those you can name me. “And why none?” For religious reasons’ (Welche Religion ich bekenne? Keine von allen, / Die du mir nennst! “Und warum keine?” Aus Religion).51 And what we find in his correspondence, in a letter to Goethe of 17 August 1795 (in the context of a discussion of Book 6 of Wilhelm Meister’s Apprenticeship), is a careful distinction of the aesthetic from the religious and the moral, and the subordination of the latter to the former.

I find that Christianity virtually contains the first elements of what is highest and noblest, and its various manifestations in life seem to me repulsive and distasteful only because they are erroneous representations of this highest. If one considers the peculiar and characteristic features of Christianity – which distinguish it from all monotheistic forms of religion – it consists of neither more nor less than the abrogation of the law (Kant’s Imperative), which place Christianity wishes to see occupied by free will. Hence, in its pure form, it is the representation of high morality or the embodiment of the Holy Spirit, and in this sense it is the only aesthetic religion.

(CSG 1, 88–9)

Schiller’s endorsement of Christianity here is only in terms of its status as an ‘aesthetic religion’, just as, in ‘What Effect can a Good Theatrical Stage Actually Have?’, he noted that ‘religion works in general more on the sensuous part of the people’, suggesting that perhaps it is only through what is sensuous that it is able to work ‘so infallibly’, and that if we take this away, we take away its power as well. (Schiller saw a chance here for the theatre to supplant religion.)52

Jung himself was attracted to using a religious vocabulary, to a far greater extent than Schiller was. Jung claims, during his discussion in Psychological Types of Pragmatism: A New Name for Some Old Ways of Thinking (1907) by
William James (1842–1910), with whose theory of psychological types his own shows a striking affinity, \(^5^3\) that the religious function is a universal psychic constituent, a component ‘found always and everywhere’ (CW 6 §529). In Jung’s own case, it was the iconography and symbolism of religion, rather than ecclesiastical history or dogma *per se*, which proved fascinating to him. (This trait marks another resemblance, in addition to the one noted in Chapter 3, between Jung’s approach to religion and Cassirer’s in his *Philosophy of Symbolic Forms*.) In *Transformations and Symbols of the Libido*, Jung had described religion as a major human institution and acclaimed the truth of the religious symbol as a pre-eminently psychological one:

The religious myth meets us here as one of the greatest and most significant human institutions which, despite misleading symbols, nevertheless gives us assurance and strength, so that we may not be overwhelmed by the monsters of the universe. The symbol, considered from the standpoint of actual truth, is misleading, indeed, but it is *psychologically true*, because it was and is the bridge to all the greatest achievements of humanity.

(‡U §353)

Not surprisingly, then, Jung wants to amalgamate Schiller’s aesthetic theory of the symbol with his own psychological and (apparently) religious point of view (CW 6 §202). As is clear from his concluding remarks about Schiller in *Psychological Types*, however, Jung holds close to a central tenet of Weimar aesthetics which obviates the need for him to leap, as he so often seems to do, into the mystic. For, at this point, Jung’s discussion of Schiller in *Psychological Types* offers us a fresh reading of analytical Jungian psychology which will yield not a substitute religion, even less a cult, but rather an archetypal aesthetics. That central element, common to both Schiller in the *Aesthetic Letters* and Jung in *Psychological Types*, is the concept of ‘semblance’\(^5^4\).

**Semblance (Schein)**

Jung brings his discussion of the *Aesthetic Letters* to a close with an acknowledgment of the psychological merit of Schiller’s treatise. For Jung, the greatness of Schiller’s thoughts lay in ‘his psychological observation and in his intuitive grasp of the things observed’ (CW 6 §211). As we have seen, a major aspect of Schiller’s aesthetics that Jung wishes to emphasize is his conception of the symbol. By uniting ‘antithetical opposites’ the symbol, as Jung rightly recognizes, also (somehow) unites the opposites of reality and unreality (for it shows what *might yet become real*), the opposites of ‘psychic reality (on account of its efficacy [Wirksamkeit])’ and what ‘corresponds to no physical reality’ (CW 6 §211).\(^5^5\) Thus, for Jung, the Schillerian symbol is ‘a
fact and yet an appearance’ (*eine Tatsache und doch ein Schein*) (CW 6 §211). In a manner which is entirely consistent with Weimar aesthetics, Jung attributes to the symbol the quality of ‘semblance’ (*Schein*) or ‘aesthetic illusion’, when he writes that ‘the reality, which the one drive presupposes, is a different one from the reality of the other’, to which it would be ‘quite unreal or a semblance [*Schein*]’, and vice versa. What is inherent in the symbol, however, is ‘this double character of the real and the unreal’ (dieser Doppelcharakter des Realen und Irrealen) (CW 6 §178).

As Wilkinson and Willoughby point out in their edition of Schiller’s *Aesthetic Letters*, ‘aesthetic semblance’ (*ästhetischer Schein*) – as opposed to actuality, truth or logical semblance (Letter 26 §5) – becomes for Schiller ‘an indispensable characteristic of all phenomena whatsoever’ whenever they are ‘viewed under their aesthetic aspect’. Although Jung quotes two passages from Letter 26 where Schiller discusses the concept of semblance – his brilliant remark that ‘supreme stupidity and supreme intelligence have a certain affinity with each other, in that both of them seek only the real and are completely insensitive to mere semblance’ (Letter 26 §4); and his observation that ‘the sovereign human right’ of ‘separating our territory from the actual existence of things, that is to say, from the realm of nature’ is what we ‘exercise in the art of semblance [*Kunst des Scheins*]’ (Letter 26 §9, cf. §8) – he does not refer to Schiller’s central distinction in that letter between logical (false) and aesthetic (true) semblance. ‘It goes without saying’, Schiller says, although he needed to say it,

> that the only kind of semblance I am here concerned with is aesthetic semblance [*ästhetischer Schein*], which we distinguish from actuality and truth, and not logical semblance, which we confuse with these: the semblance, therefore, which we love just because it is semblance, and not because we take it to be something better.

Only this first – aesthetic – semblance is play (*Spiel*), he adds, while the latter – logical – semblance is ‘mere deception’ (*bloss Betrug*) (Letter 26 §5).

Yet from Jung’s discussion of Letter 16 and Letter 17, an intriguing similarity emerges between, on the one hand, what Schiller says about semblance and, on the other, what Jung says about the unconscious. Here Jung says that ‘the unconscious, when not realized, is, as is well known, always at work, casting a false glamour [*Schein*] over everything’, and that the unconscious ‘appears to us always on objects’, because ‘everything unconscious is projected’. Thus, he continues, ‘when we can apprehend the unconscious as such, we remove the false appearance [*falschen Schein*] from objects, which can only promote truth’ (CW 6 §212). At a first glance, the unconscious as described by Jung might look like ‘logical semblance’ for, according to Jung, only acceptance of the unconscious for what it is, and thus the removal of false appearance, can reveal the truth. When read in the light of the
Aesthetic Letters, however, unconscious projection in the form of the symbol is really much closer to ‘aesthetic semblance’, inasmuch as it reveals the truth about the psyche, not just in the past and the present, but also in the future. The unconscious is ‘false’, then, in the Schillerian sense of aesthetic deception.

In his Aesthetic Letters, Schiller correspondingly argues that humankind passes from beauty to truth – ‘there can, in a single word, no longer be any question of how we are to pass from beauty to truth, since this latter is potentially contained in the former’ – precisely inasmuch as humankind enters into the aesthetic – so there is ‘only a question of how we are to clear a way for ourselves from common reality to aesthetic reality, from mere life-serving feelings to feelings of beauty [von blossen Lebensgefühlen zu Schönheitsgefühlen]’ (Letter 25 §7). Or, as Schiller wrote in his philosophical poem ‘The Artists’ (Die Künstler) (1789), invoking ‘heavenly’ Venus, the goddess of ‘sacred’ love, Beauty becomes Truth:

Fled to her sunny throne,
She who – her face ’mid constellations shrouded –
Beheld by spirits of purest sense alone –
In awful majesty, unclouded,
Consuming travels over worlds of light –
Urania, heavenly bright, –
She now – her flaming crown beside her laid –
In Beauty’s form before us stands display’d;
And, girdled with the Graces’ winning zone,
Becomes herself a child, to be by children known.
That which, as Beauty, charm’d our youth,
Will one day meet us in the guise of Truth.

Die, eine Glorie von Orionen
um’s Angesicht, in kehrer Majestät,
nur angeschau from reinernen Dämonen,
verzehrend über Sternen geht,
gefloh in ihrem Sonnenthrone,
die furchtbar herrliche Urania,
mit abgelegter Feuerkrone
steht sie – als Schönheit vor uns da.
Der Anmut Gürtel umgewunden,
wird sie zum Kind, daß Kinder sie verstehn:
was wir als Schönheit hier empfunden,
wird einst als WAHRHEIT uns entgegen gehn.

Moreover, Schiller’s aesthetic, like the Jungian unconscious (once it has attained consciousness), enables humankind to tap into hidden psychic
For Schiller, it is the task of art to open up ‘living springs’ and, as such, it is an instrument outside the control of the state (Letter 9 §1–§2); and, by giving form to outer life, Schiller believes, aesthetic culture has the power to open up the inner (Letter 23 §8). Just as, in *Transformations and Symbols of the Libido*, Jung had spoken of the return of the libido to its psychic source –

When some great work is to be accomplished, before which the weak individual recoils, doubtful of his strength, his libido returns to that source – and this is the dangerous moment, in which the decision takes place between annihilation and new life

(UP §459)

– so now he taught that the tasks of life bring about in the individual a moment of *enantiodromia*, when the libido streams back to the source of life, that is, when the libido introverts, and returns to the unconscious:

When the individual stands before a difficult task which he cannot master with the means at his command, a retrograde movement of the libido automatically sets in, i.e., a regression. The libido draws away from the problem of the moment, becomes introverted, and reactivates in the unconscious a more or less primitive analogue of the conscious situation, together with an earlier mode of adaptation.

(CW 6 §314)

So although Jung emphasizes the contrasts, and apparently overlooks some of the striking affinities, between his psychological theories in *Psychological Types* and Schiller’s views in his *Aesthetic Letters*, the structural correspondences between Jung’s notion of the unconscious and Schiller’s concept of the aesthetic are numerous and extremely close. These parallels between Jungian psychology and Schillerian aesthetics centre on four central concepts: fantasy, or the imagination; the importance attached to play; the conception of the symbol; and the idea of aesthetic semblance.

**Excursus: On Naive and Sentimental Poetry**

As a pendant to his discussion of the *Aesthetic Letters*, Jung turns to Schiller’s treatise published the following year (1796) entitled *On Naive and Sentimental Poetry* (*Über naive und sentimentalische Dichtung)*. Schiller’s essay was intended as much to provide a general taxonomy of literature, a revised form of the *querelle des anciens et des modernes*, as it was to distinguish his own writing, as a ‘sentimental’ poet, from Goethe’s, the product of ‘naivety’. Looking back in a conversation with Eckermann of 21 March 1830, Goethe suggested that Schiller had written the treatise ‘to defend himself against me’, and that Schiller’s distinction between naive
and sentimental was the basis for the later distinction between the classical and the Romantic.\textsuperscript{61}

In outline, Schiller argues that the ‘naive’ poet is at one with nature, and his great example here is the Greeks, particularly Homer. By contrast, the modern poet is \textit{sentimentalisch}, conscious of being separated from nature and longing to return. In fact nature, both inner and outer, is at the heart of Schiller’s concerns in this essay, from its opening lines and their lush evocation of ‘a modest flower, a spring, a mossy stone, the twittering of the birds, the humming of the bees, and so on’ as

moments in our life when we accord to nature in plants, minerals, animals, landscapes, as well as to human nature in children, in the customs of country people and of the primitive world, a sort of love and touching respect, not because it pleases our senses nor because it satisfies our intellect or taste (the opposite of both can often be the case) but merely \textit{because it is nature}.\textsuperscript{62}

On this basis of their relation to nature Schiller describes ‘naive’ writers as ‘realist’, ‘sentimental’ ones as ‘idealist’. In terms of literary genre, ‘naive’ poetry is simply that, naive, whereas ‘sentimental’ poetry is either satirical or elegaic (including, in this second category, the idyll).\textsuperscript{63}

Of Schiller’s famous treatise, nowadays more often referred to than actually read, William F. Mainland wrote that

in the midst of much apparently contrary effort and division, throughout his presentation of an actual discrepancy between poetic practice and the Ideal, ancients and moderns, spiritual values and the data of the senses, the musical and the plastic mode, the head and the heart, Schiller was engaged in that search for unison which, in spite of a professed antagonism for his art and teaching, was to fill the lives of a whole Romantic generation.\textsuperscript{64}

As the German critic Peter Szondi noted, this underlying unity emerges in Schiller’s argument that the ‘naive’ and the ‘sentimental’ are aspects of a fundamental unity, that the ‘naive’ is the ‘sentimental’;\textsuperscript{65} or, as Schiller wrote to Goethe in that famous letter of 23 August 1794, Goethe was a ‘naive’ poet who could remain one only by becoming ‘sentimental’:

Had you been born a Greek, nay, but an Italian, and had you from infancy been placed in the midst of choice natural surroundings, and of an idealizing art, your path would have been infinitely shortened, perhaps even have been rendered entirely superfluous. […] But being born a German, and your Grecian spirit having been cast in this northern mould, you had no other choice but, either to become a northern artist,
or, by the help of the power of thought, to supply your imagination with that which reality withheld from it, and thus, as it were, to produce a Greek from within by a reasoning process.

(CSG 1, 7)

In the wake of Schiller’s treatise, later conceptual pairs, such as the Apollonian and the Dionysian in Nietzsche’s *The Birth of Tragedy* (1872), or ‘abstraction’ and ‘empathy’ in the aesthetics of Wilhelm Worringer (1881–1965) – both discussed by Jung in detail in *Psychological Types* – were developed, which would have been unthinkable without Schiller’s master concepts.

Jung begins his discussion of the treatise by admitting that, previously, he had found a clear parallel between the typology of *On Naive and Sentimental Poetry* and his own. In fact, in his lecture ‘A Contribution to the Study of Psychological Types’, delivered at the Psychoanalytic Congress in Munich in September 1913, Jung had set up a parallel between the introverted and the naive, and the extraverted and the sentimental. Following Schiller’s definition that the naive poet ‘is’ nature, while the sentimental ‘seeks’ nature, Jung aligned the former with the introverted and the latter with the extraverted, on the basis that ‘the naive poet expresses primarily himself, while the sentimental poet is primarily influenced by the object’ (CW 6 §875). As reformulated by Jung, Schiller’s definitions of the naive and the sentimental – ‘a simple but beguiling formula’, Jung says – could be interpreted, he writes in *Psychological Types*, in terms of the subject–object relationship. To do so, however, reverses the order of identification, since ‘whoever seeks or desires nature as an object does not possess her, and such a person would be an introvert’; conversely, ‘whoever already is nature, and therefore stands in the most intimate relation with the object, would be an extravert’ (CW 6 §213).

Indeed, in a passage not actually cited by Jung, Schiller himself argues that, historically, the withdrawal of nature as (psychological) subject is accompanied, mutatis mutandis, by the emergence of (second) nature as (artistic) object: ‘Just as nature began gradually to vanish from human life as experience and as its (active and feeling) subjectivity, so we see it emerge in the world of the poet as an idea and as subject-matter’. Roland Marleyn writes that the ‘typological dichotomy’ of the naive and the sentimental is thus coupled by Schiller with the ‘historical dualism’ of the ancient and the modern, to the extent that he believes the fully typical poets and artists of ancient Greece to have been ‘naive’ and the majority of those of later periods to have been ‘sentimental’; although Schiller is, in fact, as becomes clear, talking about different modes of poetry.

But Jung finds both these alignments, whichever way round, of the introverted and the extraverted with the naive and the sentimental, too simplistic. Now, commenting on Schiller’s definitions of the naive poet as being nature and the sentimental poet as seeking nature, Jung rejects both
of them as ‘beguiling’ (verführerisch) and dismisses his earlier view as a ‘forced interpretation’ (CW 6 §213). Jung concludes that Schiller’s distinction between the naive and the sentimental applies not so much to the poet as to poetry; as he argues, ‘the same poet can be sentimental in one poem, naive in another’ (CW 6 §213), and Schiller himself says in a footnote that the naive and the sentimental can occur in the same work, pointing to the example of Goethe’s novel, The Sufferings of Young Werther.70 For Jung, Schiller’s distinction of the naive and the sentimental applies less to the problem of types and more to the question of typical mechanisms (CW 6 §214).

Beginning with the ‘naive’ attitude, Jung presents a series of quotations where Schiller discusses the relationship between the naive poet and nature (CW 6 §215).71 When Schiller writes that ‘the naive spirit namely allows nature to operate unchecked in it’,72 Jung interprets the relationship in terms of introjection or Lévy-Bruhl’s notion of participation mystique (CW 6 §216). In other words, the ‘naive’ attitude is conditioned by the object (CW 6 §216), and in a footnote Schiller had remarked on how ancient literature provided evidence for ‘the degree to which the naive poet is dependent on his subject-matter [wie sehr der naive Dichter von seinem Objekt anhänge] and how much, indeed how everything, depends on his perception [sein Empfinden]’.73 Or to put it another way, the ‘naive’ attitude is extraverted (CW 6 §216). Turning to the sentimental attitude, the sentimental poet is said by Schiller to stand in a specific, but different, relationship to nature;74 in this case, the reflective quality of the sentimental attitude serves to distance it from the object, and so, in a phrase cited by Jung, the poet seeks to ‘master his material’ (seinen Stoff beherrschen) (CW 6 §218).75 To put it another way, Jung regards the sentimental attitude as introverted (CW 6 §218).

Finally, Jung looks at the conclusion of On Naive and Sentimental Poetry where Schiller turns to another typological dichotomy he describes as ‘a very remarkable psychological antagonism among people in a century which is in the process of civilisation’ – namely, realism and idealism.76 This distinction arises out of the distinction between ‘naive’ and ‘sentimental’; Schiller arrives at these ‘types’, Jung points out, by means of (as Schiller puts it) ‘abstract-[ing] from the naive as well as from the sentimental character what is poetic in both’.77 As Schiller says, ‘then nothing remains over from the first’ – that is, the ‘naive’ – ‘but a sober spirit of observation with regard to the theoretical and a firm attachment to the uniform evidence of the senses and, with regard to the practical, a resigned submission to the necessity [..] of nature’, a resignation to ‘that which is and which must be’; such is the realist. Or as Jung says, ‘to the naive there remains the attachment to the object and its autonomy in the subject’. Equally, in the case of the ‘sentimental’ character, there remains, Schiller says, ‘nothing over except a restless spirit of speculation in theoretical things which urges on to the absolute in all perception, a moral rigorism in practical things which insists on the absolute in the actions of the will’; such is the ‘idealist’. Or as Jung says, ‘to the sentimental there remains
the superiority over the object’, expressed in an arbitrariness of judgement or treatment (CW 6 §221).78 This classification of realism and idealism, echoing Kant’s distinction between ‘sensuous philosophers’ (Epicurus) and ‘intellectual philosophers’ (Plato), between ‘empiricists’ (Aristotle) and ‘noologists’ (Plato), and anticipating Heine’s contrast between Plato and Aristotle placed at the beginning of Psychological Types, thus forms part of a traditional typological opposition; as Schiller himself says of the realist and the idealist, ‘this conflict is without doubt as old as the beginning of culture’.79 The idealist–realist dichotomy acquires the same significance for Jung as he ascribes to the introvert and the extravert, writing that, ‘with regard to the reciprocal relation’ of these two types, he could endorse ‘almost word for word’ what Schiller had said of the relation between his (CW 6 §221). But as well as reversing his typological analysis of the naive and the sentimental as far as introversion and extraversion is concerned, and realigning introversion and extraversion with idealism and realism, Jung set up a fresh parallel with yet a further pair of typological categories.

As we have seen, Jung has so far worked largely with two psychic functions, thinking and feeling. Now he introduces a further two, sensation (Empfindung) and intuition (Intuition). According to Jung, the naive is characterized by the psychological function of sensation; this function ‘creates ties to the object’, it ‘pulls the subject into the object’, with the resulting ‘danger’ for naive types of ‘completely vanishing into the object altogether’ (CW 6 §219). By contrast, the sentimental is characterized by intuition, a concept which has quite a precise meaning in Jung’s system. As ‘a perception of one’s own unconscious processes’, intuition draws the subject away from the object; it rises above the object, even using violence in its attempt, in Schiller’s phrase, ‘to master its material’, or ‘to shape it’, as Jung says, entirely ‘in accordance with the subjective viewpoint’. The danger here for the ‘sentimental’ type, as for the ‘idealistic’, is ‘a complete severance from reality’, of ‘completely vanishing into the fantasy streaming from the unconscious’, of – in Schiller’s terms – ‘visionary raving’ or Schwärmern. For his part, Schiller, very much in the Enlightenment tradition, specifically condemns ‘enthusiasm’ or Schwärmerei, and his treatise closes with a warning about the potentially destructive consequences of ‘deluded visionary raving’ or Phantasterei, which ‘leads to a never-ending fall into a bottomless pit’ and ends in ‘complete destruction’.80

Now the language of Jung’s formulation of these categories is clearly indebted to Schiller, even if Jung later claims to have generated them in response to the ideas of Nietzsche (CW 6 §240). In his chapter on the Apollonian and the Dionysian, Jung designates sensation and intuition as representatives of a standpoint opposed to logico-rational elaboration which, tellingly, he actually dubs the aesthetic. This viewpoint, he writes, ‘lingers in introversion with the perception [Anschauung] of ideas, it develops intuition
[Intuition], the inner vision [die innere Anschauung], whereas, in extraversion, ‘it tarries with sensation [Empfindung] and develops the senses [die Sinne], the instinct, the affectivity’. From the aesthetic standpoint, thinking is a ‘mere derivative’ of intuition or ‘inner perception’ (innere Anschauung), just as feeling derives from ‘sensory sensation’ (Sinnesempfindung) (CW 6 §239).

On the surface, aesthetic is used by Jung here in a sense which is closer to that of Kant’s first Critique than that of Baumgarten or Schiller. Yet what Jung terms ‘inner perception’ (innere Anschauung) is, on closer inspection, not far removed from ‘aesthetic perception’. For instance, the aesthetic functions provide the basis for a mediation between reason and feeling, to which a secondary significance is attributed. Thus conceived, the aesthetic standpoint would provide Jung with a set of psychological functions for uniting the opposites of the mind and the body, reason and the senses, associated with the logico-rational functions of thought and feeling.

On the Naive and Sentimental in Poetry defines beauty, as did the Aesthetic Letters, as ‘the product of the harmony between spirit and senses’ (das Produkt der Zusammenstimmung zwischen dem Geist und den Sinnen).81 That aesthetic unity is referred to elsewhere in the essay as ‘a common but higher category’, or the poetic ideal.82 As Schiller himself allows, both the ‘naive’ and the ‘sentimental’ have a poetic quality (Poetisches),83 yet neither in itself can attain this ideal, can ‘quite exhaust the ideal of noble humanity [das Ideal schöner Menschlichkeit], which can only emerge from the close combination of both’.84 As ‘the fusion of the naive and the sentimental’,85 the poetic ideal represents the totality which is the goal of Schillerian aesthetics, for ‘the poetic mood [die poetische Stimmung] is an independent whole [ein selbständiges Ganze], in which all differences and all deficiencies vanish’.86 Thus, in contrast to the conventional triadic pattern in the Aesthetic Letters of (1) the physical; (2) the moral; (3) the aesthetic, in which, to pass from (1) to (2), we need to go via (3), namely:

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On Naive and Sentimental Poetry we find in operation the following threefold structure of (1) nature; (2) art; (3) the ideal, in which art returns to (second) nature,87 namely:
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[Diagram of triangle with labeled vertices: the aesthetic, the physical, the moral]
As Schiller writes, ‘nature makes the poet one with himself, art separates and divides him, through the ideal he returns to that unity’. We might recall here Goethe’s maxim that ‘art’ is ‘a second nature, also mysterious, but more intelligible; for it arises from the understanding.’

At the beginning of *On Naive and Sentimental Poetry*, Schiller spoke of such natural objects as a modest flower, a spring, a mossy stone, the twittering of the birds, and the buzzing of the bees as representing ‘the calm, creative life, the quiet functioning from within themselves, the existence according to their own laws, the inner necessity, the eternal unity with themselves’. The reason why such objects are so pleasing to us, why we love them, even, is because ‘they are what we were; they are what we should become again’, because ‘we were natural like them, and our culture should lead us back to nature along the path of reason and freedom’.

Much later on, in his discussion of the concept of the idyll, Schiller describes ‘the ideal of beauty applied to real life’ in terms of ‘a conflict completely resolved in the individual human being and in society, of a free union of the inclinations with the law, of a nature purified to the highest moral dignity’. So for Schiller, as for Jung, there remains a nature to which, via art – via the aesthetic – via the symbol, one can ‘return’. Here, then, we find nature being used in a way similar to its deployment by the Frankfurt School theoreticians, T.W. Adorno (1903–69) and Max Horkheimer (1895–1973), when, in *Dialectic of Enlightenment* (1944), they speak of the ‘remembrance of nature in the subject’ (*Eingedenken der Natur im Subjekt*) as the central point at which the Enlightenment is opposed to tyranny. ‘By virtue of this remembrance of nature in the subject’, they write, ‘in whose fulfilment the unacknowledged truth of all culture lies hidden, enlightenment is universally opposed to domination’. In his *Theory of Communicative Action* (1981), the second-generation Frankfurt School philosopher Jürgen Habermas (b.1929) focuses on this key phrase: as part of his critique of Adorno’s and Horkheimer’s critique of instrumental reason, Habermas accuses his colleagues of ‘follow[ing] the (largely effaced) path that leads back to the origins of instrumental reason, so as to outdo the concept of objective reason’; thus their theory of mimesis, Habermas argues, leads them to
speak about it ‘only as they would about a piece of uncomprehended nature’. Although these remarks echo Freud’s comment in Civilization and its Discontents (1930) about ‘a piece of unconquerable nature’ (ein Stück der unbesiegbaren Natur) forming ‘a part of our own psychical constitution’ (SE 21, 86), the phrase is originally found in Jung. As Tilman Evers has convincingly demonstrated, there is an important intersection here between critical theory and Jungian thought.95

Some indication of what the final state of the Jungian ‘individuation process’ (Individuationsprozeß) might be like is provided in the conclusion to Memories, Dreams, Reflections, where a sense of kinship with nature is said to have revealed to Jung an unexpected unfamiliarity with himself. ‘There is so much that fills me’, we read here, ‘plants, animals, clouds, day and night’ (perhaps also a flower, a spring, a mossy stone, twittering birds, buzzing bees?), ‘and the eternal in humanity’ (what we were, and what we should become again?). ‘The more uncertain I felt about myself’, the passage continues, ‘the more there grew up a feeling of kinship with all things’; so much so, in fact, that ‘it seems to me as if that alienation which so long separated me from the world has become transferred into my own inner world, and has revealed to me an unexpected unfamiliarity with myself’ (MDR, 392). Has Jung been led by culture back to nature along the path of reason and freedom that Schiller describes? Moreover, what Schiller calls ‘the poetic ideal’, ‘an independent whole, in which all differences and all deficiencies vanish’, corresponds closely to how Jung, in ‘The Development of Personality’, describes the psychological ideal of ‘the personality’ – ‘the complete realization of our whole being’ (eine völlige Verwirklichung der Ganzheit unseres Wesens), and, as such, ‘an unattainable ideal’ (ein unerreichbares Ideal) (CW 17 §291). But because Schiller believed that we would be ill advised to take ‘the path towards the ideal’ in order to save ourselves ‘the way to the real’ (Letter 27 §1), he would not have disagreed with Jung’s assessment that unattainability is no argument against the ideal, for ideals are, in this sense, only the signposts, never the goal.
Conclusion
The development of the personality

In this volume I have offered a survey and an analysis of Jung’s evolving reaction and response to Weimar classicism in the form of his early reception of Goethe and Schiller. We have come a long way from Jung’s early and deep-seated fascination with Faust in his parents’ house in Klein-Hüningen, and his methodological concerns centring on the concept of synthesis, and examined his complex and fascinating coming-to-terms in Psychological Types with Schiller’s two treatises, On the Aesthetic Education of Humankind in a Series of Letters and On Naive and Sentimental Poetry. Yet there is still a long way to go: we have yet to discuss the affinities between analytical psychology and Goethean morphology, and Jung’s ‘alchemical’ reading of Faust. These areas will form the basis of volume 2, The Constellation of the Self.

Before concluding this volume, however, I wish to highlight one aspect of Jung’s theory of the personality, upon which we have already touched in Chapter 4. In his comments on the persona as the social mask and in the distinction between the persona and the personality especially we can see the social dimension of Jung’s thought: a dimension that is frequently overlooked or misunderstood. Arguing in a tradition derived from Rousseau, Schiller, and Marx, Jung develops in The Relations between the Ego and the Unconscious (1928) a theory of the psyche and its relation to the world of labour that foregrounds the notion of alienation. In the world of social relations, Jung claims, the outward relationship of the individual to the world around him or her is, far from being an expression of individuality, in fact imposed upon the individual by the class and labour relations of society. Jung dubs this merely social role, ‘this segment of the collective psyche, often created with much effort’, the ‘persona’ (CW 7 §245). As Jung was aware, the word derives from the Latin persona, meaning a mask worn by an actor; many other thinkers, including Ludwig Klages, have noted this etymology. That this social mask is obvious does not hinder its effectiveness: the Latin phrase, larvatus prodeo, ‘I advance wearing my mask’, was used by Descartes to suggest his activity as a philosopher, and was later used by the structuralist critic Roland Barthes to describe the conventions of representation in literature. Other later writers, including Nietzsche and Oscar Wilde, have explored

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Chapter 5
further the problem and the necessity of the mask in writing, as in (social) being. And the sociologist Erving Goffman (1922–82) likewise made use of the idea of the mask in his famous discussion of the presentation of the self in everyday life (or what is nowadays called ‘impression management’). Although there is always the risk of erroneously taking the persona to be ‘something “individual”’, it is, Jung insists, ‘only a mask of the collective psyche, a mask that feigns individuality’ (CW 7 §245). Thus the persona, the social ‘mask’, is nothing ‘real’ (nichts “Wirkliches”), but something ‘apparent’; it is ‘a compromise between individual and society about “what someone should appear to be” [das, “als was Einer erscheint”]’ (CW 7 §246). Although, on one level, persona is simply appearance, it is, on another level, nonetheless ‘real’ for that: it is ‘a semblance, a two-dimensional reality’ (ein Schein, eine zweidimensionale Wirklichkeit) (CW 7 §246). For ‘to present an unequivocal face to the world’ is, Jung claims, ‘a matter of practical importance’ (CW 7 §305).

Jung’s doctrine of the persona has two important corollaries. On the one hand, he emphasizes how important it is to be aware of the persona precisely as appearance, and not to identify with it (CW 7 §310). As Jung put it, the professor runs the risk of overidentifying with the textbook, the tenor overidentifies with his voice, and so on, just as Sartre advances a critique of inauthentic behaviour in his chapter on ‘bad faith’ in Being and Nothingness (1943). ‘Let us consider this waiter in the café’ in Sartre’s example:

His movement is quick and forward, a little too precise, a little too rapid. He comes toward the patrons with a step a little too quick. He bends forward a little too eagerly; his voice, his eyes express an interest a little too solicitous for the order of the customer. [. . .] He is playing at being a waiter in the café.

To identify completely with this semblance of personality means we cannot live or hope to grow into a true ‘self’. On the other hand, Jung suggests that, without the persona, we must abandon all hope of ever becoming the ‘self’. Elizabeth M. Wilkinson and L.A. Willoughby have drawn attention to Schiller’s remarks about the importance of social conduct (Schönheit des Umgangs) in Letters 26 and 27 of On the Aesthetic Education of Humankind (1795), as well as in his letter (one of his Kallias-Briefe) to Körner of 23 February 1793. Their argument for the importance of the aesthetics of social conduct helps foreground the role of appearance in Jungian psychology.

In this respect Jung’s theory is remarkably sophisticated. The persona represents the intersection between the individual and the collective at the point where the collective risks overwhelming the individual. At the point where we overidentify with the persona – with our social mask, with the face we wear for society – the collective triumphs over the individual. As Lucy Huskinson has argued, in its relation to the ego the self (das Selbst) appears
as the Other, sometimes even as a ‘violent Other’. This sense of ‘otherness’ that belongs to the self comes to the fore in Jung’s later writings: in *The Psychology of the Transference* (1946) (CW 16 §454), for example, or in *Mysterium coniunctionis* (1955–6), where he advises, in the course of discussing the therapeutic technique of ‘active imagination’, that the analysand should turn the inner drama experienced in the course of analysis into ‘a coming-to-terms with the Other in us’ (eine wirkliche Auseinandersetzung mit seinem eigenen Gegenüber, or die Auseinandersetzung mit dem anderen in uns) (CW 14/ii §706). In Jungian terms, this encounter with the Other is a vital one. But the risk we run when we overidentify with the persona is subtly different: rather than the self which is our own Other, the persona is the self given to us by the others. Or as Jung put it in ‘Concerning Rebirth’ (1940/1950), ‘the persona is that which in reality one is not, but which oneself as well as others think one is’ (CW 9/i §221).

Yet we need this mask. (Imagine what would happen if we spent just one day telling people what we really think . . .) The mask of the persona – the professional mask of the professor, the tenor, the cobbler, the poet, etc., or the ‘lifestyle’ mask of the wife, the husband, etc. – allows us to negotiate our way in society; it is a form of ‘adaptation to external reality’ (CW 7 §252), ‘a complicated system of relations between individual consciousness and society’ (CW 7 §305). The danger of the *persona* consists in its liability to distract us from ‘the inner adaptation to the collective unconscious’ (CW 7 §252). The demands of the (social) collective can take us away from the call of the collective (unconscious). ‘In order to discover what is authentically individual in ourselves’, says Jung, ‘profound reflection is needed’; and ‘suddenly we realize how uncommonly difficult the discovery of individuality in fact is’ (CW 7 §242).

For, in the *personality*, there is a further intersection between the individual and the collective, only on a higher level. Here the individual triumphs, for he or she participates in that archetypal totality which he or she – potentially – (always) already is. According to Jung, it is the purpose of analysis to negotiate this relation between, on the one hand, the personal or the individual and, on the other, the collective (both in the social/political and in the archetypal sense). ‘Through the analysis of the personal unconscious’, he writes, ‘the conscious mind becomes suffused with collective material which brings with it the elements of individuality’ (CW 7 §247). In the concluding letter in his *Letters on the Aesthetic Education*, Schiller envisages a ‘state of aesthetic semblance’ (*Staat des schönen Scheins*) in which ‘conduct is governed, not by some soulless imitation of the manners and morals of others, but by the aesthetic nature we have made our own’ (Letter 27 §12). The confidence underlying such conduct may be gained in Jungian terms, not by abandoning the social mask (persona), but by attending to those other parts of ourselves excluded from a repressive society, and integrated into a mode of being by which we may – again, in Schillerian language – ‘make our
way, with undismayed simplicity and tranquil innocence, through even the most involved and complex situations’ (Letter 27 §12). When we have begun to liberate ourselves alike from ‘the compulsion to infringe the freedom of others in order to assert our own’ and ‘the necessity to shed our dignity [Würde] in order to manifest grace [Anmut]’ (Letter 27 §12), we have taken the first steps along the path of ‘the development of personality’ of which Jung speaks in his lecture to the Kulturbund in Vienna in 1932.

Joy of earthlings is perfected
In the personality.

Höchstes Glück der Erdenkinder
Sei nur die Persönlichkeit

– his was how Jung began that lecture, citing the same poem from Goethe’s Westöstlicher Divan (1819) that, as it happens, Freud had cited some years earlier in the twenty-sixth of his Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis (1917), on the topic of libido theory and narcissism (SE 16, 418).

In Freud’s lecture the poem serves as some ‘refreshment’ after the ‘essentially dry imagery of science’ as a ‘poetic representation’ of what Freud calls the ‘economic’ (in the sense of quantitative) contrast between narcissism (as defined in his famous paper of 1914) and true being-in-love. Like Jung, Freud does not cite the entire poem, but he cites more of it (five of the six stanzas, rather than just the first two lines). He uses the dialectic of the poem – the opening statement by Suleika and the subsequent development of its theme of personality, followed by the response of her lover, the poet Hatem – to depict the difference between, as Freud sees it, egoistic self-absorption and mature erotic engagement with the Other. Yet Freud’s use is purely illustrative, and he says no more about the poem. Jung’s use is more evocative, and his purpose in citing it is more implicit. Did Jung know the passage in the historical part of Goethe’s Doctrine of Colour (Zur Farbenlehre) (1810), in the section entitled ‘Newton’s Personality’, where Goethe declared the desire of ‘every being that feels itself to be a unity’ to ‘preserve itself unseparated and undisturbed in its own condition’ to be ‘an eternal and necessary gift of nature’? It is difficult to tell, but Jung’s paper ‘The Inner Voice’ (Die Stimme des Innern), later published as ‘The Development of Personality’ (Das Werden der Persönlichkeit), acts as a commentary on Goethe’s concept of character (Charakter) ‘in a higher sense’ as set out in this section of the Farbenlehre (and as evoked by Suleika in the opening two lines cited), namely, ‘when a personality of significant qualities persists in its own way and does not allow itself to become estranged’.

The concept of the personality does not stand in opposition to Jung’s notion of the self, but it does delineate a particular contour of Jung’s thinking. In the same paper, The Relations between the Ego and the Unconscious, where Jung elaborates his theory of the persona, he also speaks of the self. In Memories, Dreams, Reflections the ambition is ascribed to Jung ‘to penetrate into the secret of the personality’ (in das Geheimnis der...
Persönlichkeit einzudringen). We shall discuss the philosophical implications of Jung’s concept of the self in further detail in volume 2. His conception of the self implies a more interior notion of ‘self’-discovery, which does not withdraw from the social, but transcends it on a cultural plane. The construction of the self, it turns out, is nothing less than a cultural task. In ‘On the Nature of the Psyche’ (1946/1954) Jung writes that the ‘self’ is ‘as much the Other or the Others [der oder die anderen] as the ego [das Ich]’ (CW 8 §433). And in the definition of ‘individuation’ – the concept with which we will close this chapter and this volume – given in that work, Jung makes the famous remark Individuation schließt die Welt nicht aus, sondern ein, inaccurately but wonderfully translated by R.F.C. Hull as ‘individuation does not shut one out from the world, but gathers the world to oneself’ (CW 8 §433).

**Individuation**

For Schiller, the whole question of beauty is ‘the thread which will guide us through the whole labyrinth of aesthetics’ (Letter 18 §3), just as, according to Jung’s preface of 1950 to the heavily revised version of *Transformations and Symbols of the Libido*, now entitled *Symbols of Transformation*, the fantasies of Théodore Flournoy’s patient, Miss Frank (sic) Miller, provided the thread (albeit a somewhat tangled one!) through the elaborate labyrinth of symbolic parallels between pathological case-study and universal myth (CW 5, p. xxv).

Yet, as I have argued in this volume, particularly in Chapters 3 and 4, Weimar classicism in general and Schiller’s treatise *On the Aesthetic Education of Humankind* in particular can also provide an aesthetic thread through the often labyrinthine thought of both *Psychological Types* and, more broadly, analytical psychology as a whole.

In *Psychological Types*, Jung draws attention to the opposition between the functions of introversion and extraversion – or, in the case of Schiller, the two mechanisms of sensation and thinking – and describes it as ‘unbridgeable’, quoting Schiller’s lines in Letter 18 that ‘the distance between matter and form, passivity and activity, feeling and thought, is infinite, and there exists nothing that can conceivably mediate between them’ (Letter 18 §2). Yet it is precisely Schiller’s point in Letter 18 that, in fact, beauty alone can mediate between these ‘two conditions which are diametrically opposed’, since ‘beauty unites these two opposed conditions and thus destroys the opposition’ (Letter 18 §4). For Schiller, the reconciling activity is the aesthetic mode of the psyche, and hence the medium of reconciliation is beauty. Only by reconciling the rational and the sensuous – or, so to speak, the Angel and the Beast – can humankind become truly human, and thus be free, for ‘freedom lies only in the co-operation of both our natures’ (Letter 17 §4). For Schiller, reciprocal coordination of sense and reason is a key-stone of the aesthetic character (Letter 13 §2, fn. 1), and the
reciprocal relation between the formal drive and the sensuous drive, which finds expression in the ludic drive, constitutes the idea of human nature (Letter 14 §2). Thus the Aesthetic Letters develop the view of the unity which, in Schiller’s earlier review of Bürger’s Poems (1789), the aesthetic was said to bring:

In the isolation and separated effectiveness of our mental powers, which the extended circle of our knowledge and the division of labour make necessary, it is almost only poetry that can bring the separated powers of the soul into unity; that can unite the head and the heart, insight and wit, reason and imagination into a harmonious union, and that can re-establish in us the whole individual [den ganzen Menschen].

This, a Jungian goal of wholeness and totality, is well expressed in the title of a collection of Jung’s essays in English called The Integration of the Personality. Wholeness and totality are the result of what Jung termed the ‘individuation process’ (Individuationsprozeß), ‘the process which produces a psychological “individual”, that is, a separate, indivisible unity, a “whole” [ein Ganzes]’ (CW 9/i §490). The goal of the individuation process is the totality which Jung designated ‘the self’ (das Selbst).

The concept of the self, the archetype of order and psychic totality, was first mentioned by Jung in ‘La Structure de l’inconscient’ (1916); and, in Psychological Types, Jung distinguished between the ego and the self, defining the former as ‘the subject of my consciousness’ and the latter as ‘the subject of my total psyche, including the unconscious’ (CW 6 §706). Or in other words, ‘the really fundamental subject, the self, is far more comprehensive than the ego’ (CW 6 §623). In his Seminar on Analytical Psychology, held in English in 1925, Jung declared the self to be ‘the totality or sum of the conscious and unconscious processes’, a ‘centre of self-regulation’ that is ‘a postulate that is assumed’. And in The Relations between the Ego and the Unconscious, Jung defined the archetype of the self as ‘a quantity that is superordinate to the conscious ego’, adding that it ‘embraces not only the conscious but also the unconscious psyche, and is therefore, so to speak, a personality which we also are’ (CW 7 §274). Consistent with this position, in his lecture on ‘The Development of Personality’ Jung defined ‘personality’ (Persönlichkeit) as ‘a specific psychic whole that is capable of resistance and abounding in energy’ (eine bestimmte, widerstandsfähige und kraftbegabte seelische Ganzheit) (CW 17 §286).

In Kantian philosophy, the human individual is seen as the citizen of two realms – the phenomenal and the noumenal – and our conduct in the former is to be determined by our membership of the latter. Opposing Kant’s underlying dualism, Schiller argues in ‘On Grace and Dignity’ that beauty also belongs to two realms, ‘the citizen of two worlds, to one of which it belongs by right of birth, to the other by adoption; it receives existence in sensuous
nature and, in the rational world, attains citizenship’. So what unites these two realms of the senses and of reason is, according to Schiller, aesthetic judgement: ‘taste steps in between the mind and sensuousness and unites both these mutually antagonistic natures into a happy concord’.19

As human individuals, our purpose as members of two realms finds its highest expression in love, which, for Schiller, is closely united with the aesthetic. Only by means of beauty, Schiller argues in the Aesthetic Letters, can lust become love, such that ‘the crude character imposed by physical need upon sexual love’ becomes ‘obliterated’ by morality and ‘ennobled’ by beauty (durch Sittlichkeit auslöscht und durch Schönheit veredelt) (Letter 3 §2). Just as Juno Ludovisi, that great eighteenth-century cultural icon of the aesthetic, demands ‘our veneration’, so the god-like woman, says Schiller, kindles ‘our love’ (Letter 15 §9). For Schiller, the appreciation of the beauty of the beloved represents a high moment – perhaps the highest – of aesthetic achievement:

Now a compulsion of a lovelier kind binds the sexes together, and a communion of hearts helps sustain a connexion but intermittently established by the fickle caprice of desire. [. . .] Desire widens, and is exalted into love, once humanity has dawned in its object. [. . .] The need to please subjects the all-conquering male to the gentle tribunal of taste; lust he can steal, but love must come as a gift.

(Letter 27 §7)

The same idea is expressed, if (and characteristically) more forcefully, by Nietzsche, who describes lust as the great simulacrum-happiness for higher happiness and highest hope – ‘sensual pleasure: the great symbolic happiness of a higher happiness and highest hope’, thus speaks Zarathustra.20

In another sense – although, given the history that was to develop in psychoanalysis of ‘boundary issues’, not an entirely different sense – Freud told Jung in his letter of 6 December 1906 that, in psychoanalysis, we find ‘the cure is effected by love’ (eine Heilung durch Liebe). 21 Three years later, in his letter to Jung of 9 March 1909, and in response to rumours of scandal, Freud wrote that ‘the perils of our trade, which we are certainly not going to abandon on their account’ were ‘to be slandered and scorched by the love with which we operate’.22 (Jung’s affair with Sabina Spielrein would prove Freud’s point.)23

In Transformations and Symbols of the Libido, Jung links existential fulfilment to libidinal distribution when he says that ‘this world is empty to those who do not understand how to direct their libido towards objects, and to render them alive and beautiful [lebendig und schön] for themselves’. Even though it lacks the subtlety of Schiller’s discussion of beauty in the Kallias-Briefe, Jung’s definition of beauty is entirely compatible with Schiller’s ‘sensuous-objective’ account when Jung writes that ‘beauty does not indeed lie in things, but in the feeling that we give to them’ (Die Schönheit liegt ja
nicht in den Dingen, sondern im Gefühl, das wir den Dingen geben) (PU §284).
Furthermore, on Jung’s account, sexual passion can be transmuted into an esoteric, as well as an erotic, experience. As he demonstrated at length in The Psychology of the Transference (1946), sexual congress, the imagery of which lies at the centre of alchemical symbolism, can represent a psychological union. The nuptiae chymicae, the royal marriage, holds such an important place in alchemy as ‘a symbol of the supreme and ultimate union’, since ‘it represents the magical-analogy which is supposed to bring the work to its final consummation and bind the opposites by love, for “love is stronger than death” ’ (CW 16 §398).

Analogously, although not so magically, in one of his elegaic distichs Schiller used the image of the loving couple to symbolize the relationship between the poet and language, urging the reader ‘let language be to you what the body is to the lovers’ (Laß die Sprache dir seyn, was der Körper den Liebenden).24 And in ‘On Grace and Dignity’, Schiller described love as ‘the absolute greatness, what is imitated in grace and beauty and finds satisfaction in ethical behaviour, it is the law-giver, the god within us [der Gott in uns], who plays with his own image in the sensory world’.25 Using exactly the same phrase, ‘the inner god’, Jung came to imbue what is, in Schiller, a secularized, psychological concept with an apparently religious overtone when, in The Relations between the Ego and the Unconscious, he wrote of the self that

this ‘something’ is strange to us and yet so near, wholly ourselves and yet unknowable, a virtual centre of so mysterious a constitution that it can claim anything – kinship with beasts and gods, with crystals and with stars – without moving us to wonder, without even exciting our disapprobation.

If, in intellectual terms, the self is ‘no more than a psychological concept’, it is nevertheless a construct ‘that serves to express an unknowable essence which we cannot grasp as such, since by definition it transcends our powers of comprehension’. We could even call it, Jung suggested, ‘the god within us’ (“der Gott in uns”) (CW 7 §398–§399).

Yet what is often read as a move towards the religious and the mystical in Jung might also, and perhaps more plausibly, be interpreted along aesthetic lines. As Schiller wrote in his distichon ‘To the Mystics’:

The real mystery is that which lies before the sight
Of all – which all around them feel – yet none e’er brought to light.

Das ist eben das wahre Geheimnis, das allen vor Augen
Liegt, euch ewig umgibt, aber von keinem gesehn.26

As discussed in Chapter 4, the concept of ‘semblance’ (Schein) is central, not
just to Schiller but to Jung as well. ‘The whole point of “Schein”’, in the words of Elizabeth M. Wilkinson, is that its illusory forms can serve as symbols’. But as symbols of what? ‘Symbols of human feeling’; and the ‘high function’ of semblance is ‘to articulate the logic of the life within us, which is continuously felt, but only darkly apprehended’. In their introduction to their edition of the Aesthetic Letters, Wilkinson and Willoughby drew a link between Schiller’s concept of ‘semblance’ and Jung’s doctrine of ‘the persona’, that is, the notion that there is a semblance of personality without which we cannot become a true ‘self’, yet with which it is disastrous to identify. But the significance of ‘semblance’ for the aesthetics of Weimar classicism and for analytical psychology is much larger than even this comparison might suggest. More important still is the way that Schiller’s concept of aesthetic ‘semblance’ embraces reason and instinct, just as Jung’s use of the term ‘psychoid’ does. In the Aesthetic Letters, Schiller writes of ‘the realm of aesthetic semblance’ (das Reich des schönen Scheins) that it ‘stretches upwards to the point where reason governs with unconditioned necessity, and all that is mere matter ceases to be’ and ‘stretches downwards to the point where natural impulse reigns with blind compulsion, and form has not yet begun to appear’ (Letter 27 §11). Correspondingly, in ‘On the Nature of the Psyche’, Jung declares ‘just as, in its lower reaches, the psyche [die Seele] loses itself in the organic-material substrate, so, in its upper reaches, it turns into a so-called spiritual form’ (CW 8 §380).

In Wilhelm Meister’s Apprenticeship (1794–5), the androgynous and mysterious Mignon sings a haunting poem with the line, ‘So let me seem till I become’ (So laßt mich scheinen, bis ich werde) (GE 9, 316). This emphasis on becoming through appearing is central to Jung’s notion of the ‘individuation process’. And his fullest definition of the self did not emerge until after he had completed Psychological Types when, in The Relations between the Ego and the Unconscious, he did not just describe it in terms of the individuation process, but defined that process itself in terms of becoming. Individuation, he wrote, means ‘becoming a single, homogeneous being, and, insofar as by “individuality” we understand our innermost, last, and incomparable uniqueness, it means becoming one’s self [zum eigenen Selbst werden]’. Therefore, he suggested, one could translate individuation as ‘a “coming to selfhood”’ (“Verselbstung”) or as ‘a “self-realization”’ (“Selbstverwirklichung”) (CW 7 §266). And so, too, the self is ‘the goal of life’, for it is ‘the most complete expression of the fateful combination called individuality’ (CW 7 §404). In terms of a social dimension, Jung adds that this individuality also means the most complete expression of the group, ‘in which each person complements the other to create an entire picture’ (CW 7 §404).

Jung’s language here carries a clear echo of Goethe’s use, in Part Two, Book 8 of Dichtung und Wahrheit, of the terms entselbstigen and verselbstten. In this complex passage, Goethe examines the idea of redemption in terms of the idea that ‘the deity itself should assume the form of a man’ and ‘share
man’s destiny for a while’, and ‘by means of this similitude enhance his joys and soothe his sorrows’. (Is this why Schiller, in his letter to Goethe of 17 August 1795, suggested that Christianity is ‘the only aesthetic religion’?)

The history of religion and philosophy shows, Goethe suggests, how ‘this great truth, indispensable to human beings’, has been ‘passed down by various nations at various times in manifold ways’, just as Jung, in *Transformations and Symbols of the Libido*, sought to uncover the great psychological truths in the religious myths underlying the fantasies of Miss Miller. For us, Goethe, concludes, it is enough to recognize the following, that

> our condition, even though seeming to drag us down and oppress us, is such that we are still left with the opportunity, nay, the duty of raising ourselves up and fulfilling the plans of the deity. This is what we do when, while compelled on the one hand to concentrate into ourselves [verselbst], we do not neglect, on the other hand, to expand, in regular pulsations, away from ourselves [entselbstigen].

*(GE 4, 263)*

Or to borrow from the subtitle of Nietzsche’s *Ecco Homo*, the individuation process is about ‘how one becomes what one is’ (*wie man wird, was man ist*), it involves the process of ‘self-cultivation’, of ‘becoming master of the chaos that one is, compelling one’s chaos to become form’.29 When Nietzsche invokes the idea of ‘turning out well’ and notes that ‘the human being who has turned out well does our senses good’, using the image of someone who is ‘carved out of wood at once hard, delicate and sweet-smelling’,30 he is echoing an ancient philosophical topos, stretching at least as far back as the neo-Platonic philosopher, Plotinus:

> Withdraw into yourself and look. And if you do not find yourself beautiful yet, act as does the creator of a statue that is to be made beautiful; he cuts away here, he smoothes there, he makes this line lighter, this other purer, until a lovely face has grown upon his work. So do you also: cut away all that is excessive, straighten all that is crooked, bring light to all that is overcast, labour to make all one glow of beauty and never cease chiselling your statue, until there shall shine out on you from it the godlike splendour of virtue.31

Thus the individuation process is nothing other than ‘the development’ – or ‘becoming’ (*Werden*) – of the personality, of which Jung writes in his lecture on this topic that it constitutes ‘the act of the highest courage to face life, of absolute affirmation of being an individual, and the most successful adaptation to the universal conditions of existence coupled with the greatest possible freedom of self-determination’ (*CW 17* §289). In this lecture, Jung compares the development of personality to a process of organic growth:
during the course of our life, our personality develops ‘from germ-seeds that are hard or impossible to discern’, and only ‘through the deed’ is it revealed ‘who we are’ (CW 17 §290). So, according to Jung, the development of personality is a task whose difficulty had been suspected, even if not fully realized, by Schiller. The parallels between the Jungian conception of ‘a dangerous task indeed’ (eine gefährliche Aufgabe fürwahr) (CW 17 §289) and Schiller’s notion of ‘a task for more than one century’ (eine Aufgabe für mehr als ein Jahrhundert) – a phrase used to describe the project of aesthetic education (Letter 7 §3), for which the Enlightenment motto, ‘dare to be wise!’ (sapere aude) – is fully appropriate, are numerous and substantial. As well as emphasizing the difficulty of this task, Jung and Schiller alike insist on its necessity. For, in the final words of Goethe’s poem from the West-östlicher Divan, whose opening lines were cited by Jung at the beginning of his lecture in 1932,

Every life is worth the choosing
If oneself one does not miss;
Everything is there for losing
If one stays just as one is.

Jedes Leben sei zu führen,
Wenn man sich nicht selbst vermißt;
Alles könne man verlieren,
Wenn man bliebe, was man ist.32
Preface and acknowledgements

1 There is an unending amount in our power, we have not recognized our assets – these assets are time. A conscientious, careful use of this can make astonishingly much out of us. And how lovely, how calming is the thought of being able ourselves, simply through the proper use of time, which is our property, to acquire for ourselves, and without the help of others, without being dependent on external things, all the goods of life. [...] [Heaven] gave us time, and we have everything, as long as we have understanding and an earnest will, to make profit from this capital.

(Schiller, Werke [NA], vol. 24, p. 141)


Introduction


5 Compare with Patrick Harpur’s observation that, ‘true to their shape-changing nature’, the daimons ‘continue to appear in our culture, but in a form so far removed from their traditional personified shape that we do not immediately recognize them’ (The Philosophers’ Secret Fire: A History of the Imagination, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 2002, p. 7).

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13 In the context of his discussion of the faculty of ‘intuitive judgement’, Goethe wrote:

Impelled from the start by an inner need, I had striven unconsciously and incessantly toward primal image and prototype, and had even succeeded in building up a method of representing it which conformed to nature. Thus there was nothing further to prevent me from boldly embarking on this ‘adventure of reason’ (as the Sage of Königsberg himself called it).

(GE 12, pp. 31–2)

(The reference here is to Kant’s Critique of Judgement (1790), §80.) For further discussion, see E. Cassirer, Rousseau, Kant, Goethe, tr. J. Gutmann, P.O. Kristeller and J.H. Randall, Jr., New York: Harper & Row, 1945, pp. 71–2.

14 I had not failed to learn from Kant’s natural science that the powers of attraction and repulsion belong to the essence of matter and cannot be separated from each other in our concept of matter; from this I derived my conception of the fundamental polarity of all things, a polarity which permeates and animates the infinite multiplicity of phenomena.

(J.W. von Goethe, From Life: Poetry and Truth (GE 5, p. 711))


16 W. McGuire and R.F.C. Hull (eds), C.G. Jung Speaking: Interviews and
Encounters, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1977, p. 256; and A. Storr, 

17 F. Nietzsche, Sämtliche Briefe: Kritische Studienausgabe, ed. G. Colli and 
M. Montinari, 8 vols, Berlin: Walter de Gruyter and Munich: Deutscher 
18 Beyond Good and Evil, §6, in F. Nietzsche, Basic Writings of Nietzsche, ed. and tr. 
20 ‘Umrisse eines neuen Schillerbildes’ (1936), in W. Deubel, Im Kampf um die Seele: 
21 R. Barthes, ‘The Death of the Author’ (1968), in Image, Music, Text, ed. and tr. 
an Author?’ (1969), in P. Rabinow (ed.), The Foucault Reader, Harmondsworth: 
22 M. Onfray, ‘Physiologie de la philosophie: Ecrire, puis lire selon Nietzsche’, in 
(p. 448). See M. Onfray, Contre-histoire de la philosophie, vol. 1, Les Sagesesses 
antiques, Paris: Grasset, 2006; and vol. 2, Le Christianisme hédoniste, Paris: 
24 For further discussion, see E.M. Wilkinson and L.A. Willoughby, ‘“Wandrers 
Sturmlied”: A Study in Poetic Vagrancy’, in Goethe: Poet and Thinker, London: 
Edward Arnold, 1962, pp. 35–54.
25 L.A. Willoughby, ‘“Wine that maketh glad . . .”: The Interplay of Reality and 
Symbol in Goethe’s Life and Work’, Publications of the English Goethe Society 47, 
1977, 68–133.
26 Schiller, Werke [NA], vol. 1, pp. 169–72; The Minor Poems of Schiller, tr. J.H. 
Merivale, London: William Pickering, 1844, pp. 4–7. For further discussion of 
this text, see C.P. Magill, ‘Schiller’s “An die Freude”’, in S.S. Prawer, R. Hinton 
Thomas and L. Forster (eds), Essays in German Language, Culture and Society, 
and R.H. Stephenson, [Entry on] ‘Ode to Joy (An die Freude)’, in L. Henderson 
and S.M. Hall (eds), Reference Guide to World Literature, 2nd edn, 2 vols, New 
27 A. Oeri, ‘Some Youthful Memories’, in W. McGuire and R.F.C. Hull (eds), 
(p. 7).
29 For a discussion of the intellectual significance of Eranos, see S.M. Wasserstrom, 
Religion after Religion: Gershom Scholem, Mircea Eliade, and Henry Courbin at 
xi; cited in Brome, Jung, p. 214.
33 Jaffé, From the Life and Work of C.G. Jung, p. 120. On Jung’s female followers, see 
M. Anthony, The Valkyries: The Women around Jung, Longmead, UK: Element, 
1990.


60 Noll, *The Jung Cult*, p. 262.


Goethe was a grateful heir to the full sweep of the scientific tradition [...]. Unlike Schelling, however, Goethe did not conflate the immanence of scientific inquiry with transcendental speculation (p. 33).

66 Shamdasani, *Cult Fictions*, p. 42; cf. CW 6 §314.
73 Herbert, *The German Tradition*, p. 41.
74 Herbert, *The German Tradition*, p. 56; cf. Goethe’s conversation with F.W. Riemer (1774–1845) of 5 August 1810: *Der Mensch kann nicht lange im bewußten Zustande oder im Bewußtsein verharren; er muß sich wieder ins Unbewußtsein flüchten, denn darin lebt seine Wurzel*.
75 Herbert, *The German Tradition*, p. 56.
76 For a crisp and eloquent rejection of

such ‘classical’ (or, as we have nowadays learnt to say, ‘logocentric’) concepts as centredness, organic wholeness, autotelicity and correspondences (all collected in the master-concept of the symbol which binds together the material and the spiritual realms),

78 *Mysterium coniunctionis* (CW 14 §471).

1 Biographical and intellectual affinities between Goethe and Jung

1 Freud’s paper was first published in 1909 along with Otto Rank’s *The Myth of the Birth of the Hero* (see SE 9, 237–41).
2 See SE 11, 165–75 (especially pp. 166–8).
3 See Freud’s letter of 15 October 1897 to Wilhelm Fliess (*The Complete Letters of
4 See Dichtung und Wahrheit, Part One, Chapter 2 (GE 4, 62–3).


6 According to R.F.C. Hull, Jung’s translator, Kurt Wolff told him how for several years he had tried to persuade Jung to write [an autobiography], how Jung had always refused, and how finally he (Kurt) hit on the happy idea of an ‘Eckerfrau’ to whom Jung could dictate at random, the Eckerfrau being Aniela Jaﬀe.


10 In 1848, Bismarck’s memoirs appeared in two volumes as Gedanken und Erinnerungen, to which a third volume was added in 1921 entitled Erinnerung und Gedanke (originally the title proposed for the entire work).


12 In an unpublished part of the Jung–Jaffé transcripts in the Jung collection, Library of Congress, Jung says that he sensed a further affinity between Goethe’s sister, Cornelia; the sister of his own grandfather, Karl Gustav Jung; and his own sister, Gertrud Jung. I am indebted to Sonu Shamdasani for bringing this passage to my attention.


The Seeress of Prevorst was the title given to Friedricke Hauffe by the Romantic writer and doctor Justinus Kerner (1786–1862), who recounted her mediumistic abilities in *Die Seherin von Prevorst* (1829).


see the final stanza of ‘Lover in all Forms’ (*Liebhaber in allen Gestalten*): ‘For I am as I am, / And just take me as such! / If you want someone better / Then make them yourself. / I am as I am, / So just take me as such!’ (*Doch bin ich wie ich bin, / Und nimm mich nur hin! / Willst du bess’re besitzen, / So laß dir sie schnitzen. / Ich bin nun wie ich bin; / So nimm mich nur hin!*)


*Ich könnte mir aber vorstellen, daß der manchmal recht schalkhafte C.G. Jung seine heimliche Freude an so einem Gerücht gehabt – und gefunden hatte: Wer schon so blöd ist das zu glauben, mags ja tun* (private correspondence).

In this second paper, based on an Eranos lecture, Jung takes a stand against three Freudian themes: the Oedipus complex; the notion of the primal horde as advanced in *Totem and Taboo* (1912–13); and Freud’s understanding of religion in terms of patriarchal projection (CW 9/1 §126). Compare with ‘Arche-types of the Collective Unconscious’ (1934/1954), where Jung reinterprets the conflict between the genders in terms of the projection of the anima archetype, and goes on to reject Freud’s diagnosis of neurosis in terms of sexual repression (CW 9/1 §61).


In fact, Freud cites Richard Muther’s discussion in volume I of his *History of Painting* (1909) of other treatments of the theme by Hans Fries, Holbein the Elder, Girolamo dai Libri, and Jakob Cornelisz (SE 11, 112).

In Jung’s words, this view holds that ‘the unconscious reflection’ is in fact ‘the image of father and mother’, which was ‘acquired in early childhood, overvalued, and later repressed’, because of the ‘incest-fantasy’ associated with it’ (CW 9/1 §135).


In ‘On Psychic Energy’ (1928/1948), Jung expanded on the psychological significance of childhood (GW 8 §98).


With reference to the famous ice-skating episode discussed by Kurt Robert Eissler,


33 Compare Goethe’s earlier definition, given in his letter to Friederike Oeser (1748–1829) of 13 February 1769, of beauty as ‘not light and not day’, as ‘twilight’, as ‘the offspring of truth and untruth’, as ‘something in-between (ein Mittelding).

34 For further discussion of Strasbourg cathedral, see Goethe’s essay ‘On German Architecture’ (1772), reprinted in J.G Herder’s Concerning German Art and Manner (1773) (GE 3, 3–10). A later, identically titled essay, published in 1823, discusses Cologne cathedral (GE 3, 10–14).


36 For a discussion of various drafts relating to the translation of this passage, see Shamdasani, Jung Stripped Bare by his Biographers, Even, p. 33.

37 ‘From the History of an Infantile Neurosis’ (1918), SE 17, 1–123 (pp. 16–17, 66–8). The ‘Wolf Man’ speculated that ‘since Christ had made wine out of nothing, he could also have made food into nothing and in this way have avoided defaecating’ (SE 17, 63). Compare with a fragment of the lost works of Valentinus recorded by Clement of Alexandria: ‘Jesus [. . .] ate and drank in a special way, without excreting his solids’ (The Gnostic Scriptures, ed. and tr. B. Layton, London: SCM Press, 1987, ‘Fragment E’, ‘Jesus’ Digestive System’ (Epistle to Agathopus), p. 239).

38 R. Hayman, A Life of Jung, London: Bloomsbury, 1999, p. 18; compare with Exodus 33:18–23. According to one commentator, Yahweh’s wish to be seen only from behind ‘may suggest that he is concealing his genitalia from Moses’, since the word *kabod*, usually translated as ‘glory’, is used to allude to the male genitalia in the Book of Job, 29:20; see J. Miles, God: A Biography, London: Simon & Schuster, 1995, p. 125. For Swedenborg, by ‘the back parts of God’ are meant ‘the visible things in the world, and in particular the things perceptible in the Word’ (The True Christian Religion, London: J.M. Dent and Sons, 1933, §28, p. 39).


41 The manuscript of this disputed text is held in the Fanny Bowditch Katz papers in the Francis A. Countway Library of Medicine at Harvard Medical School.


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46 See *Transformations and Symbols of the Libido*, Part One, Chapter 4 (PU §133–§136).


50 Goethe, *Briefe* [HA], vol. 1, p. 223.


54 See Goethe’s letter to Lavater of 3–5 December 1779 (*Briefe* [HA], vol. 1, pp. 287–9).


the symbol is perhaps more ambiguous than Goethe consciously intended: the moment of good fortune that brings the sphere to rest over the centre of the cube is frozen in permanence only by the sculptural form, and perhaps the good fortune that has brought this rolling stone to rest in Weimar is also a matter only of a moment.

(p. 286)


60 Curiously, Jung also called one of the numinous fantasy figures whom he encountered during his ‘confrontation with the unconscious’, Philemon (MDR, 207–10). According to F.X. Charet, *Faust* was ‘probably’ the source from which Jung took this name, but his explanation is unconvincing (*Spiritualism and the Foundations of C.G. Jung’s Psychology*, Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1993, pp. 242, 250 and 255).

61 I am grateful that I was given permission by Jung’s son, Franz Jung, to visit the tower at Bollingen on a hot afternoon in 1992.

See Meetings with Jung: Conversations Recorded by E.A. Bennet, p. 107.

See also Part Three, Book 14, where the notion is mentioned with slight reservations (GE 4, 450). Goethe had earlier referred to the idea in his Brief des Pastors zu *** an den neuen Pastor zu *** (1773): ‘Thus everyone has his or her own religion’ (So hat jeder seine eigene Religion) (Werke [WA], vol. I.37, p. 164).

Compare also with Jung’s comments in his letter of 3 May 1939 to A. Zarine:

You can find a detailed exposition of the transcendent function in Goethe’s Faust. After his pact with the devil, Faust is transformed through a series of symbols. But Goethe could describe them only because he had no definite preconceived religious ideas. He too was extra ecclesiam.

(L 1, 268–9)


Goethe, Briefe [HA], vol. 1, p. 402.

II.iii.32, in Collected Works of Erasmus, vol. 33, Adages, II.i.1. to II.vi.100, tr. and annotated R.A.B. Mynors, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1991, p. 146. In 1894 Carl Jung acquired a copy of the 1563 edition of the Adagiorum Collectanea by Erasmus, the great sixteenth-century humanist and scholar (Hayman, A Life of Jung, p. 110). The phrase is also inscribed on Jung’s gravestone, along with a quotation from 1 Corinthians 15:47: ‘Primus homo de terra terrenus, secondus homo de caelo caelestis’ (‘The first man is of the earth, earthly: the second man is from heaven, heavenly’) (G. Wehr, Carl Gustav Jung: Leben, Werk, Wirkung, Munich: Kösel, 1985, p. 407). Erasmus cites an account which links this quotation to the Spartans (see Suidas, the Greek lexicon-encyclopedia, K 254; and cf. Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, I, 118:

Though the Spartans had already decided that the truce has been broken by Athenian aggression, they also sent to Delphi to inquire from the god whether it would be wise for them to go to war. It is said that the god replied that if they fought with all their might, victory would be theirs, and that he himself would be on their side, whether they invoked him or not.

(tr. R. Warner, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1972, p. 103)

As Erasmus points out, the phrase is alluded to in his Odes (2.18.34–40) by Horace, another classical writer well known to Jung, and by Terence in his Eunuchus (1058–60).


See also Jung’s letter to Henry A. Murray of August 1956 (L 2, 323–4).


‘The Psychological Foundations of Belief in Spirits’ (CW 8 §570–§600), ‘On the
Problem of Psychogenesis in Mental Disease’ (CW 3 §466–§95) and ‘On the Psychogenesis of Schizophrenia’ (CW 3 §504–§41) were subsequently published in the Proceedings of the Society for Psychical Research, the Proceedings of the Royal Society of Medicine, and the Journal of Mental Science.

Jung’s lectures at Darmstadt in 1927 were published as ‘Die Erdbedingtheit der Psyche’ in the symposium Mensch und Erde (1927), edited by Keyserling, and were later expanded into ‘The Structure of the Psyche’ (CW 8 §283–§342) and ‘Mind and Earth’ (CW 10 §49–§103); see, too, ‘Paracelsus’ (Paracelsus: Ein Vortrag gehalten beim Geburtshaus an der Teufelsbrücke bei Einsiedeln am 22. Juni 1929) (CW 15 §1–§17); and ‘Die Stimme des Innern’, delivered in November 1932, was subsequently published as ‘The Development of Personality’ (Vom Werden der Persönlichkeit) (CW 17 §284–§323).


Prokhoris, The Witch’s Kitchen, p. 73.


Prokhoris, The Witch’s Kitchen, p. 73.


Analytical Psychology, pp. 9–99.

Noll, The Jung Cult, 214.

The classical philologist Friedrich Creuzer conducted an affair with the poet Karoline von Günderode (1780–1806), who killed herself after Creuzer decided not to divorce his wife. Among the many mythological motifs examined by Creuzer are the Cabiri, mentioned in Faust II (ll.8178 ff.), lines frequently cited by Jung.

Analytical Psychology, p. 99.


For Jung’s notion of the mid-life crisis, see ‘The Stages of Life’ (1930/1931) (CW 8 §749–§795).


95 Goethe, *The Flight to Italy*, p. 106.

96 See also Goethe’s letters to Herder of 10 November 1786 and to Charlotte von Stein of 25 January 1787 (Goethe, *Briehe HA*, vol. 2, pp. 20–1 and 45).


talent devoid of that longing, in the world of scholars or that of the so-called cultivated, we are repelled and disgusted by it; for we sense that, with all their intellect, such people do not promote an evolving culture and the procreation of genius – which is the goal of all culture – but hinder it.

105 Jung told Freud that he wanted to give psychoanalysis time ‘to infiltrate into people from many centres, to revivify among intellectuals a feeling for symbol and myth, ever so gently to transform Christ back into the soothsaying god of the vine, which he was’. Only in this way, Jung argued, could psychoanalysis absorb those ecstatic instinctual forces of Christianity for the one purpose of making the cult and the sacred myth what they once were – a drunken feast of joy where the human being regained the ethos and holiness of an animal.

*(The Freud/Jung Letters*, p. 294)


2 Jung’s early reception of Goethe and Faust, 1880–1916

1 See Goethe’s lines: ‘My build from Father I inherit, / His neat and serious ways; / Combined with Mother’s cheerful spirit, / Her love of telling stories’ (*Vom Vater hab’ ich die Statatur,/ Des Lebens ernstes Führen, / Von Mütterchen die Frohnatur / Und Lust zu fabulieren*) (GE 1, 197).


5 Faust I, l.1110. Later, in the conclusion to Part Two, Faust (or his ‘entelechy’) is described as ‘united double-nature’ (Geeinte Zwienatur) (Faust II, l.11962).

6 Jung’s library in his house in Küsnacht contains the following edition: Werke: Vollständige Ausgabe letzter Hand, 40 vols, Stuttgart: Cotta, 1827–35 (BC 25–55). It also contains the following editions of individual works by Goethe: Dichtung und Wahrheit, Leipzig: Insel, 1922 (BC 56); Faust, Leipzig: Insel (no date – 2nd edn) (BC 57); Faust I, Graphische Kunstanstalt Paul Bender, Zollikon: Druck nach Originalhandschrift von Johann Holtz, Flensburg (no date) (S 11); Faust I und II, Jena: Eugen Diederichs, 1912 (S 12); Goethes Antworten auf Probleme der Gegenwart, Munich: Georg Müller, 1928 (BC 59); Italienische Reise, Leipzig: Insel, 1912 (S 10); Über seinen Faust, Leipzig: Insel (no date) (BC 60); Goethe in den vertraulichen Briefen seiner Zeitgenossen: Auch eine Lebensgeschichte, Berlin: E.S. Mittler & Sohn, 1921 (BC 63a); Briefe, ed. P. Stein (Lieferungsausgabe, only pp. 145–92), Berlin: Otto Elsner (no date) (BC 70). I am grateful to Herr Ulrich Hoerni and Dr Peter Jung of the Erbengemeinschaft C.G. Jung for confirming this information.


8 For further discussion of the complex background to the historical figure, see the trilogy of studies by E.M. Butler, The Myth of the Magus, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1948; Ritual Magic, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1949; The Fortunes of Faust, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1952. For discussion of the different uses to which the figure has been put, see O. Durrani, Faust: Icon of Modern Culture, Mountfield, UK: Helm Information, 2004.


12 Why is analytical psychology called ‘analytical psychology’? Originally preferring the term ‘Zurich School’ (as opposed to the ‘Vienna School’), in 1914 Jung used the phrase ‘prospective psychology’; in the 1930s, he renamed it ‘complex psychology’ (W. McGuire, ‘Firm Affinities: Jung’s Relations with Britain and the United States’, Journal of Analytical Psychology 40, 1995, 301–26; S. Shamdasani, Jung and the Making of Modern Psychology: The Dream of a Science, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003, p. 13). The failure to adopt this term has led to the obscuring of its synthesizing approach, and hence its Goethean origins.

13 Faust II, l.6215.

14 See Faust I, l.3868.

15 See Faust II, l.6289.

16 See Faust II, ll. 6222–3.

17 For the notion of the ‘open secret’, see Dichtung und Wahrheit, Part Three, Book 11 (GE 4, 370) and Goethe’s letter to Christian Friedrich Ludwig Schultz of 28 November 1821:
There are so many open secrets, because the feeling they are there enters the consciousness of so few, and only then because they are afraid of harming themselves and others if they do not express an inner enlightenment in the form of words.

18 Cf. CW 8 §309, §710; CW 11 §750. See Faust I, ll.4159–61: ‘This is outrageous! Why are you still here? / The world has been enlightened! You must disappear!’ (Ihr seid noch immer da! Nein, das ist unerhört. / Verschwindet doch! Wir haben ja aufgeklärt!) (J.W. von Goethe, Faust: Part One, tr. D. Luke, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987, p. 131). In the figure of the Proktophantasmist Goethe is satirizing Friedrich Nicolai (1733–1811), who is parodied not just for his simplistic and excessive view of reason, but also for his notorious lecture to the Berlin Akademie in 1799, in which he reported sightings of apparitions in Tegel, a district of Berlin, and advised placing leeches in the anus to prevent supernatual occurrences.


20 See, too, Goethe’s discussion of Gehalt in the section entitled ‘Intervention’ (Eingeschaltetes) his ‘Notes and Essays for a Better Understanding of the West-Eastern Divan’ (Noten und Abhandlungen zu besserem Verständnis des West-östlichen Divans):

The reflection of the poet relates in fact to the form, the material is given to him all too generously by the world, the content springs of its own accord from the fullness of his inner being; unconsciously both meet and in the end one cannot tell to which of them the wealth belongs. But the form, although it already lies preeminently in the genius, demands recognition, demands consideration, and here reflection is called for, so that form, material, and content fit in with each other, submit to each other, penetrate each other. The poet is far too important to be able to take sides. Cheerfulness and consciousness are the beautiful gifts for which he gives thanks to the creator: consciousness, so that he is not afraid of what is terrible, and cheerfulness, so that he is able to represent everything pleasantly.

(Goethe, Werke [HA], vol. 2, p. 178)


Either the predicate $B$ belongs to the subject $A$ as something that is (covertly) contained in this concept $A$; or $B$ lies entirely outside the concept $A$, though to be sure it stands in connection with it. In the first case I call the judgment analytic, in the second synthetic.

(B 10, p. 141)

23 I. Kant, Lectures on Logic [The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel

24 ‘I comprehend something absolutely when I have insight into it in such a way as is required for this or that end’ (Lectures on Logic, p. 106), quoted in ‘On Psychological Understanding’.

25 Goethe, Werke [HA], vol. 1, p. 349.

26 Hence, mineralogy is a science for the understanding, for practical life; for its subjects are something dead which cannot rise again, and there is no room for synthesis. The subjects of meteorology are, indeed, something living, which we daily see working and producing; they presuppose a synthesis – only the co-operating circumstances are so many that man is not equal to this synthesis and therefore uselessly wearies himself in observations and inquiries. We steer by hypotheses to imaginary islands; but the proper synthesis will probably remain an undiscovered country; and I do not wonder at this, when I consider how difficult it is to obtain any synthesis even in such simple things as plants and colours. (Conversations of Goethe, p. 294)

27 The chain of being of eighteenth-century natural history has two opposing attributes: it is composed of discrete elements, yet these elements are themselves continuously linked to form a single whole. Interpretations of nature, as Goethe realized, will therefore vary according to which of the two attributes, diversity or unity, is given precedence, and disagreements can hardly be avoided.


28 According to Buffon, the natural historian must possess ‘deux qualités qui paraissent opposées, les grandes vues d’un génie ardent qui embrasse tout d’un coup d’œil, et les petites attentions d’un instinct laborieux’ (two qualities which appear opposed, the overarching perspectives of ardent genius, taking everything in at a glance, and the attention to detail of laborious instinct) (Buffon, Œuvres philosophiques, ed. J. Piveteau, Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 1954, p. 7).


30 Goethe, Werke [WA], vol. II.5, p. 403.


33 J.G. Droysen, Grundriß der Historik, Jena: Frommann 1858.

34 For further discussion, see G.H. von Wright, Explanation and Understanding, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1971.


39 Schnädelbach, Philosophy in Germany 1831–1933, p. 128; cf. on Schleiermacher, pp. 114–18.


45 Schnädelbach, Philosophy in Germany 1831–1933, pp. 55–6.

46 In the work of one of Dilthey’s followers, the German philosopher and pedagogue, Eduard Spranger (1882–1963), the idea of Verstehen became part of an attempt to provide a conceptual foundation for a philosophy of culture, with particular reference to Goethe. See E. Spranger, Goethes Weltanschauung: Reden und Aufsätze, Wiesbaden: Insel, 1949.

48 See ‘On Psychic Energy’ (c.1912–28/1948) (CW 8 §2–§3), where Jung uses the terminology of the ‘causal’ approach (described as ‘mechanistic’) and the ‘final’ approach (described as ‘energetic’).


55 See Jung’s letters to Ernst Jahn of 7 September 1935 (L 1, 195), to Swami Devatananda of 9 February 1937 (L 1, 226) and to Norbert Drewitt of 25 September 1937 (L 1, 237).


63 The Italian psychologist Roberto Assagioli (1888–1974) founded his own school of therapy on a similar concept of ‘psychosynthesis’. Assagioli cited Faust’s contemplation of the sign of the macrocosmos at the beginning of Part I as ‘an example of what can be experienced through meditation on a design’ (R. Assagioli, *Psychosynthesis: A Manual of Principles and Techniques*, London: Thorsons/HarperCollins, 1993, p. 309). Later, the notion of psychosynthesis was taken up by the psychologist Hans Trüb (1889–1949), who developed one of the most percep-
tive critiques of analytical psychology. For further discussion, see P. Bishop, ‘C.G. Jung, Hans Trüb und die “Psychosynthese”’, Analytische Psychologie 27, 1996, 119–37 and 159–92.


65 The wholeness Goethe had in mind was to be managed [...] by being analytical (i.e., one-sided) where analysis is appropriate, intuitive (i.e., whole) where synthesis was appropriate. The ‘undivided existence’ of which he spoke was, in fact, a unity to be created in succession of time. Any other kind of unity is a betrayal of what man has become and what he has achieved.


66 As Sonu Shamdasani has emphasized, ‘notions of a collective or transindividual unconscious were so widespread in the last quarter of the nineteenth century that it is surprising that the actual term, “collective unconscious”, was not used before Jung’ (Jung Stripped Bare by his Biographers, Even, London: Karnac, 2005, p. 90). For further discussion, see Shamdasani, Jung and the Making of Modern Psychology, pp. 163–270.

67 First published in the Jahrbuch für psychoanalytische und psychopathologische For- schungen 3, 1911, 120–227, and 4, 1912, 162–464; published as a separate work in 1912; republished in revised form in 1925 and 1938; and completely reworked and published under the new title Symbole der Wandlung (Symbols of Transformation) in 1952 (CW 5). References here are to the recent reprint (1991) of Beatrice M. Hinkle’s translation as Psychology of the Unconscious, first published in 1916 (abbreviated as PU).

68 First delivered as a lecture to the Psycho-Medical Society in London on 24 July 1914, it was published in the Journal of Abnormal Psychology 9, 1915, 385–99; and appended, in a revised form, to the second edition of The Content of the Psychoses (1914).

69 Later revised and expanded in 1928 and 1966 as The Relations between the Ego and the Unconscious (Die Beziehungen zwischen dem Ich und dem Unbewußten), ‘La Structure de l’inconscient’ was first published in Archives de psychologie 16, no. 2, 1916, 152–79.

70 For Sonu Shamdasani, ‘Freud and Jung came from quite different intellectual traditions, and were drawn together by shared interests in the psychogenesis of mental disorders and psychotherapy’, their intention being ‘to form a scientific psychotherapy based on the new psychology, and in turn, to ground psychology on the in-depth clinical investigation of individual lives’ (Jung Stripped Bare by his Biographers, Even, p. 89); for further discussion of this view, see Jung and the Making of Modern Psychology.


73 Derived from the essay ‘On the Task of the Historian’ (1821) by Wilhelm von Humboldt (1767–1835), the notion Ahnung (‘divination’), of ‘historical
understanding as resulting from concentrated and sympathetic attentiveness’, as
Gossman summarizes it (p. 367), was mediated to Burkhardt by the approach of the
theologian Wilhelm Martin Leberecht de Wette (1780–1849). For further discus-
sion, see T.A. Howard, Religion and the Rise of Historicism: W.M.L. de Wette,
Jacob Burckhardt, and the Theological Origins of Nineteenth-Century Historical
75 Conversations of Goethe, pp. 293–4.
76 J. Kerr, A Most Dangerous Method: The Story of Jung, Freud, and Sabina Spielrein,
77 For discussion of the term Leitfaden as one of the dominant metaphors of
eighteenth-century philosophy, found in Herder, Kant and Goethe, see T.J. Reed,
‘Paths through the Labyrinth: Finding your Way in the Eighteenth Century’, Pub-
lications of the English Goethe Society 51, 1980–1, 81–113. According to Nicholas
Boyle, the metaphor of Ariadne’s thread ‘determined Goethe’s own formulation
of the problems he was setting himself in natural science’, and this applies, mutatis
mutandis, to Jung, too: ‘He was looking for a single principle of order in the
phenomena as they appear to us now (for it is in the present world which we
inhabit and in which we have to make ourselves at home)’ (Goethe: The Poet and
78 Letter 18 §3 (F. Schiller, On the Aesthetic Education of Man in a Series of Letters,
79 The so-called ‘doctrine of indirection’, as it was called in the eighteenth century, is
summarized in the French proverb il faut reculer pour mieux sauter (take a step
back to get a better jump). The idea can be found in Edmund Burke’s letter to
Richard Shackleton of 28 December 1745, where he writes that ‘sorrow is a pas-
sion and a strong one and must not immediately be oppos’d by a direct Contrary
which is reason the product of a Calm and undisturbed mind’ (E. Burke,
The Correspondence of Edmund Burke, ed. T.W. Copeland, 10 vols, Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1958–78, vol. 1, p. 59; cited in Wilkinson and
Willoughby, ‘Commentary’, in F. Schiller, On the Aesthetic Education of Man,
p. 262). For Schiller’s use of this idea in Psychological Types (1921), see Chapter 4.
80 See Faust I, ll.312–14.
81 MDR, 410; for further discussion, see A. Samuels, B. Shorter, and F. Plaut,
16–17.
82 See H. Lausberg, Handbuch der literarischen Rhetorik: Eine Grundlegung der
86 Compare with the original version of this passage (PU §696).
87 See Faust II, ll.11,559–63, 1011–12, and 1050–5.
88 See Faust I, ll.1011–12, 1051–5.
89 Goethe, Werke [HA], vol. 1, pp. 61–2.
90 Schiller, Werke [NA], vol. 1, p. 302.
91 For a discussion of the various interpretative approaches to this scene, and a
summary of relevant secondary literature, see J.R. Williams, The Problem of the
Mothers’, in P. Bishop (ed.), A Companion to Goethe’s ‘Faust’, Parts I and II,

93 In her contribution to the discussion of the Vienna Psychoanalytic Society on 8 November 1911, following papers by Wilhelm Stekel and Josef Reinhold, Sabina Spielrein reportedly made the following point concerning how ‘the unconscious strips the event of the present and transforms it into one that is connected to any particular time’, comparing this transformative effect to ‘the Mothers, for whom all borders and times are fused together’ (Protokolle der Wiener Psychoanalytischen Vereinigung, ed. H. Nunberg and E. Feder, 4 vols, Frankfurt am Main: S. Fischer, 1976–81, vol. 3, p. 291).


95 See Conversations of Goethe, p. 342.


100 See Faust II, cf. ll.12,096–103.

101 See Faust II, l.6289.

102 See Faust I, ll.1080–3, 699–706, 710–19. The mention of the ocean here could also be taken as a reference to the opening of Act 4 of Part Two, or as a misunderstanding of Mephisto’s contrast of the way to the Mothers with the ocean (see Faust II, ll.10,039–42 and 6239–45). From the context, however, Jung is referring to ‘the sea with its warmed bays’ of l.1083 and ‘the open sea’ of l.699.

103 The Nietzsche reference here is to a line from ‘Amid Birds of Prey’ (Zwischen Raubvögeln), one of the Dithyrambs of Dionysus (Dionysos-Dithyramben) composed over the six-year period from 1883 to 1888 and collected in the summer of 1888:


(Jetzt – / einsam mit dir, / zwiesam im eignen Wissen, / zwischen hundert Spiegeln / vor dir selber falsch, / zwischen hundert Erinnerungen / ungewiß, / an jeder Wunde müd, / an jedem Froste kalt, / in eignen Stricken gewürgt, / Selbstkenner! / Selbsthenker!)


104 A more positive assessment of narcissism than is found in Freud was offered in the work of the psychoanalyst Heinz Kohut (1913–81). For further discussion, see A.M. Siegel, Heinz Kohut and the Psychology of the Self, London: Routledge, 1996.

105 See Faust II, l.6291.

106 See Faust II, l.6304.


109 Jung returned to this image in ‘The Stages of Life’ (Die Lebenswende) (CW 8 §749–§795) (see especially §778).
Freud first formulated the idea of Thanatos, the ‘death drive’, in Beyond the Pleasure Principle (1920):

The manifestations of a compulsion to repeat [...] exhibit to a high degree an instinctual character and, when they act in opposition to the pleasure principle, give the appearance of some ‘daimonic’ force at work. [...] It seems, then, that an instinct is an urge inherent in organic life to restore an earlier state of things which the living entity has been obliged to abandon under the pressure of external disturbing forces; that is, it is a kind of organic elasticity, or, to put it another way, the expression of the inertia inherent in organic life. [...] If we are to take it as a truth that knows no exception that everything living dies for internal reasons – becomes inorganic once again – then we shall be compelled to say that ‘the aim of all life is death’ and, looking backwards, that ‘inanimate things existed before living ones’. 

(SE 18, 35 and 36 and 38)

In An Outline of Psycho-Analysis (1940 [1938]), Freud explained further:

After long hesitancies and vacillations we have decided to assume the existence of only two basic instincts, Eros and the destructive instinct. [...] The aim of the first of these basic instincts is to establish ever greater unities and to preserve them thus – in short, to bind together; the aim of the second is, on the contrary, to undo connections and so to destroy things. In the case of the destructive instinct we may suppose that its final aim is to lead what is living into an inorganic state. For this reason we also call it the death instinct.

(SE 23, 148)

For further discussion, see Civilization and its Discontents (1930), especially §4 (SE 21, 99–107), and its conclusion:

Men have gained control over the forces of nature to such an extent that with their help they would have no difficulty in exterminating one another to the last man. They know this, and hence comes a large part of their current unrest, their unhappiness and their mood of anxiety. And now it is to be expected that the other of the two ‘Heavenly Powers’, eternal Eros, will make an effort to assert himself in the struggle with his equally immortal adversary,

to which the following sentence was added in 1931: ‘But who can foresee with what success and with what result?’ (SE 21, 145). In this same work, Freud wrote that ‘the meaning of the evolution of civilization is no longer obscure to us’:

It must present the struggle between Eros and Death, between the instinct of life and the instinct of destruction, as it works itself out in the human species. This struggle is what all life essentially consists of, and the evolution of civilization may therefore be simply described as the struggle for life of the human species. And it is this battle of the giants that our nurse-maids try to appease with their lullaby about Heaven.

(SE 21, 122)


The conceptual confusion surrounding the term ‘renunciation’ (Entsagung) makes it a highly problematic term. For the biographer, Nicholas Boyle, Goethe’s writing is ‘the poetry of desire’, and ‘the evaporation of the happy ending, the
imposition on us by an inscrutable reality of the renunciation of our ideal goal’ is
the nucleus from which grow nearly all the major works Goethe wrote in the
second half of his life, and in which he tried to meet the moral and literary
demands put on him by a revolutionary and Kantian age;

indeed, ‘renunciation is the negative image of desire’ (Goethe: The Poet and the
Age, vol. 1, The Poetry of Desire (1749–1790), especially p. 443; and vol. 2,
For older critics, however, the concept is more nuanced. The classic view, accord-
ing to which Entsagung in effect forms a part of the Polarität of Goethean
Steigerung, was stated in 1943 by Paul Hankamer in his Spiel der Mächte: Ein
Kapitel aus Goethes Leben und Goethes Welt, Tübingen: R. Wunderlich, 1943;
second edition: Stuttgart: J.B. Metzler, 1960. At about the same time in the early
1940s, Arthur Henkel attended a seminar in Marburg with Max Kommerell,
which led directly to his study published in 1954, which again understood
renunciation in terms of a positive decision (see Entsagung: Eine Studie zu

113 See S. Hornblower and A. Spawforth (eds), The Oxford Classical Dictionary, 3rd
edn, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996, pp. 1185 and 1508. In his letter to
Freud of 25 February 1912, written during the composition of the second part of
Transformations and Symbols of the Libido, Jung identified himself with the
figure of Peirithoos:

I think I am not wrong in suspecting that you rather resent my remissness as
a correspondent. In this regard my behaviour is indeed a little irresponsible,
as I have allowed all my libido to disappear into my work. On the other hand
I don’t think you need have any apprehensions about my protracted and
invisible sojourn in the ‘religious-libidinal cloud’. I would willingly tell you
what is going on up there if only I knew how to set it down in a letter.
Essentially, it is an elaboration of all the problems that arise out of the
mother-incest libido, or rather, the libido-cathected mother-imago. This
time I have ventured to tackle the mother. So what is keeping me hidden is

[καταβασίς] to the realm of the Mothers, where, as we know,
Theseus and Peirithoos remained stuck, grown fast to the rocks. But in time
I shall come up again. These last days I have clawed my way considerably
nearer to the surface. So please do forbear with me a while longer. I shall
bring all sorts of wonderful things with me ad majorem gloriam ΨΑ.
(The Freud/Jung Letters, pp. 487–8)

115 Freud, SE 12, 1–83. For the text of Schreber’s memoirs, see D.P. Schreber,
Memoirs of my Nervous Illness, ed. and tr. I. Macalpine and R.A. Hunter, London:
P. Heiligenthal and R. Volk (eds), Bürgerliche Wahnwelt um Neunzehnhundert:
Denkwürdigkeit eines Nervenkranken von Daniel Paul Schreber, Wiesbaden,
116 Ludwig Feuerbach (1804–72) is best known for his work The Essence of
Christianity (1841). For the likely source of Jung’s allusion, see chapter 17;
L. Feuerbach, Das Wesen des Christentums [Werke in sechs Bänden, vol. 5],
Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1976, p. 188.
117 For further discussion, see R.H. Stephenson, Goethe’s Conception of Knowledge
118 As discussed in Chapter 1, the choice of the Gothic style as a point of
comparison may well have been suggested by Goethe’s reflections on Strasbourg cathedral in *Dichtung und Wahrheit* (GE 4, 266 and 284–6), or in his essay ‘On German Architecture’ (1772), published in *Concerning German Man and Manner* (1773), edited by Johann Gottfried Herder (GE 3, 3–10).


121 I have modified here the translation given in the *Collected Works*. The words in square brackets are an editorial intervention in the text of the *Gesammelte Werke*, required to render the sentence meaningful.


124 See ‘A Contribution to the Study of Psychological Types’ (CW 6 §858–§882), a lecture delivered by Jung at the Fourth Private Psychoanalytic Meeting in Munich in September 1913.

125 See *Psychological Types* (1921) (CW 6).

126 Compare with the title of Jung’s 1912 paper, ‘New Paths in Psychology’ (*Neue Bahnen der Psychologie*).

127 *Maxims and Reflections*, ed. Hecker, no. 1072; *Werke* [HA], vol. 12, p. 490.


129 ‘La Structure de l’inconscient’; CW 7 §475.

130 ‘La Structure de l’inconscient’; CW 7 §476.

131 See *Faust II*, ll.11,410–27. There is no better commentary on this scene than the article by Konrad Burdach, the source of Heidegger’s interest in the link between Goethe and Hyginus’s *Fables*, no. 220; see ‘Faust und die Sorge’, *Deutsche Vierteljahrsschrift* 1, 1923, 1–60.


134 Buber’s essay was published in *Merkur* 6(2), 1952, and later became part of
3 Schiller and the problem of typology


2 For Schiller’s concern about his appointment as Professor of History, see his letter to Körner of 15 December 1788. Having published a book about the relationship between the Netherlands and Spain in the sixteenth century (*Geschichte des Abfalls der vereinigten Niederlande*), he went on to write a history of the Thirty Years War (*Geschichte des dreißigjährigen Krieges*, 1791–3) but in 1791, due to overwork, suffered a breakdown. A grant from Prince Friedrich Christian, Duke of Schleswig-Holstein-Augustenburg, enabled him to pursue his research on Kant and, in 1795, to publish the treatise *On the Aesthetic Education of Humankind in a Series of Letters*.


4 In *L’Ame et l’écriture*, Ania Teilhard described Jung’s psychological types in terms of the behaviour of guests at a dinner party: a perfect hostess (extraverted feeling), along with her husband (introverted sensation), receives a lawyer (extraverted thinking), a famous businessman (extraverted thinking) with his musician wife (introverted feeling), a distinguished scholar (introverted thinking) and his wife, a former cook (extraverted feeling). One guest – a poet (introverted intuitive) – fails to arrive, because his typology has made him forget his invitation. See V. Brome, *Jung*, London: Macmillan, 1978, p. 174.

5 For definitions of these terms, see pp. 102–9; the sections ‘General Descriptions of the Types’ and ‘Definitions’ in *Psychological Types* (CW 6 §672–§844); and A. Samuels, B. Shorter, and F. Plaut, *A Critical Dictionary of Jungian Analysis*, London: Routledge, 1986.

6 For most letters the following translation has been used: *Correspondence between Schiller and Goethe from 1794 to 1805*, tr. L.D. Schmitz, 2 vols, London: George Bell and Sons, 1877–9, referred to as CSG, followed by volume number and page reference.

7 See *The Iliad*, Book 9, ll. 410–16.


Goethe, Werke [WA], vol. IV.18, p. 79. Compare with Goethe’s remarks in Dichtung und Wahrheit (Part Three, Book 14) about his ‘innate and acquired realism’ (GE 4, 449).

11 Goethe, Briefe [HA], vol. 3, p. 7. See also Goethe’s remarks as recorded by Eckermann of 18 January 1825 and 11 September 1828 (Conversations of Goethe, pp. 85–6 and 261).


12 Goethe, Briefe [HA], vol. 3, p. 7. See also Goethe’s remarks as recorded by Eckermann of 18 January 1825 and 11 September 1828 (Conversations of Goethe, pp. 85–6 and 261).

13 Goethe, Werke [HA], vol. 1, p. 259.


16 Nietzsche, Sämtliche Briefe, vol. 3, p. 36.


18 For an emotionally charged account, see L. Donn, Freud and Jung: Years of Friendship, Years of Loss, New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1988.


22 For Jung’s empirical scientific writings, see CW 1 (Psychiatric Studies) and CW 2 (Experimental Researches); for his Freudian writings, see CW 3 (The Psychogenesis of Mental Disease) and CW 4 (Freud and Psychoanalysis).

23 Could Jung be thinking of On the Aesthetic Education of Humankind, Letter 13, §4 (see p. 130), where Schiller says that ‘man can transfer [legen] the intensity [die Intensität] required by the active function to the passive, let his sensuous drive encroach upon the formal, and make the receptive faculty do the work of the determining one’?

24 Based on the lecture ‘The Inner Voice’ (Die Stimmme des Innern), delivered at the Kulturbund in Vienna in November 1932, ‘The Development of Personality’ was published in Wirklichkeit der Seele in 1934 (CW 17 §284–§323).


27 Jung protests too much that the personality was a neglected concept in the eighteenth century. To give but one example, Kant, in the first edition of the first *Critique*, discussed ‘personality’ in his section on the third paralogism of pure reason (*Critique of Pure Reason*, A 362). And, in his second *Critique*, Kant defined ‘personality’ (*Persönlichkeit*) as freedom and independence from the mechanism of the whole of nature, regarded nevertheless as also a capacity of a being subject to special laws – namely pure practical laws given by his own reason, so that a person as belonging to the sensible world is subject to his own personality insofar as he also belongs to the intelligible world.


29 For further discussion of the political background, see Wilkinson and Willoughby, pp. xv–xx and 334–7.

30 In ‘Psychological Typology’, an essay published in *Süddeutsche Monatshefte* in 1936, Jung outlined the process of *Kulturrentwicklung* (‘cultural development’) (CW 6 §965) from the time of pagan antiquity, via the Pythagoreanism of the sixth century BCE, Hellenistic syncretism and Christianity, to the materialist conception of the world. As the motor of this process Jung spoke of ‘self-alienation’ or ‘self-diremption’ (*eine Entzweiung mit sich selbst*). ‘Nothing’, he wrote, ‘is so apt to challenge our self-awareness and alertness as being at war with oneself’, for ‘one can hardly think of any other or more effective means of waking humanity out of the irresponsible and innocent half-sleep of the primitive mentality and bringing it to a state of conscious responsibility’ (CW 6 §964).


37 See also ‘On the Nature of the Psyche’ (1946/1954) (CW 8 §421 and §437).

38 Goethe, *Maxims and Reflections*, ed. Heckler, no. 616; *Werke* [HA], vol. 12, p. 422; Goethe’s ‘Maximen und Reflexionen’: *A Selection*, ed. and tr. R.H. Stephenson
(Scottish Papers in Germanic Studies, 6), Glasgow: Scottish Papers in Germanic Studies, 1986, p. 83.


40 See Goethe, Werke [HA], vol. 14, p. 54. Compare, too, with Kant’s first Critique (A 854/B 882) where, in connection with ‘the origin of pure cognitions of reason’ – whether they are ‘derived from experience’ or, ‘independent of it, have their source in reason’ – he writes that ‘Aristotle can be regarded as the head of the empiricists, Plato that of the noologists’ (Critique of Pure Reason, ed. and tr. P. Guyer and A. W. Wood, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997, p. 703).

41 The subject is and remains the centre of every interest. It looks, one might say, as though all the life-energy were ultimately seeking the subject, and thus continually prevented the object from exercising any overpowering influence. It is as though the energy were flowing away from the object, and the subject were a magnet drawing the object to itself. (CW 6 §4)

42 GE 1, 159 (tr. C. Middleton); Werke [HA] 1, 358. The title of the poem refers to the words spoken by the chorus in ancient Greek tragedy.

43 In his letter to Körner of 21 December 1792 Schiller proposes to write a dialogue Kallias, or On Beauty. The dialogue is named after the Greek word kallos, meaning ‘beauty’. Callias, the son of Hipponicus, is also the name of the person in whose house the sophist philosopher Protagoras is staying, in the Platonic dialogue of that name. For further discussion of the work, see J.M. Ellis, Schiller’s ‘Kalliasbriefe’ and the Study of his Aesthetic Theory, The Hague: Mouton, 1969.


45 Schiller, Werke [NA], vol. 26, p. 225.


47 Schiller, Werke [NA], vol. 26, p. 183.

48 Zur Farbenlehre, §38; Goethe, Werke [HA], vol. 13, p. 337.

49 Zur Farbenlehre, §739; Goethe, Werke [HA], vol. 13, p. 488.

50 Goethe, Werke [WA], vol. II.6, p. 226.


52 See Faust II, I.6287.

53 See Wilhelm Meister’s Journeyman Years, Book 2, Chapter 10 (GE 10, 280).

54 See Dichtung und Wahrheit, Part Two, Book 8 (GE 4, 263).

55 Goethe, Werke [HA], vol. 13, p. 48.

56 See also CW 7 §275, CW 8 §158–§159 and CW 16 §330. As Anthony Storr has
pointed out, the concept of self-regulating psyche is one of the most important insights of analytical psychology: ‘The idea of self-regulation runs right through the whole of Jung’s scheme of how the mind works, and largely accounts for his view of dreams [. . .] Compensation and self-regulation are integral parts of [Jung’s] type theory’ (‘Introduction’, in Jung: Selected Writings, ed. A. Storr, London: Fontana, 1983, pp. 17–18).

57 Compare with Ilse Graham’s observation that ‘the conception of the human psyche as an organism’ emerges as ‘the central thought’ in the seventh letter of Schiller’s On the Aesthetic Education of Humankind, where he draws ‘a detailed analogy between the evolution of the human psyche towards higher forms of organisation and the evolution of more differentiated physical organisms from primitive beginnings’ (‘The Structure of the Personality in Schiller’s Tragic Poetry’, in F. Norman (ed.), Schiller: Bicentenary Lectures, London: University of London, Institute of Germanic Languages and Literatures, 1960, pp. 104–44 [p. 132]).


60 Goethe, Werke [WA], vol. II.7, p. 7.

61 Bortoft, The Wholeness of Nature, p. 120.

62 WW, p. xxvii.


64 It would be a stroke of good fortune, I will be told, to have strong feelings. Yes, indeed, if they are all in unison. Establish a true harmony between them, and you need fear no disorder. If hope is balanced by fear, a sense of honour with the love of life, the inclination towards pleasure with a concern for health, you will see neither libertines, nor hotheads, nor cowards.

(D. Diderot, Pensées philosophiques (1746), §4; in D. Diderot, Oeuvres philosop-phiques, ed. P. Vernière, Paris: Garnier, 1964, p. 11.)


66 WW, p. lxvi.

67 For further discussion, see D.M. Armstrong, Universals and Scientific Realism, 2 vols, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978, vol. 1, Nominalism and Realism.

68 In his discussion of Abelard’s attempt to reconcile nominalism and realism in a form of conceptualism (CW 6 §69–§70), Jung writes that

he sought the mediatory position in the sermo, by which he meant not so much a ‘discourse’ as a formal proposition joined to a definite meaning – in fact, a definition requiring several words for its meaning to be established.

(CW 6 §73)

Abelard’s ‘sermo’ (as Jung presents it) performs a similar function to what Schiller called ‘aesthetic discourse’ (schöner Vortrag), in which logical (in the Kantian sense) or conceptual and poetic (in the Herderian sense) or expressive modes of

69 Otherwise known as the principle of all-or-none or the law of excluded middle, whose earliest formulation in Aristotle’s *Organon* is ‘there is nothing between asserting and denying’. For further discussion, see W. van Orman Quine, *Philosophy of Logic*, Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1970, pp. 83–5.

70 See WW, p. li.

71 See *Critique of Pure Reason*, A 118–A 126 (pp. 238–41). Kant observes in a footnote that ‘no psychologist has yet thought that the imagination is a necessary ingredient of perception itself’ (A 121, note). While this might be true of eighteenth-century psychology, it is a deficit which Jung tries to make good.

72 A 118; p. 238.
73 A 78/B 103; p. 211.
74 A 123; p. 240.
75 A 124; p. 241.
76 A 138/B 177; p. 272.
77 A 141/B 181; p. 273.
78 Imagination, in the Kantian sense, is defined by Wilkinson and Willoughby as the faculty which achieves the cooperation of intuition and understanding. Without it no knowledge is possible, since it alone performs the synthesis of the representations given to us in intuition (*Anschauung*); but it cannot of itself produce knowledge, since it depends on the laws of the understanding to transform the material it presents in images into ‘clear and distinct’ notions. (WW, pp. 306–7)


81 WW, p. 306.


83 In Jungian psychology there are four psychic functions: thinking (*Denken*) (CW 6 §830–§833), feeling (*Fühlen*) (CW 6 §723–§729), sensation (*Empfinden*) (CW 6 §792–§796) and intuition (*Intuition*) (CW 6 §770–§773). It is important not to confuse Jungian intuition with ‘sensory intuition’ or Jungian sensation with ‘sense data’ (in both cases, translations of *sinnliche Anschauung*, i.e., sense-perception).

84 Later, Jung writes of *Phantasie* that ‘this bridge’ – that is, between feeling and thought – ‘is already given us in creative fantasy. It is not born of either, for it is the mother of both – nay more, it is pregnant with the child, that final goal which unites the opposites’ (CW 6 §85). Jung’s language here recalls such powerful
images of Nietzsche’s *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* as the bridge, the goal, the pregnant mother, and the child.


88 As Zarathustra says, ‘a child is concealed in the true man: it wants to play [. . .] the child is innocence and forgetfulness, a new beginning, a sport, a self-propelling wheel, a first motion, a sacred Yes’ (Nietzsche, *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, pp. 55 and 92). In ‘The Development of Personality’, Jung wrote that

in every adult there lurks a child – an eternal child, something that is always becoming, is never completed, and calls for unceasing care, attention, and education. That is the part of the human personality which wants to develop and become whole.

*(CW 17 §286)*


89 The inner non-material world can be transposed by sandplay into a concrete outer picture of psyche. This transposition symbolically objectifies the inner archetypal content through allowing it to have an outer material form. The intuition of the patients, which is related to an inward and non-rational impulse involving the unconscious, may go free and self material can flow into the sandplay unreservedly.


91 *WW*, p. lx.

92 Schiller, *Werke* [NA], vol. 21, p. 22; cf. *CW* 6 §196, fn. 95). In his sonnet on ‘Nature and Art’ (*Natur und Kunst*) (1800/1802) Goethe wrote that ‘None proves a master but by limitation / And only law can give us liberty’ (*In der Beschränkung zeigt sich erst der Meister, / Und das Gesetz nur kann uns Freiheit geben*) (GE 1, 164–5).

93 *WW*, pp. xxxiv–xxxv.


there is a like-mindedness [. . .] that goes beyond their concurrence on psychological types: both men studied medicine; both had an intense interest in philosophy; for each, the encounter with Kant’s work was a turning point in his life; each sought his identity in terms of personality differences with his more famous contemporary: Schiller with Goethe, Jung with Freud.


98 Similarly, Hegel distinguishes between ‘natural barbarism’ (natürliche Barbarei) and ‘the barbarism of culture’ (die Barbarei der Kultur) in his Essays from the Critical Journal of Philosophy (1802–3)(G.W.F. Hegel, Werke, ed. E. Moldenhauer and K.M. Michel, 20 vols, Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1986, vol. 2, p. 271). Likewise, in §4 of The Birth of Tragedy (1872), Nietzsche contrasts the Apollonian world of ‘the individual, i.e., the delimiting of the boundaries of the individual, measure in the Hellenic sense’ with the ‘titanic’ and ‘barbaric’ world of the Dionysian, with its concomitant ‘excess’, for which the fate of Prometheus – ‘torn to pieces by vultures’, due to his ‘titanic love for humans’ – serves as an example (F. Nietzsche, Basic Writings of Nietzsche, ed. and tr. W. Kaufmann, New York: Modern Library, 1968, p. 46). Nevertheless, Nietzsche is careful to distinguish in §2 between Dionysian Greeks and Dionysian barbarians (Basic Writings, p. 39). Although both are said to participate in those primal energies released in the Dionysian orgy, the Dionysian barbarians allegedly merely regressed to the condition of animals, whereas something much more important was achieved in the Greeks’ synthesis of Dionysos with Apollo, so that ‘we shall now recognize in the Dionysian orgies of the Greeks, as compared with the Babylonian Sacaea with their reversion of man to the tiger and the ape, the significance of festivals of world redemption and days of transfiguration’ (Basic Writings, pp. 39–40).


100 Schiller contemplated writing a drama about Julian the Apostate, but never did; see his letter to Goethe of 5 January 1798, where he asks Goethe to look for a copy of Julian’s Misopogon (‘The Beard Hater’), a satirical work, or his letters in the Ducal Library in Weimar. For a lively discussion of the historical figure of Julian, see L. Jerphagnon, Julien dit l’Apostat: Histoire naturelle d’une famille sous le bas-empire, Paris: Seuil, 1986.

101 See L. Lévy-Bruhl, Les Fonctions mentales dans les sociétés inférieures, Paris: F. Alcan, 1910. Schiller advances a similar notion in Letter 11, when he writes that ‘as long as the human merely feels, merely desires and acts upon mere desire, he or she is as yet nothing but world’ (Letter 11 §8); and in Letter 25, when he says that

as long as the human, in that first physical state, is merely a passive recipient of the world of sense, i.e., does no more than feel, he or she is still com-
pletely One with that world; and just because he or she is himself nothing but world, there exists for him or her as yet no world.

(Letter 25 §1)

Later in *Psychological Types*, Jung glosses *participation mystique* in the following terms:

This identity always derives from an analogy between the object and an unconscious content. One could also say that the identity comes about through the projection of an unconscious association by analogy with the object. An identity of this kind has a compelling character, too, because it expresses a certain quantity of libido which, like all libido operating from the unconscious, is not at the disposal of consciousness and thus exercises a compulsion on its contents.

(CW 6 §216)

102 WW, p. 254.
103 WW, pp. 231, 239.
104 Goethe, *Werke* [WA], vol. I.5, p. 213. For further discussion, see Wilkinson, ‘Schiller: Poet or Philosopher?’
105 Among the main features of ‘aesthetic discourse’ Wilkinson and Willoughby include

a tendency to exploit the sound-look of words as well as their meaning; to control the number of relevant meanings co-present in any particular occurrence of a word by other aspects of the linguistic structure; to make linguistic structures into analogues of the life of ‘felt thought’; to pursue a circular, looped movement which turns back upon itself rather than linear progress towards a fixed conclusion; to make the form as a whole a reflection of the content.

(WW, p. xcix)

Analysed – and distinguished from poetry proper and from rhetoric – by Stephenson in *Goethe's Wisdom Literature*, and in *Goethe's Conception of Knowledge and Science*, pp. 73–81.

106 In this context, Schiller refers the reader to Fichte’s *Lectures on the Vocation of the Scholar* (1794) (Letter 4 §2). Schiller is also following Herder who, in his *Letters for the Advancement of Humanity* (1793–7) (Third Collection, Letter 27), wrote that ‘humanity is the character of our species; but it is only within us as a potential, and has to be actually developed’ (J.G. Herder, *Werke*, ed. M. Bollacher et al., 10 vols, Frankfurt am Main: Deutscher Klassiker Verlag, 1985–2000, vol. 7, p. 148).

107 With reference to Schiller’s plays, the literary critic Hermann Pongs (1889–1979) argued that they are, in fact, archetypal in nature; see *Schillers Urbilder*, Stuttgart, Germany: J. Metzler, 1935.

108 In ‘On the Psychology of the Unconscious’ Jung writes that ‘the endless dilemma of culture and nature is always a question of too much or too little, never of either-or’ (CW 7 §41). Later, in ‘The Stages of Life’ (1930/1931), Jung described those two stages in terms of a shift from *Natur* to *Kultur* (CW 8 §749–§795).


111 Schiller, *Werke* [NA], vol. 26, pp. 342–3. Goethe troped his own position with respect to Kant in a similar manner when, in one of his *Maxims and Reflections*, he ‘posed the challenge’ of ‘a critique of senses’ (ed. Hecker, no. 468; *Werke* [HA], vol. 12, p. 468; tr. Stephenson, pp. 75–6).

4 Schiller and the problem of beauty


3 *Wirklichkeit der Seele* was the title of volume 4 of the *Psychologische Abhandlungen*, edited by Jung and containing papers by him and his followers (Zurich: Rascher, 1934).

4 Schiller, *Werke* [NA], vol. 27, p. 126.

5 Schiller, *Werke* [NA], vol. 27, pp. 70–1.

6 As Wilkinson and Willoughby have pointed out, Jung’s argument that Schiller’s turn to the transcendental at the end of Letter 10 is a sign of the poet taking over is not only a ‘nice irony’ but also ‘would make Lord Kames and Immanuel Kant into poets too’ (WW, p. xcviii)!.


8 Goethe, *Werke* [WA], vol. IV.18, p. 79.


10 As Wilkinson and Willoughby point out, Schiller passes over Kant’s distinction between subjective and objective Empfindung and, instead, concerns himself with the process whereby man passes from a state of non-differentiation – whether epistemological or psychological – of subject and object (what Lévy-Bruhl was to call participation mystique) to a state of intense awareness of the distinctness, yet interrelatedness, of self and world.

(WW, p. 307)

11 As Schiller acknowledges, the concept of reciprocal action is taken from the
Fundaments of the Science of Knowledge (Grundlage der gesamten Wissenschafterlehre) (1794) by Johann Gottlieb Fichte (1762–1814).


13 For further discussion, see F. Beiser, Schiller as Philosopher: A Re-Examination, Oxford: Clarendon, 2005, pp. 143–4.

14 Nearly twenty years later, in ‘The Psychology of the Child Archetype’ (1940) Jung worries again about the destructive aspect of play. According to Jung, the motif of the child emerges ‘threatened on the one hand by the negative attitude of the conscious mind and on the other by the horror vacui of the unconscious’ – for the unconscious is ‘quite ready to swallow up all its progeny, since it produces them only in play, and destruction is an inescapable part of its play’ (CW 9/i §286). Even though the context here is the negative aspect of play, the passage demonstrates how the connection between the imaginative function of the unconscious (‘fantasy’) and the notion of (aesthetic) play functions at a deep level in Jung’s thinking.

15 Alluding to Gotthold Ephraim Lessing’s Nathan the Wise (1778/1779), Schiller wrote in On the Sublime (1801) that ‘all other things must act; the human being is the being that wills’ (alle andere Dinge müssen; der Mensch ist das Wesen, welches will (Werke [NA], vol. 21, p. 38). For Jung’s definition of the will in terms of ‘the amount of psychic energy at the disposal of consciousness’, see CW 6 §844. In ‘On the Nature of the Psyche’, Jung uncharacteristically defined the psyche in terms of the will (CW 8 §380). Equally, Wilkinson and Willoughby argue that ‘[Schiller’s] third term, the aesthetic, is revealed as a matrix of psychic activity in which will and understanding are both involved, even if in as yet undifferentiated form’ (WW, p. lxxvii). For a psychological system that seeks to strengthen and develop the will, see the work of Roberto Assagioli (1888–1974), especially Psychosynthesis: A Manual of Principles and Techniques (1965), London: Thorsons, 1993, pp. 125–43 (‘Technique for the development of the will’); and The Act of Will: Self-Actualization through Psychosynthesis (1973), London: Aquarian/Thorsons, 1994, esp. pp. 35–46.


18 In ‘On Psychic Energy’ (begin c.1912, completed 1928), Jung wrote of semiotic interpretation that ‘its usefulness is undisputed in all those cases where nature is merely thwarted without any effective work resulting from it’, but that semiotic interpretation ‘becomes meaningless when it is applied exclusively and schematically – when, in short, it ignores the real nature of the symbol and debases it to a mere sign [die wirkliche Natur des Symbols verkennt und es zum bloßen Zeichen erniedrigt]’ (CW 8 §88).


20 Maxims and Reflections, ed. Hecker, no. 314; Goethe, Werke [HA], vol. 12, p. 471.
Maxims and Reflections, ed. Hecker, no. 1113; Goethe, Werke [HA], vol. 12, p. 470; Goethe’s ‘Maximen und Reflexionen’: A Selection, ed. and tr. R.H. Stephenson [Scottish Papers in Germanic Studies, 6], Glasgow: Scottish Papers in Germanic Studies, 1986, p. 82.


23 In his note to this passage in the Suhrkamp Edition, one of the editors, Thomas P. Saine, comments:

The provenance of the famous colossal head, long thought to be of Juno, is unclear; today it is in the Museo dei Termi in Rome. In the 19th century it was identified as part of a colossal statue erected by Emperor Claudius to portray his mother, Antonia Augusta. Goethe made a present of his cast to Angelica Kauffmann upon leaving Rome, but acquired another as a gift in 1823.

(GE 6, 458)

According to David Pugh,

in its fusion of mortal and immortal, the sculpture serves as a synthesis of Schiller’s two basic types of deification [in his poetry], the ascent of Hercules and the descent of Venus. In accordance with the dualism of Schiller’s thought, these can be said to represent respectively the beautiful and the sublime options, or in Christian parlance the equivalents of incarnation and resurrection.


26 See the note in Chapter 2 (p. 187, n. 79) and see also WW, p. 262. Compare with Jung’s comment in ‘Principles of Practical Psychotherapy’ (1935) that ‘the process which, at first sight, looks like an alarming regression, is rather a reculer pour mieux sauter, a gathering-together and integration of powers that will develop into a new order’ (CW 16 §19).


28 Wilkinson and Willoughby compare Schiller’s psychological notion of ‘nought’ with the Nichts of Pietism, the Todo y nada of St. John of the Cross and the ‘Nothing’ of Zen Buddhism (WW, p. 263); compare, in turn, with Jung’s own comments in ‘On the Nature of the Psyche’ (1947/1954) (CW 8 §431).

29 In their commentary, Wilkinson and Willoughby note that nought and infinity provide Schiller with
a perfect symbol for his present argument of the *coincidentia oppositorum*: they are opposite extremes; yet in the circle [. . .] which can symbolize both, extremes meet, even as in one respect the ‘emptiness’ of sheer indetermination coincides with the ‘fullness’ of aesthetic determinability.

(WW, p. 263)

For Jung, the *coincidentia oppositorum* (also known as *complexio oppositorum* or *coniunctio oppositorum*) was a symbol for the Self (see *Mysterium coniunctionis* (1955–6) [CW 14]).

30 It is untrue to say that Schiller had no concept of the unconscious. In his critique of the recently published *System of Transcendental Idealism* (1800) by Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling (1775–1854), made in his letter to Goethe of 27 March 1801, Schiller took issue with Schelling’s claim that ‘in nature one starts from the unconscious in order to raise it to consciousness, whereas, in art, one proceeds from consciousness to the unconscious’. Instead Schiller argued that ‘unconsciousness combined with reflection constitutes the poetic artist’ (*Das Bewußtlose mit dem Besonnenen vereinigt macht den poetischen Künstler aus*) (*Correspondence between Schiller and Goethe, from 1794 to 1805*, tr. L.D. Schmitz, 2 vols, London: George Bell and Sons, 1877, vol. 2, pp. 371–2) (henceforth cited as CSG with a page reference). For further discussion of the role of the unconscious on Romantic *Naturphilosophie*, see the chapter on Schelling in R.J. Richards, *The Romantic Conception of Life: Science and Philosophy in the Age of Goethe*, Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2002, pp. 114–92.

31 Later, Jung explains the affinities between Schiller’s theory and Taoism (as well as between Meister Eckhart, Kant, and the Upanishads) in terms of the collective unconscious (CW 6 §193). Wilkinson and Willoughby rightly caution, however, that before postulating a collective unconscious, or any other form of polygenesis, to explain the similarity of Schiller’s doctrines and those of the East [. . .], it would be necessary to explore all possible channels of transmission, early and late, not forgetting those *Lettres édifiantes et curieuses* (Paris, 1707–73) written by the Jesuits from their foreign missions.

(WW, p. lxxxi, fn.l)

32 Schiller, *Werke* [NA], vol. 31, p. 25 (see n. 30 above).

33 Whoever speaks in primordial images speaks with a thousand voices; he enthrals and overpowers, while at the same time he lifts the idea he is seeking to express out of the occasional and transitory into the realm of the ever-enduring. He transmutes our personal destiny into the destiny of humankind, and evokes in us all those beneficent forces that ever and anon have enabled humanity to find a refuge from every peril and to outlive the longest night.

(CW 15 §129)

As Karin Barnaby has commented, the artist in Schiller’s and Jung’s view is ‘the instrument of the unconscious’, ‘the servant of an autonomous psychic mechanism, which seeks to restore the balance between consciousness and the unconscious’, and ‘a mediator, an agent of synthesis’ (‘A Poet’s Intuition: Schiller’s Anticipation of C.G. Jung’s Psychology in “Über naive und sentimentalisiche Dichtung”’, in A. Ugrinsky (ed.), *Friedrich Schiller and the Drama of Human Existence*, New York: Greenwood, 1988, pp. 120–8 [p. 125]).
With a corroscating irony almost impossible to translate into English, the poem’s first stanza runs: ‘They sat and drank at the tea-table / And spoke much about love. / The gentleman were aesthetic [Die Herren, die waren ästhetisch], / The ladies of tender feeling’ (H. Heine, Selected Verse, tr. P. Branscombe, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1968, p. 33).

I am grateful to Roger Stephenson for clarification of this point (personal communication, November 2000).

For the use of the phrase bloß ästhetisch elsewhere, see Wilhelm von Humboldt’s letters to Schiller of 13 February 1896 and 16 July 1897 (Schiller, Werke [NA], vol. 36, p. 124; vol. 37, p. 71). See also Schiller’s annotations of Humboldt’s essay ‘Über das Studium des Alterthums, und des griechischen Insbesondere’ (1793), in Werke [NA], vol. 21, pp. 63–5 (p. 64).

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In his second Critique, Kant describes a ‘postulate of pure practical reason’ as a ‘subjective but nevertheless unconditional rational necessity’ (Preface, fn. 5, I. Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, ed. and tr. M. Gregor, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997, p. 9). Elsewhere, in his ‘Attempt to Introduce the Concept of Negative Magnitudes into Philosophy’ (Versuch den Begriff der negativen Größe in der Weltweisheit einzuführen) (1763), Kant defines ugliness as ‘negative beauty’ (I. Kant, Theoretical Philosophy, 1755–1770 [Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant, vol. 1], ed. and tr. D. Walford and R. Meerbote, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992, pp. 203–41 [p. 221]). And in his third Critique (1790), Kant discusses the relationship between ugliness and disgust at some length, writing that ‘where fine art evidences its superiority is in the beautiful descriptions it gives of things that in nature would be ugly or displeasing’, and that ‘one kind of ugliness alone is incapable of being represented conformably to nature without destroying all aesthetic delight, and consequently artistic beauty, namely, that which excites disgust’ (Kritik der Urteilskraft, §48; I. Kant, The Critique of Judgement, tr. J.C. Meredith, Oxford: Clarendon, 1952, pp. 173–4).

For further discussion of Schiller’s attempt to deduce beauty from practical reason and the ethical nature of humankind, see D. Henrich, ‘Der Begriff der Schönheit in Schillers Ästhetik’, Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung 11, 1957, 527–47 (p. 534). According to Henrich, the marginalia in Schiller’s copy of Kant’s Critique of Judgement, held in the Schiller-Nationalmuseum in Marbach, indicate Schiller’s interest in the relation between the aesthetic and the ethical.

Schiller distinguishes between beauty as an idea (one and indivisible, although never actualizable in reality) and beauty as experience (twofold, oscillating between reality and form) (Letter 16 §1). In terms of beauty as experience, Schiller indicates, but never further elaborates, a distinction between melting beauty (which has a relaxing effect) and energizing beauty (which has a tensing effect) (Letter 16 §2); compare with ‘On Grace and Dignity’, where he distinguished between ‘enlivening’ (belebende) and ‘calming grace’ (beruhigende Grazie).
(Werke [NA], vol. 20, p. 305). In Letters 18 to 27 of the Aesthetic Letters, Schiller examines the effects of melting beauty; but he never carried out his promised examination of energizing beauty (Letter 16 §5; cf. WW, p. 256).

48 Schiller, Werke [NA], vol. 20, p. 90.
49 See WW, p. 298.
50 See WW, p. lix.
51 ‘My Belief’ (Mein Glaube); Schiller, Werke, [NA], vol. 1, p. 296.
52 Schiller, Werke [NA], vol. 20, p. 91.
55 As Jung wrote in The Relations between the Ego and the Unconscious (1928), ‘the real is what works’ (Wirklich aber ist, was wirkt) (CW 7 §353) (cf. CW 5 §344; CW 8 §742).
56 WW, p. 328.
57 As Schiller suggested in his letter to Körner of 3 February 1794, the Aesthetic Letters are an expansion on ideas found in Der Künstler (Werke [NA], vol. 26, p. 342).
59 Wilkinson and Willoughby have compared Schiller’s notion in Letter 9 §1 of ‘opening up living springs’ to the satori (‘opening’, ‘realization’) of Zen Buddhism and to ‘the assumption, tacit or expressed, underlying such psychoanalytical procedures as Jung’s’ (WW, p. 238).
66 Schiller, Werke [NA], vol. 20, pp. 432 and 436; NSL, pp. 35 and 38.

68 Schiller, Werke [NA], vol. 20, p. 341; NSL, p. 34.


70 Schiller, Werke [NA], vol. 20, p. 437, fn.; NSL, p. 97, n. 17.

71 Schiller, Werke [NA], vol. 20, pp. 440–1, 475, 476–7, 481–2; NSL, pp. 42, 67, 68–9, 72.

72 Schiller, Werke [NA], vol. 20, pp. 481–2; NSL, p. 72.

73 Schiller, Werke [NA], vol. 20, p. 478, fn.; NSL, p. 105, n. 65.

74 Schiller, Werke [NA], vol. 20, pp. 441, 475–6, 481–2; NSL, pp. 42, 67, 72.

75 Schiller, Werke [NA], vol. 20, p. 482; NSL, p. 72.

76 Schiller, Werke [NA], vol. 20, p. 491; NSL, p. 81.

77 Schiller, Werke [NA], vol. 20, p. 492; NSL, p. 81.

78 Schiller, Werke [NA], vol. 20, p. 492; NSL, pp. 81–2.

79 Schiller, Werke [NA], vol. 20, p. 492; NSL, p. 81.

80 Schiller, Werke [NA], vol. 20, p. 481; NSL, p. 72; and Werke [NA], vol. 20, p. 503; NSL, p. 90. For further discussion of the problem of enthusiasm in the eighteenth century, see P. Bishop, Synchronicity and Intellectual Intuition: Kant, Swedenborg, and Jung, Lewiston, NY: Edwin Mellen, 2000, pp. 200–14.

81 Schiller, Werke [NA], vol. 20, p. 487; NSL, p. 77.

82 Schiller, Werke [NA], vol. 20, p. 439; NSL, p. 41.

83 Schiller, Werke [NA], vol. 20, p. 492; NSL, p. 81.

84 Schiller, Werke [NA], vol. 20, p. 491; NSL, p. 80.


86 Schiller, Werke [NA], vol. 20, p. 491; NSL, p. 80.

87 Schiller, Werke [NA], vol. 20, p. 473, fn.; NSL, p. 104.

88 Schiller, Werke [NA], vol. 20, p. 438; NSL, p. 40.

89 Werke [HA], vol. 12, p. 467; Maxims and Reflections, ed. Hecker, no. 1105; tr. Stephenson, p. 72.

90 Schiller, Werke [NA], vol. 20, p. 414; NSL, p. 22.

91 Schiller, Werke [NA], vol. 20, p. 472; NSL, p. 66.


94 See Jung’s comment in his paper ‘Psychological Types’ (1923) that ‘the unconscious is the residue of unconquered nature in us, just as it is also the matrix of our unborn future’ (das Unbewußte ist der Rest unbezwungener Urnatur in uns, so wie es auch der Mutterboden ungeschaffener Zukunft in uns ist) (CW 6 §907).
5 Conclusion: the development of the personality


2 ‘The word persona is really a very appropriate expression for it, since it originally meant the mask worn by an actor, signifying the role he played’ (CW 7 §245).


11 For a popular account of Jung that sees the confrontation (= Auseinandersetzung) with the Other of the unconscious as central to his thought, see A. Agnel, Jung: La Passion de l’Autre, Toulouse: Editions Milan, 2004.


13 Werke [HA], vol. 14, p. 172. Goethe caustically remarks that ‘every single thing has character’ – even down to ‘the worm that curls up when it is stepped upon’:

   In this sense we may ascribe character to the weak person, even to the coward: for he surrenders what other people prize above all, but which does not belong to his nature – honour, fame – in order merely to preserve his personality.

14 Werke [HA], vol. 14, p. 172: wenn nämlich eine Persönlichkeit von bedeutenden Eigenschaften auf ihrer Weise verharret und sich durch nichts davon abwendig machen läßt.

15 Schiller, Werke [NA], vol. 22, p. 245.


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